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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the origins of the Chinese Communist Party, making full use of 
primary materials, especially newly published Comintern documents and British archives. 
In making a comprehensive survey of the international background of the foundation of 
the CCP, the author proposes that the establishment of the CCP was a part of the Bolsheviks' 
global strategy of world revolution, of the Comintern's efforts to expand Communist forces into 
the East; it also served Soviet Russia's interests in the Far East. 
The study reveals the important role that Soviet Russia and the Comintern played in the 
establishment of the CCP. During the period 1918-1921, Soviet Russia and the Comintern 
dispatched numerous emissaries to China and recruited many agents there. These people made 
wide-ranging contacts with Chinese in different organisations and factions regardless of their 
political beliefs, party affiliation or social strata. They conducted intensive agitation and 
propaganda by various media and means, including supplying news and publicity to the press 
free of charge and publishing Communist booklets and journals in Chinese. They had a hand in 
directing important student and worker organisations which emerged during the May Fourth 
Movement, and later urged people who had a little knowledge of Marxism and who belonged to 
anarchist organisations and the Guomindang to organise socialist and communist organisations 
and parties. The CCP's important founders, Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu's conversion to 
Bolshevism and their creation of the CCP only happened after the Bolshevik agents' persuasion 
and instruction. 
Therefore, the thesis concludes that the establishment of the CCP was not, as official 
ideologists claim, the outcome of the combination of the dissemination of Marxism-Leninism 
and the labour movement in China, but actually the result of political direction and financial 
support by the Bolsheviks. In consequence, the CCP was built along Leninist lines from the 
very beginning. This research further analyses the internal causes allowing Bolshevism to be 
transplanted into China and points out that the ideology which the CCP embraced during its 
founding period still has far-reaching influence upon politics in China today. 
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THE ORIGINS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND 
THE ROLE PLAYED BY SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE 
COMINTERN 
INTRODUCTION 
The foundation of the Chinese Communist Party (henceforth abbreviated as 
the CCP) is a significant event in Chinese history. It has had a vital and profound 
influence on the development and vicissitudes of modem Chinese society. 
Therefore, it is important to explain why and how the Chinese Communist Party 
emerged in the early twenties of the 20th century. 
For a long time there has been considerable interest in this subject, and some of 
the relevant monographs have been notable scholarly achievements. Zhang Jingru's 
Zhongguo Gongchandang de chengli (The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party) 
(Shijiazhuang: Hebei People's Press, 1981), A. Dirlik's The Origins of Chinese 
Communism (Oxford, 1989), K. V. Shevelyov's "On the History of the Foundation of 
the Communist Party of China", Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow, 1981, No. 1), Li Xin 
and Chen Tiejian's Weida de kaiduan (The Great Beginning) (Beijing, 1983), Sima 
Lu's Zhongizong de chengli yg chugi huodon (The Founding and Initial Activities of 
the Communist Party of China) (Hong Kong, 1974), Shen Yunlong's Zhongguo 
. gongchandang zhi 
laivuan (The Origins of the Chinese Communist Party) (Taibei, 
1959), M. Luk's The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism (Oxford and Hong Kong, 1990) 
and H. Van de Ven's From Friend to Comrade (Berkeley, 1991) are all worth 
mentioning in this respect. The issue has also been treated in works on the history of 
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the CCP, on Sino-Russian relations, and on relations between the Chinese 
revolutionary movement and the Comintern. 
In tracing the origins of the CCP, many historians both in China and abroad have 
noticed the impact of the October Revolution and the role of the Comintern. But they 
hold different views on the levels of the significance of these influences, which may be 
roughly classified into the following categories: 
1. Official books on the history of the CCP published in the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) assert that the CCP came into being as an outcome of the combination of 
the Chinese labour movement with the spread of the science of Marxism-Leninism 
after the October Revolution! Though the authors of these books admit that the aid 
given by Soviet Russia and the Comintern promoted the foundation of the CCP, they 
regard it as a merely contributory factor. They resolutely deny that the creation of the 
CCP was the result of transplanting Communism from abroad. Recently a Western 
scholar, Hans ven de Van, went even further to suggest that without the efforts of the 
Comintern a unified Communist party would have later emerged autonomously in 
China. 
2. The prevailing view among students in Western countries, Taiwan and Hong 
Kong is that the Russian Bolsheviks initiated the CCP's organisation. and nurtured the 
Chinese Communist movement; therefore the CCP was a product of direct Comintern 
intervention. 3 It is interesting to note that many historians of the ex-Soviet Union held 
' Zhonggong zhongyang wenjianxuanbian (Sellected documents of the Central 
Committee of the CCP), Beijing: the CCP's Central Academy Press, 1992, p 145. 
Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi, Zhongguo Gongchandang lishi (The History 
of the Chinese Commununist Party), Beijing: People's Press, 1991, p 47. 
2 Hans van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade: The Foundinq of the Chinese Communist 
Party. 1920-1927, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, p 55. 
3 Chen Yongfa, Zhon-qcluo cionqchan -qeminq gishinian 
(70 Years of the Chinese 
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similar views in spite of their different political standpoint; they declared that the 
Chinese Communist movement emanated from Moscow and that Soviet Russia and 
the Comintern played a crucial role in forming the CCp. 4 Nowadays this interpretation 
has come to be shared by several Chinese scholars in PRC. 5 
3. Some researchers accept the fact of involvement of Soviet Russia and the 
Comintern, but take internal and historical factors into greater consideration. They 
stress the indigenous roots of the Chinese Communist movement, pointing to China's 
need for social revolution, the influences of China! s traditional political thought and 
culture, the radical historical experiences, the contemporary nationalist sentiments and 
the CCP founders' preoccupations and personal strains. These factors, they consider, 
with some ideas, such as populism, cosmopolitanism, inclined radical Chinese to 
believe in communism. 6 
4. Another line of thinking asserts that the October Revolution did not bring 
about the swift or wide dissemination of Marxism-Leninism. According to this 
interpretation, it was other varieties of non-Marxist socialism, and especially 
anarchism, which had a considerable influence on Chinese radical thinking during the 
May 4th period. It follows that not only did anarchism have a pervasive influence on 
radical circles at the time when Marxism-Leninism was introduced into China, but also 
Communist Revolution), Part 1, Taibei: Lianjing Publishing Company, 1998; Sima Lu's 
Zhonqqonq de chengli yu chuqi huodong (The Founding and Initial Activities of the 
Communist Party of China) (Hong Kong, 1974). 
4 K. V. Shevelyov's "On the History of the Foundation of the Communist Party of China", 
Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow, 1981, ). No. 1. 
5 Gonqchanquoii ýu Zhonqquo geming quanxi lunwenii (Essays on the Relations 
between the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution), Shanghai: People's Press, 1985. 
6 M. Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Ori-qins of Chinese Marxism, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1967; B. 1. Schwarts, Chinese Communism and the Rise of 
Mao, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961. 
3 
that anarchists played an important part in the early organisational activities which 
culminated in the founding of the CCP. This point of view is mainly held by Arif 
Dirlik. 
It is not easy to reach a firm conclusion as to which of these interpretations is the 
most accurate for a number of reasons. Different research angles and methods are 
important factors that need to be taken into account. Some studies failed to relate the 
Bolsheviks' global strategy and the broad scope of their Far Eastern policies to their 
policies toward China; some scholars did not pay enough attention to the application of 
Lenin's theory on the East to the Bolsheviks' practice in China at the early period; in 
some works, the activities of Soviet Russia! s diplomats and the Comintern's agents in 
China were dealt with separately and their co-operation was ignored; moreover, there 
is a paucity of studies comparing the origins of the CCP with the origins of Communist 
Parties in countries other than Russia. In short, there have been scant researches 
soundly and dialectically to expound the relations between internal causes and external 
influences, general strategy and specific policies, theoretical principles and concrete 
practices, diplomatic and revolutionary activities. 
Another reason for the deficiencies in the studies conducted was the shortage of 
original historical materials. 
It is beyond doubt that the major relevant records are kept in Russia. In the past, 
although certain scholars of the ex-Soviet Union were given access to the Comintern 
archives and were permitted to quote from the sources in these files, what they 
revealed was far from satisfactory. This situation did not change until 1993 when a 
7 A. Dirlik,. The Origins of Chinese Communism, New York & 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
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great quantity of relevant archives kept in the Russian Modem Historical Documents 
Storage and Research Centre was first opened to the public. Using the archives 
relating to the Chinese revolutionary movement, the Institute of the Far East Studies of 
the Russian Sciences Academy and the Society of the East Asian Studies of the Free 
University of Berlin have been compiling a series of monumental books VKP(b), 
Komintem i Kitaya, Dokuments, 1920-1949 (The All Union Communist Party (B) , 
the Comintem and China, Documents, 1920-1949) and published its first volume 
(1920-1925) in Moscow and Berlin in 1994. This volume's several documents relate 
to the founding of the CCP. In the introduction, the compilers express their belief that 
some confidential documents were transferred to other archive systems or intentionally 
destroyed; while some important archives, such as those of the Commissariats of 
Foreign Affairs, and of National Defence and the Committee of State Security, have 
not so far been opened. Despite this incompleteness, this newly published book still 
provides valuable and reliable first-hand infori-nation for research purposes. 
In China some collections of reference materials on the founding of the CCP 
have been published, such as GonRchanzhuyi xiaozu (The Communist Groups), Yida 
gianhou (The Period of the First Congress of the CCP) and Zhonjzguo Gongghandang 
diyici daibiao dahui dangan ziliao (Archival Sources for the First Congress of the 
CCP). But these mainly consist of some early documents of the CCP, articles by the 
founders of the CCP and memoirs of persons who participated in its establishment. 
Since the early documents and publications rarely recorded the events surrounding the 
formation of the CCP in detail, many historical descriptions of the process by which it 
emerged are based primarily on memoirs written in the 1950s and 1980s. However, 
important founders of the CCP, such as Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Li Hanjun and Zhang 
Tailei, died early without leaving memoirs relevant to the period of the CCP's 
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formation. In view of this, it is necessary to seek out and unearth other reliable 
historical sources. In recent years, part of the archives of the former Chinese central 
and local governments have been sorted out and published. Among these sources, 
there are the publications of the Beijing, Nanjing and Shanghai Archives, and also 
Zhong-E gganxi shiliao (Archival Materials on Sino-Russian Relations), which were 
compiled by the Institute of Modem History of the Central Academy of Sciences in 
Taiwan from the archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Beijing Government (1910s- 
1920s). While useful, these materials contain only fragmentary records of the 
Bolsheviks' activities and the Chinese Communist movement. Under these 
circumstances, it is necessary to make use of other countries' archives. 
From about 1840 to 1949, China had close relations with the major foreign 
powers, and there are therefore plenty of archives which record the events of 1918- 
1922 in China kept in these countries. The diplomatic and intelligence bodies of 
several major powers, together with the authorities of foreign settlements in China, 
paid considerable attention to Chinaýs internal affairs as well as to its external affairs. 
After the October Revolution they attached importance to collecting information on 
the dissemination of Bolshevism, on the activities of Russian Bolsheviks in China, and 
on Chinese revolutionary movements. For instance, the Records of the US 
Department of State relating to Chinaýs internal affairs include special files on 
Bolshevik Activities in China and Socialism in China. The Archives of the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Japanese Army and Navy also contain relevant 
files, such as Materials relatina to the Recent Communist Movement in China and 
Manchuria, Report on Sino-Russian Joint Propaganda Activities and some reports on 
the Chinese's relations with the Korean Communists. The archives of the foreign 
concessions in China, such as Shanghai International Settlement Municipal Council 
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Minute Book, ShanjZhai International Settlement Municipal Council Police 
Intelligence Summa[y, and Shanghai French Concession Administration Police 
Report, have many records on the activities of the Bolshevik agents and Chinese 
Communists in Shanghai. The Sneevliet Archive in Holland has a sizeable section 
covering the first official Conýiintem plenipotentiary to China, Sneevliet's activities in 
China. Britain was a dominant imperialist power in China and was also the leading 
country in the world engaged in combating Bolshevism during the period in question. 
So the British archives have many documents which are important for this research, 
such as Memorandum respecting Bolshevism in the Far East, Report respectin 
Bolshevism and Chinese Communism and Anarchism and Report on the Activities 
and Tracks of the Comintern's Representatives in China. Moreover, the Secret 
Abstracts from the China Command's Intelligence Diaries, the Secret Intelligence 
Reports on the Asian Colonies by the Indian Bureau of Information, and the political 
and intelligence reports from Shanghai, Tianjin, Harbin, Zhangzhou, Xiaman, Nanjing 
and elsewhere record many details of the activities of Chinese Communists and 
Russian Bolsheviks in China. Most of these British records can be seen in the files of 
the Foreign Office (abbreviated to FO). These documents have rarely been utilised by 
students of the history of the CCP, hence many important materials have been 
overlooked. 
In addition to consulting the relevant publications, especially the Chinese 
translation of VKP(b), Komintern i KitUa, Dokuments, 1920-1949's first volume 
Liangong(bu) Gongchanzuoij y2 Zhongguo g2omin gerning--yundong (the All-Union 
Communist Party (B), the Comintern and the Chinese National Revolutionary 
Movement, 1920-1925), which was published in Beijing in 1997 as the first volume of 
Gongchanguoii Liangongbu y2 Zhongguo geming dang'an ziliao congshu (A Series of 
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Archival Material on the Comintern, the All-Union CP(B) and the Chinese 
Revolution), I have made a particular endeavour to use original sources which have 
not been published so far, especially the British archives kept in the Public Record 
Office in London. By careful examination and textual research, many rarely known 
historical facts can be sifted out and verified. I found that the relevant British 
documents and the newly published Russian documents can complement and 
corroborate each other. Moreover, my thesis adopted valuable recollections made by 
some participants in the May 4th Movement and the founding of the CCP, which I 
obtained through interviews and correspondence in the early1980s. 
This study attempts to make a comprehensive survey of the origins of the 
Chinese Communist movement, to explore its international background and 
ideological roots. The intention is to observe from a broad perspective and study the 
various incidents as an organic whole in order to find out their connections with one 
another; and to penetrate the superficial appearance of things to reveal their underlying 
reality. Since a number of works have already given a detailed account of the 
formation of the CCP. I therefore have no intention of retracing a story whose facts 
are already well-known. However, this monograph, based on copious primary source 
material, will bring to light a number of historical aspects of this event that have 
hitherto been ignored or skated over, and will also contain many findings which have 
seldom or never been revealed. In addition, it provides some interpretations of a 
number of phenomena that have been misread by certain historians and differ from 
those have been widely maintained. In this way, new light may be shed on some of 
the following issues: 
1. Shortly after the October Revolution, the Bolshevik leaders began to pay 
attention to China and proposed their policy towards China. As early as 1918, they 
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started sending emissaries to China and also recruiting agents among Russians which 
had already been in China. These agents were numerous and well-organised. 
Bolshevik centres were set up in several cities in China. The agents dispatched or 
recruited by Soviet Russia and the Comintern made wide-ranging contacts with 
Chinese in various organisations and factions. It is by no means the case, as some 
historians have asserted, that the Bolsheviks had no time to attend to affairs in China 
and they did not establish relations with Chinese revolutionaries until the reopening of 
8 the Sino-Russian border in the spring of 1920. 
2. The intensity of Soviet propaganda in China between 1919 and 1921 has been 
underestimated. During this period special propaganda units were set up in Russia and 
China to conduct agitation and propaganda directing at Chinese people. Many 
propagandists were sent to China to incite the Chinese to revolt, and large quantities of 
booklets and leaflets were printed and distributed. The Bolsheviks did not only have 
their own organs but also established news agencies in China to supply news and 
publicity to the press free of charge. In order to extend their influence and to conceal 
the source of such propaganda, the Comintem agentý subsidised and created some 
radical Chinese journals and enlisted the help of various Chinese to engage in 
propaganda work. Soviet propaganda was perhaps an important factor in making 
Soviet Russia win favour with the Chinese public opinion and in making some radical 
intellectuals incline towards Bolshevik theory and practice around 1920-21. 
3. The May 4th Movement is generally regarded as a spontaneous patriotic 
movement. It has hardly been noticed that, behind the scenes, Bolshevik agents played 
8 Xiang Oing, Gonachancjuowi vu Zhoncicluoqeminq Guanxi Lunwenoi (Essays on the 
Relations between the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution), (Shanghai: People's 
Press, 1985), p 81. 
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a part in stimulating the anti-Japanese and anti-Beijing Government campaigns and 
had a hand in directing some important students' and workers' organisations which 
emerged in the Movement. As a result, this Movement brought about the preliminary 
integration of intellectuals and labourers, and fostered a batch of radicals who later 
became the key members of the Chinese Communist party. 
4. To ally with national bourgeois revolutionaries in colonial countries and to 
support their national liberation movement was one of Lenin's major strategies in the 
East. From a very early stage, the Bolsheviks tried to draw the Chinese nationalists, 
led by Sun Yat-sen, into the common anti-imperialist struggle and to win them over to 
Soviet Russia! s side. Contrary to the traditional view, the United Front policy was 
applied to China even before its formal adoption at the 2nd Comintern Congress and 
prior to the foundation of the CCP. Moreover, the Bolshevik agents persuaded several 
Guomindang (GMD) leaders who believed in socialism to take the lead in forming a 
socialist or Communist party subordinated to the Comintern. 
5. In order to promote the world revolution and to fight against the opportunist 
leaders of the 2nd International, the Bolsheviks for a time co-operated with anarchists 
in countries other than Russia. In China, since numerous radical youth believed in 
anarchism then, the Chinese anarchists became the main target that the Comintern 
agents tried to make contact with. As a result of the efforts of the Bolsheviks, certain 
anarchists were persuaded to undertake the revolutionary propaganda work which 
benefited the interests of Soviet Russia and their organisational. links were exploited to 
carry out organisational activities which related to the formation of the CCP. 
Furthermore, some anarchists were spurred on to the conversion to Bolshevism and to 
participate in a Communist party. That was why the Chinese anarchists were seen as 
having served as midwives for the birth of the CCP. 
10 
6. Voitinsky was not the first and only Bolshevik emissary who attempted to 
establish Communist organisations in China. Before his arrival, several other Soviet 
and Comintern agents had already engaged in organising actions in China. Around the 
CCP's formation, they sponsored, organised and supported a number of revolutionary 
organisations, such as the Truth Society, the Socialist League, the Datong Party (later 
evolved into Oriental Communist Party), the Zhina Communist Party and the Social 
Communist Party. Some of these organisations were just built for making a show of 
strength, or for serving as a stopgap, and some helped to lay the foundation for the 
establishment of the CCP. 
7. Why and how Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu were suddenly converted to 
Bolshevism and undertook to found the CCP have been contentious issues. This 
research will show that Li Dazhao had been approached by Soviet agents before the 
autumn of 1918 when he and. Chen started the first society for the study of Marxism, 
despite the confused state of their thinking at that time; that Li Dazhao and Chen 
Duxiu did not start their activities to establish the CCP until Bolshevik emissaries 
urged them to do so; and that they organised the Communist groups totally under the 
Comintern's leadership. It confirms that the CCP was by no means voluntarily 
initiated by the Chinese. 
8. Besides the Russian Bolsheviks, some internationally inclined activists 
belonging to the Communist parties, socialist parties and revolutionary organisations 
of some other countries (including Britain, America, France, Korea, Japan, Turkey, 
India and Indonesia) also had close relations with Chinese radicals during the period 
while the CCP was taking shape. Some of them even joined some revolutionary 
organisations set up in China and were involved in the process of founding the CCP 
and the CSY (the Chinese Socialist Youth League). The establishment of the Chinese 
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Communist Party was closely related to similar efforts being made in other Asian 
countries, Korea and Japan in particular. This indicates that there were co-ordinated 
operations in the Far East under the unified leadership of the Comintern. 
The above may add something new to our knowledge of the origins of the CCP 
and fill various gaps in this research field. 
On the basis of the evidence presented, the conclusions can be drawn as follows: 
The establishment of the CCP was not the outcome of the combination of the broad 
spread of Marxism-Leninism in China and the Chinese labour movement. From 
intemational perspective, this was one fruit of the efforts made by the Bolsheviks after 
the October Revolution to expand Bolshevik revolution throughout the world and was 
actually an integral part of the actions of the Comintem to found Communist parties in 
many other countries. In China in particular, the founding of the CCP was, to a large 
extent, the result of instigation and instruction by Bolshevik agents in China under the 
guidance of Lenin's theory and strategy. If Soviet Russia and the Comintern had not 
provided the initial dynamic for the rise of the Communist movement in China, it 
would have been impossible to form a Communist Party in China in the early 1920s, at 
a time when modem industry and a class-conscious proletariat were lacking, and when 
there was no adequate ideological basis for such a movement, since few Chinese 
intellectuals understood Marxism. 
Besides researching into the origins of the CCP's establishment, this study will 
also analyse internal causes why Bolshevism could be transplanted into China, and 
why the CCP could be successfully founded, pointing out that many conditions in 
China were the same as, or similar to, those found in Tsarist Russia. For example, the 
economic backwardness, agricultural population constituted the majority, as well as 
the existence of a long-standing tyrannical autocracy were comparable. Seeing that 
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social revolution had been successful in Russia, many Chinese radicals, eager to 
change decadent Chinese society and to throw off the yoke of imperialist rule, were 
inclined to look up to Bolshevism and a Party of Bolshevik-type as a remedy for 
Chinaýs desperate condition. With some other internal reasons, the influence of some 
traditions in Chinese political thinking, such as "Datong" (universal harmony) and 
"Junping" (egalitarianism) and the Chinese historical tradition of violent peasants 
rebellions made China a fertile soil for radical revolution. Given these circumstances, 
we can understand the reason why "following the path of the Russians" became a 
conclusion of some Chinese progressives, as Mao Zedong remarked. 9 It is no 
exaggeration to say that it was these moves which decided the future direction and 
destiny of modem China. 
There is no doubt that in the 20th century no other state had greater influence on 
China than Soviet Russia (the Soviet Union after 1922). Under the guidance of 
Lenin's theory, the CCP, as a highly centralised and disciplined organisation, led the 
Chinese people and in particular the peasants to seize state power through violent class 
struggle and armed revolution. They established a regime which they called "the 
people's democratic dictatorship. " But it was actually controlled by the CCP, which 
retained power by the control of people's thinking and by the use of force and terror. 
China thus turned into a Russian-style "Socialist country, "' politically totalitarian, 
economically centralised and culturally monopolistic for quite some time after 1949. 
Nowadays, Bolshevism (Leninism) has been cast away by most people in the 
country of its birth and other former Communist countries, but the CCP has still 
refused to abandon its political doctrinal heritage and insists on its basic tenets. 
9 Mao Zedong Xuanii (Selected Works of Mao Zedong), Beijing: People's Press, 1965, 
Vol. 3, p 374. 
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While conducting vast economic reforms, the hierarchy of the CCP now in power is 
reluctant to carry out thorough political reform, and still uses Lenin's principles to 
justify its one-party rule. This clearly demonstrates that up to now, some Bolshevik 
concepts on politics are still believed by the CCP leaders as ideological orthodoxy. 
This ossified way of thinking has become a serious hindrance to China! s further 
progress. Hence, this study, in addition to clarifying the CCP's organisational 
origins, may also help to find out the CCP's ideological roots from the time of its 
birth, an ideology that has had far-reaching and significant influence on the China of 
today. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE BOLSHEVIKS AND THE WORLD REVOLUTION AFTER THE 
OCTOBER REVOLUTION 
Section 1. Global Strategy 
In March 1917, the Russian people, who had suffered long from the rule of Tsarist 
autocracy and the disaster of World War I, rose in a mass uprising. The Romanov Dynasty 
collapsed overnight. On the basis of an agreement between the Temporary Committee of 
the State Duma and the Petrograd Soviet, a Russian Provisional Government was formed 
and would rule pending the election of a constituent assembly. 
The February Revolution bore the character of a spontaneous people's uprising. The 
principal Bolshevik leaders were far from the revolutionary centre - Petrograd. Convinced 
that the World War had severely crippled the capitalist system, they had summoned the 
world proletariat to end the imperialist war by turning it into a civil war; nevertheless the 
outbreak of the revolution in their fatherland still caught them by surprise. V. I. Lenin even 
said in a lecture which he gave in Zurich at the beginning of 1917 that a Russian revolution, 
once it happened, would be "the prologue to the coming European revolution", which could 
only be "a proletarian, socialist revolution. " However, he ended his speech gloomily: "We 
of the old generation may not live to see the decisive battles of this coming revolution. "10 
These words clearly implied that, in Lenin's opinion, socialist revolution, both in Russia 
and in Europe, would not come soon. When Lenin heard the news of the February 
'0 V. 1. Lenin, Collected Works, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1960-70), Vol 23, p 
253. 
15 
Revolution, he exclaimed: "It is so incredibly unexpected! "" According to L. Trotsky's 
memoirs, before the February Revolution most socialists held the view that "the productive 
forces of Russia were not sufficient for the conquest of power by the working class. " K. 
Radek did not even concede the possibility of a proletarian revolution in the advanced 
capitalist countries in the near future, given that "the productive forces of mankind, taken as 
a whole, are not sufficiently developed. " 12 
The majority of the Bolshevik leaders gave their tentative support for the Provisional 
Government. L. B. Kamenev and J. V. Stalin, who had returned from Siberian exile, 
assumed in the Party's organ, Pravda, that the bourgeois stage of the revolution still had a 
long way to run and that the immediate tasks of the Bolsheviks lay in constructive work 
within the social democratic movement. Nevertheless, no sooner had Lenin returned to 
Russia than he advanced the famous "April Theses", which called for a new revolution to 
transfer power to 'the proletariat and the poorest peasants' and to start immediate transition 
to the stage of a proletarian socialist revolution. In these theses, he put forward a 
programme which called for the establishment of a republic of soviets, soviet control over 
all social production and distribution, the changing of the party's name to "Communist", 
and the rebuilding of the International. 13 Lenin gradually won over the majority of the 
Bolshevik Party's centre, but accepted that a lengthy period of agitation would be needed 
before the masses would be ready to follow the Bolsheviks to the next stage of the 
revolution. Along with promises to give "bread to the workers, land to the peasants and 
" 0. Figes, A People's Tragedy, The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924, (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1996), p 385. 
12 L. Trotsky, Mv Life, An Attempt at an Autobiography, (Gloucester, Mass., 1970), p 
239. 
13 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 24, pp 55-88. 
16 
peace to all", Lenin raised the slogan "All power to the Soviets", aimed at the conquest of 
state power through the Soviets. 
At first most Soviets were dominated by the Mensheviks and Socialist 
Revolutionaries. After the failure of the Komilov coup the Bolsheviks gradually won 
control of some principal urban and military soviets. The situation was, again, to the 
Bolsheviks' advantage after their abortive coup de force in July. From September Lenin, 
from his hiding place in Finland, wrote several letters to spur the Bolshevik Central 
Committee to organise an insurrection. He argued, the Bolsheviks "can and must take state 
power into their own hands. " There were "indisputable symptoms ... that we are on the 
eve of a world wide revolution". To "miss such a moment and wait for the Congress of 
Soviets would be utter idiocy, or sheer treachery. " 14 But other Bolshevik leaders were less 
willing to support Lenin's proposals. For example, Kamenev suggested that a 
democratic government be formed together with other socialist parties. The Central 
Committee even wanted to destroy those letters by Lenin. It was not till 23 October when 
Lenin secretly returned to Petrograd and attended a session of the Central Committee that 
the Bolshevik leadership finally yielded to Lenin's instructions and voted overwhelmingly 
for an insurrection. In order to justify their proposed armed uprising, the Bolshevik Party 
CC's resolution referred to "the international situation", and identified an incipient navel 
mutiny in Germany as "the extreme manifestation of the growth of the world-wide socialist 
revolution all over Europe. "15 According to Lenin's theory, the triumph of the Russian 
Revolution would be a break in the weakest link of the capitalist system or, to switch 
14 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 26, p 67,74,82. 
15 J. Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918: Documents and 
Materials, (California: Stanford University Press, 1934), p 58. 
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metaphors, would be a "spark" which would cause a series of revolutions throughout the 
world. 
The Bolsheviks set up the Military Revolutionary Centre, but most military 
preparations were mainly done by the Petrograd Soviet's Military Revolutionary 
Committee, which was in fact led by Trotsky, who had joined the Bolsheviks in August 
and was the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. He advocated organising an insurrection 
through the Petrograd Soviet coinciding with the Soviet Congress. Yet Lenin intended 
to launch an insurrection before the 2 nd Congress of Soviet in order to present it with a 
fait accompli. 16 He eagerly urged an early uprising by arguing: 
It would be a disaster, or a sheer formality, to wait for the uncertain voting of 
October 25th [November 7 th] . The people have the right and are in duty bound 
to decide such questions not by vote, but by force. 17 
On 6 November 1917, soon after Kerensky took measures to check the proposed 
Bolshevik insurrection, the Petrograd Soviet's Military Revolutionary Committee 
initiated counteracting measures. At Lenin's insistence after he arrived Smolny Palace 
about the midnight, the Bolshevik CC decided to give the order for an offensive operation. 
The military coup took place on 7 November, on the same day of the opening of the 
Second All-Russian Congress of the Soviets. After the assault on the Winter Palace, the 
Russian Provisional Government was overthrown. 
The Bolsheviks seized state power and a purely Bolshevik government, the Council 
of People's Commissars, was formed afterwards. 18 In the name of the dictatorship of 
16 According to Orlando Figes' analysis, if the transfer of power to the Soviet took 
place by a vote of the Soviet Congress, the result would certainly be a coalition 
government made up of all the Soviet parties, whereas Lenin was unwilling to share 
power with them. See A People's Traged , pp 471-2. 17 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 26, p 235. 
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proletariat, the Bolsheviks closed down hostile newspapers, created the Cheka and set up 
revolutionary tribunals. Furthermore, they dissolved the Constituent Assembly, which was 
the product of a free election, 19 and outlawed their opponents. In March 1918, the 
Bolsheviks changed their party's name to the Communist Party [henceforth RCP(B)] and 
declared their goal to be the creation of a Communist society. It was in such circumstances 
and by such methods that the first state to proclaim itself socialist and to be ruled by a 
Communist Party appeared upon the world stage. 
Recovering from their shock over the Bolsheviks' seizure of power, various anti- 
Bolshevik forces and dissident elements began to challenge the new regime. Following the 
Don Cossacks' revolt in December 1917, the Civil War broke out. The German Army, 
after a temporary armistice, launched an offensive on the Russian front. The Soviet State 
was also menaced by armed intervention by the Allies. British troops, followed by French 
and American marines, occupied Murmansk in March 1918. The tense situation was 
aggravated by the clash between the Czechoslovak Corps and Soviet forces. By the 
summer of 1918, three-quarters of the territory of the country was in the hands of foreign 
forces and the White Guards. The Soviet State was surrounded by battle fronts on all sides. 
"World revolution" hence ceased to be a mere prophecy and became an urgent need 
for the Soviet Regime's survival. First of all, they counted on a European revolution. 
Lenin, in his report to the Party Congress in March 1918, pointed out: 
There would doubtless be no hope for the ultimate victory of our revolution if it 
were to remain alone, if there were no revolutionary movements in other 
"3 There was, however, a coalition government which included the Left Socialist 
Revolutionaries for a short period from the end of 1917 to the spring of 1918. 
'9 In this election, the Socialist Revolutionary Party won 370 seats, while the Bolshevik 
Party had only 175 seats and their Left SR allies a further 40 seats, being in the 
minority. 
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countries. ... Our salvation from all these 
difficulties is an all-European 
revolution. 20 
Trotsky also pinned all hope on a European revolution, saying: 
There are only two alternatives: either the Russian revolution will create a 
revolutionary movement in Europe, or the European powers will destroy the 
Russian Revolution ! 21 
However, the desired "world revolution" did not happen of its own accord. It was 
therefore only natural that, in order to extricate themselves from their predicament, the 
Bolshevik leaders should have resolved to create a "world revolution". They endeavoured 
to outline a global strategy in the drive for world revolution - initially a European 
revolution - and this became a state policy. 
The first instrument for carrying out world revolution was the People's Commissariat 
of Foreign Affairs (henceforth Narkomindel), which was intended to be little more than a 
disseminator of the world revolution. Trotsky, the People's Commissar of Narkomindel, 
declared: "I will issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the peoples of the world and 
,, 22 then shut up shop. An appeal from Narkomindel on 19 December 1917 summoned "the 
toiling, oppressed, 'and exhausted peoples of Europe" to join "the victorious struggle against 
all imperialists" and close up the ranks of proletarians of all countries "under the banner of 
the social revolution. " It also declared that the Soviet Government would "use all the 
means at our disposal, to help the working class in all lands to overthrow the rule of capital 
and to seize political power in order to reconstruct Europe and the whole world on 
20 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 26, pp 95-8. 
21 John Reed, Ten Days that Shook the World, (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1977), 
p 142. 
22 Committee on Foreign Affairs of House of Representatives, United States (ed. ), 
Soviet Diplomacv and Nenotiatinq Behaviour: Emerainq New Context for U. S. 
Diplomacy, (Washington, D. C., 1979), p 48. 
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democratic and socialist lines. , 23 A special body, the International Propaganda Bureau, 
was established under Narkomindel, headed by Radek. The various people in this Bureau 
who spoke foreign languages were engaged in propagating the ideas of the Bolshevik 
revolution abroad. Soviet "diplomatic couriers" frequently left for the European capitals 
with trunk-loads of propaganda materials. 
Every Soviet representative abroad was also entrusted with the mission to stir up 
revolution. Trotsky stated publicly that the Soviet authorities considered "diplomatic 
intercourse necessary not only with governments, but also with revolutionary socialist 
parties bent on the overthrow of the existing government. , 24 On 26 December 1917, the 
Council of People's Commissars issued a decree, resolving "to allocate two million rubles 
for the needs of the revolutionary international movement and to put this sum at the 
" 25 disposal of the foreign representatives of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. 
A. Joffe's embassy in Berlin was depicted by Lenin as "a burning house [which] 
would set all Germany alight. , 26 Joffe admitted that his embassy was "the staff 
headquarters of the German revolution. ... more than ten Independent Socialist Party 
newspapers were directed and supported by the Soviet embassy in the German capital. "27 
The Soviet diplomatic representative in London, M. Litvinov, often gave advice to 
socialists, and issued literature originating from Russia. 28 V. Vorovsky, who had been a 
23 J. Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Polic , Vol 1 (1917-1924), (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p 18-21. 
24 E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923 (London: Macmillan, 1961), Vol 
3,29. 
5 Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Polic , Vol 1, p 22. 26 B. Lazitch and M. M. Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern (California: Stanford 
University Press, 1972), Vol 1, p 39. 
27 L. Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs: A History of Relations Between the Soviet 
Union and the Rest of the World. 1917-1929, (N. J. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1951), Vol 1, pp 75-6. 
2" Lazitch, et al., Lenin and the Comintern, pp 130-31; Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 
1917-1923, Vol 3, pp 19-20. 
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member of the Bolshevik Party's Foreign Bureau in Stockholm, represented Soviet Russia 
in Sweden, which became a centre for indirect liaison between Moscow and Western 
Europe from 1918 to 1920. Switzerland was a Bolshevik propaganda base in Europe. I. 
Berzin, the Soviet ambassador to Switzerland, received several instructions from Lenin 
during the second half of 1918. Lenin urged him: 
For God's sake don't save the money for publishing purposes in German, French, 
Italian, English, use it fast, fast. 29 
Similar instructions were also given by Lenin to other Soviet representatives and agents, 
prodding them to spend money unsparingly on fostering revolution in European countries. 
Besides the formal diplomats, the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet Govemment also 
appointed and dispatched many secret agents abroad. According to John Reed, a radical 
American journalist, by September 1918, Narkomindel had on its payroll 68 agents in 
Austria-Hungary, and more than that in Germany, as well as others in France, Switzerland, 
and Ital Y. 30 A. Balabanova reminisced that large sums of money were sent to Switzerland 
to pay those agents who were "creating Bolshevik movements and newspapers throughout 
the world. 01 
International work was also pursued amongst prisoners of war, Allied soldiers and 
foreign residents in Russia. Publications in German, Magyar, Romanian, Serb, Czech and 
Turkish were widely circulated. Bolshevik emissaries were sent out to POW camps 
throughout Russia and under their direction many Soldiers' Committees were set up by 
prisoners. 32 The All-Russian Congress of International Social Democratic Prisoners of 
War, which was held in Moscow on 14 March 1918, proceeded to consider an agenda that 
29 Lazitch, et al., ibid., p 199, p 41. 
30 
3 
W. H. Chamberlin, The Russia Revolution, (London: Macmillan, 1935), 
Ip 
380. 
1 A. Balabanova, My Life as A Rebel, (New York, 1938), p 175. 
32 Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol 3, p 30. 
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included the organisation of an international Communist Party, and issued a manifesto 
appealing to homeward-bound prisoners to be the pioneers of the international proletarian 
social revolution and to be ready for an armed insurrection. 33 In May 1918, the Federation 
of Foreign Groups of the RCP(B) was formed, under the leadership of Bela Kun, a 
Hungarian Communist. Its duties were not limited to Russian territory. Some key 
members of this Federation, including B. Kun himself, played an important role in forming 
Communist Parties and building up revolutionary movements in their own homeland. The 
Bolsheviks even gave material support to the ex-war prisoners of France, Austria, Germany 
and other countries, who were sent abroad for revolutionary work. Under the Bolsheviks' 
direction and support, many former POWs in Russia fought for the world revolution in the 
van. To their activities, Lenin at the 8th Congress of the RCP(B) expressed his satisfaction: 
"Hundreds of thousands of war prisoners. ... upon returning to Hungary, Germany and 
Austria, thoroughly infected those countries with the germs of Bolshevism. ', 34 
Setting up "a strong guiding centre" to lead international revolutionary movements 
was indispensable for Moscow. Lenin had the idea of establishing a new International at 
the beginning of World War I; he believed that the majority of the leaders of the 2nd 
International had betrayed socialism by supporting the war efforts of their respective 
bourgeois governments and misleading the proletarian movement. According to Lenin's 
proposal in the "April Theses", the Bolshevik party resolved on 29 April 1917: "It is the 
task of our party, ... to take the initiative in creating a third International. "35 Once in power, 
Lenin and his colleagues were anxious to realise this scheme. At the end of 1918, Lenin 
33 R. L. Tokes, Bela Kun and the Hunclarian Soviet Republi , (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), p 66; Lazitch, et al., Lenin and the Comintern, p 43. 
34 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 29, p 161. 
35 J. Degras (ed. ), The Communist International. 1919-1943. Documents, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1956), Vol 1, p 1. 
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considered that the time for the creation of the 3rd International was ripe and would brook 
no delay. There were various reasons why he thought so: the social and economic chaos in 
Europe, especially in Central Europe, had increased since the Armistice; the German 
Communist Party had been founded; and the leaders of the 2nd International were going to 
convene a conference in Berne to resuscitate the old organisation. In a note to G. 
Chicherin, who had succeeded Trotsky as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Lenin stressed: 
"We urgently need to set up an international socialist conference for the founding of the 3rd 
Intemational . 
06 Narkorrýindel was in charge of the preparatory work for the setting up of 
the new International. 
On 24 January 1919, an invitation was published in Pravda and Izvestfia and 
broadcast on radio, inviting revolutionary parties and organisations throughout the world to 
send representatives to a congress which would create a new revolutionary International. 
The invitation declared: 
The Congress must establish a common fighting organ for the purpose of 
maintaining pen-nanent co-ordination and systematic leadership of the 
movement, a centre of the communist international, subordinating the interests 
of the movement in each country to the common interest of the international 
revolution. 37 
Since communications between Russia and the outside world were very difficult, a 
few foreign parties and groups sent their delegates to Moscow. Without any hesitation, the 
Bolsheviks therefore set about creating "foreign delegates". They assembled the members 
of parties of some countries that were under Russia's control, such as Latvia and Lithuania; 
these delegates were in fact members of the RCP(B); they selected prisoners of war and 
36 Lazitch, et al., Lenin and the Comintern, p 53. 
37 Degras, The Communist International, Vol 1, p 5. 
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emigrants who had been in Russia for several years and were affiliated to the Bolshevik 
Federation of Foreign Communist Groups of the RCP(B); and they even called in foreign 
radicals who had worked as employees of Narkomindel. Balabanova, the first secretary of 
the Comintern, revealed later: "Among the thirty-five assembly members only one had the 
" 38 political right to represent his country and to vote as its delegate. This man was H. 
Eberlin, who was in possession of a full mandate from the German Communist Party, and 
had been instructed to oppose the formation of the 3rd International on the grounds that it 
was premature. This opinion stemmed from the views of Rosa Luxemburg, who had been 
murdered on 15 January 1919. However, the foundation of the new International was 
proclaimed with the affirmative votes of the "majority of delegates" on 4 March 1919 . 
39 
Even the president of the Comintern, Zinoviev admitted later that the Communist 
International, founded in March 1919, was "nothing but a figment of propaganda". 40 
The first Congress of the Comintem issued several documents drafted by Bolshevik 
Leaders, in particular by Lenin, as the subsequent congresses were to do also. Those theses 
which were adopted by the first Congress reiterated the theories of Lenin and the 
standpoint of the Bolsheviks. They emphasised that capitalism was doomed, and that 
communism was now emerging from the ruins of capitalism. Therefore, the proletariat 
must take over the power of the bourgeois state and establish the dictatorship of the 
proletariat - "the new, proletarian democracy" to replace bourgeois democracy and the 
parliamentary system. On the closing day of the Congress, Lenin concluded: 
38 Balabanova, Impressions of Lenin, (Ann Arbor, 1964), p 69. 39 According to the Bolsheviks, the First Congress of the Comintern was held from 2 to 
6 March 1919. 
40 Lazitch, et al., Lenin and the Comintern, p 135. 
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The victory of the proletarian revolution on a world scale is assured. The 
founding of an international soviet republic is on the way. 41 
The Comintern had an Executive Committee, known as the ECCI (the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern), whose function was to conduct the Comintern's work 
between the congresses and act on its behalf. The first ECCI was composed of 
representatives from the important European parties but was, in effect, controlled by a 
bureau of five Bolsheviks. Balabanova found that the ECCI meetings were nothing more 
than a mere formality and that real authority rested with the Bolshevik Party Politburo. In 
fact, according to Trotsky, "On all basic questions involving the International, Lenin called 
the tune. , 42 
The initial apparatus of the Comintern derived from the Soviet Government and 
RCP(B). For example, the Propaganda Bureau of Narkomindel was described by an 
intimate of Lenin's as the "embryo" of the Comintern; 43 and the work of the Federation of 
Foreign Groups of the RCP(B) was regarded by Lenin as having laid "the real foundation" 
of the 3rd International. " In addition, many local leaders of the Russian Party, 
Government and Army were concurrently heads of the regional branches of the Comintem. 
Rakovsky of the Southern Bureau, Sokolnikov of the Central Asiatic Bureau and 
Shumiatsky of the Far Eastern Secretariat are all cases in point. It is obvious that the 
Comintem, which was known as "the international general staff of the proletarian 
revolution" was virtually an apparatus established and entirely controlled by the Bolsheviks 
themselves. Whether viewed in the light of its political platform, or assessed in terms of its 
41 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 28, pp 475-77. 42 Lazitch, et al., Lenin and the Comintern, p 138. 
43 ibid., p 133. 
44 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 29, p 161. 
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internal organisation, it was nothing but Lenin's new vehicle for transforming the Bolshevik 
revolution into a universal cause. 
The Comintem and the Soviet Government linked arms in the service of a single 
authority: the Bolshevik Party. In their work aimed at foreign countries, the Comintem and 
Narkomindel were distinct but related channels. Basically, their interests were compatible 
and mutually reinforcing. 
The year 1919, when the Con-ýintem was founded, was seen as "the year of Soviet 
Russiaýs most complete isolation from the outside world. "45 The Allies, though from the 
spring of 1919 in the process of withdrawing part of their troops, did not stop the economic 
blockade or their support for the anti-Bolshevik Russian armies. The White forces, under 
the command of A. Kolchak, A. Denikin and N. N. Yudenich, advanced from every 
direction with Moscow as their destination. The Civil War and the economic blockade still 
posed a serious threat to Soviet regime. The Bolsheviks thought it necessary to take some 
of the pressure off Soviet Russia through a variety of actions in the West. 
In order to trigger and direct the revolution in the West more effectively, more secret 
emissaries and agents were appointed and dispatched abroad by the Comintern and the 
Soviet Government. Lenin took particular interest in this work. He himself had talks with 
some important emissaries before their departure, and even learned some agents' names by 
heart. 46 Since many old Bolsheviks had achieved senior positions in the Party, the State 
and the Red Army, few of them were available and suitable for work abroad, so some 
fon-ner Mensheviks, Anarchists and Socialist-Revolutionaries were appointed by the Soviet 
Government and the Comintern as their agents. Many secret agents went under the cover 
of Soviet diplomats and representatives of Soviet trade missions, the Red Cross and news 
45 Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol 3, p 109. 
46 Lazitch, et al., Lenin and the Comintern, p 145. 
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agencies. Some agents and even agencies had multiple functions. For instance, the Soviet 
representative in the United States, L. Martern, opened a "Russian Soviet Bureau" in April 
1919, which acted as a diplomatic-cum-trade mission, news agency as well as a centre for 
47 directing the Communist movement in the U. S. A.. Some agents were delegated both by 
the Soviet Government and the Comintern. For instance, in 1919 M. Borodin was 
entrusted with a mission to Mexico and the U. S. A. by Narkomindel and the Comintern as 
well. He went to America not only as the first emissary of the Comintern, but also as the 
Soviet diplomatic representative. 48 
The year 1919 was also seen as a year when a revolutionary whirlwind swept over 
several European countries. Soviets or Workers' Councils appeared in a number of cities in 
Germany, France, Italy, Austria and other countries. Communist regimes were set up in 
Bavaria and Hungary. To some extent, this situation and movement were created and 
fostered by the Bolsheviks directly or indirectly. In spite of that, this "high tide" of the 
European revolutionary movement aroused a mood of expectancy among the Bolshevik 
leaders. Zinoviev expressed his optimism in the first issue of the Communist International, 
the organ of the ECCI, which began publishing in May 1919: 
The movement is proceeding at such terrific speed that we may say with full 
confidence, within a year we shall already begin to forget that there was a 
struggle for communism in Europe, because in a year the whole of Europe will 
be communist. 49 
47 L. W. Levy (ed. ), Revolutionary Radicalism, (New York, 1971), p 634. 
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However, in reality, both the Bavarian and Hungarian Soviet Republics were short- 
lived, the former collapsing in May and the latter in August 1919. The end of this episode 
signalled the failure of the expected European revolution. The Bolshevik leaders now 
knew that "the incubatory preparatory period of the revolution in the West may last for a 
considerable time. "50 
Drawing lessons from the defeat, the Bolshevik leaders considered it necessary to 
strengthen the leadership further, in the realms of ideas and organisation, of the European 
proletarian movements. As a concrete move in this direction, the Comintern. established 
the West European Secretariat in Berlin, the West European Bureau in Amsterdam and the 
East European Secretariat in Vienna. The Bolshevik leaders believed that the reluctance of 
the European working class to follow the Bolsheviks' example of violent revolution was 
due to the influence of opportunists and revisionists and also due to Western Communists' 
lack of flexible tactics. 
While severely attacking "opportunism", Lenin also criticised the Left in the 
international Communist movement. In his famous pamphlet Left-wing Communism - An 
Infantile Disorder, Lenin stressed that "to throw only the vanguard into the decisive battle" 
without the support and sympathy of the entire working class could not lead to victory. 51 
He pointed out that in order to expand the revolutionary forces, Communists should work 
among mass organisations, such as trade unions, and should participate in bourgeois 
parliaments. Communists should "use all the weapons, all the means and methods, ... 
combining illegal fon-n of struggle with every form of legal struggle" in their war with the 
50 J. M. Meijer (ed. ), The Trotsky Papers, (London: Mouton & Co. 1964), Vol 1 (11917- 
1919), pp 621-27. 
51 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 31, pp 92-3. 
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enemy. 52 Furthermore, Lenin realised that the proletariat of the advanced countries could 
not be victorious without the aid of the oppressed people in colonial countries. According 
to Lenin's theory, the high monopoly profits from the exploitation of colonies and semi- 
colonial countries enabled the European capitalists to bribe certain sections of the workers 
in the imperialist countries, making revolution more difficult. 53 Hence one of the 
Comintern's pressing tasks was to raise revolution in the East to destroy one of the props of 
imperialist power. These important ideas led to a change of strategy and tactics at the 2nd 
Congress of the Comintern. 
The 2nd Congress of the Comintern was held from 23 July to 7 August 1920, and 
was attended by 217 delegates from 41 countries. With the gradual consolidation of Soviet 
Russia and the extension of the Comintern's political influence, the Bolsheviks felt it was 
time to further confirm their leading position among the revolutionary movements of the 
world, and to build the Comintern as a "really centralised" leading force and a fighting 
organ instead of a "propaganda association". 54 The "Statutes of the Communist 
International", adopted at the Congress, defined the Communist International as "a single 
communist party of the entire world", and claimed "the parties working in the various 
countries are but its separate sections. 05 "The Conditions of Admission to the Comintern" 
drafted by Lenin stipulated that every party or organisation which intended to join or had 
already belonged to the Comintern must model itself on the Bolshevik Party and must 
accept firm control from the Comintern. Alongside these "stiff' principles and discipline, 
many "flexible" tactics can be seen in some of the organisation's theses. 
52 ibid., Vol 31, pp 96-7. 
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The 2nd Comintern Congress also marked the introduction of the "Theses on the 
National and Colonial Questions", which formed the theory and strategy on the revolution 
in the East, a subject which will be dealt with in the following section. 
Not long after the close of the 2nd Congress of the Comintern, great changes 
occurred. The war with Poland, which was not provoked by Soviet Russia but was used by 
Lenin in an effort to kindle the world revolution by force, ended with the defeat of the Red 
Arrny in October 1920. The vision of imminent revolution in the West faded again. The 
Civil War ended with the overthrow of Wrangel in November 1920. Meanwhile, the 
Russian people's resentment against the Soviet regime was growing. Waves of workers' 
strikes and peasants' uprisings culminated in the revolt of the Kronstadt naval base in 
March 1921. Ironically, it was the Kronstadt sailors who had made a great contribution to 
the Bolsheviks' seizure of power in 1917 and now they rose up to end the rule of "a small 
group of Communist bureaucrats". 56 Their revolt and other uprisings were bloodily 
suppressed by the Bolsheviks. 
From 1921, to restore Soviet Russiaýs economy and increase the productive forces 
became the central task for the Bolsheviks. Around this time, the capitalist world began to 
regain some stability and the putsches to overthrow the capitalist system in Western 
countries, such the March action in Germany, met with defeat. In the light of these 
circumstances, the Bolsheviks made strategic retreats and compromises both at home and 
abroad. At home War Communism was replaced by the New Economic Policy, while 
abroad, Soviet Russia was trying to build up trade and diplomatic relations with Western 
Countries, and head-on confrontation with the capitalist powers became increasingly rare. 
56 P. Avrich, The Russian Anarchists, (N. J. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1980), p 229. 
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The 3rd Comintern Congress (June-July 1921) reflected these changes and started a 
new stage of international Communist movement. "Theses on Tactics" adopted by this 
Congress pointed out that the world revolution would "require a fairly long period of 
revolutionary struggle" and need careful political and organisational preparation, as well as 
regular propaganda and agitation. However, the Communist party must be "obliged to do 
everything it can to lead the workers into this attack [the offensive against capitalist 
society] whenever the conditions for this are at hand. 07 Since the Comintern had 
proclaimed the cause of Soviet Russia as its own and set the question of Soviet Russia as 
the touch stone by which all the organisations of the working class should be tested, the 
theses stressed again: 
Unconditional support of Soviet Russia remains as before the cardinal duty of 
the communists of all countries. Not only must they vigorously oppose any 
attack on Soviet Russia, but they must fight energetically to clear away all the 
obstacles which the capitalist states place in the way of Soviet Russian trade on 
the world market and with other nations. 58 
"Theses on the Structure of Communist Parties and on the Methods and Content of Their 
Work" imposed the Bolshevik principles on the party, such as democratic centralism, iron 
discipline, and various tactics on foreign parties. Although Lenin remarked at the 4th 
Congress of the Comintern that this resolution was "too Russian" and was "permeated and 
imbued with a Russian spirit", and therefore it was "quite unintelligible to foreigners", he 
, 59 believed that it was "an excellent resolution'. 
57 Degras (ed. ), The Communist International, Vol 1, p 243; p 251. 
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It further made the Comintern the supreme body above all communist parties by 
stipulating that "the decisions of the Communist International are to be carried out by 
affiliated parties without delay in those cases where the requisite changes in the existing 
statutes and party decisions can only be made subsequently., '60 By such means, Soviet 
Russia's interests were given priority, Bolshevik principles became a model for all 
Communist parties, and Moscow could easily control all Communist parties and direct the 
international revolutionary movement through the Comintern. 
After Lenin died in 1924, the axiom of world socialist revolution was superseded by 
Stalin's doctrine of "socialism in one country". To consolidate the Communist regime 
within the Soviet Union became a matter of paramount importance, and to launch or 
support revolutionary movements in foreign countries was henceforth subordinated to that 
aim. The Comintern became more and more a tool to safeguard the Soviet Union's 
interests and to realise their own goals, and it became more inclined to adopt the tactics of 
undermining capitalist countries by dividing them against each other and by supporting the 
nationalist movements in the Third World. 
Section 2. Fundamental Strategy in the East 
The Bolsheviks' fundamental policy towards the East derived from Lenin. As a 
Marxist, Lenin understood that "For the present, real communism can achieve success only 
in the occident. , 61 In spite of this, he considered that the national liberation movements of 
the oppressed nations in the backward Eastern countries would become a struggle against 
60 ibid., p 269. R-. F-use, Soviet Policy in the Orient, (East Peking: Enjinsha, 1927), p 2. 
33 
the capitalist system itself and could help the proletariat of the advanced western countries 
to achieve power, for he believed, the maintenance of the western imperialist powers was 
dependent on the plunder and exploitation of their colonies and semi-colonies. The waves 
of the anti-imperialist struggle in Asia, which attracted Lenin's attention, made him 
appreciate highly the role which "the awakening of Asia" would play in the world history 
of the 20th century. 62 Lenin firmly believed that: 
Social revolution can occur only in an entire epoch in which the civil war of the 
proletariat against the bourgeoisie in the advanced countries is joined with the 
whole number of revolutionary democratic and national-liberation movements in 
the backward and oppressed nations. 63 
It seems that such views of Lenin were accepted by other Bolshevik leaders. Only a few 
days after the Bolshevik Revolution, Pravda declared: 
The army of the Russian Revolution derives its strength from countless reserves. 
The oppressed nations of Asia are as eager for the fall of the regime of 
capitalistic oppression as the oppressed proletarian masses of Europe. To fuse 
these forces in a world revolution against the imperialistic bourgeoisie is the 
historic mission of the Workers'and Peasants' Russia. 64 
After the Bolsheviks came to power, the Eastern issue became a live political issue 
instead of a purely theoretical one, related to the very survival of the Soviet regime. The 
Soviet State inherited from Tsarist Russia a vast Asian territory which bordered on Turkey, 
Persia, Afghanistan, China, Korea, etc.. Some nationalities living in Russia! s Asian 
62 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 19, p 86. 63 Lenin, Sochineniia, XIX, p 221; Quoted from X. J. Eudin and R. C. North, Soviet 
Russia and the East, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey, (California: Stanford 
University Press, 1957), p 45. 
64 F. L. Schuman, Russia since 1917: Four Decades of Soviet Politics, (New York: 
Frederick L. Schuman, 1957), p 96. 
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territory had close links with adjoining Asian countries. Either with the aim of achieving 
world revolution or consolidating the Soviet Regime, the Bolsheviks required the 
formulation of special policies towards the East, which included both their dealings with 
the Asian areas of the ex-Russian empire and Soviet Russia's relations with other Asian 
countries. 
From the very beginning, the Soviet Government proclaimed the right of national 
self-determination and declared all treaties of the Tsarist Government with other 
governments null and void. In an appeal to the Muslims of Russia and the East on 3 
December 1917, the Council of People's Commissars reiterated these principles and further 
appealed to the Muslims of Russia to "support this revolution and its authorised 
government! " and called upon the Muslims of the East to "overthrow these robbers and 
enslavers of your country. s, 65 It is obvious that the Soviet's early policy towards the East 
was concerned with the pursuit of dual goals: to defend the "Socialist fatherland" and to 
instigate revolution against imperialism. Bukharin later gave a frank explanation of the 
Bolsheviks' policies on national and colonial issues: 
If we propound the solution of the right of self-determination for the colonies, 
we lose nothing by it. On the contrary, we gain; for the national gain as a whole 
will damage foreign imperialism ... . The most outright nationalist movement, 
for example, that of the Hindus, is only water for our Mill. 66 
The Russian territories bordering onto Asian countries were regarded as bases for the 
spread of revolution. At the conference for the constituent congress of the Tartar-Bashkir 
Autonomous Soviet Republic in May 1918, Stalin, the Commissar of Nationalities Affairs, 
referring to his country's strategic position between imperialist Europe and oppressed Asia, 
6*5 Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Polic , Vol 1, pp 16-17. 66 Cited from Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution , Vol 3, pp 235-6. 35 
pointed out that Soviet Russia would pursue the policy of fraternal support of oppressed 
peoples of the East in their struggle for their own liberation. ... let then this autonomous 
republic serve the peoples of the Muslim world, as a shining beacon which lights their way 
toward liberation. 67 
Later, when the Red Army advanced eastward and more Soviet Republics were set 
up in the Eastern borderlands, Stalin repeated time and again his idea of building "a citadel 
of Soviet power" and planting "a socialist beacon" in the East. 68 Turkestan with its special 
geographical position, was considered by Moscow to be "extremely important", and could 
"play the role of a revolutionary beacon for Chinese Turkestan, Tibet, Afghanistan, India, 
Bukhara, and Khiva"; and Red Azerbaijian was regarded as "a revolutionary beacon for 
Persia, Arabia and Turkey. , 69 
Since many nationalities living within Russian-controlled central Asia were Muslims, 
Muslim peoples were among the primary targets of Soviet Russia's Eastern drive. In late 
1917, a Muslim Commissariat was set up in the Commissariat of Nationalities with the aim 
of directing work among the Muslims of Russia. The Commissariat of Nationalities 
Affairs was also in charge of revolutionary work among citizens of Asian countries living 
in Russia. These Asian citizens were mainly composed of Turkish prisoners-of-war, 
Iranian migrant workers, Chinese war-time labourers and Korean immigrant peasants. 
During the period 1917-1920, there were no fewer than one million people in this 
category. 70 The Bolsheviks promoted extensive agitation among these foreign citizens, and 
67 Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, p 47. 
68 j. V. Stalin, Collected Works, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
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from 1918 onwards helped them to form various national revolutionary organisations and 
communist groups on Russian territory. Several key Asian Communists were appointed by 
Lenin and Stalin as the first commissars in the Commissariat of Nationalities Affairs for the 
various national groups. In October 1918, some Communist groups and revolutionary 
organisations of the Eastern peoples on Russian territory formed the Union for the 
Liberation of the East. Its declared aim was to achieve a united anti-imperialist front and 
lead a struggle which would ultimately bring about a federal United States of Asia. 71 
In November 1918, the First All-Russian Congress of Communist Organisations of 
Eastern Peoples (also known as the First Congress of the Muslim Communists) was 
convened in Moscow. Delegates from the Eastern domestic and foreign Communist 
organisations attended this congress. Stalin addressed the gathering as follows: 
Our duty is to build a bridge between the people of the West and the East and, 
having created the united front of the revolution, to break the ring of imperialism 
which encircles us. However, nobody will be able to build a bridge between 
West and East so easily and so quickly as you, because the gates of Persia, and 
India, Afghanistan, and China are open for you. The liberation of the peoples of 
these countries from the yoke of the imperialists would ensure freedom for your 
own country and at the same time would undermine imperialism at its very 
foundation. 72 
At Stalin's suggestion, the Central Bureau of Communist Organisations of Eastern Peoples 
(Muslims) was set up, headed by Stalin himself, functioning under the direct guidance of 
the RCP(B) Central Committee. This Bureau claimed its "sacred work" was "to spread the 
ideas of communism quickly in the East and draw all oppressed peoples into the world 
71 Lazitch, et al., Lenin and the Comintern, p 372. 72 Lazitch, et al., ibid., p 374; Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, pp 77-78. 
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labouring family. 03 The Bureau also decided to organise a Department of International 
Propaganda for Eastern Peoples, which was entrusted to a Turk, Mustafa Subhi. This 
Department soon had 12 sections: Arab, Persian, Turkish, Azeri, Bukharan, Kirghiz, 
Kalmuk, Caucasian, Chinese, Korean, Japanese and Indian. By March 1919, the 
Department had published 15 newspapers in different languages, 74 and had begun to 
dispatch propagandists to Asian countries. 
This bustle of activities in the East, was but a sideline to the Bolsheviks'main efforts. 
At that time almost all the Bolshevik leaders except Stalin focused most of their attention 
on the proletarian revolution in the West and on internal affairs. Although Lenin was the 
principal maker of Soviet policy toward the East, he was then actually more interested in 
the effects of Eastern revolution on Western countries and had scarcely any time to spend 
on the concrete work directed at the East. Trotsky and Zinoviev both maintained that 
national liberation in the East was contingent upon a successful European socialist 
revolution. Only Stalin, partly due to his Georgian background, partly due to his 
responsibilities, had more of an Eastern orientation. He was not only a faithful executor of 
Lenin's Eastern policy, but also its main advocate. When he saw that "the eyes of all are 
naturally turned to the West, ... the remote East naturally tends to disappear from our field 
of vision and is even forgotten, " Stalin published his famous article on 24 November 1918 
"Don't Forget the East", in which he argued: 
The East should not be forgotten for a single moment for the reason that it 
provides inexhaustible reserve and most reliable rear of world imperialism. 75 
Nevertheless, Stalin's appeal did not have much echoes. 
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The founding Congress of the Comintem paid little attention to the East. The 
Congress was attended by some Asian representatives, yet none of them had full votes or 
became members of the ECCI. This Congress's western orientation was indicated by the 
following sentences in the "Manifesto of the Communist International to the Proletariat of 
the Entire World": 
The emancipation of the colonies is possible only in conjunction with the 
emancipation of the metropolitan working class. ... Colonial slaves of Africa and 
Asia! The hour of proletarian dictatorship in Europe will also be the hour of 
your own liberation ! 76 
In general, Soviet Russia and the Comintern did not attach more importance to the 
revolutionary potential of the East until the summer of 1919, when the Bolsheviks' attempts 
to foment the European revolution ended in miserable failure and the prospects for 
revolution in the West were gloomy. Around this time, large scale anti-imperialist 
movements were starting up in India, Korea, China, Persia, Turkey, and Afghanistan. With 
the victorious advance of the Red Army eastward, the possibilities of a successful 
revolution in the East increased. Trotsky, as the Commissar of War, had a thorough 
understanding of the general situation. He made a penetrating analysis on the relative 
strength of Soviet and enemy forces. In a letter to the Central Committee of the RCP(B) 
dated 5 August 1919 he wrote: 
In any event the European revolution appears to have withdrawn into the 
background. But Asia may become the arena of the next uprising. ... The sort of 
army which at the moment can be of no great significance in the European scales 
can upset the unstable balance of Asian relationships of colonial dependence, 
76 Degras (ed. ), The Communist International, Vol 1, p 43. 
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give a direct push to an uprising on the part of the oppressed masses and assure 
the triumph of such a rising in Asia. 
He came to the conclusion: 
Our task lies in effecting the necessary switch of the centre of gravity of our 
international orientation at the opportune moment. 77 
The shift in the strategic orientation started from the summer of 1919. From July to 
September of 1919, Narkomindel issued in succession the "Declaration to the Chinese 
people and to the Governments of North and South China" (July), the "Declaration to the 
Mongolian people and to the Government of Autonomous Mongolia" (August), an "Appeal 
to the workers and peasants of Persia" (August), and an "Appeal to the workers and 
peasants of Turkey" (September). These demonstrated that Soviet Russia was starting to 
make more active gestures to Asian countries. 
From the autumn of 1919, Lenin himself began taking an active part in particular 
initiatives relating to the East. In October, he drafted a resolution to send a special 
commission to Tashkent, and wrote a letter to the Communists of that region. Soon, the 
Turkestan Commission of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, which was formed 
under Lenin's direction, established an agitation and propaganda sub-division and, in 
December 1919, it decided to set up a Council for International Propaganda. Both bodies 
were charged with conducting revolutionary work among the Asian peoples on Russian 
territory and in the neighbouring Eastern countries. Through these apparatus, the 
Bolsheviks gave more effective leadership to the revolutionary movement in the East. 
In the Russian Far East, similar work also started. In June 1919, a responsible 
member of the Siberian Regional Committee of the RCP(B), F. Gapon, suggested that an 
77 Meijer (ed. ), The Trotsky Papers, Vol 1, pp 621-627. 
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Eastern Bureau with the obligatory participation of representatives of the Far Eastern 
peoples should be set up in order to establish close contacts with the revolutionary forces of 
the Far Eastern countries, including China, Korea, Japan and Mongolia. Although the 
Eastern Bureau was not set up at once, some proposals of Gapon's were implemented and 
later the Section of the Eastern Peoples was formed. 78 In August of the same year, V. D. 
Vilensky put forward a programme on carrying out Communist work among the East 
Asian peoples. The Politburo of the RCP(B) soon approved this programme and gave him 
the detailed instructions to fulfil it. The main points of the instructions were summed up by 
Vilensky as follows: to aggravate the conflict of interests between Japan, America and 
China by all possible means; to arouse the masses of Chinese, Mongolian and Korean 
people to conscious action aimed at breaking away from the oppression of the foreign 
capitalists; to support the revolutionary movement of the Eastern Asian peoples by 
establishing firm connections with the revolutionary organisations in Japan, China and 
Korea and by publishing pamphlets and leaflets to agitate there; to help the Koreans and 
Chinese set up guerrilla forces. In September 1919, Vilensky was dispatched to the 
Russian Far East as the plenipotentiary of Narkomindel there, and he did his best to 
implement these tasks. 79 
Against this background, the Second Congress of the Communist Organisations of 
the Peoples of the East was held in Moscow from 22 November to 3 December 1919, with 
78 Persits, 'Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Certain Questions of the National 
Liberation Movement', Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, pp 86-88. 79 'Vilenskys Report to the ECCI on the Work among the People in the Eastern Asia, 
1 September 1920', Gon-qchancluoii. Lian-qonabu vu Zhonclquoc - 
danaanziliao ieminq 
congshu (A Series of Archival Material on the Comintern, All-Union Communist Party 
(B) and the Chinese Revolution), which is henceforth abbreviated to GLZDC, (Beijing: 
The Beijing Library Press, 1997), Vol 1, pp 38-9; This volume is the Chinese translation 
of the first volume of VKP(b). Komintern i Kitaya. Dokuments. 1920-1949, (Moscow, 
1994). 
41 
Lenin himself playing a major role. He made a long and important speech to the assembly, 
declaring: 
The emancipation of the peoples of the East is now quite practicable. ... Here 
contact with the peoples of the East is particularly important. ... Our Soviet 
Republics must now master all the awakening peoples of the East and, together 
with them, wage a struggle against international imperialism. 
Further explaining the nature of revolution in the East, Lenin pointed out that since 
the bulk of the population in the Eastern countries were peasants, the task of the revolution 
was not directed against capitalism in their own countries, but against "international 
imperialism" and "medieval survivals". 80 Stalin's speech at this Congress offered no 
further new ideas than had been expressed in his previous utterances. In accordance with 
Lenin's spirit, the Congress passed a resolution - "Outline for the Revolutionary Work of 
the Communist Party in the East" - which stated: 
The revolutionary work of the Communist Party in the East must proceed in two 
directions: one direction is determined by the basic class revolutionary program 
of the party which, on its part, prompts the necessity of a gradual formation of 
communist parties in the countries of the East as sections of the Communist 
International. The second direction is determined by the present political and, 
naturally, historical, social, and economic position of the East, which 
necessitates the support in the East, for a period of time, of the national 
movement directed at the overthrow of the rule of Western European 
imperialism there - in so faý as such a movement does not contradict those class 
80 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 30, p 151. 
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revolutionary aspirations of the international proletariat which are aimed at the 
overthrow of international imperialism. 81 
We can see that the preliminary theory and strategies for the revolution in the East were 
thus put in place. These tentative ideas were to be fully crystallised at the Second Congress 
of the Comintern. At this Comintern Congress, the tendency of the preoccupation with the 
West was corrected, while Eastern issues were put on the agenda. 17 representatives out of 
a total of 25 Eastern delegates had full votes. The ECCI began to accept Asian members. 
A special Commission on National and Colonial Questions was formed. 
At the opening session of the Second Congress on 19 July 1920, Lenin declared: "It 
is one of our most important tasks to find out how we should set about organising the 
Soviet movement in the non-capitalist countries. , 82 As he later explained to the Congress: 
We must not only form independent cadres of fighters, of Party organisations in 
all colonies and backward countries, we must not only carry on propaganda in 
favour of organising peasant soviets and strive to adapt them to pre-capitalist 
conditions; the Communist International must lay down, and give the theoretical 
grounds for the proposition that, with the aid of the proletariat of the most 
advanced countries, the backward countries may pass to the Soviet system and, 
after passing through a definite stage of development, to Communism, without 
passing through the capitalist stage of development. 83 
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The purpose of establishing these soviets was to form a Federation - "a transitional form 
towards the complete union of working people of all nations" which would arise on the 
basis of the Soviet system and the Soviet movement. 84 
In Lenin's famous "Theses on the National and Colonial Questions", he stated that 
"what is essential is to pursue a policy designed to achieve a close alliance of all national 
and colonial liberation movements with Soviet Russia. " Communist Parties and the 
Comintern must therefore prepare to assist "the bourgeois-democratic liberation 
movement" and support peasant movements . 
85 By contrast, M. N. Roy, an Indian, in his 
theses stressed the need to support the working class and develop Communist movements 
in colonies. Clearly, Roy did not understand what was in Lenin's mind. To support 
peasant movements and to collaborate with the national bourgeoisie in colonial and 
backward countries was a tactic to establish soviet governments in backward countries and 
to overthrow the rule of imperialist powers in colonial countries in order to win over the 
entire East to Soviet Russiaýs side and to serve the cause of Soviet Russia's survival and 
consolidation. With regard to this, the only Asian member of the ECCI, the Korean 
delegate Pak Chin-sen, showed that he had fully understood Lenin's intentions, and in his 
speech at the Congress he declared that the Congress would "speed the revolutionary 
ferment, the revolution, in the East. " His party, the Korean Communist Party, he 
continued, would be "one of the main forces that turn enslaved Korea into a part of the 
federated World Soviet Republic. J6 In an article entitled "The Revolutionary East and the 
84 Degras (ed. ), The Communist International, Vol 1, pp 138-144. 85 In the Theses on the National and Colonial Questions, adopted by the Second 
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Next Tasks of the Communist International", which Pak Chin-sen wrote during the Second 
Congress, he stated: 
The industrial proletariat, if we exclude Japan, is too feeble in Asia to permit of 
our nourishing any serious hopes of an immediate Communist revolution, but 
the victory of an agrarian revolution is undoubted, if we are able to cope with the 
immediate problem of the great and bloody struggle. 87 
This article of Pak's complemented and supported Lenin's theses. 
The Theses on the National and Colonial Questions adopted by the Congress laid a 
theoretical foundation for the strategy and tactics on revolution in the East where hardly 
any proletariat existed, consequently adding bizarre colours to the international Communist 
movement. Putting the theory into immediate practice, the ECCI decided to convene the 
Congress of the Eastern Peoples and the Congress for the Toilers of the Far East 
respectively. The latter was delayed until January 1922, but the Congress of the Eastern 
Peoples was held at Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, in September 1920, soon after the 
closure of the Second Congress of the Comintern. 
The Baku Congress was attended by 1,891 delegates representing 37 nationalities. 
Most of them were Muslims from Russia's borderlands and from the countries of the Near 
and Middle East. There were a few delegates from the Far East, including 8 Chinese. 88 
87 Pak Din Shoon, 'The Revolutionary East and the Next Tasks of the Communist 
International', Communist International, (Moscow, June-July 1920) Nos 11-12, pp 2315- 
20. This important article was also published in Pravda on 27 July 1920. 88 Up to now, it is still not sure who the Chinese delegates to Baku Congress were. 
According to Zhang Ximan [Lishi huivi (Historical Reminiscences), (Shanghai, Jidong 
Publishing House, 1949) p 20], the Chinese delegates included Ling Yue, Jiang Kang- 
hu and He Han-zhong. Sokolsky learned that at the Congress, China was presented 
by Li Dazhao. [G. Sokolsky, The Tinder Box of Asia (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1933), p 322]. J. Guillermaz writes in A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921 - 1949 (London: Methuen & Co., 1972, p 39) that Zhang Tai-lei and Liu Shao-zhou 
attended the Congress. H. F. MacNair's China in Revolution (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1931, p 204) shows that the name of Chinese representative at the 
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The Comintern's principal leaders, Zinoviev, Radek and Bela Kun, were the main speakers 
at this Congress. Faced with such an audience, they talked bombastically about socialist 
revolution, building "communist organisation", establishing the "Soviet system" and 
creating a "new culture under the banner of communism" . 
89 Regardless of these dogmas, a 
Turkish delegate declared that all they wanted from Russia were arms. Answering 
Zinoviev's question on the identity of the Bolsheviks, the delegate replied that in the 
opinion of the Turks, "a Bolshevik is a man who is an enemy of England. " As for 
Zinoviev's next question "What do they think about Bolsheviks fighting against the 
capitalists and the landlords? " his answer was "that is a matter in which the Turks are not 
interested. "90 
Of course, those Comintern leaders clearly knew that these Eastern national 
revolutionaries had nothing in common with communists. So the key tone of the Baku 
Congress was anti-imperialist, especially anti-British. In his speeches, Zinoviev said: 
We are ready to help any revolutionary struggle against the English 
Government. Our task is to kindle a real holy war against the English and 
French capitalists. 91 
Another aim of the Congress was to turn the Eastern peoples towards the political strength 
of Moscow. As Pavlovich told his listeners: 
If the Eastern peoples wish to have on their side the sympathy of the 
international proletariat, they must also fight for Soviet power and the principles 
proclaimed by Soviet Russia. 92 
Congress given in the press was "Lai". 
"9 C. Mackerass and N. Knight, Marxism in Asia, (London: Croom Heim, 1985), pp 
171-3, p 177. 
90 Flovinsky, World Revolution and the U. S. S. R., p 60. 91 Degras (ed. ), The Communist International, p 105. 
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It was clear that the Bolsheviks' purpose was to mobilise Eastem peoples to throw 
themselves into the battle against the Western imperialist powers in the rear and to expand 
Soviet Russia's sphere of influence in the East. 
In order to fulfil these tasks more efficiently, a permanent auxiliary institute of the 
Communist International in the East, the Council of Propaganda and Action for the Peoples 
of the East, was established, under the direction of Pavlovich, Stasova and others. This 
Council in Baku served as a centre for Communist activities in the Near East. About the 
same time, two other similar institutions were set up: the Tashkent Bureau, which was 
established in October 1920 in Turkestan, was assigned to work in central Asia; and the 
Irkutsk Bureau, which was formed in July-August 1920, became the centre for propaganda 
and organisational work in the Far East. Before long the Comintern's branches in Baku and 
Tashkent were abolished and the Comintern opened an Eastern Section with headquarters 
in Moscow, whose first chief was G. Safarof. The Comintern's Irkutsk branch was later 
transformed into the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat. 
The First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, which was originally scheduled as a 
sequel to the Baku Congress and later proposed as a counter to the Washington 
Conference, was convoked by the Comintern. The preliminary conference was held in 
Irkutsk in November 1921, and the Congress officially opened in Moscow in January 1922. 
There were 148 delegates representing Communist, nationalist and anarchist parties and 
organisations in China, Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Siberia, India and Indonesia. The Chinese 
delegates, numbering 44, constituted the second largest group. 
The main themes of the Congress were set forth by Zinoviev and Safarof in their 
speeches. Zinoviev in his report "On the International Situation and the Result of the 
92 Mackerass and Knight, Marxism in Asia, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p 176. 
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Washington Conference" attacked the Washington Conference had refused to acknowledge 
"the legitimate aspirations of the Asian people for independence" and described the Four- 
Power Treaty concluded at that Conference as an "alliance of the four bloodsuckers". He 
chided certain parties and elements who persisted in looking to the West, especially 
America, for the blessings of democracy and progress. He pointed out that only when 
areas like Asia were totally free of Western domination, would the world Communist 
movement have achieved its primary goals. Hence national liberation could not be 
advanced except by reliance upon Soviet Russia and the world proletariat. He further 
proclaimed that the entire Far East was "ripe for the soviet system. " Safarof stated that the 
Comintern supported every nationalist movement for emancipation, because it was directed 
against imperialism and because it was in harmony with the interests of the international 
proletariat. Moreover, he stressed the leading role of the proletariat in the national 
revolution and the importance of peasants awakening. These Bolshevik speakers 
elaborated Lenin's doctrines on the revolution in national and colonial countries, which was 
put forward in the Second Congress of the Comintern. 
Lastly, the Congress passed a manifesto, which appealed to the Far Eastern people to 
form an unbreakable alliance under the banner of the Comintern, to carry out anti- 
imperialist and anti-feudal national and democratic revolutions, to establish a fair social 
93 
system and to place political power in the grasp of the workers and peasants. This 
Congress successfully safeguarded Moscow's dominant position in leading the anti- 
imperialist and revolutionary movements in the Far East. In the history of the Far Eastern 
Communist movement, this Congress had a significant influence. 
93 Cf. First Conqress of the Toilers of the Far East, (Petrograd, 1922); Huang Xiu-rong, 
Gonqchanciuoei vu Zhonciquo geming quanxi shi (The History of the Relations between 
the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution), (Beijing: The CCP's Central Academy 
Press, 1989), Vol 1, p 109. 
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It is not difficult to see that the main direction of the Bolsheviks' penetration into 
Asia extended from Russiaýs borderlands to the adjacent Asian countries and from the Near 
East toward the Far East. Soviet Russia! s main targets in the East were India and China. 
Provoking disturbances in some of its adjacent countries, such as Afghanistan, was treated 
as a step towards clearing the way for revolution "in India and China, and on to the bastions 
of imperialism - England, America and Japan. 
04 
Under the supervision of the Bolsheviks, the Communist organisations of the Asian 
peoples transfer-red from Russian territory to adjacent Asian countries. The Iranian 
Communist Party was founded in June 1920, and the Turkish Communist Party was set up 
in September 1920. In other Asian countries Communist groups began to spring up. 
Meanwhile the Bolsheviks did their utmost to establish diplomatic relations with 
neighbouring Asian countries. Moscow adopted friendly policies towards nationalist 
governments, such as Kemal's government in Turkey, Amanullah's government in 
Afghanistan and the Shah's government in Persia, regardless of these governments' 
capitalist or feudalistic character. Chicherin explained this policy in December 1920: 
Our policy is ... a compromise between us and the national states which are 
struggling for their own independence against the imperialism of the West. 95 
In 1921, Soviet Russia signed treaties of friendship with Persia, Afghanistan, Turkey, and 
Mongolia. In turn, these actions of Soviet diplomacy further "pave[d] the way for the 
Communist International", as Safarof said. 96 
The spread of Bolshevik revolution to the East was not solely dependent on peaceful 
means, such as undertaking propaganda and agitation through the Comintern and 
94 Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, p 77, p 92. 95 Eudin and North, ibid., p 91. 96 Mackerass and Knight, Marxism in Asia, p 180. 
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Communist Parties, or exerting political influence through diplomatic channels. Military 
methods were also considered as immediate and effective measures to stimulate Bolshevik 
revolutions in the Asian countries. When Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and other Bolshevik 
leaders talked about Eastern affairs, they always mentioned the military factor. In May 
1919, an article in the organ of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, suggested: 
Creation of special battalions from among the Russian Muslims in order to 
render active assistance to the East in struggle against the British imperialists. ... 
Without active assistance from the outside by the fresh untapped forces of 
Russia's Muslims it can once again fall into a lethargic sleep of spineless 
inertness and apathy. 97 
Another article in this journal argued that because "there was no working-class movement 
and no knowledge of the findings of sociology, i. e. international socialism in the East, ... 
the struggle of an international proletarian detachment in the Soviet Republic has been 
placed on a practical footing. ... If Tsarism could plan an invasion and seizure of India via 
several hostile countries, then why cannot workers' and peasants' Russia do the same thing 
along the same lines in order to give the Indians the Bolshevik ideology? 08 Accordingly, 
the Second Congress of the Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East resolved 
to organise an Eastern Red Army as a part of the international Red Army in order to 
liberate Eastern peoples. 99 
Both in word and in deed, such work was, to some extent, undertaken. The Turkish 
and Persian Detachments and the International Korean-Chinese Regiment were formed in 
97 Zhizn Natsionalnostei (The Life of Nationalities), (26 May 1919) No 19, p 2; Quoted 
from Ulyanovsky, The Comintern and the East, p 117, and Eudin and North, Soviet 
Russia and the East, p 161. 
9" Ulyanovsky, Lbiýd., p 118. 
99 Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, p 165. 
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the Red Army, whose tasks included liberating their own homelands as well as fighting for 
Soviet Russia. 100 In May 1920, Russian troops landed in the Gilan region of Persia to set 
up a Soviet Republic there. In the Autumn of 1920, a large number of Indian militants 
were organised in Turkestan for military training and they prepared to launch a joint assault 
with the Red Army into India through Afghanistan. 101 The following year, a satellite 
Soviet state was founded in Outer Mongolia with the "help" of the Red Army. To export 
revolution abroad became a pretext for using force to either interfere in or to control other 
countries. 
The Fourth Congress of the Comintern (November 1922) specially adopted "Theses 
on the Eastern Question". This document further developed the ideas on the national and 
colonial questions which Lenin had expounded at the Second Congress. In which, the 
slogan of a united anti-imperialist front in the East was proclaimed and the tasks for the 
Communist parties of the Eastern countries were put forward as follows: to fight for the 
most radical possible solution of the tasks of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and to 
organise the working and peasant masses for the struggle for their class interests. The 
theses claimed that "for backward countries the Soviet system represents the most painless 
transitional form from primitive conditions of existence to the advanced communist culture 
which is destined to replace capitalist methods of production and distribution throughout 
the world economy. " And they further convinced Asian peoples that the backward 
'00 Cf. Persits, 'Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the 
National Liberation Movement', Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, pp 70- 
137. 
101 M. N. Roy, M. N. Roy's Memoirs, (Bombay: Allied Publishers Privated Ltd, 1964), 
pp 417-421. 
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countries could become members of the international federation of Soviet republics 
through an alliance with the proletariat of the West. 102 
Surveying the strategy and policies of Soviet Russia and the Comintern towards the 
East in this early phase, we find that the Bolsheviks' Eastern policies were imbued with a 
spirit more of pragmatism than of idealism. Their efforts to spread Bolshevism were 
combined with acts aimed at triggering anti-imperialist movements, with the purpose of 
drawing the Eastern People into the world soviet movement and of aggrandising Soviet 
RussiXs power and strength in the East. The Menshevik leader Y. 0. Martov remarked 
that the Comintern was not being immune from a temptation "to regard the peoples of the 
East as pieces on the chessboard of the diplomatic war with the Entente. " 103 Anyhow, the 
Bolsheviks' policies and activities had a rather strong influence on the events in many 
Asian countries. 
Section 3. General Policies towards China 
China, being the largest country in the East and sharing a 7,000-kilometre border 
with Russia, was naturally Soviet Russia! s most important neighbour in the East. Although 
China was not the initial target for revolution in Asia, it became more and more important 
for the Bolsheviks' world revolutionary strategy as time passed. 
In the past, Tsarist Russia's expansion in the East had brought enormous territorial 
acquisitions at the expense of the Chinese Empire. Russia also grabbed various political 
and economic privileges within China. In 1898, when Japan and several European powers 
102 Degras (ed. ), The Communist International, Vol 1, pp 388-9. 103 Quoted from Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol 3, p 268. 
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were scrambling for spheres of influence and concessions in China, Russia extorted the 
right to build the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) in Manchuria, which linked up with the 
Trans-Siberian Railway. In 1900, Russian troops joined the Eight Powers' Allied 
Expedition and entered Beijing to suppress the Boxer Rising. Taking advantage of the 
situation, the Russians further invaded Manchuria under the pretext of protecting their 
interests and later refused to vacate the territory. In 1904 the Russo-Japanese War broke 
out over the struggle for superiority in Manchuria, and ended with Russia! s defeat in 1905. 
As a result, Southern Manchuria passed under the control of Japan, while Northern 
Manchuria remained within the sphere of influence of Russia. With other imperialist 
powers, Tsarist Russia also had a hold over the Qing Government through long-term loans. 
The Chinese Revolution of 1911 overthrew the Qing Dynasty and established the 
Republic of China. But still China could not cast off the yoke of the imperialist powers. 
Sun Yatsen, the revolutionary bourgeois democratic leader, had to resign his presidency to 
Yuan Shikai, a fonner high-ranking official of the Qing Cabinet, who had the support of 
the imperialist powers. 
During World War I, European powers were busy with the war in Europe and had 
little time to attend to the affairs of the Far East. Under these circumstances, Japan took 
advantage of the situation and sent troops to Shandong province to seize Qingdao, which 
had previously been occupied by Germany. In 1915, Japan put forward its infamous 21 
Demands to China, with the aim of controlling the whole of China. Yielding to the 
pressure from Japan, Yuan Shikai accepted most of Japan's demands. 
After Yuan's death in 1916, China entered a phase of tangled warfare among 
different warlords who were backed by various imperialist powers. In 1917, the Anfu 
Clique, headed by Duan Qirui, controlled the Beijing Government, 
-while 
Sun Yatsen 
organised a rival government in Guangzhou. At Japan's instigation, the Beijing 
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Government declared war on Germany and joined the Allies. Using the war as a pretext, 
the Duan Qirui Government borrowed large amount of loans from Japan. In return, Japan 
grabbed more special rights and concessions from China. Complementing its pro-Japanese 
policy, the Beijing Government adopted a hostile attitude towards the Soviet regime from 
the very beginning. 
Soon after the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks in Harbin, the seat of the 
Administration of the CER, responding to the order from Petrograd that they should "take 
power in the name of the proletariat and the Government", 104 increased their efforts to seize 
control of the CER Administration and oust its head, General Horvath. The Bolsheviks in 
Harbin even claimed that Harbin was Russian territory and the Soviet officially represented 
state power. In December, the Harbin Soviet which had been established there also 
received two orders from the Soviet Government, asking them to send personnel to 
Manzhouli, Suifenhe Hailar, Kuanchengzi and some other cities to take over customs and 
consulates there. 105 These actions led to disturbances in Harbin and Beijing. At the request 
of Allied diplomats, the Beijing Government sent troops to suppress the Bolshevik uprising 
in Harbin in December 1917. Moreover, in May 1918, the Beijing Government agreed to 
sign a Joint Military Defence Pact with Japan for the declared purpose of checking the 
threat from Russia. This Pact stipulated that the Japanese troops could enter Manchuria 
and Mongolia; the Japanese officers could command and train the Chinese troops; and the 
Chinese should engage the Japanese as political, financial and military advisors. The 
'04 Leong Sowtheng, Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917-1926, (Honolulu: Hawaii 
University Press, 1976), p 21. Harbin was the junction of the three sections of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway and the seat of the CER Administration. 105 Li Xinggeng, et a[., Fencivu fupinq -E quo qiaomin zai Zhon-qquo. 1917-1945 (Duckweed in Wind and Rain, Russian Residents in China, 1917-1945), (Beijing, 
Central Translation Bureau Press, 1997), pp 25-6, pp 28-9. 
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conclusion of this pact kindled the flames of the anti-Japanese movement among Chinese 
students. 
Faced with the complicated situation in China, the new-born Soviet Russian regime 
adopted a multi-pronged policy towards China. On the one hand, it acted in a conciliatory 
way towards the officially-recognised Beijing Government, in order to seek "good- 
neighbour relations" with China and to break through the "blockade in the East and thwart 
the wishes of Japan and other rapacious Entente powers". 106 On the other hand, the 
Bolsheviks encouraged the Chinese people's anti-imperialist feelings and promoted a 
national liberation movement and even a revolutionary movement in order to overthrow the 
pro-Japanese Beijing Government. 
No sooner had the Soviet Government declared its "honest, popular, truly democratic 
foreign policy" 107 than a new Soviet-Chinese diplomacy unfolded. The first gesture was to 
seek formal recognition of the Soviet regime from the Beijing Government. On 18 January 
1918, Narkomindel sent a formal note to Liu Jingren, the Chinese Minister in Petrograd, 
informing the Chinese Legation that the Soviet Government recognised neither the ex- 
Tsarist and later the Russian Provisional Government's diplomatic mission in Beijing, 
headed by Prince Kudashev, nor the Tsarist General Horvath as head of the CER 
Administration. In place of these Tsarist officials, A. N. Voznesensky, chief of the East 
Department of the Commissariat, was appointed Soviet representative to China. 108 Several 
days later, Voznesensky and the deputy commissar of Narkomindel, Polivanof, had a talk 
with Li Shizhong, the second secretary of the Chinese Legation. Saying "the Soviet 
106 V. Vilensky, 'China and Soviet Russia', Izvestiia (News), Moscow, 9 October, 
1920. 
107 Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Poli , Vol 1, p 8. 108 Voznesensky had been deputy consul in Shanghai before 1915 and thus knew 
China well. This experience might help to gain him the post, despite the fact that he 
was a member of the Left-Socialist Revolutionary Party. 
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Government was willing to help the Chinese people" and "China's sovereign rights should 
return to the Chinese", they promised that Soviet Russia would abandon extraterritoriality 
in China and return the Russian concessions to China. Accordingly, Voznesensky sought 
permission to go to China. Several discussions were held afterwards, but without result. 109 
Relations between Soviet Russia and China were strained, mainly because the 
Beijing Government, acting in concert with the Entente, refused to recognise the Soviet 
regime, and even withdrew its legation from Petrograd toward the end of February 1918. 
As a result, Voznesensky was unable to proceed to Beijing. In April 1918, Narkomindel 
appointed several consuls in the Chinese borderlands, such as Ili, Tacheng and Kulun, but 
the Chinese authorities also refused to admit them. ' 10 
Nevertheless, some semi-official and informal communications between China and 
Soviet Russia still remained. Through the Chinese consulates which continued to operate 
on Russian territory and the Chinese local institutions along the Sino-Russian border the 
Bolsheviks made contacts with the Chinese authorities. For example, Y. D. Yanson, a 
representative of Narkomindel in Irkutsk, and S. G. Lazo, head of the Bolshevik troops in 
Trans-Baikal, had meetings with the Chinese authorities on the Manchurian frontier in 
1918.111 On the border of Central Asia, similar contacts between the Tashkent Soviet on 
the one hand, and the Chinese local authorities and the Xinjiang Governor Yang Zengxin 
on the other, were underway from 1918 and Soviet trade agencies and even political 
109 The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, (ed. ), Zhong-E quanxi shiliao 
(Archival Materials on Sino-Russian Relations), [henceforth ZEGXSL, (Taibei: Jinghua 
Press, 1959-70), Vol 1, pp 244-45; Xue Xian-tian, et al. (eds. ), Zhong-Su -quo'ia quanxishi ziliao huibian, 1917-1924 (Selected Materials on the History of Sino-Soviet 
State Relations), [henceforth ZSG G SZHI (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 
1993), p 29. 
"0 Xue Xiantian, et al. (eds), ZSGGZH, p 131. 
Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol 3, p 485; see also FO 228/2757. 
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agencies were pennitted to be set up at several cities in Xinjiang. 112 It is not true, as 
Professor Xiang Qing has suggested, that there were no relations whatsoever between 
China and Soviet Russia before the spring of 1920.1 13 
While trying to build good relations with the Chinese authorities, the Soviet 
Government began its campaign to win the Chinese people's sympathy and support for the 
Soviet Russia and to direct Chinese public opinion against the Beijing Government. On 22 
February 1918, Narkomindel issued to various local Soviets in Siberia a set of instructions 
governing policy towards China and Japan. One instruction emphasised that they were 
"laying the first stone in the creation of completely new relations with the peoples of the 
East. ... If the Chinese people want to repulse the Japanese-European capitalists and to 
fight against tyranny and injustice, they must rally more closely with the Russian people 
since the Russians are the oppressed nations' best friends. "114 In July 1918, the newly 
appointed People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, G. V. Chicherin, in his report to the 
Fifth Soviet Congress formally announced Soviet policy towards China. He proclaimed 
that the Soviet Government intended to renounce the conquests of the Tsarist Government 
in Manchuria and to restore the sovereign rights of China in this territory. Chicherin 
expressed the Soviet Government's willingness to negotiate with the Beijing Government, 
and did not disguise the fact that he had greater faith in the Guangzhou Government. 
112 Zhang Yongjin, China in the International System, 1918-20, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), pp 158-160; Guo Ting-yi, Zhonghua minquo shishi rizhi (Daily 
Chronicle of Events in the Republic of China), (Taibei: Institute of Modern History, 
Academia Sinica, 1979), p 501; FO 405/233, No 222. 
113 Xiang Qing: 'An Exploratory Study on the Comintern Relations with the Chinese 
Revolution', Danqshi vaniiu ziliao, 1981, No 3. 114 Quoted from R. Mirovitskaya, 'The First Responses in China to the Victory of the 
Great October Socialist Revolution', Far Eastern Affairs, (Moscow, 1978), Vol 1, pp 
147-9. 
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A few weeks after his report, Chicherin wrote a warm letter in reply to Sun Yatsen, 
whom he had met in London several years previously. In this letter, he appealed to "the 
friends, the proletariat of South China" for help against the capitalist powers' attempts to 
"strangle the Russian revolution", saying: 
Our success is your success. Our ruin is your ruin. ... Let us close the ranks 
in 
the great fight for the common interests of the world proletariat. 
Meanwhile, he condemned the Beijing Government as "the creature of foreign bankers". 
115 
In December 1918, a circular by the deputy commissar of Foreign Affairs, L. Karakhan, to 
all Soviet deputies cautioned that Chinese democrats should not be treated like members of 
the "bourgeois class", for the "Soviet government is doing everything possible to attract 
Asian democrats to the common struggle against imperialism. " 116 Both Chicherin and 
Karakhan's statements demonstrate that the Bolsheviks regarded Sun Yatsen's Party and 
Government as progressive, and proposed a United Front policy to ally with them as early 
as 1918. 
Soviet Russia's China policy was subordinated to the Bolsheviks' strategy in the Far 
East. From the summer of 1918 to the beginning of 1920, war in Siberia was the main 
threat to the Soviet regime. The foreign intervention in Siberia began with a Japanese 
detachment landing at Vladivostok on 5 April 1918, later joined by American, British, 
French and other troops. The Beijing Government also dispatched troops to join the Allied 
armed intervention in Siberia in August 1918. Among the various powers involved in this 
military intervention, Japan was unique in its ambition to conquer territory from Russia, 
and its troops' behaviour was brutal in the extreme. Trotsky commented: 
115 Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Poli , Vol 1, pp 92-3. 116 Quoted from B. A. Elleman, 'Soviet Diplomacy and the First United Front in China', 
Modern China, (1995), No 4, p 453. 
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I, of course, object to both armies [of Gennany and Japan], but if there is no 
alternative, I say, better the German army than the Japanese ... if Japan sends an 
armed force she will not withdraw it. 117 
With the support of Japan, the White Cossack General, A. Semenov led his men on 
several incursions into Soviet territory from Manchuria and cut the Bolsheviks' 
communication lines. Kolchak, who had been a former Admiral in the Tsarist Navy, and 
was supported mainly by Britain and America, assumed the position of the "Supreme 
Ruler" of Russia in Omsk on 18 November 1918. Before establishing himself in Siberia, 
he had consulted with the foreign missions and ex-Tsarist officials in Beijing and Harbin in 
the spring of 1918. About this time, two anti-Bolshevik organisations - the Far Eastern 
Committee for the Defence of the Fatherland and the Constituent Assembly - were created 
on Chinese soil. ' 18 In addition, the CER was used as a vital line of transport by the Allied 
troops. Under these circumstances, the Bolshevik leaders did not want to see China under 
the domination of the Entente countries in general and Japan in particular. A change in 
China's situation was especially desirable to them. 
The opportunity soon arose. Many Chinese initially welcomed the Entente's triumph 
in the Great War, but news from the Versailles Peace Conference soon indicated that the 
Powers had resolved to transfer all of Germany's interests in Shandong to Japan. This gave 
rise to furious protests. In Beijing a students' demonstration on 4 May 1919 marked the 
beginning of an upsurge of anti-Japanese and anti-Beijing Government movements 
throughout China. 
117 L. Fischer, Russia's Road from Peace to War: Soviet Foreian Relations, 1917- 
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The Soviet leaders took advantage of this situation and launched a vigorous 
propaganda campaign towards China. In July 1919, the Soviet Government issued the 
"Declaration to the Chinese Nation and the Governments of Northern and Southern China", 
which is usually called "the First Karakhan Manifesto" since it was signed by Karakhan. It 
was actually a public declaration addressed to all the people of China, rather than a formal 
diplomatic note. It reiterated the principles which Voznesensky and Chicherin had earlier 
declared. In addition, some new offers were made, the most important being: 
The Soviet Government returns to the Chinese people without any compensation 
of any kind the Chinese Eastern Railway, and all mining concessions, forestry, 
and gold mines 
The main aim of renouncing the CER was given as follows: 
Anticipating the return to the Chinese people of the Manchurian Railway, Japan 
and its allies seized it themselves, invaded Siberia, and even forced Chinese 
troops to help them in this criminal and unparalleled robbery. 
Therefore "the return to the Chinese people of what was taken from them requires first of 
all putting an end to the robber invasion of Manchuria and Siberia. " The clear implication 
here was that the main obstacle to returning the CER to China was the occupation of 
Siberia by Allied troops, especially the Japanese, and, moreover, the fault was imputed to 
lie with the Beijing Government, because it continued both to join the armed intervention 
and "to refuse to have any relations with the Russian Workers'and Peasants' Government. " 
The promise to return the CER served to attract Chinese public opinion to favour Soviet 
Russia and stimulate anti-imperialist and anti-Beijing Government feelings. 
The Karakhan Manifesto also stressed that the Red Army, which was marching 
across the Urals to the East, would bring "liberation" and "help" to the Chinese people, and 
the Soviet Government would let the people living in Manchuria and other areas which had 
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been conquered by Tsarist Russia "decide within the frontiers of which state they wish to 
dwell, and what form of government they wish to establish in their own countries. "' 19 This 
passage hinted that Soviet Russia expected to see the Soviet Russia's sovereignty extend to 
Manchuria and a change of government in China. 
Vilensky-Sibiriakov, who had drafted the Karakhan Manifesto, wrote in a pamphlet 
published in 1919: 
The creation of Soviet Russiaýs alliance with revolutionary China is one of our 
foremost tasks, for the attainment of which we should apply all the energy and 
resources at our disposa - 
120 
Here the prerequisite for such an alliance was the creation of a "revolutionary China". To 
achieve this aim, the Bolsheviks tried to utilise every opportunity, every means and every 
channel. 
The large numbers of Chinese labourers in Russia 121 were considered suitable for 
spreading revolution into China. In December 1918, the All-Russian Union of Chinese 
Workers was set up in Petrograd; simultaneously, the first Chinese branch of the RCP(B) 
was formed from members of the Union. At an international meeting held in Petrograd in 
December 1918, a representative of North China declared: 
"9 Quoted from Xue Xiantian, et al. (eds. ), ZSGGZH, pp 58-60; A. S. Whiting, Soviet 
Policies in China. 1917-1924, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), pp 269- 
271. 
120 Vilensky, Kitai I Sovetskaia Rossia (China and Soviet Russia), (Moscow, 1919), p 
14; Quoted from Leong, Sino-Soviet Diolomatic Relations, p 133. 
121 During World War 1, there were about 1/2 million Chinese labours working in 
Russia. Cf. Xue Xiantian and Li Yuzhen, 'The Communist Organisations of the Chinese 
in Russia and Some Issues concerning the Establishment of the Communist Party in 
China', Jindaishi yaniiu, (Studies in Modern History), (1989), No 5, p 151.1 should state 
here that, since I have referred to many books and journals in languages other than 
English, I always give both their original and English names when they are cited for the 
first time, and then, only the original names in the phonetic alphabet. For readers' 
convenience, all titles of articles published in journals in other languages are translated 
into English from the beginning. 
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The Chinese workers would strive together with the Soviet Russia for a 
universal revolution, for Soviet power against all exploiters. 122 
The leaders of the Union, Liu Shaozhou, Zhang Yongkui and An Enxue, were received by 
Lenin and were invited to attend the first two Congresses of the Comintern. Under the 
auspices of the RCP(B) and the Soviet Government, the Union and Party organisations of 
the Chinese workers undertook extensive propaganda, educational and organisational work 
among Chinese labourers in Russia. Numerous Chinese workers and soldiers were trained 
in special schools for propaganda and military work. From 1919, many Chinese who had 
joined the Bolshevik Party and the Red Army in Russia were sent back along with the 
homeward bound Chinese labourers. Although the Japanese, British and U. S. 
Governments tried hard to prevent revolutionary-minded Chinese from returning to China, 
a large number of the Chinese labourers still managed to arrive in China by various means. 
Some of them were engaged in inciting anti-Japanese struggle and anti-Beijing revolt in the 
border areas and in the interior of China; 123 some even tried to set up soviets in their home 
towns. 124 
122 Levy (ed. ), Revolutionary Radicalism, Vol 1, p 445. 
123 Telegram from Bao Guiqing, 27 January 1919, in the Archives of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, Quoted from Peng Ming (ed. ), Zhonqquo xiandaishi ziliao xuanil 
(Selected Materials on Modern Chinese History), (Beijing: China People's University 
Press, 1988), Vol 1, p 613. Note from the Russian Legation to the Chinese Ministry of 
the Foreign Affairs, 23 January 1919, ZEGXSL, Vol 2, p 22. Persits, 'Eastern 
Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the National Liberation Movement', 
Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, p 102. Directive No 571 of the Chinese 
Representation Bureau of the Harbin Railway, in Archives of the Heilongjiang 
Province's Record Bureau, Quoted from Zhonqquo shixue lunwen huibian (Collection of 
the Theses on Chinese History), 1979, p 644. 124 FO 228/3214,1 April 1920. As early as November 1918, Stalin in an article 
remarked: "The oppressed colonies and semi-colonies, looking with hope at Russia 
[are] already organising their own soviets of deputies (India and China)l" [Quoted from 
Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-24, p 107]. But nobody knows which soviets 
Stalin referred to. 
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Besides these Chinese militants, many Russians, Muslims from Russian Central Asia 
and ex-POWs were dispatched to China as agents and agitators. I shall deal with them in 
the next chapter. Suffice it to say here that they all shared the same objective of creating a 
revolutionary China. 
At the beginning of 1920, the triumph of the Red Army over Kolchak's forces turned 
the balance in favour of the Bolsheviks in Siberia. But, in view of the strength of the 
Japanese occupation troops, who were reinforced after the other Allied powers withdrew 
their troops from Siberia, Soviet Russia could not move regular Red Army detachments 
beyond Lake Baikal. In February 1920, the Central Committee of the RCP(B) decided that 
a clash with Japan should be avoided. 125 
A. M. Krasnoshchekov, a prominent Bolshevik leader in Siberia, proposed a plan to 
create a buffer state in Siberia and this was approved by Unin and Trotsky. In April 1920, 
the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia was founded at Verkhne Udinsk. Later its capital was 
moved to Chita. The resulting Government was ruled by a coalition of Bolsheviks and 
non-Bolsheviks and purported to be a bourgeois-democratic state. Ostensibly the Far 
Eastern Republic existed as a separate entity from the Soviet Russian Republic, but in fact 
it was dominated by the government of Soviet Russia and directed by the Central 
Committee of the RCP(B). Soviet Russia not only made use of the Far Eastern Republic as 
a buffer to avoid a direct military confrontation with Japan, but also used it as an 
intermediary to make contact with the Chinese Government and the Chinese people. 
In June 1920, the Republic dispatched a delegation to China, headed by M. I. Yurin. 
M. Kasanin, the secretary to Yurin, later revealed the Yurin Mission's tasks as follows: 
125 'Vilenskys Report to the ECCI on the Work among the People in the Eastern Asia, 
I September 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 39. 
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Our initial purpose was to establish relations with China, secure recognition and 
conclude an agreement. But this was not all: we had been entrusted with the task 
of entering into contact with all the forces that could prove efficacious in 
averting war with Japan. 126 
Owing mainly to the efforts of the Yurin mission, the Beijing Government issued a 
mandate on 28 September 1920 to cancel the recognition of all Tsarist representatives in 
China. The way to Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations was thus opened. A semi-official 
Chinese delegation, headed by General Zhang Si-lin, arrived in Moscow in September and 
was given a warm welcome by Lenin and other Soviet leaders. The Zhang mission brought 
back to Beijing a Narkomindel note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry which was issued by 
Karakhan on 27 September 1920. Since its content was similar to Soviet Russia's first 
declaration, it was therefore called the Second Karakhan Manifesto. 
Later, other Soviet representatives arrived in China, including Joffe, who had been 
described by Lenin as "one of our first and best diplomats" 127 , and Karakhan, who was 
vice-Commissar of Narkomindel in charge of eastern affairs. In their negotiations with the 
Beijing Government, these Soviet diplomats, following Moscow's orders, not only broke 
their early promise to return the CER to China, 128 but also refused to withdraw the Red 
Army from Outer Mongolia. On these issues, Soviet Russia virtually continued the 
126 Marc Kasanin, China in the Twenties, translated to English by Hilda Kasanina, 
(Moscow, Central Department of Oriental Literature, 1973), p 57. 
127 L. Fischer, The Life of Lenin, (London, 1965), p 532. 
128 Following to the decision of the RCP(B) Politburo's meeting on 31 August 1922, 
Stalin sent a telegram to Joffe, to the effect that the Party's Central Committee 
maintained that, in negotiations with China, it could not be permitted to draw 
instructions directly from the 1919 and 1920's Manifestos; On the issue of the CER, 
some terms must be stipulated to guarantee our privileges. (GLZDC, Vol 1, p 115); So 
on 5 November 1922, Joffe announced that Russia was no longer bound by its 
previous, generous, declarations of 1919 and 1920. [Tony Saich, The Origins of the 
First United Front in China. The Role of Sneevliet, (henceforth abbreviated to OFUFQ , Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991, Vol 1, p 128) 
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imperialist policy of territorial expansion and interference with China! s sovereign rights, 
which it had inherited from Tsarist Russia. During 1922-25, some Chinese intellectuals 
came to believe that Soviet Russia had become "Red Imperialist" because of its reckless 
pursuit of self-interest at the expense of a helpless China, and because of its harmful 
Communist propaganda. 129 Even Joffe and the Comintern representative Sneevliet advised 
the Soviet Government not to "do anything ourselves that can appear as a disguised 
imperialist policy" and to "give the slightest impression of similarity with the policy of the 
imperialist states". 130 
While dealing with the Beijing government, Soviet Russia! s representatives were 
simultaneously engaged in revolutionary work to undermine the same government. Guided 
by the Bolsheviks' policy and strategy towards China, these Soviet diplomats joined hands 
with covert Comintem agents and made strenuous efforts to bring China into the orbit of 
Soviet Russia by both legal and illegal methods. 
In view of the fact that China was a backward agricultural country and that it was 
impossible to start a proletarian revolution straightaway, the Bolsheviks' immediate tasks 
were to promote a national liberation movement and to foster any forces which might lead 
to the formation of a pro-Soviet government. Besides pursuing an alliance with Sun 
Yatsen's nationalists, the Bolshevik agents also tried to get in touch with prominent people 
who had political influence or military strength in China. 
129 See Zhang Jin (comp. ), Lian E vu chou E wenti taolunii (The Debate of Friendship 
or Enmity towards Russia), Beijing, 1927. Quoted from Leong Sow-theng, Sino-Soviet 
Diplomatic Relations, pp 296-98. "I"' Concerning Our Work in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countres in General and in 
China in Particular, Theses of Joffe and Maring, (end 1922), Sneevliet Archive, No 294, 
cited from Saich, OFUFC, p 370; H. R. Isaacs, 'Talks with H. Sneevliet, 19 August 
1935', China Quarterly, (1971), No 45. 
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Of course, the Bolsheviks' final goal was the eventual establishment of a Communist 
China which would become a member of the world-wide Union of Soviet Republics. 
Therefore, it was absolutely necessary for them to initiate and foster a Communist party in 
China as a main tool to achieve this object. The Chinese Communists in turn could also 
serve Soviet Russia! s interests by increasing Soviet Russia's influence and promoting Sino- 
Soviet diplomatic relations. 131 
***** 
The establishment of the CCP was not an accidental event which could be isolated 
from this international background. As this chapter has made clear, after the October 
Revolution, the Bolsheviks developed a global strategy and spared no effort to create the 
world socialist revolution. In order to exert a unified international leadership of the 
Communist movement, the Communist International was founded under the control of the 
Bolsheviks. The Comintern first focused its attention on establishing Communist parties in 
Western countries and directing the proletariat movement there. However, the world 
revolution did not come as the Bolsheviks had expected. 
To unleash an anti-imperialist struggle in the East became more vital to the 
Bolsheviks after the failure of revolution in Europe. Soviet Russia and the Comintern 
131 For example, after the first Karakhan Manifesto was sent to Beijing, a campaign 
urging the restoration of diplomatic relations with Russia was launched in China, and 
lasted several years. It has been said that "Ui Dazhao was one of the initiators and 
most active participants in that campaign. 0 [Xu Wanmin, 'Li Dazhao on Sino-Soviet 
Relations', Far Eastern Affairs, (1990), No 1, p 109]; During the Sino-Soviet 
negotiations in 1923, U Dazhao persuaded Gu Weijun, the Chinese Foreign Minister, to 
approve the draft agreement with Karakhan by saying that "the draft agreement was the 
best one in China's diplomatic history"; in regard to the Outer Mongolia issue, which 
was a major obstacle to agreement, U argued that "even if Outer Mongolia were 
dominated and ruled by Soviet Russia, the people there could live a better life. u rGu 
Weiiun huivilu, (Gu Weijun's Reminiscences), (Beijing: Zhonghua Publishing House, 
1985), Vol 1. p 340. 
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began to pay more attention to supporting national liberation movements in the colonial 
and semi-colonial countries and to establishing close ties with Eastern peoples, trying to 
cripple imperialist powers in their backyard and to expand their own force and influence. 
In line with this shift in orientation, they started to establish Communist parties in Eastern 
countries. Establishing a Communist party in China was only one of the Comintem's 
efforts to expand Communist forces into the East. 
In addition to this, some particular circumstances, such as geopolitical factors should 
also be taken into account. As China held a special strategic position, Soviet Russia 
adopted rather complex policies towards China. Their aims were to resume diplomatic 
relations with the Beijing Government as a way extricating themselves from the isolation 
and encirclement by imperialist powers; to forrn an alliance with the Chinese Nationalists 
headed by Sun Yatsen for the common struggle against imperialism; and to establish the 
Communist party in order to kindle the Communist movement in this neighbouring 
country. 
With the lapse of time, China became more and more important in the eyes of the 
Bolsheviks. In a telegram to Stalin dated 30 August 1922, Joffe pointed out: 
This place [China] will be to our advantage, ... China, beyond doubt, is a focus 
of international conflicts and the place where international imperialism is 
weakest. I believe that, when imperialism is undergoing a crisis in Europe and a 
revolution is coming there, to strike blows against imperialism in the place 
where it is weakest will be of significance. 132 
In their endeavours to export revolution abroad, Soviet Russia and the Comintern's 
intervention in China was on a larger scale than it had been in any other colonial or semi- 
132 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 112. 
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colonial country. The greatest success they won in Asia was the appearance of a 
Communist China. 
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CHAPTERTWO 
SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE COMINTERN'S AGENTS IN CHINA, 
1918-20 
It is widely acknowledged that the Bolshevik Revolution had a significant 
influence on the Chinese Communist movement. But it is more problematic to 
discover when it was that Soviet Russia and the Comintern began to exert direct 
influence by sending their agents into China. 
The prevailing view amongst historians is that there were no direct relations or 
regular contacts between the Bolsheviks and the Chinese revolutionaries until the 
spring of 1920. Xiang Qing, an authoritative Chinese scholar of Sino-Soviet relations, 
asserts: 
After the Russian October Revolution, the transport connections between 
China and Russia were cut entirely. Meanwhile the relationship of the two 
countries was disrupted, making it impossible for revolutionaries of the 
two countries to communicate. 
He insists that "the spring of 1920 when G. Voitinsky visited China was the starting 
point for the relationship between the Comintern and the Chinese revolution"! This 
viewpoint is shared by many experts on the history of the Chinese Communist Party, 
both in China and abroad. A. Dirlik concurs with Xiang's assessment of early Sino- 
Soviet relations: 
Xiang Oing, Gonqchancluoii vu Zhonqciuoqemin i, p 81. 
-q 
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As long as the Russo-Chinese border remained closed, neither the October 
Revolution nor the Comintern had any appreciable influence on Chinese 
radicals. This situation changed drastically with Voitinsky's arrival. 2 
J. Guillennaz goes so far as to state that "1920 saw the appearance of the first Soviet 
envoys or Comintern agents in China. 0 Many other works on the CCP and the 
Comintern regard Voitinsky as the first Bolshevik emissary to China. 
It seems that there is a missing link in the history of Sino-Soviet relations from 
the time of the October Revolution to the Spring of 1920.1 have already made a 
general survey of Soviet RussiSs and the Comintern's global strategy and policies 
towards the East, and outlined the Bolsheviks' activities in many countries, both in the 
West and the East, during that time. It is hard to believe that the Bolsheviks should 
have made an exception of China and left it alone. It is true that the Sino-Russian 
border was partly blockaded between 1918 and 1920, as a result of foreign armed 
intervention, the White Guards' revolt and the operations of Chinese troops, but such a 
long border could not have been blockaded entirely and continuously, and thus 
communications between China and Soviet Russia could not have been completely 
severed. 
Section 1. Emissaries Dispatched during 1918-1919 
2 A. Didik, The Oriclins of Chinese Communism, p 192. 3 J. Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1949, (London: 
Methuen & Company, 1972), p 39. 
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In January 1918, the Chinese Government issued a circular to the officials on 
the frontier with Russia, warning them that the Bolsheviks were dispatching agents to 
China, and asking them to take precautionS. 4 This circular might be interpreted as 
reflecting nothing more than Beijing's imaginary worries, since it offered no evidence. 
But from the following month, there were signs indicating that Soviet Russia was 
indeed dispatching agents to China. In a telegram dated 16 February 1918 to the 
British Minister in Beijing, the Military Attach6 of the British Consulate in Harbin, 
Captain Denny, reported that, according to General Semenov's information, three 
representatives from the Soviet Government, who were travelling to Tokyo and 
5 Beijing, had been caught at Manzhouli Station. In March, a Bolshevik delegation 
consisting of seven men headed by S. Lazo, arrived in Manzhouli to negotiate with the 
Chinese authorities. Lazo was the military chief of the Harbin Soviet, which was 
established after the October Revolution, and he was later appointed to command 
Bolshevik troops in the Transbaikal and Maritime areas. 6 
In April, other reports recorded that a Bolshevik emissary named Verestchak 
had been an-ested by the Russian authorities at Harbin. This man was believed to be 
associated with Makaroff, who was said to have been sent by the Soviet Govemment 
to China on investigation and propaganda assignments. 7 Makaroff arrived in Shanghai 
on 5 May 1918 and carried with him a letter written by the head of the Eastem 
Department of the Narkomindel, Voznesensky, to the head of the Soviet at 
Vladivostok, Sukhjamov. Although Makaroff was not a Bolshevik, he was sent to 
4 ZEGXSL, 22 January 1918, No 35. 
5 FO 228/2755, Telegram No 43. 
6'Disorder in Harbin and the CER', Zhonavan- YanoiuVuan jindaishi Yaniiusuo Jikan 
(Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica), Taibei, No 9; FO 
228/2757,10 March 1918; Who Was Who in the USSR, (New Jersey, 1972), p 340. 7'FO 228/3214, No 206,25 April 1918; FO 405/228, No 157. 
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China as an emissary because he had lived in China at an earlier period. It seems, 
however, that Makaroff only intended to resume his work at the Shanghai branch of 
the Russo-Asiatic Bank where he had been employed before World War 1, and that he 
was evidently reluctant to fulfil the task assigned to him by the Bolsheviks. Instead of 
delivering Voznesensky's letter to Sukhjamov, he handed it over to the Russian 
Consul-General in Shanghai. The content of this letter revealed that, since 
Voznesensky himself could not proceed to China, Popov and Podvoisky were to be 
sent to discover what was happening in Shanghai and Beijing. 8 
Among the first batch of Bolshevik agents, M. Popov was conspicuously 
active and successful. Accounts of Popov have appeared in some early books on the 
Chinese revolution. For example, H. 0. Chapman, in his book The Chinese 
Revolution wrote: 
In 1919 M. Popov arrived in Shanghai, having been sent out from Russia 
for the definite purpose of exploring the situation and its possibilities, and 
reporting to headquarters. After a few months' investigation he returned, 
and in 1920 agents from Russia thoroughly organised the Communist 
Party of China. 9 
T'llis book considered that Popov's activities had a certain bearing on the forming of 
the CCP. Afterwards similar accounts were given in books published in the 1930s. 10 
8 FO 22at3214,16 May 1918. Popovs name is sometimes written as "Popoff". Since 
many of the Russian names referred to in this thesis were found in non-Russian 
sources, it has not been possible to convert all Russian names according to one of the 
standard systems of transliteration. 
9 H. Owen Chapman, The Chinese Revolution, 1926-1927 (London: Constable and 
Co., 1928), p 45. W. Levi mentioned in his work Modern China's Foreign Policy 
(Minneapolies: The University of Minnesota Press, 1953, p 174) that the first prominent 
Soviet agent to China was Pavlov, but, unfortunately, he did not give any further details. '0 See, for example, H. F. MacNair, China in Revolution. An Analysis of Politics and 
72 
However, without ftirther corroborative evidence, the story was told less and less with 
the passing of the time. The most recent works on the CCP hardly mention Popov at 
all. By way of exception, C. A Wilbur and J. Y. How in their monograph on the 
missionaries of Soviet Russia in China make passing reference to Popov, but only in a 
footnote. " In another book, Wilbur cites Sokolsky's "Reminiscences" that Popov 
came to Shanghai in May or June 1919, at the time of the student strike, under an 
assumed name. 12 
In the archives kept in the British Public Record Office, there are plenty of 
detailed records on Popov. According to these dossiers, Michael Popov had studied 
Japanese and Chinese in Petrograd before he became a colonel attached to the General 
Staff of Soviet Russia, 13 and later he was appointed inspector of Bolshevik propaganda 
in the Far East. Popov's first visit to China was reportedly made in May 1918, when 
he stayed in Shanghai for several days and then left for Harbin. 14 One cannot be sure 
whether Podvoisky came to China with Popov, but later a Russian named Pudhorosky 
or Podgursky appeared in Shanghai and was engaged in Bolshevik activities. 15 
In August 1918, another Bolshevik agent, Joseph Malkin, who was said to 
have worked on a newspaper in Petrograd, reached Shanghai by the S. S. Simbirsk. As 
this man was suspected of being engaged in espionage, the local police requested the 
Militarism under the Republi ; Fang FuEan, Chinese Labour, (Shanghai, 1931); Lowe 
ChuanZhua, Facing Labour Issues in China, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
1934). 
" C. M. Wilbur and J. Y. How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and 
Nationalist China. 1920-1927, (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University 
Press, 1989), p 64, note 16. 
12 USIDS 761,93/142, quoted from C. M. Wilbur, Sun Yatsen: Frustrated Patriot, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p 326. 13 The All-Russia Supreme Staff was founded in May 1918; The General Staff was 
not named until 1935; cf., J. Erickson, Soviet High Command, (London, 1962), p 34. '4 FO 228/3214,30 May 1918; FO 228/3211, April 1921; FO 405/233, September 
1921. 
15 FO 228/3214, September 1920; FO 405/233, September 1921. 
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Russian Consulate to take him into custody on the arrival of the steamer, and then send 
him back to Vladivostok by the same vessel. 16 
According to the information originated in Vladivostok, British Intelligence 
reported that following the downfall of the Soviets in Siberia in the summer of 1918 
numerous Bolshevik commissars fled to China with large funds, "agitating for a 
Bolshevik rising and the boycotting of Japanese goods. "17 Around this time, many 
Bolsheviks came to China as refugees, continuing their work for the Soviet cause. 
Generally speaking, it was rather difficult for the Russian Bolsheviks to reach 
China, but many foreigners who had been prisoners-of-war in Russia and later began 
to serve Soviet Russia were dispatched to China. On 15 April 1918, an official of the 
Chinese Consulate at Irkutsk, Wu Mingrui reported to the Chinese Foreign Ministry: 
According to reliable information, some Bolsheviks and German and 
Austrian prisoners disguising themselves as Poles, sneaked into South 
Manchuria, Korea and other bordering areas and agitated on the sly in 
order to cause chaos. 18 
From January 1918, the British Intelligence Department in Bombay and Shanghai 
began to receive the following infonnation: 
Russian passports were being freely issued to Germans, many of them had 
arrived at Shanghai via Vladivostok intending to disembark and, if 
possible, to carry on political work. 19 
'6 FO 228/3211, Series of September 1918; FO 228/3214, No 375,29 August 1918. 17 ZEGXSL, 3 July 1918, No 480; FO 228/3211, August 1919. 
is XSL, Vol 1, No 371, pp. 373-74. 19 -F05 -22k2l 1, April 1918, No 93. According to this report, the commandant in 
Irkutsk was Ruettin, whose chief-of-staff was a German POW, Colonel Stremburg. This 
Ruettin was in fact E. M. Riutin who had assumed the Chairmanship of the Harbin 
Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in 1917 and had been expelled by the 
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There was some substance to these rumours. Some time before March 1918, an ex- 
prisoner carrying the rank of Captain had been to Shanghai and then moved to Tianjin 
holding a Russian passport in the name of Aromovitch. Another former POW, Janes 
de Mezey, who had been a lieutenant in a Hungarian regiment, went to China from 
Irkutsk in early 1918. After travelling around Harbin, Changchun, Tianjin, Shanghai 
and Hong Kong, he gave himself up to the British authorities in Hong Kong and 
confessed that "the prisoners at Irkutsk had a soldiers' committee, ... they drew 
lots of 
men to go to China to agitate. I was one of these. Others were to organise troops to 
help the Bolsheviks against Japan. , 20 This man's confession is supported by the 
famous British journalist Thomas F. Millard, the editor of Millard's Review. Millard 
also noticed that numerous released German, Austrian, Hungarian and Czech-Slovak 
prisoners in Siberia, who had intended to escape repatriation and further military 
service, joined the Bolsheviks and became their agents in Manchuria. 21 
Early in 1919 a Hungarian Communist, A. A. M01ler, who could speak 
Chinese and English, was sent by the Harbin Committee of the RCP(B) to Qiqihar, 
where he conducted revolutionary agitation and education work in a Chinese guerrilla 
force. Later he arrived in Tianjin. 22 That winter, a Turk named Fakiruddin arrived in 
China from Omsk where he had been held as a POW. He was very familiar with a 
Chinese troop from Harbin. cf. SowEtheng Leong, Sino-Soviet Diolomatic Relations, 
1917-1926, p 18. In October 1921, Ruettin was dispatched to China by the Far Eastern 
Secretariat of the ECCI. GLZDC, Vol 1, p 82. 
20 FO 228/3214, No 313,4 July 1918. 
21 T. F. Millard, Democracy and the Eastern Question (London, 1919), p 302; Millard 
also remarked that there were also many agents of the Central Powers in Manchuria, 
who worked for their own governments to sow dissension among the Allies, and 
especially to play upon China's fear of Japan and Japan's jealousy of America. 2 Xue Xiantian and Li Yuzhen, 7he Communist Organisations of the Chinese in 
Russia and Some Issues on the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', 
Jindaishi vanjiu, (1989), No 5, p 170; A. A. MOller, Plameni Revoliutssi, 1917-1920 (in 
the Flames of the Revolution, 1917-1920), (Irkutsk, 1957); Quoted from Far Eastern 
Aff2ýirs, (Moscow, 1988), No 5, p 105. 
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conference held a short time previously in a place near Ufa which had been attended 
by representatives of most of the Asiatic races. 23 Fakiruddin visited a group of Turks 
who were staying in Shanghai from 1919 to 1920. These Turks aroused the suspicion 
of the local police because they advocated Pan-Islamic and anti-British movement and 
had connections with Turks co-operating with Bolsheviks in Central Asia. Many 
papers in Chinese were found in their rooms. 24 In December 1919, a report from 
Tashkent indicated that eight Germans who had intimate knowledge of oriental affairs 
and knew different oriental languages had recently been dispatched from Moscow to 
China. They travelled incognito as pilgrims or tramps. 25 It was also reported that in 
early 1920 the civil governor of Sichuan tried to use some German engineers as 
inten-nediaries with the Bolsheviks in Soviet Russia. 26 
Those former European POWs might have been dispatched by the Federation 
of Foreign Groups of the RCP(B), and the Turkish POWs were probably sent by the 
Central Bureau of Communist Organisations of Eastern Peoples of the RCP(B). 
The foundation of the Comintern in March 1919 served to accelerate the pace 
at which agents were dispatched to various countries including China. It was reported 
that the Lenin Government in Moscow sent some important figures to Shanghai in that 
year. 27 Later in March, the Second Siberian Conference of the RCP(B) was secretly 
held in Omsk. It decided to organise a bureau of infori-nation and propaganda with the 
aim of contacting the communists of Asia and America to exchange information with 
23 The conference he attended might have been the 2nd Congress of the Communist 
Or 
2ýanizations 
of the Peoples of the East. 
FO 228/3214,19 June 1919,4 March 1920; FO 228/3211, Series of December 
1919, Series of February 1920. 
25 FO 228/3211, Series of December 1919. 
26 FO 405/228, No 157. 
27 Yang Zengxin's Telegram to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, ZEGXSL. Xinuiang 
Frontier Defence, p 300. 
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them and to conduct all kinds of agitation. 28 Afterwards, the foreign diplomatic 
missions in Beijing obtained information that a Bolshevik conference was to be 
convened in Shanghai at the end of March, and one of the subjects for discussion 
would be to incite revolutionary movements in China, Japan and America. They also 
heard that the Bolshevik delegates to this conference were on their way, travelling in 
groups of four. 29 Whether this conference was held in Shanghai or not is still 
uncertain. However, according to a reliable report, a group of four Russians - Tolstof, 
Semesheko, Khodorov, and Massing arrived in Shanghai from Siberia in April 1919,30 
and each of them bore a special responsibility in China: Colonel Tolstoff was said to 
be Soviet Russia! s military representative in Shanghai and to live with Wilde, the 
Comintern's liaison man in Shanghai; in 1923 he was consulted by Joffe and received 
a large sum of money from him; 31 Massing was an ardent Bolshevik engaged in 
educational work in Shanghai, and this person might be identified with a representative 
of the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia to Beijing in 1921, whose name was transcribed 
as Clossing; 32 Semesheko and Khodorov were prominent propagandists in China, both 
of whom will be discussed later. 
When the outbreak of the May 4th Movement was brought to the Bolsheviks' 
attention, the Harbin Committee of the RCP(B) sent N. Burtman to Tianjin to find out 
28 M. A. Persits, 'Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the 
National Liberation Movement, 1918-July 1920', Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and 
the East, p 86. 
29 The Dispatch to Shanghai Hujunshl and Tepaiyuan, 21 March 1919, and Telegraph 
from Shanghai Hujunshi, 1 April 1919, ZEGXSL, 1917-1919, No 190,234; FO 
228/3214,27 April 1919. 
30 FO 228/3214,22 April 1920. 
31 Cf. The daily reports of 24 and 25 January 1923 of Shanghai Public Settlement 
Municipal Council Police Report, which kept in the Shanghai Archives; Quoted from 
Dangshi vanmiu ziliao (Materials for the Study of the Party History), (Beijing), Vol 5. 32 The Conversation between the Chinese Foreign Minister Yan and Cblossing 
[Clossing] and Gorodetyski, 20 December 1920, ZEGXSL, 1921, No 810. 
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what was happening in the Movement and to make contact with the Chinese. Burtman 
was also described as a Russian refugee who had escaped from Vladivostok when it 
was occupied by Kolchak's troops. 33 In any event, the two versions are not 
contradictory. Perhaps Burtman was dispatched to Tianjin after he had escaped to 
Harbin. Even if Burtman came to China as an emigr6, one cannot rule out the 
possibility that he was assigned certain duties in China. Information from Russia 
indicated that the Red Army sent many partisans to infiltrate the eastward flow of 
Russian refugees. 34 Having grown up in Harbin, Burtman was familiar with Chinese, 
and was therefore a suitable person for the task in hand. It was this man who later 
became the Chairman of the Presidium of the Section of the Eastern Peoples under the 
Siberian Bureau of the RCP(B) Central Committee, and the Executive manager of the 
Council of Ministers of the Far Eastern Republic after his return to Siberia in early 
35 1920 . 
In September 1919, a Russian named D. E. Komaroff reached Shanghai by the 
S. S. Dilwars. He himself claimed that he had been a military clerk of the Russian 
forces in Mesopotamia. When the authorities discovered that he was connected with 
the Bolsheviks, Komaroff was sent back to Vladivostok. He can probably be 
identified with Kumaroff, a Bolshevik commissar in charge of propaganda work in 
Afghanistan and India. 36 Two other Russian Bolsheviks who later took charge of the 
33 P. Korovyakovsky and N. Rusanov, 'Zhang Tailei, A Trail-Blazer of the Chinese 
Revolution', Far Eastern Affairs, (1988), No 5, p 105; Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 
15. 
34 The official letter from the Division of Frontier Defence Affairs, dated 22 August 
1919, ZEGXSL, Vol 2, No 287, p 467. 35 K. V. Shevelyov, 'On the history of the Formation of the Communist Party of 
China', The Far Eastern Affairs, (1981), No 1, p 128; Kasanin, China in the Twenties, 
plý 14-15; 
6 FO 228/3214,25 September 1919; Levy (ed. ), Revolutionary Radicalism, p 244. 
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Comintern's Eastern affairs also came to China in 1919. One was K. N. Sokelov- 
Strolakhov, who did underground work in China during 1919-21, and then assumed 
the post of secretary of the Far Eastern Department of the ECCI. 37 Another was V. L. 
Hoholovkin, who came to China as an emissary in the fall of 1919. He visited China 
again in autumn 1920 as secretary of the Chinese Office of the Eastern Peoples Section 
of the Siberian Bureau of the RCP(B). 38 
In autumn 1919, an important figure from the Comintern arrived in China, a 
Korean named Pak Chinsen. Pak had settled in Russia prior to World War I and had 
studied at Moscow University. Soon after the Bolshevik Revolution, he rallied to the 
Bolshevik cause and was appointed by the Soviet leaders to be Korean Commissar at 
the People's Commissariat of Nationalities. Under the direction of the Bolshevik 
Krepkov, Pak Chinsen helped Yi Tunghui found the Korean Socialist Party in 
Khabarovsk in June 1918. After the Party's first congress, which was held in 
Vladivostok in April 1919, Pak, as general secretary, went to Moscow to register his 
party with the Comintem. and participated in the work of the ECCI. Lenin and other 
Bolshevik leaders received Pak and other Korean representatives, and reached an 
agreement that the Korean revolutionaries should use funds from the Comintern for the 
liberation of Korea and the espousal of the communist cause . 
39 In August 1919, Pak 
Chin-sun left Moscow for the Far East with a large amount of money, arriving in 
China in November. 40 
37 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 64. 
38 -Fenq Shuzhi xUgr-Ci (Selected Works of Peng Shuzhi), (Hong Kong: The October L 
Press, 1983), Vol 1, p 43; GLZDC, Vol 1, p 54. 
39 B. Lazitch and M. M. Drachkovitch (ed. ), Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, 
(Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1973) p 350; R. A. Scalapino and C. S. Lee, 
Communism in Korea, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp 7-10. 40 Suh Dae-sook, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948, (Princeton, N. J.: 
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The Western border of China was also a gateway for Bolshevik agents. From 
January 1919, there were some reports that the Bolsheviks sent their agents to Xinjiang 
(Chinese Turkestan) and the agents even set up local organisations in some towns to 
start a revolutionary movement there. Later, several Bolsheviks were arrested by the 
Chinese authorities. 41 In February, the Chinese authorities found that Turkish 
Bolsheviks were sent to Xinjiang to preach revolution among the Muslim peoples 
there. 42 In June, the Omsk Government also informed the Chinese Government that 
the Bolsheviks in Turkestan were using Xinjiang and Tibet as a route to establish 
communications with adjacent Asian countries. 43 Before December 1919, a Russian 
Jew had stayed in Gansu for several months and had established close relations with 
the local Muslim leader. 44 Most agents coming from Russian Central Asia were 
probably sent by the Central Bureau of the Muslim Organisations of the RCP(B). 
Some Bolsheviks did not come direct from Russian territory. For one reason 
or another, they reached China via other foreign countries. Many of them came from 
Japan for they could not stay in Japan any longer. In July 1918, a Russian Pole named 
Fuchs arrived in Shanghai from Japan, where he had been detained for his Bolshevik 
activities . 
45 It is not certain if this man was the Comintern agent who worked under 
the name of Fuchs in Henan and Hebei provinces between 1921 and 1922.46 One 
Princeton University Press, 1967), p 11; Kim Chun-yop and Kim Ch'angsun, Hanquk 
Konqsan Chuui Undonsa (The History of Korean Communist Movement), (Seoul, 
1986), p 169. 
41 ZEGXSL, 21 January 1919; FO 228/2986,26 April 1920; FO 228/3216,15 
November 1920. 
42 Shen bao (Shanghai Paper), 8 May 1919. 
43 note from the Foreign Ministry of Omsk Government to the Chinese General 
Consulate in Omsk, 18 June 1919; ZEGXSL, 1917-1919, No 525. 
44 FO 228/2986,26 April 1920. 
4 '5 FO 228/3214,11 July 1918. 
46 FO 228/3140, p 118. 
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month later, J. E. Tobinson and his wife reached China having been expelled from 
Yokohama for "spreading Bolshevik ideas". The Japanese Home Office stated that 
Tobinson was the younger brother of one of the Bolshevik leaders. 47 This suggests 
that his elder brother might have been the famous Bolshevik leader in Siberia A. M. 
Krasnoschekov, who sometimes used the assumed name Stroller Tobinson in America 
and Siberia. 48 Immediately on arrival in Shanghai J. E. Tobinson contacted Massing, 
a friend of Semesheko, Khodorov and Tolstoff. For this reason, the British 
Intelligence in Shanghai considered that Tobinson was probably one of that group. 49 It 
could also be conjectured that this group of Russians had connections with the 
Bolshevik leaders in Siberia, including Krasnoschekov himself. There was a 
prominent figure from Japan - A. S. Potapov. This man was an ex-Major General in 
the Tsarist Army who, while serving his term of military service, went to several Far 
Eastern countries. During the first days of the Bolshevik Revolution, he openly 
defected to the Soviet side and became the first high-ranking military officer to raise 
the red flag among the Guard Regiments. His past career made it dangerous for him to 
remain in Russia, and he therefore went abroad to work for the Bolshevik Regime as 
an important agent. At the end of 1919, he was urged by the Japanese Authorities to 
leave Tokyo and went on to live in the French Concession of Shanghai. 50 
47 FO 228/3214,21 August 1919. 
48 Erickson, The Soviet High Command, pp 218- 222. 49 FO 228/3214,21 August 1919. 
50 Li Yuzhen, Sun Zhonqshan vu Gonqchanquogi (Sun Yatsen and the Comintern), 
Taibei: the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1996, p 56; FO 228/3211, 
Series of May 1920; FO 228/3214,18 March 1920; 8 April 1920; FO 405/228, p 232. It 
is still not sure if this Potapov can be identified with N. M. Potapov, who was also a 
former general, and after the February Revolution, who became the President of the 
Military Commission of the Temporary Committee of the State Duma, ahd who later 
worked for Soviet Russia as a agent abroad. Cf. A. Wildman, The End of the Russian 
Imperial Army, (Princeton, 1980), p 233; R. P. Browder and A. F. Kerensky (ed. ), The 
Russian Provisional Government, 1917, (Stanford, 1961), p 848; D. V. Lehovich, White 
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Some other Russians arrived in China after they had been involved in 
revolutionary movements in America, Australia, India, Indonesia, Vietnam and so on. 
For example, Samuel Ran, a Russian Jew who had been naturalised in America, 
reached China from Saigon on 10 January 1919. He spent much time on the 
dissemination of Bolshevik propaganda and the expression of violent anti-British 
views. He held that the principles of Bolshevism would ultimately conquer the 
51 world. 
China, reduced to semi-colonial status by various foreign powers, had many 
free ports and foreign concessions in her territory. In addition, foreigners living on 
Chinese soil enjoyed extraterritorial rights, so the Chinese authorities had very little 
control over them. This made it very easy for foreigners to enter and settle in the 
country, especially in port cities such as Shanghai, Tianjin, Harbin, Hankou, Qingdao 
and Guangzhou. That is why many Russian Bolsheviks who had been deported from 
other countries could remain in China. 
News on the Bolsheviks' dispatches and activities in China by the year of 1919 
can be seen in many contemporary newspapers and periodicals, both within China and 
abroad. For example, an editorial of the Japanese Daily News (Nichi Nichi Shimbun) 
wrote that Russian Bolsheviks were sending partisans to China who were propagating 
their doctrines within her borders, and so "China will become a breeding ground of 
Bolshevism. , 52 Even Tan Pingshan, who joined the Communist movement the 
following year, expressed his fear of the arrival of the Bolsheviks in China in an article 
against Red (New York, 1973), p 429. 
5' FO 228/3211, Series of March 1919. 
52 Quoted from Chen bao (Beijing Morning Post), (Beijing), 17 June 1919. 
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published in Xin Chao (New Tide). 53 A Reuters' correspondent reported an interview 
with a Chinese official, who admitted: 
It is true that the Bolsheviks have sent agents to China, Korea and 
Japan. ... They are endeavouring to create a vast oriental movement 
which would throw many countries into flames. 54 
These warnings were not merely rumours. According to a Japanese police 
report in January 1920, by the beginning of the 1920, in Shanghai alone, there were 
55 
at least ten Bolsheviks. The evidence shows that Soviet Russia and the Comintern 
never gave up sending agents to China even during the crisis period of between the 
spring of 1918 and the end of 1919, and nothing could hinder them from attempting to 
spread revolution into China, contrary to the suggestion of many historians. 
Section 2. Agents Recruited in China during 1918-20 
During the years immediately following the October Revolution, there was not 
enough time for Bolsheviks to train agents who were familiar with China and the 
Chinese language, therefore some left-wing Russian residents in China were entrusted 
with the tasks of finding out about the situation in China and making contacts with 
progressive Chinese elements. 
r '3Tan Mingqian, 'Discussion on Democracy', An chao (The Renaissance), (Beijing, I 
MU 1919), Vol 1, No 5. 
The Pekinq and Tientsin Times, (Tianjin), 14 January 1920. 
The Ministry of Culture and Education of the Republic of Korea (ed. ), Han-auk 
Doknib Undonsa (The History of the Korean Independence Movement), (Seoul, 1970), 
Vol 3, p 400. 
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Russian residents in China included both Russians who had lived in China 
before the October Revolution and those who came to China as refugees or 6migr6s 
during the turmoil of revolution and the ensuing civil war. These groups were of 
diverse social status and held various political beliefs. Amongst them were some 
Bolsheviks, who, of course, had a strong desire to work for the Bolshevik cause. 
Moreover, there were some Russian democratic socialists, anarchists and even ex- 
Tsarist officials, who, despite their political convictions, were willing to help their 
fatherland to vanquish the foreign armed intervention. These Russians were also 
easily recruited by Soviet Russia and the Comintem though they might have had 
different motives: some were attracted by the ideal of social progress or patriotism and 
some were just out to earn money as a means of livelihood. 
According to the Section of the Eastern Peoples of the Siberian Bureau of the 
RCP(B) Central Committee's report to the ECCI, before Voitinsky's team arrived in 
China, certain work had been done by several Russian residents, including Polevoy, 
Ivanov, Khodorov and Agarief. 56 
A. A. Ivanov was an anarchist. In his younger days, he had been arrested for 
revolutionary activities before contriving to emigrate to Paris, where he learned 
Chinese at the Ecole des Langues Orientales Vivantes (School of Oriental languages) 
and became associated with the famous anarchist P. A. Kropotkin. When the February 
Revolution of 1917 broke out, he returned to Russia and obtained a diplomatic 
appointment from the Russian Provisional Government as a student interpreter in the 
56 GLZIDC Vol 1, p 50; A. 1. Kartunova., 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of 
China, 1920-1922, ' Problemy Dal'neqo Vostoka (Problems of the Far East), (Moscow, 
1973), No 1; Quoted from its Chinese translation by Ma Guifan in Gonqchan-Quoii yu 
Zhonqquo qeminq - Sulian xuezhe lunwen xuanyi (The Comintern and the Chinese 
Revolution - Selected Translations of the Treatises by Soviet Scholars), (Chengdu: 
Sichuan People's Press, 1987), p 50. 
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Russian Legation in Beijing. On 5 December 1917, Narkomindel issued a circular 
telegram to all Russian diplomatic missions abroad, demanding that they immediately 
answer whether they would like to carry out Soviet foreign policies; and ordering that 
whoever did not intend to work for the Soviet regime should leave their posts and 
transfer diplomatic business to the persons who now agreed to serve the new 
government regardless of their position. 57 Ivanov was the only person at the Russian 
Legation in Beijing who declared his desire to serve the Soviet regime. Thereupon, as 
he told Kasanin, "He found himself promoted suddenly from the lowest place to the 
highest, as the sole representative of the new revolutionary government. , 58 However, 
Ivanov could not hold his post long, since ex-Tsarist diplomats threatened him with 
arrest. He left the Legation and afterwards became a contributing editor to a French 
magazine Journal de Pekin. From September 1919, Ivanov was employed as a lecturer 
at Beijing University. All the time, he continued working for Soviet Russia and later 
joined the RCP(B) and became an advisor to the Yurin Mission. 59 
One of Ivanov's Russian colleagues at Beijing University, S. A. Polevoy, also 
served Soviet Russia. Polevoy had been a sinologist of the Oriental Institute in 
Vladivostok and one of his research subjects was Chinese periodicals published after 
57 Xue Xiantian, et al. (eds. ), ZSGGZH, p 130. 
ý'8 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, pp 44-5. A similar case can also be seen in Persia 
where a former Tsarist diplomat, Karl Bravin, was appointed in January 1918 to act as 
an unofficial Soviet representative in Teheran until an ardent Bolshevik was selected for 
this role; cf. Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, pp 93-4. 
59 These accounts on Ivanov's early experiences are mainly based on V. N. Nikiforov, 
Sovetskie Istoriki 0 Problemakh Kitaya (Soviet Historians on the Problem of China), 
henceforth abbreviated to SIOPK (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), and Kasanin, China in the 
Twenties. Kasanin was the interpreter and assistant representative of the Yurin 
mission, and he was also a close friend of Ivanov. The other references are the 
following: Ernestine Evans, 'Looking East from Moscow, Asia, (America, December 
1922), Vol 22, No 12, p 1012; 'The Table of the Foreign Employees at Beijing 
University' in the official note to the Chinese Education Ministry from Beijing University, 
dated 22 September 1924. 
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19 11.60 According to Zhang Ximan, Polevoy claimed to be a sinologist researching 
the ancient Chinese text, Shiiin (The Book of Songs), and he came to China for 
further study of the Chinese language; later, he became a Comintern agent in charge of 
the work to liaise with Chinese cultural circles. 61 Zhang Ximan had a close 
relationship with Polevoy: they both graduated from the Oriental Institute in 
Vladivostok and became lecturers at the Beijing Russian Language Institute and the 
Russian Department of Beijing University, therefore Zhang's information about 
Polevoy is very valuable. Nevertheless, most historians in mainland China have 
ignored Zhang's first-hand account and denied that Polevoy was an agent of the 
Comintern; they would rather believe the recollection of Bao Huiseng, who saw 
Polevoy only once, and who described Polevoy as a "White Russian" who 
of sympathised" with the Russian Revolution and Soviet Russia. 62 In fact, "White 
Russian" refers to Russians who were against the October Revolution and the 
Bolsheviks, and afterward escaped from Soviet Russia. Polevoy was born into a poor 
family and left Russia before the October Revolution. 63 He was probably sent to 
China by the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok, since as a usual practice, the Institute 
used to send students to relevant oriental countries for further language study. 64 
60 Nikiforov, SIOPK, pp 37-8. 
61 Zhang Ximan, Lishi huivi (Historical Reminiscences), (Shanghai: Jidong Press, 
1949), p 4; Here I should thank Zhang Xiaoman, the daughter of Zhang Ximan, who 
provided me with some material about her father. It is quite possible that Polevoy came 
to China for further study as Zhang said. 
62 Cf. Qiwu Laoren (Bao Huiseng), 'Before and After the Formation of the CCP', Xin 
guancha (New Look), (Beijing, 1 July 1957). 
63 Probably relying on Wu Nanru's recollection, Hua Yang in his article 'The Early 
Activities of Qu Qiubai and Zhang Tailei' [Zhon-q-qon-q vaniiu (The Studies of the CCP), 
(Taibei, July 1977), Vol 10, No 7] wrote that Polevoy came to China in July 1917. 
64 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 135; Kasanin himself was a graduate of this 
Institute. M. Sladkovsky in 'The First Centre of Sinology in the Far East and Its 
Graduates in the 1920s' [Far Eastern Affairs, (1980) No 1] mentions that at the 25th 
anniversary of the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok, some old graduates recalled their 
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Moreover, he sympathised with the October Revolution. So in any sense, Polevoy was 
definitely not a "White Russian". Perhaps Polevoy was a citizen of White Russia 
(Belorussia) or he intentionally told others that he was a "White Russian" in order to 
conceal his true identity. Nevertheless, a Beijing Government detective Guan Qian 
and some of Polevoy's other acquaintances, such as Cao Jinghua and Mao Yiheng 
claimed that Polevoy was employed by the Soviet Government. 65 According to newly 
published Comintern archives, Polevoy had been a member of the RCP(B) and worked 
for Soviet Russia before the arrival of Voitinsky in spring 1920.66 
Another well-known Russian 6migr6 in Beijing was B. Turgashev, a former 
Menshevik. Turgashev had studied in Paris and had then been an engineer with a 
responsible position at the Russo-Asiatic bank in Harbin. He was subsequently elected 
first chairman of the Harbin Soviet of Workers' Deputies after the February 
Revolution. Shortly after, he retired from politics and moved to Beijing. Later he was 
involved in working for Soviet Russia and became the Commercial Attache of the 
Yurin Mission. 67 
There were many Russians living in South China, especially in Shanghai. 
Shanghai had a large Russian community, numbering approximately 5,000 by 1920.68 
early study trips to China, Manchuria, Korea and Japan. (p 133) After the conclusion of 
the Russo-Chinese Treaty in 1896, the graduates of the Oriental Department of St. 
Petersburg University were even sent to China for three years to perfect their 
knowledge of China and the Chinese language. (p 130) 
65 The secret reports by Guan Qian are kept at the Second Chinese History Archives 
in Nanjing. See Zhonq-quo wuzhencifu zhuyi he Zhonqquo shehui clang (Chinese 
Anarchism and the Chinese Socialist Party), (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Press, 1981), p 
86; Guan Shanfu, 'Some Matters on Polevoy and Ivanov', Dangshi tonqxun (The 
Bulletin on the History of the CCP), (Beijing, 1984), No 3, p 59. 66 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 50. 
67 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 64; FO 228/3291. 68 FO 228/3563, September 1920; Note from Official for Foreign Affairs of Jiangsu 
Province to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 October 1921, ZEGXSL, 1921, p 
580. 
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It is difficult to distinguish between those Russians who were dispatched from Russia 
and those who were recruited in China. 
As early as September 1918, some radical Russian residents' activities also 
attracted the attention of the local authorities in Shanghai. It was reported that some 
young Russians in Shanghai had subscribed to Bolshevik principles and were 
convinced that Bolshevism would save Russia, and then China and India from the 
"yoke of British imperialism". These men intended to establish a "Socialistic Society" 
in order to keep in touch with the Bolsheviks in Russia. 69 It is not certain whether the 
Socialistic Society was founded or not, but there is no doubt about the existence of 
certain Russians in Shanghai who put themselves at the service of Soviet Russia. Not 
later than 1920, a revolutionary Russian 6migr6s' organisation - "Fhe Bureau of the 
Russian 6migr6s" was formed in Shanghai, and its secretary was a Bolshevik, 
Kaufman. 70 
J. Lizerovitch was an important left-wing Russian resident in Shanghai. 
Before 1917 Lizerovitch had previously made himself conspicuous by his radical 
views and his connections with socialists and anarchists in England and afterwards he 
came to Shanghai, where he was employed by Jardine Matheson, a British firm. As 
the following evidence suggests, he became a Bolshevik agent in Shanghai not later 
than spring 1919. Around that time a Korean, Yo Un-hong, 71 was sent from Shanghai 
to Siberia to seek Bolshevik assistance for the Korean independence movement and 
met a Bolshevik representative there. On his return to Shanghai, Yo and other 
69 FO 228/3214, No 412,20 September 1918. 
70 VKNDK, Vol 1, Index. 
71 Vo Un-hong was Yo Un-hyong's brother, who had been graduated from Leicester 
University in England. See Japanese Foreign Office (ed. ) Gendai Chosen Jinme! Dal 
ýLiten (A Biographical Dictionary of Modern Korean). 
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Koreans reportedly "established contacts with John Ruzaruichi, a Russian Bolshevik in 
Shanghai. 02 This Ruzaruichi is obviously a homophonic name of Lizerovitch, since 
many East Asians make no distinction between the pronunciation of 'R' and '1;. His 
identity was later confirmed by Voitinsky, who once remarked that Lizerovitch as a 
"comrade" and had been receiving special instructions from Soviet Russia. Later an 
official of the Bolshevik Propaganda Bureau at Chita praised Lizerovitch as a "noble 
worker" for the Soviet cause. 73 Despite this, Lizerovitch has never been mentioned in 
any works on the CCP before. 
From 8 February 1920, there were several meetings in Shanghai attended by 
Russian residents who were sympathetic to the Bolshevik regime. The main topic for 
discussion at these meetings was to form a committee to take control of the Russian 
Consulates and the branches of the Russo-Asiatic Bank in China. 74 Prominent speakers 
at these gatherings were Poliak, Smolensky and Lunden. At one of the meetings 
Sokolsky was mentioned. V. E. Poliak (or Polejack and Polialk) was a Bolshevik 
agitator, and his overt occupation in Shanghai was a tailor. Poliak's careers is worth 
noting: he joined the RCP(B) in 1918 and graduated from the Oriental Department of 
the Military Academy of the Red Army; in 1923 he became a member of the Joffe 
Mission, and later worked under M. Borodin and held the post of chief advisor to 
Huangpu Military Academy. 75 A. M. Smolensky was also reported to be a Bolshevik. 
D. A. Lunden was a Russian Jew, a graduate of King's College, London. Following 
72 Ku Dae-yeol, Korea under Colonialism, (Seoul, 1985), p 233. 
73 FO 228/3214, September 1920; FO 228/3216, No 37,6 November 1920; FO 
228/3140, p 78. 
74 FO 228/3214,19 February 1920,13 March 1920, FO 405/233, No. 107. 
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332; Wang 
Yijun, Zhonq Su waiiiao de xumu (The Prelude of the Sino-Soviet Diplomacy), (Taibei: 
Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1963), p 338; Holubnychy, Michael 
Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923-1925, p 256, p 259. 
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the Revolution in 1917, he went to Petrograd where he met most of the leading 
politicians. Subsequently he reached Vladivostok, where he acted as a representative 
of the Times, and then proceeded to China. In July 1919, he expressed his neutral 
political attitude, supporting the Russian democratic socialists against both the White 
Guards and the Bolsheviks. But later he became a close friend of Lizerovitch and 
went over to the Bolshevik cause. In May 1920 he embarked on a mission to Moscow 
via the U. S. A. and England. 76 
G. Sokolsky, an American of Russian extraction, was a mysterious person. As 
the editor of the English language Russian Daily News in Petrograd, Sokolsky 
witnessed the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 and became acquainted with Unin, 
Trotsky and Bukharin. In his reminiscences written in his old age in America, 
Sokolsky claimed that he had been evicted from Russia in March 1918 and then 
arrived in China. But in a conversation with a Dane on a steamer from Hankou to 
Shanghai in April 1919, Sokolsky told the latter that he was a Bolshevik and was keen 
to disseminate Bolshevik ideas in China. He also boasted that he had been in close 
contact with Lenin and Trotsky. The American Consulate was soon informed of these 
claims. Sokolsky was reported to be working on behalf of Soviet Russia and had close 
relations with Bolshevik agents. But if that was the case, it was rather surprising that 
Sokolsky reported the activities of the Bolsheviks to the American consulate in 
Shanghai from the spring of 1920. Perhaps he was a double agent or simply changed 
his political stand. 77 
76 FO 228/4313,19 February 1920,18 March 1920, May 1920; FO 405/228, No 157; 
FO 405/233, No 107. 
77 Sokolsky, 'Reminiscences', USIDS, 761,93/142, quoted from Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen: 
Frustrated Patriot; FO 228/3214,1 May 1919; FO 405/228, No 157. Hu Shi recorded in 
his diary that Sokolsky was very concerned himself with Chinese politics in 1921, [Hu 
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There were several Russians residing in other cities who offered to help the 
Soviet Regime. For example, Pankratoff, who had graduated from the Oriental 
Institute in Vladivostok and knew Chinese very well, was an associate professor in 
Hankou and, started to work for the Bolsheviks on Polevoy's recommendation. 78 F. 
W. Thompson, who had been a naturalised American citizen, changed his name to G. 
L Mikulin and reverted back to Russian nationality in 1918. Later he became a 
Bolshevik worker while working as an Examiner on the staff of the Customs in 
Shantou. 79 
By virtue of their familiarity with the Chinese and English languages and 
social environment, those Russians who were recruited by Soviet agents in China used 
to act as intermediaries between the Russian Bolsheviks and potential Chinese 
revolutionaries, and hence sometimes accomplished more than the agents sent from the 
Soviet Russia, as we will see in the following chapters. 
Section 3. Arrival of the Voitinsky Group and Other Emissaries in 1920 
1920 was a turning point in the history of Soviet Russia as well as in Sino- 
Soviet relations. The Bolshevik regime had survived the Civil War and foreign 
armed intervention. Regular traffic between Soviet Russia and China gradually 
resumed from the beginning of 1920. 
Shi de 1E (The Diary of Hu Shi), (Beijing, 1985) p 198, p 203]. In his The Tinder Box of 
Asia, which was published in 1933, Sokolsky showed his sympathy for the Chinese 
revolution. 
78 Pankratoff later became a famous Sinologist and Tibetanlogist. GLZDC, Vol 1, p 
28; Hu Sh! de riii, 4 July 1921. 
FO 228/3211, November 1920 and April 1921; FO 405/233, September 1921. 
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With regard to this situation, A. Kushnaryov and M. Sakhyanova, the 
leaders of the underground Far Eastern Regional Committee of the RCP(B) in 
Vladivostok, wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the RCP(B) in January 
1920, explaining that they were planning to establish permanent relations with 
Chinese revolutionaries. 80 The following month, Vilensky, came to Vladivostok, 
assuming the leading position of the Vladivostok Committee of the Far Eastern 
Bureau (the Dal'buro) there and taking the responsibility for directing the RCP(B) 
and the Comintern's local organisations to undertake revolutionary work in China. 
At Vilensky's suggestion, the Bureau set up a Foreign Section at the beginning of 
1920 .81 From then on, more agents were sent to China and many of them were 
dispatched directly from Siberia. 
According to a secret telegram from the Chinese Cabinet to the Governors of 
Shanghai and Jiangsu province, Lenin's government had dispatched emissaries to 
Shanghai and a number of Bolsheviks had come to Jiangsu at the beginning of 
1920. British intelligence agents later discovered that these Bolsheviks had 
established themselves in Nanjing, the capital of Jiangsu province, in the early 
spring of 1920.82 In February, a Bolshevik agent called Puglebesky reached 
Shanghai from Vladivostok with a large sum of money and five Chinese 
assistants. 83 The following month, a Russian Bolshevik representative reportedly 
came to Shanghai with one Chinese and two Koreans. The identity of the Russian is 
not known, but it is clear that he later made contact with General Potapov. The 
80 Shevelyov, 'On the History of the Formation of the Communist Party of China', Far 
Eastern Affairs, (1981), No 1, p 129. 
'3' GLZDC, Vol 1, p 38, p 50. 
82 TO 228/2986, p 357. 
83 FO 405/233, No 107. 
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three Asians had been participants in the Second All-Russia Congress of 
Communist Organisations of Peoples of the East in November 1919. The Chinese 
was Xia Qifeng, a journalist, who had gathered news at the Paris Peace Conference 
before he returned to China via Russia, where he attended the Congress as a 
Chinese labour representative. 84 In April, the Chinese Ministry of Internal Affairs 
informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a Bolshevik named Di-Er-Na-Fu had 
brought a huge sum of money into China and was trying to stir up revolt among the 
Chinese troops. Possibly he was the same man as a certain N. E. Doienin who 
turned up in a British intelligence report. 85 
The arrival of Voitinsky's group in China is a well known affair. Many 
historians have already recognised the important role played by Voitinsky in the 
Chinese Communist movement. G. N. Voitinsky (alias Zarkhin) was bom in 1893. 
As an emigrant, he had lived in the U. S. A. and Canada and had been a member of 
the American Socialist Party before he returned home. He joined the RCP(B) in 
Siberia in 1918 and was arrested and sentenced to hard labour in Sakhalin in the 
following year. After an uprising by the prisoners there, he went to Vladivostok, 
where he worked at the Foreign Section of the Vladivostok Committee of the 
Dal'buro. In April 1920, Voitinsky with two other members of the Section, Titov, a 
graduate from the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok, and Selebryakov, actually a 
Korean Communist named Kim, were sent by Vilensky to China; this mission had 
been previously approved by the leadership of the Comintern. 86 Kasanin reminisced 
84 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, p 14; Jean Chesneaux, Chinese Labour 
Movement, 1919-1927. (California: Stanford University Press, 1968), p 160. 
_EGXSL, 
1926, --No 164; FO 405/233, No 107. 
86 GLZDC, p 48; Shevelyov, 'On the History of the Communist Party of China', The, 
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that he had heard an interesting story about Voitinsky during his stay in Beijing in 
the early 1920s, namely that when Voitinsky was on a train approaching Harbin, the 
Chinese police, acting on the advice of an informer, boarded the train to seize the 
"Russian agent". Since it was too late to burn the documents and ciphers which he 
was carrying, Voitinsky locked himself in his compartment and swallowed all the 
papers. The Chinese police detained him as a suspect, but later had to release him 
because no evidence was found. 87 If this story is true, it means that Voitinsky had 
probably already tried and failed to reach China before his arrival in spring 1920. 
Besides his assistants Titov and Selebryakov, Voitinsky came to China with 
his wife M. Kuznetsova and a Chinese interpreter Yang Mingzhai. Yang Mingzhai 
(original name Yang Haode) was born in Shandong province and moved to Siberia 
before World War 1. After the Bolshevik Revolution he joined the RCP(B) and 
became the head of the Union of Chinese Residents in Vladivostok. 
Some other agents who were dispatched to China during the spring and 
summer of 1920 also joined Voitinsky's team. One of these was K. A. Stoyanovich 
(alias Minor), who had worked for the Cheka before coming to China and could 
88 speak French. He left Harbin for Tianjin in the spring of 1920. Sakhyanova, one 
of the leading members of the Far Eastern Regional Committee of the RCP(B) in 
Far Eastern Affairs, (1981), No 1, p 12. 
87 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 224. 
8ýý VKNDK, Vol 1, Index. Stoyanovich subsequently became one of Borodin's co- 
wor s. Holubnychy wrongly holds that Stoianovich is Eugene Pick, who became a 
defector in 1927. cf. Holubnychy, Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, p 252; 
In fact, Eugene Pick in his book China in the Grip of the Reds, (Shanghai: North-China 
Daily News & Herald Ltd., 1927) did not mention this and only wrote that, "Five years 
ago, the USSR sent Stoianovich. to Canton for the express purpose of persuading Dr. 
Sun Yat-sen to accept Borodin as adviser. " See also in Eudin and North, Soviet Russia 
and the East, p 142. 
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Vladivostok, also came to Beijing to work alongside Voitinsky for a short term. 89 
Another member of the Foreign Section, I. K. Mamayev, who could speak Chinese, 
later participated in the work of Voitinsky's team. 90 L. A. Perlin also worked under 
Voitinsky's direction. According to Liang Bing-xuan, Perlin was a young American 
Communist. 91 
At the end of June 1920, Vilensky, the instigator of Voitinsky's mission, 
crossed the Sino-Russian border. Vilensky was born in Siberia in 1888. He began 
to engage in revolutionary activities in 1903 and became a Menshevik in 1912. 
After the February Revolution he was elected Chairman of the Yakutsk Central 
Executive Committee of Soviets. He soon joined the Bolsheviks and became a 
Commissar in the Siberian Council of People's Commissars. With the downfall of 
the Soviet Government in Siberia, he escaped to Moscow in April 1918, where he 
worked in the Soviet Government on Siberian and Far Eastern affairs and wrote for 
Izvestiia and became the commissar of the Military Academy of the Headquarters of 
General Staff of the Red Army. After taking part in the defeat of Kolchak, he 
headed the Soviet Government Mission for Foreign Affairs in Siberia. 92 Within the 
leading circle of Bolsheviks, Vilensky was apparently an important policy maker on 
Chinese affairs and it was he who drafted the Karakhan Manifesto to China in the 
89 Huang Xiurong, Gonqchan quo'i yu Zhonqquo geming quanxi shi p 58. 
90 Although Mamayev did not join Voitinsky's team from the beginning, he later 
worked with them. See 'Bao Huiseng's Recollection', Yida gianhou (The Period of the 
First Congress of the CCP), (Beijing: People's Press, 1981). In 1921, Mamayev 
became the head of the Chinese Section of the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat in 
Irkutsk. 
91 M. A. Persits, 'From the History of the Making of the Communist Party of China', 
Narodv Azij Afriki (Peoples of Asia and Africa), [Henceforth NAAJ, (Moscow, 1971), No 
4, p 49; Haiyu guke (Liang Bingxuan's penname), Jiefan-q bielu 'An Alternative Record 
of the Liberation', Zivou ren (Free People), Hong Kong, 1951. 
92 Cf. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, p 290. 
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summer of 1919. Therefore, Vilensky's visit to China was undoubtedly an event of 
significance, although he asked the Chinese authorities' permission only to 
"investigate industrial and commercial conditions in China in a private capacity". 93 
Until now, most Chinese historians have not paid sufficient attention either to 
Vilensky's visit to China or to the man himself. M. M. Abramson, the head of the 
Foreign Section of the Dal'buro, accompanied Vilensky as his Chinese interpreter. 94 
When Vilensky, under the assumed name of Gusev, with Abramson tried to enter 
Kiakta, a town located on the Russian and Mongolian border, they were detained by 
the Chinese frontier guards. On their release, they joined Yurin's party, but 
managed to arrive in Beijing before the Yurin mission. 95 
Besides Voitinsky's and Vilensky's teams, other Bolshevik emissaries 
continued to be dispatched to China. Amongst others, the following examples were 
recorded in British archives. 
In May 1920 a Bolshevik mission, comprising eight persons headed by 
Levitas, who was from Moscow, came to Ku1ja to negotiate a trade agreement with 
the Chinese authorities of Xinjiang. It was agreed that Soviet Russia could establish 
a political agency as well as a trade agency there. Before long, Limeref, Borchark 
96 
and Kolikof, who were Soviet political agents, came to Ku1ja one after another. In 
August 1920 a Bolshevik team was on its way to Xinjiang. The party consisted of 
93 Telegram from Shao Hengrui, the Chinese Consul at Vladivostok, to the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry, 17 June 1920, ZEGXSL, 1920, p 50. 
94 Abramson (alias Mazurin) joined the RCP(B) in 1918. He became the head of the 
Chinese Department of the Section of the Eastern People under the Siberian Bureau of 
the Central Committee of the RCP(B) and a secretary at the Foreign Ministry of the Far 
Eastern Republic from 1921. Cf. Holubnychy, Michael Borodin and the Chinese 
Revolution, p 134. 0 -Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 28. 
96 FO 405/233,25 October 1921. Kolikof had been a consul in Afghanistan before he 
came to Xinjiang. 
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one Russian Bolshevik, two Tartarised Jews, a Cossack and an Indian with an escort 
of 20 men. With the party were three Muslim agitators, all of whom had been 
serving in the Comintern's Propaganda Department in Tashkent. 97 Later, a 
Bolshevik agent named Yusuf, who had been deported by the Indian Government, 
arrived in Kashgar. 98 Also, in September 1920, a Bolshevik agent named Karinof or 
Kernoff arrived in China. He could speak Mandarin and was in possession of a 
large quantity of funds. He travelled between Shanghai and Tianjin, and on his 
second visit to Shanghai was accompanied by delegates from the Chinese 
Communists in Russia. 99 
The above are only some of the numerous Soviet and the Comintern agents 
who arrived in China during 1920. According to a report of the Section of Eastern 
People of Siberian Bureau dated 21 December 1920, there were over ten Russian 
Bolsheviks who had had responsible positions working in China. 100 By the end of 
1920, the Bolsheviks had scattered throughout many cities and regions, including 
Harbin, Manzhouli, Fengtian, Heihe, Mohe, Iffi, Ining, Kashgar, Beijing, Qingdao, 
Yantai, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Wuhan, Zhangzhou, Shantou and 
Guangzhou. 101 Owing to limitations of space, it is impossible to give details on all 
of them, but several further cases will be introduced later in the course of this study. 
Section 4. Bolshevik Organisations and Centres in China 
97 FO 228/3216, Nos 27-28, (August 1920). 
98 FO 228/3216, No 38,11 November 1920. 
99 FO 228/3211, November 1920; FO 228/3214, September 1920; FO 228/ 3216, No 
40,27 November 1920; FO 405/233, September 1921. 
100 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 53. 
101 See source materials in ZEGXSL and FO archives. 
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There is much evidence to show that, from 1919 to the beginning of 1921, 
many Russian Bolshevik groups and organisations were set up and operating in 
China. In February 1919, a secret report received by the Beijing Government 
recorded that "the Russian Bolsheviks had established an organisation in Tianjin 
and were operating surreptitiously. " 102 Another report claimed that around the 
summer of 1920 there was a central society of Russian Bolsheviks in Shanghai with 
branches in Beijing, Ningbo, Hankou, Shantou, etc. 103 
Alert to the existence of Bolshevik organisations, the Chinese military 
authorities issued an order on 19 February 1921 banning the organisations set up by 
Russian Bolsheviks and outlawing Bolshevik activities in China. 104 Nevertheless, 
these organisations could never be successfully prohibited, since most of them had 
gone underground. 
Among the Bolshevik organisations in China there were some important 
bodies which served as the leading centres of the activities of the agents of Soviet 
Russia and the Comintem. 
In order to direct the work in the East Asian countries more efficiently, the 
East Asian Secretariat of the Comintern was set up in Shanghai in May 1920 at 
Vilensky's suggestion. In some books on the Communist movements in the Far 
East, the Secretariat used to be denominated as the "Shanghai Bureau". 105 This 
102 'Beijing Government to the Governor of Zhili, Cao Rui', February 1919; the 
document kept in the China Second Historical Achives in Nanjing; quoted from Lai 
Xinxia (ed. ), Tianiin iindai shi (The Modern History of Tianjin), (Tianjin: Nankai 
University Press, 1987), p 278. 
103 ZEGXSL, 26 September 1920, p 241; FO 228/3216, No 27,21 August 1920. 
104 Wang Yijun, Zhong Su Waiiiao de Xumu, p 174. 
105 G. M. Beckmann and Okubo Genji, The Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1945, 
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Comintem provisional central institution was run by Voitinsky and was directed by 
a Bureau of three Russian Bolsheviks, including Vilensky. 106 After the 
establishment of the Section of the Eastern People under the Siberian Bureau of the 
RCP(B) in Irkutsk in August 1920, which later became the Far Eastern Secretariat 
of the ECCI in early 1921, the Shanghai Bureau became a subordinate body of it. 
No later than 17 August 1920, the East Asian Secretariat's subsidiary 
sections - the Chinese Revolutionary Bureau and the Korean Revolutionary Bureau 
- were established. In making preparations for setting up the Japanese section, the 
Secretariat dispatched a Korean, Yi Ch'un-suk, in June 1920 to Tokyo to contact 
Japanese socialists and anarchists. 107 Besides the Russians, the Secretariat's staff 
included Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, an Indian and even an Englishman. 108 
The responsibility of the Secretariat was to conduct and finance the Chinese 
revolutionary movement and the equivalent Korean and Japanese movements, and 
(California: Stanford University Press, 1969), p 31; R. A. Scalapino, The Japanese 
Communist Movement, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p 17, p 72; 
Scalapino and Lee, Eo-ýnmunism in Korea, p 13. 106 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 36. 
"' 7v-oitinsky's Letter to the Eastern Section of the Siberian Bureau of the RCP(B), 17 
August 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, pp 31-33; Kim Chun-yop and Kim Ch'ang-sun, Han-quk 
Konqsan Chuui Undonsa, p 231; Beckmann and Genji, The Japanese Communist 
Ea p30. *8 
John Pavlovich Clark was born in Moscow. In 1908 he went to Europe with his 
parents and in 1914 he became an British citizen. After the Russian Revolution he 
returned to Russia and joined the Bolshevik Party. He first served at the American Red 
Cross in Vladivostok, and lived on the false passport as Boris Gray. After the downfall 
of Kolchak, he became the secretary to the Far Eastern Committee of the RCP(B) and 
the Home Minister of the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia. Later he was invited to 
Moscow and soon was sent to Shanghai as the chief of the Military Revolutionary 
Council of Kamchatka. In 1921 the East Asian Secretariat dispatched him to Japan, 
where he was detained and then deported. Cf. 'The Immigration Section of the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Foreign Minister, 2 December 1922', and 
'The Japanese Consulate to the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs, 20 January 
1922', in The Archives of the Japanese MinistrV of Foreiqn Affairs. 
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to establish Communist parties in those Far Eastern countries. Being a major port- 
city in East Asia, Shanghai was the ideal centre for such operations. 
Firstly, Shanghai was a city where the Chinese working class and radical 
intellectuals were concentrated, and the Chinese authorities' control over the place 
was relatively loose. Secondly, after the I March Uprising in Korea in 1919, 
several thousands of Korean nationalists took refuge in Shanghai and established a 
Korean Provisional Government there. 109 The Korean Socialist Party's headquarters 
also moved to Shanghai from Siberia and its chairman Yi Tunghui became the 
Prime Minister of the Provisional Government. So it was easy for the Secretariat to 
keep in close contact with the Korean Socialist Party as well as the Korean 
Provisional Government. 110 Thirdly, it was also convenient for the Secretariat to 
send agents to Japan and other Asian countries, for various shipping lines ran from 
Shanghai to different ports of these countries regularly. According to Maring's 
report to the ECCI in 1922, the time needed to travel from Shanghai to Japan was 
under 5 days; to the Philippines, 6-7 days; to Singapore, 10 days, and to Indonesia, 
14 days. "' 
From Shanghai, the Secretariat also supported the revolutionary movements 
in some other Asian countries. Voitinsky and his assistants enlisted some Indians to 
the anti-British cause, asking them to provide news from India and criticisms of 
British rule in India, which the Russians sent on to Moscow. 112 A Russian 
'09 Cf. Nym Wales and Kim San, Song of Ariran, A Korean Communist in the Chinese 
Revolution, (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1941), p 112; Ku Daeyeol, Korea under 
Colonialism, p 95. 7-'O-Cf. Suh Dae-sook, The Korea Communist Movement, 1918-1948; Scalapino and 
Lee, Communism in Korea. 
GLZDZC, Vol 2, p 224. 
FO 405/228, No 160 (August 1920). 
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Bolshevik Kernoff declared at a meeting of Chinese Socialists that the Bolsheviks 
had sent two million rupees to the Indian revolutionaries and that he himself had 
met an Indian Communist in Bokhara. After a short stay in Shanghai, Kernoff left 
for Java to meet some prominent figures there. Other agents in Shanghai also 
contributed to the promotion of the revolution in India. One tried to start 
publication of a newspaper in Shanghai for Indians. 113 Therefore, Shanghai was 
regarded by the Comintern as the "centre of the Revolutionary work in the Far 
East". 114 
Before May 1920, the Bolsheviks' most important outlet in Shanghai was 
Shanghai Life, a Russian newspaper published for the Russian community. Its 
founder, G. Semesheko, was an ex-priest, who was later dismissed from a Russian 
newspaper for drunkenness. He then became a reporter for a socialist newspaper 
and was arrested by the Tsarist Government on a charge of sedition. Coming to 
China, Semesheko founded Shanghai Life in 1917, which, at first, was a small-scale 
paper with no Bolshevik connections. Sometime later he went back to Russia, 
returning to China in April 1919 with Khodorov, Massing and Tolstoff, all of whom 
served Soviet Russia. 115 It was reported that Semesheko consulted Vilensky in 
Vladivostok in February 1920 and that the latter purchased Shanghai Life for $ 
5,000 and appointed Semesheko as editor-in-chief. From then on, Shanghai Life 
became a completely Bolshevik newspaper. 116 Even after Shanghai Life's Russian 
113 FO 228/ 3214, September 1920; FO 228/3216, No 40. 
114 'Riutin's Report to the Far Eastern Secretariat of ECCI to China, 6 April 1922', 
GLZIDC, Vol 1, p 83. 
115 FO 405/233, No 107; FO 228/3214,22 April 1920. 
116 The Shanghai Municipality once even consulted with the Russian Consul and 
attempted to expel Semesheko from China. Cf. Official Note from the Chinese Ministry 
of the Internal Affairs to the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, 28 April 1920; FO 228/3211, 
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financial support was withdrawn in October 1922 and used to set up an English 
language journal the New Russia, A Political and Economic Weekl , it continued 
publishing independently for a while and was still a pro-Soviet paper. 117 
There were about thirty staff on Shanjzhai Life between 1920 and 1921. 
Most of them were pro-Soviet Russian 6migr6s and some were sent from Soviet 
Russia directly. M. 1. Baranovsky (Bemofsky) was a leading writer and editor, who 
began to write for Shanghai Life before the spring of 1920 and had close relations 
with the Bolshevik emissaries. ' 18 From 1922 Baranovsky became a secretary at the 
Publication Department of Narkomindel and between 1923 and 1928 he worked as 
an interpreter at the East Department of the ECCI. 119 N. K. Novitsky was also an 
important contributor, who was entrusted by Joffe in 1922 with the task of starting 
publication of the English paper, New Russia. 120 For a short period of time, 
Voitinsky was an editor and a correspondent for the newspaper. 121 Around August 
1920, ShanRhai Life was temporarily edited by Kaufman, who was the secretary of 
April 1921; ZEGXS , 30 April 1920, No 164. According to an agent of the Red Army Intelligence Service in China in 1920s, one of the editors of Shanghal Life during the 
Great Chinese Revolution was Veprentseff, who had worked for the Soviet Government 
and came to China as a Comintern agent. See Pick, China in the Grip of the Reds, p 
16. 
117 In Sneevliet Archive No 312, there are two receipts from Wilde, who received from 
Sneevliet, dated 5 December 1922: one of $ 2,206-74 (Mexican dollars and cents) for 
the liquidating commission of Shanghai Life, and one of $ 1,500 for the journal "New 
Russia". Saich, OFUFC, Vol 1, p 348. 
118 FO 405/228, No 157. 
119 See Index of VKNDK, Vol 1. In the USSR Baranovsky published several articles 
about China, including: 'China's struggle to Annul Unequal Treaties', Morovoe 
Khoziaistvo I Mirovaia Politika, No 12,1926, quoted from R. C. North, Moscow and 
Chinese Communists, (California: Stanford University Press, 1963), p 422; 'The Anglo- 
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Rut er University Press, 1962). 
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the paper's office. 122 Popov was also taken onto the editorial staff of Shanghai Life 
during Kaufman's absence in Beijing. 123 One of the active workers on Shanghai 
Life and its financial controller was Goorman or Gurman, who later became a 
member of both the Joffe and Borodin missions. 124 The head of the Printing 
Department, Fiapkin or Tiapkin, was previously the controller of the Soviet Printing 
Press in Petrograd. 125 Other Soviet agents who worked on Shanghai Life were 
Lizerovitch, Khodorov, Agariev, Stopany, Orjeschko, Sinolinkof, Podhorsky, 
Doienin and Angarrosky. 
The offices of ShanRhai Life were located at No. 716, Xia Fei Road in the 
French Concession and Edward Road in the British Concession. 126 The staff of 
Shanghai Life were reported to hold frequent meetings. For example, on 28 
September 1920, a secret meeting of about thirty Russians was held in the office of 
Shanghai Life, passing a resolution that the Chinese Government be petitioned to 
allow the Government of the Far Eastern Republic to appoint consuls in place of the 
122 Between 1920 and 1921, Kaufman was a member of the delegation of the Far 
Eastern Republic to China. Between March 1921 and 1924, he first worked at the Far 
Eastern Bureau of the Comintern and afterwards at the Eastern Department of the 
ECCL Cf. FO 228/3211, March 1920; FO 228/3216, No 27,21 August 1920; VKND , Vol 1, Index. Kaufman published an article entitled 'Japanese Imperialism and Korea' 
in Novyi Vostok (New Orient), (Moscow, 1924), Vol 5. 
=FO 228/3214, October 1920. 
124 FO 405/233, No 107; Wang Yijun, Zhonq Su waiiiao de xumu, p 338; Holubnychy, 
Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, p 259. In Sneevliet Archives No 543. 
Goorman is described as an editor of Shan-qhai Life, and in March 1922 Sneevliet lived 
in his house in Shanghai. (Saich, OFUFQ ,p 248) In September 1922, when Geker (Joffe Mission's military Attache) and Sneevliet talked with Sun Yat-sen, Goorman was 
their interpreter. GLZDC, Vol 1, p 135. 125 FO 405/233, No 107. 
126 'Yuan Zhenying's Recollections', Ge Maochun, Jiang Jun and LI Xingzhi (eds. ), 
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Tsarist representatives. 127 Sometimes the office sent emissaries to Vladivostok and 
Harbin and it was also frequently visited by Bolshevik agents from Vladivostok, 
Chita, Beijing, Tianjin and Guangzhou. 128 Many Bolshevik activities in southern 
China were related to Shanghai Life. 
After the East Asian Secretariat was established, Shanghai Life engaged in 
propaganda under its direction and was sometimes used as a front to hide its 
activities. For example, when Voitinsky's team came to China, they all pretended to 
be journalists of Shanghai Life and Voitinsky's overt profession was editor of the 
paper. 129 An agent in Zhangzhou, Mikulin, did his work under instructions coming 
from Shanghai Life. 130 
Two other peripheral institutions around the East Asian Secretariat with 
specific functions were the Shanghai branches of the Centrosoyus (the Russian 
Central Union of Co-operative Stores) and of the Zakoubsbit (the Russian Co- 
operative Union). 
They had close relations with each other and had different duties. The 
Centrosoyus mainly acted as a medium for financial transactions. 131 The 
Centrosoyus was the Soviet Government's Economic Bureau, and its agencies and 
representatives in Shanghai and later in Hankou were constantly in receipt of large 
sums of money from the Comintern, which they used to finance Soviet agents and 
127 FO 228/3214, series of September 1920. 
128 FO 405/233, No 107, September 1921. 
129 Ye Yonglie, Zhonc gong ic - zhi 
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the Communist movement in China. 132 The Zakoubsbit was often used by the 
Bolsheviks as a contact point. The above bodies were actually parts of the same 
organisation and were all Bolshevik institutions. 133 
The first manager of the Centrosoyus was I. P. Tarasoff, who was designated 
to receive funds from Moscow. In 1921 Tarasoff was relieved of his post and 
succeeded by M. A. Kossolapoff. Both of them were closely connected with the 
offices of Shanghai Life. 134 The police reports of Shanghai Public Settlement 
Municipal Council and Shanghai French Concession Municipal Council recorded 
that in January 1923, when Joffe arrived in Shanghai, he met several times with 
Kossolapoff, who was considered a "leading figure of the Bolshevik movement in 
Shanghai", and, on his suggestion, Joffe allocated large sums of money to 
Semesheko of Shanghai Life and other Soviet agents. 135 Gorigoriyev of the 
Centrosoyus undertook responsibility for transferring publications received from 
Moscow and Siberia to Voitinsky. 136 B. A. Vykhristof, the chief accountant of the 
Centrosoyus and assistant to Tarasoff, was concurrently president of the Russian 
Democratic Club, which was an open meeting place for Russian residents in 
Shanghai. 137 S. L. Wilde, who became the chief accountant of the Centrosoyus 
later, acted as a Comintern liaison man between Shanghai and Russia. 138 
132 Pick, China in the Grip of the Red, p 25. 
133 FO 405/233, September 1921. 
134 'Voitinsky's letter to the Section of the Eastern Peoples of the Siberian Bureau of 
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135 These security reports are kept in the Shanghai Archives. 
13r3 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 35. 
137 FO 405/233, September 1921. 
13" GLZDC, Vol 1, p 83, p 361. 
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Besides Shanghai, Bolshevik liaison stations were set up in Tianjin, 139 
Beijing and other cities too, and sometimes Soviet diplomatic bodies were also used 
for liaison. 140 
The Rosta and Dalta News Agencies were important Soviet institutions in 
China. "Rosta" is the abbreviation of Rossiiskoe Telegrafhoe Agentstvo (The 
Russian Telegraph Agency), and it was set up in September 1918 as the central 
information organ of the Soviet Government. 141 After the Far Eastern Republic was 
founded, it was considered more convenient to call it "Dalta" (The Far Eastern 
News Agency). The Rosta and Dalta News Agencies in China were actually one 
and the same, and their recognised Chinese names were Hua-E Tongxun She (the 
Sino-Russian News Agency) and Yuandong Tongxun She (the Far East News 
Agency). 
Wang Ruofei, an early leader of the CCP, said in a report meeting in Yanan 
in 1943: "The Comintern sent its agents to China as early as 1919, and the first one 
was director of the Soviet Sino-Russian News Agency. " 142 With regard to this, 
Professor Xiang Qing has firmly denied that there was a possibility that a Soviet 
News Agency existed in China prior to the Beijing Government's withdrawal of 
recognition for Kudashev's Legation as the official diplomatic mission of Russia on 
23 September 1920, and also considered it as sheer nonsense that a head of such a 
news agency could be sent to China before 1920.143 In contrast, some other Chinese 
139 The Tianjin contact point's address was: Mr Leoff c/o Gershevitch, No 10b 
Woodrow Wilson Street, Tianjin. GI 7DC, Vol 1, p 35; 140 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 84, p 361. 
141 Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Vol 22, p 294. 
142 Wang Ruofei, 'On the Chinese Communist Party during the Chinese Great 
Revolution', Jindaishi vanLu, (1981), No 1. 
143 Xiang Qing, 'An Exploratory Study on the Issue of When the Comintern Started 
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historians attach importance to Wang's account, but they have been unable to 
substantiate it or to establish the identity of the person Wang referred to. In fact, in 
1966, a Russian scholar V. N. Nikiforov ascertained that a Russian named A. E. 
Khodorov was in Beijing from 1919 and became director of Rosta's Beijing branch 
in that year. 
144 
Khodorov had participated in the anti-Tsarist revolutionary movement while 
he was a student in the Law Faculty of Odessa University. After graduation he 
became a qualified barrister. Khodorov joined the Menshevik during the early 
months of the Russian Revolution, but soon converted to the Bolshevik cause. In 
1917, he went to the front, and later moved on to Vladivostok where he edited a 
newspaper called DalekUa Okraiina (The Far Frontier). 145 Khodorov arrived in 
Shanghai in April 1919 and began working with Shanghai Life. Then he moved to 
Tianjin, where he was known as a correspondent of the "Comintern's News 
Agency". 146 It is possible that during his stay in Tianjin, Khodorov managed to set 
up the Rosta News Agency with headquarters in Beijing. 
The establishment of the Rosta and Dalta News Agencies in Beijing was 
made known to the public by 7 June 1920, when The Befling Daily News, the 
English-language newspaper of the Beijing Government, reported that "Mr. 
Khodorov, representative and correspondent of Rosta and Dalta News Agencies in 
Establishing Relations with the Chinese Revolution', Dancishi vanjiu ziliao (Sources on 
the Study of Party History), (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Press, 1981), No 3, p 127. 
144 V. N. Nikiforov, 'A. E. Khodorov' NAA, (1966), No 5, p 219; and in his later work 
SIOPK (pp 91-92), Nikiforov wrote definitely that "during 1919-1922, he [Khodorov] was 
the head of the branch of Rosta in Beijing. " 
145 Nikiforov, 'A. E Khodorov' NAA, (1966), No 5, p 219; Kasanin, China in the 
Twenties, P 45. 146 -* U Lisan, 'Report on the History of the CCP', I February 1930, Zhonqqon- danqshi q- 
baoqao xuanbian (Selected Reports on the History of the CCP), Henceforth 
abbreviated to ZDBX, (Beijing: the CCP's Central Academy Press, 1982), p 211. 
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China, has now established himself at 21 Chin Kiang Hutung, Peking. " When the 
Yurin Mission came to Beijing, the Agency moved to Dehua Hutong. 147 The Rosta 
News Agency's Beijing branch was its Chinese headquarters and Khodorov was 
actually head of the Rosta-Dalta in China. The second head of Rosta! s Beijing 
branch was Slepak, who had worked for the Comintern as Voitinsky's assistant. 148 
The news agency's equipment was installed in the legation quarter; it 
included a radio transmitter-receiver, which could relay news and secret messages 
to and from Moscow via Kiakhta and Chita. 149 Since Beijing was the political 
centre of China and the seat of diplomatic envoys to China, it was an ideal place for 
quick access to important information and news; in addition, the legation quarter 
was beyond the Chinese authorities' control, so that the location made it easier to 
conceal the Agencies' activities. 
Rosta's staff in Beijing included Russians and Chinese. Two Russians 
named Kharnsky and Uyashenko did compilation work. According to Kasanin, they 
were ex-Russian army officers, but "had thoroughly revised their views and whole- 
heartedly devoted themselves to revolutionary Russia and her destiny. " 150 
Prominent among the Chinese assistants were Huang Ping and Xue Hanyue. Huang 
had graduated from a secondary school attached to the YMCA and could speak 
147 A newspaper cutting kept in FO 228/2987; secret reports in ZEGXSL, 1921. 
148 Kartunova, 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of China, 1920-22', Problem 
Dal'neqo Vostoka, (1973), No 1; GLZDC, Vol 2, p 440, note 2. 
149 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 46; FO 228/3216, No 22,17 July 1920; 
Ernestine Evans's 'Looking East from Moscow` wrote that during her stay in Moscow, 
she saw a copy of the official wireless in the room reserved for foreign correspondents 
at Narkomindel. The directions for broadcasting, at the head of the message, read: '... 
Chita, Dalta, relay Khodorov, Peking'; Asia, (New York, December 1922) Vol 22, No 12, 
p 1020. It may be worth noting that the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 20 March 1920 
protested against the wanton installation of radio station(s) in China by foreigners; see 
Guo Tingyi, Zhonghua minquo shishi rizhi, p 488. 150 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 85. 
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fluent English. He had worked for the Beiiing Daily News and the Beiiing Leader, 
two English-language newspapers before becoming a translator for the Rosta. 151 
Xue Hanyue was an anarchist, who was very active during the May 4th Movement 
when he was a student at Nankai School in Tianjin. As an interpreter, Xue often 
accompanied Khodorov on visits to VIPs, and on Khodorov's recommendation, Xue 
became an advisor on foreign affairs to Wu Peifu in 1922.152 After Xue's departure, 
some other Chinese joined the staff of the Rosta-Dalta, including Liu Renjing, 
Liang Naixian, Ruan Yongzhao and a person named Li. 153 The main tasks of the 
employees of the Rosta-Dalta were to translate items received from Soviet Russia or 
the Far Eastern Republic, and to prepare materials obtained from the Chinese and 
foreign press for transmission. Wu Nanru's recollections indicate that Polevoy's 
office in Tianjin also employed several Chinese youths, including Wu himself, to 
translate materials from Chinese newspapers and magazines into English. 154 It 
151 In 1924 Huang joined the CCP and then went to study in Moscow. After returning 
to China, he worked for Borodin as a translator and in 1927 he became the People's 
Commissar of Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs of the Guangzhou Soviet. Later he 
went to Moscow as one of the representatives of the CCP to the Comintern in 1930. At 
the 5th and 6th Congresses of the CCP, he was selected as an alternate member of the 
Central Committee. In 1933 he was arrested and soon recanted. cf. Huang Ping, 
Wangshi huivi (Recollections of Past Events) (Beijing: People's Press, 1981), p 3; and 
Zhonqauo Oinýiandai renminq dacidian (A Biographical Dictionary of Modern China), 
(Beýing: China International Broadcast Press, 1989), p 606. 15 Wusi aiquo Vundonq dang'an ziliao (Archival Materials on the May 4th Patriotic 
Movement), (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1979), p 655-7; Kasanin, China in 
the Twenties, p 107; Huang Ping, Wanqshi huivi, p 3; Bai Jianwu riLi (The Diary of Bai 
Jianwu), (compiled by Du Chunhe and Geng Laijin, published by Jiangsu Ancient 
Books Press), the Diary of 27 June 1922; GLZDC, Vol 1, p 196. 153 Huang Ping, Wangshi huivi, pp 3-4; Liu Renjing was a student of Beijing University 
and a member of the Society for the Study of Marxism there. In 1921, he attended the 
founding Congress of the CCP. According to Shi Cuntong, Run Yongzhao was also a 
member of the CCP, and at the end of 1922, he and Liu Renjing became members of 
the Central Committee of the Chinese Socialist Youth League. [Yida gianhou, Vol 2,72]. 
Li was put to death by hanging with Li Dazhao in 1927. 1 54 Hua Yang, 'The Deeds of Qu Qiubai and Zhang Tailei in Early Times - Wu Nan- 
ru's Reminiscences', Zhonqqonq vaniiu, July 1976, Vol 10, No 7; Wu Nanru was Zhang 
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seems that there was a Rosta branch located in Tianjin. Around this time another 
branch was set up in Harbin. 
Before long, Rosta-Dalta extended into South China. Khodorov went to 
Shanghai again in April 1920, at the same time as Voitinsky's team also went 
there. 155 In the summer of 1920, a branch of Rosta, called "Hua-E tongxun she" 
(the China-Russia News Agency) was established in Shanghai and was nominally 
headed by Yang Mingzhai. Its main tasks were to collect and dispatch news about 
Chinese revolutionary movements to Soviet Russia and the Comintern. 156 In 
autumn of the same year, Stoyanovich (Minor) and Perlin, set up a branch of the 
Rosta News Agency in Guangzhou. 157 
According to an order of the Republic of the Far East, all correspondents of 
Rosta-Dalta in China could exercise the functions and duties of consuls, and 
perhaps this was the reason why Khodorov was sometimes regarded as a "semi- 
official delegate of the Russian Soviet Government". 158 
The Yurin mission, which arrived in Beijing in August 1920, was the first 
Bolshevik diplomatic delegation to China. This mission at first operated ostensibly 
as a trade delegation of the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia. In fact, as its secretary 
Kasanin admitted, it was virtually "the pioneer of Soviet diplomacy in China" and 
Tailei's classmate at Beiyang University in Tianjin and later became a member of the 
Socialist Youth League which was organized by Zhang. 
155 FO 228/3214,22 April 1920. 
156 Li Xin and Chen Tiejian, Weida de kaiduan (The Great Beginning), (Beijing: 
Chinese Social Sciences Press. 1983), p 33. 157 The Recollections by Liu Shixin and Tan Zuyin in Yida gianhou, (Beijing, 1980), 
Vol 3. 
'58 Shi Keqiang (Shevelyovs Chinese name), 'Sun Yat-sen and the Dalta News 
Agency', Sun Zhonqshan he ta de shidai (Sun Yat-sen and His Era), (Beijing: 
Zhonghua Publishing House, 1985), Vol 1, p 562; FO 228/3214,22 April 1920. 
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"all that had been successful in the legation's work stemmed from that well-thought- 
out plan dictated by Chita, itself inspired by Moscow. " 159 
Yurin's real name was G. Dzevaltovsky. He was a high-ranking officer of 
the Red Army after the October Revolution and then became the vice-Minister of 
the Defence Ministry of the Far Eastern Republic. 160 The delegation had a cipher- 
clerk named Mishar Guyanov, who came from the Defence Ministry. His duty was 
to communicate with Verkhneudinsk and later Chita for receiving instructions and 
reporting their work. Yurin's counsellor, Gromov, was a veteran Bolshevik, whom 
Yurin had to consult before making any decision. Together with P. Khretin and 
Kasanin, the secretaries and interpreters to Yurin, he frequently went to the Rosta 
News Agency to conduct publicity work. Once when Gromov came to Beijing from 
Fengtian (in Manchuria), he brought with him many documents and propaganda 
materials which were found and seized by the Chinese police. 161 Another old 
Bolshevik named E. Ozarnin was a member of the Legation but did not hold any 
definite post. He was later appointed Special Representative of the Far Eastern 
Republic in Manchuria and Consul-General in Harbin, where he was charged with 
directing and financing the Chinese revolutionary movement. Alexis F. Agariev, an 
envoy sent from the Temporary Government of the Maritime Province, later joined 
the Yurin legation as deputy representative and assumed Yurin's duties in his 
absence. By April 1920, Agarief was already in Shanghai and engaged in the work 
159 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 144. After the government of the Far Eastern 
Republic of Siberia moved out of Verkhne Udinsk, Chita became the new capital of the 
Republic. 
'60 H. Norton, The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia, (London, 1923). 161 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 64, p 115; Wang Yijun, Zhonq Su wai'iao de 
xumu, p 319; GEGXS , 1921, Nos 124-179, No 559. III 
of Shanghai Life and Rosta as well. 162 According to some accounts, Agarief, ex- 
mayor of Vladivostok, was a leading member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party 
in Siberia, but Soviet historians maintain that Agarief was a member of the RCP(B) 
when he was sent to China. 163 The delegate from the Amur River Region was an 
experienced Party worker, Yakovlev. The representative of the Russians in the 
CER area was Gorchakovsky. The Commercial Attache to the Yurin Legation, 
Tugashev, subsequently went to Shanghai. Another worker under Yurin, Apistain, 
was also deputed to Shanghai for propaganda work and connected with Shanghai 
Life. 164 
To conclude an agreement with the Beijing Government was not the sole 
purpose of the Yurin legation. It also shouldered the tasks of guiding the activities 
of the Bolshevik agents and promoting revolutionary movements in China. In July, 
Vilensky operated in Beijing under the cover of secretary to the Yurin Mission and 
convened a meeting of the Russian Bolsheviks in China. 165 Not long after the Yurin 
mission had settled in Beijing, they interfered in the work of the East Asian 
Secretariat and cut off its links with the Eastern Peoples Section of the Siberian 
Bureau of the RCP(B), which brought complaints from the latter. 166 
162 Norton, The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia, p 148; FO 228/2773,14 December 
1920; FO 405/233, p 438. 
163 Agarief was an old revolutionary. While a student, he had taught in revolutionary 
workers' circles. Later he lived in Australia as a political emigre until 1917 when he 
returned to Vladivostok. After he left China in 1921, he became one of the principal 
organisers of the Propaganda Bureau in Chita, and an advisor to the Foreign Ministry of 
the Far Eastern Republic. FO 228/3214,22 April 1920; FO 228/3216, No 27; M. S. 
Kapitsa, 'Soviet-Chinese Relations during 1920-1921', translated by Huang Jilian in 
Jindaishi ziliao (Historical Materials on Modern History), (Beijing, February 1991), No 
78; Wang Yijun, Zhonq Su waiiiao de xuMu, p 184, p 209; FO 228/3140, p 76. 
164 FO 405/233, No 107; FO 228/3211, April 1921. 
165 'Vilenskys Report to the ECCI, 1 September 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 41. 
166 The Report to the ECCI on the Issues of the Organisation and Work of the 
Eastern Peoples Section of the Siberian Bureau of RCP(B), 21 December 1920', 
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Many important Soviet agents in China co-operated with the Yurin legation. 
Khodorov and Ivanov became Yurin's "right hand men" and "unofficial advisers". 167 
In October 1920, Voitinsky, Kaufman and Lizerovitch were summoned to Beijing 
and held discussions with Yurin. 168 Bolshevik activities and agents from Moscow 
or Siberia also visited Yurin. For example, in September 1920, one of the important 
Bolshevik leaders in Siberia, D. Shilov, who was Commander of the Eastern Trans 
Baikal partisan force in 1920, with seven other Bolsheviks, came to stay at the 
Yurin legation and held several secret meetings with Yurin. 169 When the member of 
the ECCI of the Comintern, Pak Chinsen, returned to China at the end of 1920, he 
with Kim Rip, the vice-leader of the Korean Communist Party, visited Yurin in 
Beijing. ' 70 
The Yurin mission's activities were so conspicuous that the Beijing 
Government suspected that they were engaged in conspiracies with ulterior political 
motives. 171 A French missionary, who came to Beijing in September 1920 and met 
some of the staff of the Yurin legation, wrote: "the Bolshevists are sparing no 
efforts. Their emissaries are well supplied with money and are working hard at 
their cause in every large town. " 172 He might have exaggerated the case; however, 
GLZDC, Vol 1, p 54. 
167 FO 405/233, No 107; Kasanin, China in the Twenties. 
1&ý FO 228/3214, September 1920; FO 405/233, No 107. 
169 Erickson, The Soviet Hic1h Command, p 221; Zhang Zuolin to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2 September 1920, ZEGXSL, 1920, No 144; Kasanin, China in the 
Twenties, pp 91-92. 
170 Paý arrived in Beijing with his Russian wife in the end of 1920. Scalapino and Lee, 
Communism in Korea, p 21; 'Note of the Police Chief of the Japanese Viceroy's Office 
in Korea to the Vice-Minister of the Japanese Foreign Office, 1922 - On the State of the Korean Communist Party in Shanghai', in Japanese Achieves. 
171 Wang Yijun, Zhong Su wai*iao de xumU, p 197. 172 Abel Bonnard, In China, 1920-1921, (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1926), 
pp 125-126. 
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his account can still give us a rough idea about the situation after the advent of the 
Yurin mission. 
Although Soviet Russiaýs diplomatic legations were forbidden by the 
Bolshevik leaders to engage in revolutionary work publicly after the fall of 1921, 
Soviet Russia's diplomatic missions and legations in China still engaged in secret 
work to incite revolutionary movements. During the Great Chinese Revolution of 
1924-27, the Soviet embassy became one of the headquarters directing the 
Revolution. 
The Bolsheviks also established their intelligence services in China. As 
early as 1918, the Soviet Government planned to set up an intelligence bureau in 
China. Voznesensky declared in his letter that the Soviet Government "would send 
Popov and Podvoisky to found a secret intelligence bureau to learn what was doing 
[happening] in Shanghai and Peking. " 173 In order to investigate and report on the 
situation and the possibilities for revolution in the Far East, Popov, who was also in 
charge of intelligence work, made frequent trips to China, Japan and Siberia. He 
visited China at least three times between 1918 and 1920, staying mainly in 
Shanghai, where he collected his correspondence at the off-ice of Shanghai Life. 
Popov was a man of considerable resourcefulness and when in danger he took 
precautions to throw his pursuers off the scent. 174 He had some special co-workers, 
including Harowits and Fortunatoff. 175 
173 FO 228/3214,16 May 1918. 
174 FO 228/3214, August, September, 1920. 
175 FO 405/233,26 September 1921; Fortunatoff's main task was to collect 
information about the anti-communist activities of the White Russians and other 
foreigners in China. He once received funds from Joffe (Tolice Report of the 
Municipality of the Public Settlement in Shanghai', 25 January 1923; kept in the 
Shanghai Archives); In 1925 Fortunatoff became the doctor of the Soviet Embassy in 
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General Potapov was an important Soviet secret agent abroad. 176 According 
to Kartzoff, a Lieutenant-General under Kolchak, Potapov had established agencies 
in Yokohama, Shanghai and Manila by the spring of 1920.177 During his stay in the 
French Concession in Shanghai, Potapov was under surveillance by the French 
police and therefore rarely went out. But he received visitors almost every day and 
kept in contact with Moscow. In March 1920, when a Russian Bolshevik 
representative came to Shanghai with some Koreans and a Chinese, they got in 
touch with Potapov directly. ' 78 
The Rosta-Dalta News Agencies also served as an intelligence agency, for 
one of their tasks was to collect and translate various items of information and news 
relating to China and some other countries from newspapers published in China and 
then transmit it to Moscow. 179 Sometimes, they also collected oral information. For 
example, Khodorov managed to approach Chinese officials, bankers, journalists and 
several important foreigners, including an advisor to the Beijing Government for 
Blinl_ 
16q. 
(VKND , Vol 1, Index) 
iang Bingxuan once heard that General W" (Potapov) had been a Tsarist general 
before the Revolution and therefore incurred the hatred of some revolutionaries in 
Russia. So Lenin, as his good friend, asked him to work abroad. [Haiyu guke, Jiefanci 
bielu. Between 1922 and 27, under the arrangement of the Foreign Department of the 
GPU, he accompanied A. A. lakushev (Soviet agent)to travel abroad as the emissaries 
of Trust (the ostensibly monarchist organisation, which was dreamed up by 
Dzerzhinsky) to establish liaisons with the overseas monarchist 6migr6 underground 
organisations and "to deceive his old acquaintances and colleagues in exile. " [V. 
Lehovich, White against Red, (New York, 1973), p 429] But according to VKNDK, Vol 
1's Index, Potapov started to be engaged in teaching work from the end of 1920. 177 FO 228/3211, May 1920. 
IM FO 228/3214,18 March 1920; 8 April 1920; USDS, 893.00/3376; Scalapino and 
Lee, Communism in Korea, p 14. 179 Zhonqquo Gonqchandanq dacidian (Dictionary of the CCP), (Beijing: China 
Broacicast and TV Press, 1991), p 561; Zhýnqqonq vangiu, Vol 10, No 7. 
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potential information. 180 Stoyanovitch on 29 September 1920 reported that the 
Rosta agency in Guangzhou branch was sending information to Russia. 181 
The intelligence personnel used to be planted at Soviet diplomatic legations 
and consulates. For example, Maring found that there were some agents of the 
Cheka working with Soviet diplomats in Beijing in 1921. E. Pick was appointed to 
the Shanghai Consulate as a secret agent for the GPU in 1924.182 In a report to the 
Eastern Department of the ECCI dated 20 May 1922, Riutin suggested that agents 
who were engaged in liaison work should also collect intelligence. 183 
The Bolsheviks' intelligence services in China provided the Soviet 
Government and the Comintem with much useful information and helped them to 
make relevant decisions with regard to China. 184 
******** 
Contrary to the prevailing view that hardly any Soviet agents were sent to 
China and hence "the Russian and Chinese revolutions were at the state of complete 
180 Shi Keqiang, 'Sun Yat-sen and the Dalta News Agency', Sun Zhonqshan he ta de 
shidal, Vol 1, p 562; Kasanin, China in the Twenties p 61. =6LZDC, Vol 1, pp 42-3. In 1923, Maring was appointed the head of the Rosta 
agency in Guangzhou. Although he did not accept the appointment, he saw the value 
in the agency's role in gathering information and asked Zhang Tailei to take over the 
work. Saich, OFUFC, Vol 1, P 167. 
182 H. R. Isaacs, "Talks with SneevIiet', GLZIDC, Vol 2, p 252; Pick, China in the Grip 
of the Reds, p 3. The Cheka was replaced by the GPU (OGPU) in 1922, which existed 
till 1926. Cf. S. Wolin & R. M. Slusser (eds. ), The Soviet Secret Police, (London: 
Methuen & Co., 1957). In the above statements, Maring said that he saw the agents of 
the State Security Committee in 1921, and Pick claimed that he worked for the Cheka 
in 1924. 
183 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 85. 
184 For example, Chapman believes it was the result of Popovs investigation that 
Soviet agents were sent from Russia in 1920 and organised the CCP. See his The 
Chinese Revolution p 45. Li Da recalled the dispatch of Voitinsky's team by the 
Comintern was based on information from Vladivostok. Yida qianhou Vol 2, p 6. 
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segregation" due to the blockage of the Sino-Russian border until spring 1920 ,1 
85 
the foregoing delineation has clearly shown that no matter what obstacles and 
difficulties the Bolsheviks faced, nothing could prevent them from sending agents to 
China nor hinder them from trying to spread revolution to China. The Bolsheviks 
started to send their agents to China in the early months of 1918. From then on, a 
considerable number of agents arrived in China via different border areas and ports. 
Those agents dispatched from Russia or recruited in China belonged to 
various central and local organisations, such as the RCP(B)'s Central and various 
local committees and its Federation of Foreign Communist Groups; the Comintern's 
Executive Committee, its subordinate bureaus in Irkutsk, Tashkent and Baku, and 
its auxiliary organisations including the Red Trade International and the Young 
Communist International; Soviet Government apparatuses, such as the 
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the Commissariat of Nationalities Affairs and 
their relevant institutes in the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia; the Red Army, the 
Cheka and their local units. At an early stage, especially during the period of the 
Civil War, there used to be no unified planning for work in China among those 
organisations, and therefore their activities lacked co-ordination. Different 
organisations each sent their own agents for carrying out their respective tasks. 186 
185 Xiang Qing, 'An Exploratory Study on the Issue That When the Comintern Started 
Establishing Relations with the Chinese Revolution', Danqsh! vanjiu ziliao, (1981), No 3, 
plý 122-23. 
86 For example in a report to the ECCI (dated 21 December 1920), the Eastern 
Peoples Section of the Siberian Bureau of the RCP(B) complained that the Comintern 
had dispatched Pak Chinsen and Liu Shaozhou to China and that Narkomindel had 
allocated money and valuables to the Korean Socialist Party, the Mongolian People's 
Revolutionary Party and Tibet without consulting with them. GLZDC, Vol 1, pp 56-7. 
Similarly, the Comintern agent Minor did not know that General Potapov had been in 
China as a Soviet representative. Haiyu guke, Jiefan-q bielu,. 
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In spite of the fact that those agents came from different channels and 
different organisational systems which may not have been accountable each other, 
or even from organisations which were in conflict, ' 87 once in China, most of them 
joined hands together, trying to achieve a common objective. 
Some agents worked for several organisations and held different posts 
concurrently. For instance, Voitinsky worked for the East Asian Secretariat of the 
Comintern, Rosta and Shanghai Life; Khodorov worked for the Rosta, Shanghai 
Life and the Yurin Legation. Many agents concealed their true identities with the 
overt professions of journalists, teachers, businessmen and tailors. 
It seems inconceivable that some agents were not pure Bolsheviks. In fact, 
since there were not enough Bolsheviks who could speak Chinese or English and 
who could be sent to China, Soviet Russia and the Comintern did not stick to one 
pattern when choosing agents to send to China or recruiting agents in China. 
Among these agents, Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, anarchists, ex-POWs, 
radical Muslims, the former diplomats of the Provisional Government, clerks of the 
Russo-Asiatic Bank and the Chinese Customs, even ex-Tsar army officers were 
enlisted, whatever their beliefs and status, so long as they were willing to serve 
Soviet Russia or their motherland. Some scholars are inclined to infer that an "ex- 
tsarist officer" or a "white Russian" could not become a "Soviet representative" or a 
"Comintern agent". 188 They seem not to have considered the complexities of human 
nature and specific historical terms: the fluidity of political allegiances which is 
187 For instance, the Dal'buro of the RCP(B) headed by Krasnoschekov in Chita and 
the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern headed by Shumiasky in Irkutsk were in 
conflict. Cf. Waring's Report to the ECCI', 11 July 1922', GLZDC, Vol 2, p 229. 
18" See Xiao Lin's article 'The Motive and Effects of Lenin's Letter to Chen Jiongming', 
Fuiian dangshi vuekan (The History of the CCP in Fujian, Monthly), (1990), No 12] and 
Ye Yonglie's book Zhonggonq zhi Chu, p 121. 
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perhaps especially great at a turning point of changing regimes. A metaphysical 
mode of thinking has blinded these scholars to the historical facts that were not at 
all "either this or that" or "either red or white". 
Those agents who arrived in China or who were recruited before 1920 were 
active in China at a remarkably early stage and their endeavours paved the way for 
the operations of the Voitinsky team. Certainly the Voitinsky team strengthened the 
influence of Bolshevism and hence advanced the cause of revolution in China. But 
it is beyond doubt that Voitinsky's arrival was not the starting point of the activities 
of Soviet Russia and the Comintern in China. Clearly such activities were well 
underway before that. 
As has been already indicated, the Soviet and Comintern agents in China 
were well-organised and there were several institutions around a few leading 
centres. Although these organisations belonged to different networks, each with its 
own particular duty, nearly all of them were linked together and co-ordinated their 
activities and sometimes even shared a common pool of staff. 
The circumstances of Bolshevik agents in China at this early stage which I 
have described above may appear unimaginable, but are nevertheless based on 
factual records and accounts. These agents played a significant role in the rise of 
the Communist movement in China. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH THE CHINESE 
Making contact with the Chinese was one of the tasks of many of Soviet 
Russia's and Comintern agents who came into China during the period in question. 
The actual contact usually happened immediately after these agents' arrival. In the 
summer of 1919, the Politburo of the RCP(B) gave instructions that the Bolsheviks 
should establish firm ties with revolutionary organisations in the Far Eastern 
countries! Subsequently, making contact with Chinese, Japanese and Koreans 
became a pressing matter for the Bolsheviks in the Far East, and more agents were 
dispatched to China for this purpose. Without question such contacts took place at 
an early stage, and it was not the case that "the progressive elements in China were 
not able to make contact with the Russian Revolution and the Comintern until 
Soviet Russia smashed the Allied armed intervention in 1920. '92 The main 
questions which merit further research here are what kinds of people the agents got 
in touch with and for what purposes. 
In the past, many Chinese historians focused their attention on the contacts 
with Chinese Marxists. In fact, there was hardly any one who could be called a 
Marxist in China when the initial contacts were made. What we can see in a large 
number of original records is that the scope of the contacts was wide-ranging. It 
was not limited only to the so-called progressive elements, who later became the 
2 
'Vilensky's Report to the ECCI, 1 September 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 39. 
Xue Xiantian and Li Yuzhen, 'The Communist Organizations of the Chinese 
Residents in Russia and Some Issues concerning the Establishment of the Communist 
Party in China', Jiandaishi Yaniiu, (1989), No 5, p 152. 
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Chinese Communist leaders, but also included persons belonging to other parties 
and organisations, which held different political stands, and various circles. As 
Zhou Enlai remarked in his report on "the Comintern and the Chinese Communist 
Party": 
No sooner had the Comintern been founded in March 1919 than it began to send its 
delegates to various countries to visit prominent personages and to do work. In 
China they did not only meet Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, but also Jiang Kanghu, 
Huang Jiemin and Dai Jitao. In the North they visited Wu Peifu and in the South 
they visited Sun Yatsen. 3 
The Chinese Zhou referred to above can be classified as radical democrats, 
socialists, anarchists and nationalists by their beliefs and teachers, journalists, 
politicians and warlords by their professions. Such contacts reflected the 
Bolsheviks' deliberate tactics. Since China was dominated by several imperialist 
powers, the Bolsheviks tried firstly to attract as many forces as possible who might 
be willing to join hands with Soviet Russia against the other foreign powers 
regardless of their social position or political beliefs. As Japan was Soviet Russia's 
main threat in the Far East, the Bolshevik agents were entrusted with the task of 
entering into contact with all the forces that could help the Bolsheviks in their 
struggle against Japan. The Comintern leader Radek even declared that "In China, 
whoever is against Japanese imperialism is fighting for the Chinese revolutionary 
development.,, 4 This meant that in China whoever was against the Japanese and 
3 Zhou Enlai xuanii (Selected Works of Zhou Enlai), (Beijing: People's Press, 1980), 
Vol 2, p 303. 
4 Gonachan quoui youguan Zhonclquo geming de wenxian ziliao (Documentary 
Sources of the Comintern on the Chinese Revolution), (Beijing: Chinese Social 
Sciences Press, 1981), p 63. 
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other imperialist powers could be counted among Soviet Russia's friends for that 
period of time. In addition, the Bolsheviks tried to seek some individuals who could 
become their faithful followers to conduct Communist revolution and to serve 
Soviet Russia's interests. 
Section 1. Contact with Radical Intellectuals 
In the first place, the objects of examination will be some of the founders of 
the Chinese Communist Party. It may be interesting to see how they were 
approached by Soviet and Comintern agents and how they became Communist 
leaders. 
Li Dazhao is known as the first person in China to have advocated 
Bolshevism and Marxism. However, Li's original political stance was not radical. 
Li Dazhao opposed any revolution which aimed to overthrow existing governments. 
What he appreciated was evolutionism, nationalism, reformism and compromise. 
Towards the end of 1912, he joined Jiang Kanghu's "Chinese Socialist Party", 5 
which stood for moderate social refonn. From 1913 to 1916 Li studied law in Japan 
where he was influenced by the Western ideas of liberal democracy and where he 
edited a magazine Minyi (National Spirit). After returning to China Li Dazhao 
became a close friend of Tang Hualong and Sun Hongyi, the leaders of the Chinese 
Progressive Party, a party which mainly consisted of the persons who had advocated 
constitutional monarchy during the last years of the Qing dynasty. Later, Li also 
5 Cf. LO Mingzhuo, Li Dazhao sixianq van*iu (The Studies of Li Dazhao's Thoughts), 
(Shijiazhuang: Hebei People's Press, 1983), pp 96-115; Liu Minshan, 'Ll Dazhao and 
Tianjin', Tianiin wenshi ziliao xuanii (Cultural and Historical Material on Tianjin), No 40. 
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attended the founding meeting of the Society for Constitutional Research, which 
was organised by several leaders of the Progressive Party, and was widely known as 
"the Research Clique". While he edited the magazine Jiaygn (Tiger), Chenzhong 
(Morning Bell) and Xin Qingnian (New Youth), Li's articles written before the fall 
of 1918 showed no sign of interest in Marxism. 6 In January 1918, Li assumed the 
post of director of the Library of Beijing University and afterwards his views 
changed. 
In the autumn of 1918, Li Dazhao published "The Victory of the Common 
People" and "The Victory of Bolshevism" in which he eulogised the Russian 
October Revolution with immense zeal. This has puzzled many of the historians 
who have engaged in research on Li Dazhao and the CCP. They have suggested 
various explanations. B. Schwartz believes that Li Dazhao's vision of a "global 
rebirth" and his interest in a "universal solution" induced him to accept the 
messianic message of Lenin. 7 M. Meisner thinks that Li's "historical image of 
century-long revolution waves was a prominent feature of his response to the 
,, 8 Bolshevik Revolution. And Dirlik asserts that "a prior exposure to anarchism 
may have contributed to Li's response to the Russian Revolution in 1918. "9 
Perhaps these scholars have neglected some important source material. Li Dazhao's 
6 In the past Ll Dazhao was said to have learned Marxism from Kawakami Hajime in 
Japan. But actually Kawakami was in Europe while Li was studying in Japan. And 
Kawakami was not even a Marxist then. (Yang Kuisong: 'Li Dazhao and Kawakami 
Hajim', Dangsh! vaniiu (Studies of the CCP's History , (Beijing, 1985), No 2. Li Dazhao told a Japanese teacher in 1918 that he had met the Japanese socialist Abe [so in 
Tokyo and had been influenced by his ideas. Abe was even farther away from 
Marxism. (Jin Anping, 'The Chinese Student in Japan in Modern Times and the Early 
Communist Movement in China'Jindaishi yanjiu), 1990, No 2. 
7 B. 1. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1961), pp 12-15,18-19,21-22. 
8 M. Meisner, I-I Ta-chao and the Oriqins of Chinese Marxism, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1967), p 61. 9 A. Dirlik, The Oriqins of Chinese Communism, p 26. 
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intimate friend, Gao Yihan, 10 gave the reason for Li Dazhao's sudden change in 
ideas as follows: 
1918 was a year of crucial importance in the course of Shou Chang's (Li Dazhao's 
original first name) conversion to Marxism. ... News about the Russian October 
Revolution of 1917 had continually spread into China, and Shou Chang got to know 
a Russian diplomat. ... This deepened Shou Chang's understanding of Marxism and 
the October Revolution. It was in November of this year that he wrote the article to 
laud the victory of the Bolsheviks. " 
Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to Gao's memoir, even though it 
provides us with the very important information that Li Dazhao was acquainted with 
a Russian diplomat not long after the October Revolution. The question then arises: 
who was this Russian diplomat Li was in contact with? 
As we have seen, before August 1920 there existed only the old Russian 
diplomatic legation headed by Prince Kudashev. So the Russian diplomat whom Li 
Dazhao met in 1918 or thereabouts must have belonged to the Kudashev Mission. 
In Chapter 11 mentioned a Russian called A. A. Ivanov, the only one at the 
Legation who identified with the Soviet regime and who afterwards became the sole 
Soviet representative there. Even after being expelled from the Legation, he still 
continued working for the Soviet Government. Ivanov was probably the person 
who contacted Li Dazhao in 1918, because Ivanov's dwelling place was rather near 
to the Library of Beijing University, and Li had showed an interest in Russian 
10 Gao Yihan got to know Li Dazhao in Japan where they edited a magazine. After 
returning to China they still edited several magazines together. Later, both became 
professors at Beijing University. Therefore, Gao was very familiar with Li's career. " Gao Yihan, 'Memories of Li Dazhao during the May 4th Period', Wusl yundong 
hLi ýyilq (Memories of May Forth Movement), (Beijing, 1959) pp 339-342. 
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affairs. 12 As an anarcho-syndicalist, Ivanov might also have conveyed his anarchist 
beliefs to Li during their talks. Perhaps this was the reason why in his famous 
article "The Victory of Bolshevism" Li Dazhao displayed anarchist tendencies: 
Bolshevism is the ideology of the Russian Bolsheviks. What kind of ideology is it? 
... There will be no congress, no parliament, no president, no prime minister, no 
cabinet, no legislature and no ruler. There will be only the joint soviets of 
labourers, which will decide all matters. All enterprises will belong to those who 
work therein. 13 
Later, even after he had declared himself a Marxist, Li Dazhao still 
advocated Kropotkin's theory of "mutual aid", syndicalist "direct action", the 
Russian populists' "going among the people" and Tolstoy's Pan-labourism, which 
might have been influenced by certain Russians including Ivanov. 
In addition, we have further evidence from an old member of the CCP, Lin 
Boqu, which confirms that Li Dazhao disseminated ideas and booklets from Soviet 
Russia: "Around March or April 1918 1 received several letters from Li Dazhao one 
after another. He introduced the Russian October Revolution to me and enclosed 
some pamphlets and documents. " 14 These publicity materials could not come from 
anyone but Soviet Russian agents. 
In summer 1919, Ivanov became a lecturer at Beijing University, the most 
famous University in China. This provided ample opportunities for him to contact 
12 The Library of the Beijing University was located at Shatan, Dongsi, near Ivanov's 
home in Yanyue hutong, Dongsi; both were in the East District of Beijing. Li Dazhao 
had already written articles to introduce the Russian February Revolution. 
13 Xin gingnian, Beijing, November 1918, Vol 5, No 5. 
14 Lin Boqu's talk with Wang Laidi in October 1956, quoted by Wang Laidi in her article 
'Some Questions on the Early Organization of the CCP. ', Zheiianq- xuekan (The 
Academic Journal of Zhejiang University), (Hangzhou, 1981) No 3. 
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Chinese intellectuals. In the following years, Ivanov was reported to be "in touch 
with some of the Chinese interested in Bolshevism. "15 
Ivanov's friend Polevoy, a liaison man for the Comintern, also had close 
relations with Li Dazhao. Polevoy was a lecturer at the Beijing Russian Language 
Institute in 1918 and later he took up a post teaching Russian at Beijing University 
on the recommendation of Li Dazhao. At first he only taught several hours each 
week at the University, but from January 1921 he became a formal lecturer there. 16 
Zhang Guotao, a student at Beijing University then recalled that Polevoy "had 
frequent contacts with Mr. Li Dazhao". 17 
The historian Jin Yufu, in his article "Li Dazhao and the May 4th 
Movement", writes: 
Soon after Li Dazhao became the Director of the Library of Beijing University, he 
began to have dealings with Soviet Russia's personnel in Beijing. After the Russian 
October Revolution, Soviet Russia often sent working personnel to Beijing to make 
contact with progressive Chinese people. At first there were two Russians who 
frequently met with Mr. [Li] Dazhao. [They] often visited the Library of Beijing 
University. 18 
Unsure as to who the two Russians were, Jin Yufu believes that they 
might have been Voitinsky and Polevoy. Jin was an old professor at Beijing 
University and before writing the article in question in 1950 he made inquiries 
15 FO 228/3216, No 41,4 December 1920. 
16 Huang Xiurong, Gonc c ichan -quoii yu 
Zhonqciuo gerning - luanxi shi. p 
58; *The List of 
the Foreign Employees of the Beijing University, Dancishi ton-clxun (The Bulletin of the 
History of the CCP), (Beijing, 1983), No 19. 
17 Zhang Guotao, 'My Recollections', Yida qianhou, Vol 2, pp 128-29. 18 WUSi yundong huivilu (Collected Reminiscences of the May 4th Movement), 
(Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1979), Vol 1, pp 349-360. 
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among several members of Beijing University's staff who had had close relations 
with Li Dazhao, such as Zhang Shizhao, Mang Shenfu, Zhu Shangrui and Wang 
Xiying. It is possible that one or more of Jin's informants had seen two Russians 
entering Li's office but did not know who they were. Nevertheless, in the light of 
our present knowledge it is likely that the two Russians were Ivanov and Polevoy, 
since both were in Beijing in 1918 and later taught at Beijing University, therefore 
they could have frequently entered the University Library without arousing 
suspicion, while Voitinsky could not have appeared at the library until 1920. Most 
people only knew that Li had relations with Polevoy and did not mention Ivanov. 
The reason may be that Polevoy used the cover of being a "White Russian, " 
whereas Ivanov's political status had already been exposed. Therefore, Polevoy 
was in a better position than Ivanov to engage in open activities in Beijing and to 
get in touch with Chinese people. In spring 1920, when Voitinsky's team arrived 
in Beijing, Ivanov and Polevoy immediately introduced them to Li Dazhao and his 
followers. 19 This confirms that both Ivanov and Polevoy already had close 
connections with Li Dazhao and also knew his political stance very well. 
Soon after Burtman and other Bolsheviks came to Tianjin on commission 
from the Harbin Committee of the RCP(B) in the early summer of 1919, they 
started making contact with Chinese intellectuals, including Li Dazhao. Several 
months later, when Mfiller came to assist Burtman, he found that "Burtman, even 
before my arrival, had fairly wide ties with progressive Chinese students from the 
19 Dalin, Zhonqquo huivilu, 1921-1927 (China Memories, 1921-1927), (Beijing, 1981). 
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higher educational institutions and colleges in Tianjin and Beiiing, and personally 
,, 20 with Professor Li Ta-chao, whom Burtman spoke of as an excellent Marxist ... 
There are also some other records about Li Dazhao's connection with the 
Bolsheviks. One of the early leaders of the CCP, Peng Shuzhi, in his old age 
reminisced about what Li Dazhao had told him during their stay in Moscow in 
1924: 
At the end of 1919, a Russian named Hohonovky, who was a member of the 
RCP(B), on the recommendation of Polevoy, came to Beijing University to visit me. 
At our first meeting he said: 'How do you do, Comrade Li Dazhao. ' Before the 
guest told me the purpose of his visit, I declared: 'I am still not qualified to be called 
your cornrade. ' But the guest answered quickly: 'We know that you are a Marxist, 
since you have written a lot of articles to introduce Marxism and to praise 
Bolshevism, so you have already become our cornrade. ' 
About Hohonovky, Peng Shuzhi added the following note: "Hohonovky was born in 
Harbin and could speak Chinese fluently. He understood the situation after the May 
4th Movement, and was therefore sent by the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern 
to China. Later this man became a professor in the Chinese class of the Communist 
University for the Toilers of the East. When Li Dazhao attended the 5 th Congress of 
the Comintern in Moscow in 1924, he met the man again by chance .,, 
2 1 This man, 
according to Qin Baopu, who studied at the Communist University for the Toilers of 
the East in 1921-1922, was dean of the Far East Department of the University. 
22 
20 MOller, Plameni Revoliutsii. 1917-1920; quoted from Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the 
Origins of Chinese Marxism, p 105. 
21 Peng Shuzhi, 'How the First Communist Group Take Form? ' Peng Shuzhi xuanii,, 
Vol 1, pp 48-9. 
22 Qin Baopu called this man "Hoholofukin". See Oin's'Travels in Red Russia', Chen 
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Zhang Zhi's recollections reveal that, together with some other Chinese, Li 
Dazhao visited a Soviet Russian representative at the No. I special district of Tianjin 
on the occasion when Li escorted Chen Duxiu to Shanghai via Tianjin. The 
meeting lasted over one hour. 
23 Some Chinese historians assert that the Russian 
whom Li Dazhao met was Burtman. But according to Kasanin, Burtman left for 
24 Siberia in January 1920, while Chen went to Shanghai the following month. 
However, it seems more likely that this man could have been Khodorov, who was 
living in Tianjin during that time and was widely regarded as a "semi-official 
delegate of the Russian Soviet Government". 25 Hence it is quite possible that the 
"Soviet Russian representative" whom Li and others met in Tianjin was Khodorov. 
In the light of this albeit sketchy information, we can see that at least five 
Soviet or Comintern agents had dealings with Li Dazhao prior to Voitinsky's 
arrival. Their contacts with Li Dazhao should not be seen simply as chance affairs 
or personal initiatives, and they were probably approved by Moscow. There can be 
no doubt that these contacts exerted influence on Li's thinking and on his 
subsequent actions, particularly with regard to his activity in organising the CCP. 
Before becoming the first top leader of the CCP, Chen Duxiu had been an 
active revolutionary for a long time. During his studies in Japan Chen joined such 
revolutionary organisations as Qingnian hui (the Youth Society) and Yue wang hui 
(the Warrior Yue Society). He also organised a number of societies in China after 
his return in 1903. He took part in the Revolution of 1911 and afterwards became 
bao (Morning Post), 27 August 1924. 
23 Zhang Jingru, Zhonqciuo qonqchandanq de chuangli (The Founding of the CCP), 
(Shijiazhuang: Hebei People's Press, 1981) p 121. 
24 Kasanin, China in the Twenties. 
25 FO 228/3214,22 April 1920. 
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the head of the Anhui Provincial Secretariat. 26 Later he felt that the new Republic 
existed only in name and insisted that if political changes stood any chance of 
success, Chinese traditional thought, culture and customs should be rejected. 
Therefore Chen started publication of a journal Oingnian zazhi (Youth Magazine) 
in 1915, whose name was changed to Xin gingnian (New Youth) with the French 
title "La Jeunesse" one year later. In 1917 Chen was invited by Cai Yuanpei, 
Chancellor of Beijing University, to become dean of the Faculty of Literature at the 
University. The editorial office of the magazine moved with him to Beijing. 
As an iconoclast, Chen Duxiu severely attacked almost all Chinese national 
heritage, especially Confucianism. He claimed in his famous article published in 
September 1915 "Call to Youth": "Now our country still has not awakened from its 
long dream, and isolates itself by going down the old rut. ... All our traditional 
ethics, law, scholarship, rites and custom are survivals of feudalism. " These 
46poisonous germs" were destroying China. While attacking the "old and rotten" 
Chinese traditions, Chen introduced the "fresh and vital" Western ideas of 
"Democracy and Science" to the Chinese people. 27 . In Chen's opinion, the most 
powerful weapon in the arsenal of change was the cultural weapon. In this way a 
New Cultural Movement was launched in China, with Xin ginRnian as its main 
focus and Chen Duxiu as its initiator and standard-bearer. 
Since Chen Duxiu was seen as a trail-blazer among the progressive 
intellectuals, it was natural that he would attract the attention of Soviet agents. 
Although the relevant historical records are scarce, one can still unearth evidence of 
26 Wang Guangyuan, Chen Duxiu nianbiao (A Chronicle of Chen Duxiu's Life), 
(Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 1987). 
27 Quoted from the English translation in Vera Simone, China in Revolution, (New 
York: Fawcett Publications, 1968), pp 128-34. 
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this. In April 1927, the warlord Zhang Zuolin's troops seized many documents 
from the Soviet Union's embassy in Beijing and among them there was A Brief 
HistoEy of the CCP. This booklet was written by a Russian, but a Japanese historian 
Otsuka Reizo believed that Li Dazhao was credited with drafting the preliminary 
text as a report to the Comintern. 28 Anyway the Brief History is actually a most 
reliable and valuable first-hand historical source on the early history of the CCP- In 
this book we read that "in 1918 Chen was the only person who was engaged in 
Communist work. "29 At first glance, this account of Chen's activity seems patently 
wrong because he was not even a believer in Communism at the time. Hence, in a 
strict sense, it is not possible that Chen was engaged in Communist work in 1918. 
However, what the writer of the above had in mind was probably something 
different. It is likely that Chen was involved in some work assigned by Soviet 
agents such as Ivanov and Polevoy, either in person or through his intimate friend 
and colleague Li Dazhao. At first Chen might not even have been aware of what he 
was doing, whereas Li was fully conscious of what he was engaged in. 
Chen Duxiu not only joined the Marxist Research Society organised by Li 
Dazhao but also became one of the editors of Meizhou PinOun from the fall of 
1918. In June 1919 Chen was arrested for distributing leaflets with Gao Yihan and 
Deng Chu in Beijing. Some sources say that the real reason for his arrest was that 
2'3 This book is normally credited to the Russians Kisselev or Frunse. According to the 
research of V. Nikiforov, the book was written by Navmov, a Russian advisor in 
Huangpu Military Academy during 1926-27, based entirely on the source materials 
offered by the Chinese Communists. See his'The Chinese Labour Movement and the 
Birth of the CCP', Problemy Sovet Istoriya, _(1 
982), No 1, translated into Chinese by Lin 
Yincheng, in Gonqchanciuoei vu Zhoncl-quo geming - Sulian xuezhe lunwen xuanyl, p 
293. Otsuka Reizo, Shina Kvosanto Shi (The History of the_Communist Party in China), 
(Tokyo, 1940), Part 1, p 8. 
29 'A Brief History of the CCP', in Wilbur and How (eds. ), DCNSAC, p 48. 
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he was involved in the production of Bolshevik literature. 30 This is not entirely far- 
fetched because the "Declaration to Beijing Citizens" he was distributing went 
beyond the most radical demands made by students during the May 4th Movement 
and some of its expressions were similar to those used by the Bolsheviks. For 
example, in the "Declaration" the following two demands were made among others: 
"3. To abolish the Headquarters of the Army and Headquarters of the Police in 
Beijing; 4. The defence force in Beijing to be replaced by organisation of the 
citizens;,, 31 which is quite similar to some slogans in Lenin's April Theses: 
"Abolition of the police, the army and the bureaucracy. ... The standing army to be 
02 replaced by the arming of the whole people. Of course, these are also Marxist 
principles, but at that time Chen knew nothing about Marxism. Where he obtained 
these ideas is questionable. As further background to Chen's arrest, at the same 
time as he was circulating the "Declaration", the Beijing Police Department found 
another "extremist" (Bolshevik) leaflet entitled "The Declaration of the 
Representative Organisation in the East". 33 
According to Hu Shi, a Soviet representative came to Beijing and invited Hu 
Shi to discuss matters relating to the establishment of a Communist party in China. 
Since Hu had something else to do and could not go to meet this representative on 
the appointed day, Chen Duxiu had a chance to talk with him and later became the 
leader of the CCp. 34 It is not clear if this was Chen's first contact with the 
30 FO 228/3214,17 July 1919. 
31 'Materials on Chen Duxiu's Arrest', Bei'ing dang'an shiliao (Archival Materials on 
Beijing's History), (Beijing, 1986) No 1. 
32 Lenin. Collected Works, Vol 24, p 23. 
; '3 Note from the Office of the Beijing Police Department, 1919, No 39; Shi bao 
(Shanghai Times), 1 July 1919. 
34 Luo Ergang, 'Some Facts about Hu Shi', Yan Zhenwu (ed. ), Hu Shi yaniiu conglu 
132 
Bolshevik agents, however, it probably happened between the fall of 1919 and the 
beginning of 1920. In early 1920 Chen met a correspondent of the Comintern's 
News Agency in Tianjin when Chen went there to give a lecture to students. 35 
These two contacts must have taken place before Chen's departure to Shanghai. 
On his arrival in Shanghai in February 1920 Chen Duxiu at once got in 
touch with some Chinese who had relations with the Bolsheviks there, such as Li 
Hanjun, Zhang Mochi and Huang Jiemin. On 2 March Chen delivered a speech at a 
meeting of the Ship and Godown Workers' Union, with which a Soviet agent 
Stopany had already established firm relations. 36 After Voitinsky's team came to 
Shanghai, they approached Chen immediately. Afterwards Chen kept in close 
contact with the Bolshevik agents in Shanghai. The British Intelligence Reports 
showed that, Chen Duxiu had "a number of doubtful Russian friends and among 
others the staff of ShanRhai Life"; and he was in "close touch with the Bolshevik 
agents and particularly with Lizerovitch. 9937 Many scholars considered that the 
period from the spring to the summer of 1920 marked a decisive turning point in 
Chen's political life - an important stage in Chen's conversion to Marxism. What is 
beyond doubt is that this conversion occurred under the influence of the Bolsheviks. 
Another important figure who had connections with Bolshevik agents at an 
early stage was Li Hanjun, who was one of the main founders of the CCP. Li had 
studied in Japan for fourteen years. While at Tokyo Imperial University he studied 
some Marxist books. On his return to China Li participated in the New Culture 
(Collected Articles on Hu Shi Studies), p 13. 
35 Li Lisan, 'Report on the History of the CCP', (Moscow, 1 February 1930), Yida 
gianhou, Vol 3. 
36 FO 228/3214,4 March 1920. 
37 FO 405/233, No 107. 
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Movement. Since his elder brother was a founding member of Tongmeng hui, Li 
had close relations with some nationalist leaders, and could therefore join the 
editorial office of Xingqi 12inglun (Sunday Review), a paper of GMD (the National 
Party). By October 1919 the British Intelligence Bureau was informed that there 
were two Chinese Bolsheviks living in the French Concession in Shanghai and their 
names were given as Ho Hyau Lieu and Lee Jen Jehy. 38 Nothing more is known 
about Ho Hyau Lieu, but we can be confident that Lee Jen Jehy was Li Hanjun, for 
his original name was Li Renjie and the intelligence report also pointed out that Lee 
had been a student in Japan. Yang Zhihua's memoirs provide additional evidence 
about Li's relations with radicals from Russia and other countries: 
In the vacation of 1919,1 went to the office of Xinqi Pinglun in Shanghai. 
Li Hanjun was the leading spirit of the office in the area of ideas. ... [He] had 
connections with the Communists of Japan and Korea then. ... My aim in 
joining the office of Xinggi Pinglun was to go to Soviet Russia to study, and 
Li Hanjun gave me a lot of help in this. He took me to the home of some 
Japanese and Korean progressive friends and also introduced me to a Russian 
friend to learn Russian. 39 
Yang's memoirs indicate that Li Hanjun was well acquainted with certain 
progressive Russians, although she was not specific about whether they were 
Bolsheviks or not. From the British archives it is clear that Li at least knew the 
Russians Lizerovitch and Lundon at the time. Lizerovitch was a Soviet agent and 
Lundon was Lizerovitch's intimate friend and also served Soviet Russia. Later Li 
33 FO 405/228,7 April 1920. 
39 'Yang Zhihua's Recollections', Yida qianhou, Vol 2, pp 25-6. Yang later became 
Qu Qiubai's wife. 
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attended several meetings held by Voitinsky. Perhaps due to his close connections 
with these Bolshevik agents, he was chosen to be the first chairman of the Red 
Trade Union of the Far East, which was based in Chita. 40 
Zhang Tailei was a unique figure in the process of establishing the CCP. He 
acted as a faithful assistant and interpreter for the Bolshevik representatives in 
China. In spring 1921 he went to Irkutsk and assumed the post of head of the 
Chinese Section of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern. He often carried 
out special tasks in the Far East as a representative of the Comintern and was thus 
the first delegate of the CCP to attend the P Comintern Congress. It is interesting 
to know the reason why Zhang could inspire such trust from the Russian 
Bolsheviks. In autumn 1918, when Zhang was still a poor student at the Law 
Faculty of Beiyang University in Tianjin, he met Polevoy and kept in touch with 
him afterwards. 41 About this time Polevoy was enrolled as an agent of Soviet 
Russia and later became the Comintern's liaison man in Tianjin. Zhang helped 
Polevoy with his work in various ways, including translating, for he had learned 
English at a Christian school. Zhang Tailei probably also met Burtman in 1919. 
According to MUller, Burtman "had direct links with the students' demonstration in 
Tianjin within the framework of the May 4th Movement ... Circles of students 
attended political gatherings in his flat one after another. 42 Regrettably MUller did 
not record the names of the students who visited Burtman's flat. In their article on 
Zhang Tailei, the Soviet scholars P. Korovyakovsky and N. Rusanov assumed 
4" Li Danyang and Liu Jianyi (eds. ), Li Haniun vaniiu ziliao (Research Materials on Li 
Hanjun), compiled in 1981, unpublished. 
41 Ding Zeqin and Wang Shudi, 'Zhang Tailei's Chronicle', Zhang Tailei weni 
(Collected Works of Zhang Tailei), (Beijing, 1981). 
42 Quoted from Meisner, U Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism, p 115. 
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Zhang to be one of them, on the grounds that he later worked at the Far Eastern 
Secretariat, which was initiated by Burtman himself. 43 This seems a reasonable 
assumption. Moreover, Zhang set up a student organisation - the Society for Social 
Reconstruction in February 1919, and was one of the student leaders in Tianjin 
during the May 4h movement. Given this background, it is not difficult to 
understand why, when Voitinsky's team arrived in Beijing, Zhang was summoned 
there to act as their interpreter. 
Besides Zhang Tailei there must have been some other Chinese students in 
Tianjin who had relations with Burtman and other Bolsheviks. According to Zhu 
Molin, there was a 'New Poetry Society' in the British Concession of Tianjin during 
1919-1920 and its members are reported to have included Zhou Enlai, Zhang 
Wentian, Han Linfu, Deng Yingchao and some Russians. 44 
Qu Qiubai's rise to the leading position within the CCP after August 1927 
was supported by the Comintern. Why Moscow chose him as key leader of the 
CCP in place of Chen Duxiu can be explained by his early career. In 1917 Qu 
began to learn Russian at the Beijing Russian Language Institute, where one of his 
lecturers was Polevoy, with whom he maintained close relations. 45 Maybe it was 
through Qu that Polevoy got to know Zhang Tailei, because Qu and Zhang were 
classmates and close friends at Changzhou Secondary School and they kept in touch 
43 Korovyakovsky and Rusanov, 'Zhang Tai Lei, A Trail-Blazer of the Chinese 
Revolution', Far Eastern Affairs, (11988) No 5, p 105. 
44 Wang Jianmin, Zhonqquo Gonqchandanc gao (A Draft History of the Chinese 1 shic 
Communist Party), Taibei, 1965; In 1991 1 asked Deng Yingchao, through her 
secretary, for confirmation of this. She denied it. 
45 Guan Shanf u, 'Some Facts on Polevoy and Ivanov', Dangshi tun-qxun, (11984), No 
3. pp 58-9. 
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even after they enrolled at different institutions of higher education. 46 With their 
special connections with Soviet agents, both Qu and Zhang joined Li Dazhao's 
Marxist Research Society in 1920 and became the only members who did not 
belong to Beijing University. 47 
In the early summer of 1920, Qu was chosen to visit Soviet Russia as a 
correspondent of Chen bao (the Morning poSt). 48 When he stopped over in Harbin, 
Qu attended the celebration of the P anniversary of the October Revolution, at 
which he told some Russian friends that there were several societies for studying 
socialism and Marxism in China. 49 After he arrived in Chita Qu wrote a report to 
the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern, which was published under the pen- 
name Strakhov in the first issue of the Bulletin of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the 
Comintern in February 1921. In this report he wrote that with Voitinsky's help, the 
first branch of the CCP had been founded in Shanghai and that in North China 
Voitinsky had been engaged in organising Communist circles with the help of 
Professor S. A. Polevoy's group. 50 These indicate that Qu was very familiar with 
the process of the formation of the CCP's early organisations and with the activities 
of the Soviet agents. 51 Yet many Chinese historians have not paid attention to this 
46 Chen Tiejian, Ou Qiubai zhuan (The Biography of Qu Qiubai), (Shanghai: Shanghai 
People's Press, 1986). 
47 Liu Nongchao, 'The Chief Commander in Leading the May Fourth Movement - 
Comrade Li Dazhao', Wusi vundonq lunwenii (Collected Theses on the May 4 th 
Movement), (Wuhan, 1959). 
48 As early as June 1920, the news that the Chinese journalists would visit Soviet 
Russia appeared in Moscow. However, Qu and other journalists left for Soviet Russia 
in October 1920. 
49 Qu Qiubai wenii (Writings of Qu Qiubai , (Lite ratu re), _(Beijing: 
The People's 
Literature Press, 1985), Vol 1, p 62. 
50 Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, pp 415-6; V. 1. Glunin, 'The 
Comintern and the Rise of the Communist Movement in China', Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The 
Comintern and the East, p 283. 
Dov Bing believes that Qu wrote this letter in Beijing while Voitinsky was still there; 
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report by Qu and thus believe that Qu became involved in the Communist 
movement only after he reached Soviet Russia or after he joined the CCp. 52 In fact, 
Qu Qiubai had been committed to the Russian way before his departure to Russia. 
During his trip to Moscow, Qu wrote "E xiang jicheng" (Journey to the Land of 
Hunger), in which he described his journey as a trip towards the "gate of freedom" 
and his mission as "shouldering the responsibility of developing ideas for China 
during its rebirth", and extolled Moscow as the "lighthouse" in his heart. 53 On 
arrival in Moscow, Qu and some other Chinese journalists claimed that they were 
"the disciples of Karl Marx". 54 During his stay in Moscow, Qu got acquainted with 
some Soviet and Comintern officials, and made a good impression on them. 
Qu Qiubai and Zhang Tailei were the individuals within the CCP who 
enjoyed the trust of the Bolsheviks most and were regarded as "long-tested, faithful, 
reliable and exemplary Chinese Communists" . 
55 This position much helped their 
future careers within the CCP. 
So far, I have made a brief survey of the early connections which existed 
between Bolshevik agents and some key founders of the CCP. Besides these the 
agents also contacted other Chinese radicals. The advent of Voitinsky's team in 
China rendered the range of contacts wider and more open. As a result of these 
efforts, more Chinese were drawn into the Communist movement. Voitinsky was 
Dov Bing, 'Voitinsky and the Foundation of the CCP', Feiging vuebao (Taibel, 
November 1976) Vol 19, No 5. 
52 There are arguments on the time Qu Qiubai joined the CCP: Some say that it was 
summer 1921; others say spring 1922; cf. Lu Yuan, 'On the Time When Qu Qiubai 
Joined the CCP', Dan-qshi vianaiu ziliao (Collected Materials on the CCP's History), 
(Shanghai, 1980), No 4. 
53 QU Qiubai wenui (Writings of Qu Qiubai), (Literature), Vol 1. 
54 in and Nortý, Soviet Russia and the East, p 89. 
*5,5'Vilensky to Radek, 6 April 1922', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 80. 
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so satisfied with it that he once stated that the list of educated young Chinese in 
Shanghai who had pledged themselves in writing to the support of the Russian 
Soviet and Communist principles was growing everyday. 56 The Bolsheviks' 
endeavours to convert the Chinese to Communism were the main driving force 
which gave the impetus to radical Chinese as they moved towards Bolshevism. 
Section 2. Contact with Sun Yat-sen and His Party 
Soviet Russia's contact with Sun Yat-sen and his followers is an interesting 
subject for many scholars both in China and abroad, and much has been written on 
this topic. But since the relevant materials have not been searched sufficiently, the 
accounts are incomplete. In particular, there has been insufficient analysis of the 
purpose which lay behind the contacts and its links with the establishment of the 
CCP. 
Sun Yat-sen was a great nationalist democratic revolutionary. He organised 
Xingzhong hui (The Society for Reviving China) in 1894 and formed Tongmeng 
hui (the Revolutionary Alliance) in 1905. His early political programme can be 
summed up in his slogan: "Drive out the Manchus; Restore the Chinese Nation; 
Establish a Republic and Equalize Land Ownership. " Sun called himself a socialist 
and read socialist literature widely. In May 1905 he even visited the Executive 
Bureau of the Second International in Brussels with the purpose of gaining 
56 FO 228/3214, September 1920. 
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membership for his party. 57 Sun's ideas and his career endowed him with 
considerable prestige, so Sun was elected the first Provisional President of the 
Republic of China in January 1912. Before long Sun's Tongmeng hui changed its 
name to Guomin Dang (the Nationalist Party, abbreviated to GMD). After moving 
to oppose Yuan Shikai in the so-called "Second Revolution", Sun reorganised his 
party in Japan in 1914 calling it Zhonghua Geming Dang (the Chinese 
Revolutionary Party). In October 1919, the Party resumed its former name - 
Guomin Dang. 
The victory of the Chinese Revolution of 1911 drew the attention of Lenin 
and the Bolshevik party to Sun Yat-sen and his party. In 1912, the Russian Socialist 
Democratic Labour Party at its 6th conference hailed "the revolutionary republicans 
of China" and recognised "the world-wide importance of the revolutionary struggle 
,, 58 of the Chinese people. In the same year, after reading an article written by Sun 
Yat-sen in Brussels' socialist newspaper, Le Peuple, Lenin commented on it in his 
article "Democracy and Narodism in China", in which he praised Sun as "a 
revolutionary democrat, endowed with the nobility and heroism of a class that is 
rising" in addition to criticising Sun's economic programme aimed at forestalling 
capitalism in China and thus similar to that entertained by the Russian Populists . 
59 
In November 1912 Lenin again wrote a piece on the political parties of China and 
expressed himself favourably towards the GMD: "The Nationalist Party is 
predominantly a party of the more industrially-developed and progressive southern 
57 Hu Sheng, 'On Sun Zhongshan's Socialist Thoughts', Sun Zhongshan he ta de 
ahýidaj (Sun Yat-sen and His Era), Beijing: Zhonghua Publishing House, 1985, Vol 1, p 
45. 
5'3 Lenin. Collected Works, Vol 17, p 485. 
59 in, Collected Works, Vol 18, pp 163-169. 
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part of the country. ... Its leaders are intellectuals who have been educated 
abroad. '960 After the October Revolution the Bolsheviks believed that Sun Yat-sen 
and his followers might become their allies in China. In one of the early 
instructions issued by Soviet Russia's Council of People's Commissars to guide the 
local soviets in Siberia on the policy toward the Far East, Sun's Guangdong 
Government was portrayed as progressive. 61 
For his part, Sun Yat-sen followed with interest the development of the 
Russian Revolution and, while he was in exile kept in touch with such Russian 
revolutionaries as E. Volkholvsky, N. K. Sudzilovskii and G. Chicherin. 62 After 
becoming the provisional president of the Republic of China, Sun received the 
Vice-Consul of the Russian Consulate General in Shanghai, Voznesensky, who was 
a Socialist Revolutionary at that time and later the head of the Eastern division of 
Narkomindel. Sun said to him: "The necessary condition for achieving the 
complete success of social revolution is that Russians, Indians and Chinese must 
participate in the revolution together. "63 When he heard news of the outbreak of the 
February Revolution in Russia, Sun Yat-sen sent a congratulatory telegram to 
Petrograd but received no reply. 64 On 25 October Sun despatched Wang Shuwen, 
one of his staff, to Siberia in order to investigate the situation in Russia and report 
back . 
65 In a speech at a dinner party on 28 January 1918 Sun Yat-sen expressed his 
60 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 18, p 401. 
61 Leong Sow-theng, Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relation. p 33. 
62 WU Xiangxiang, 'Soviet Scholarly Works on the Father of the State', Zhuanni 
wenxue (Biographical Literature), (Taibei), Vol 23, No 3. 
63 S. L. Tikhvinskii, 'Sun Yat-sen and Soviet Russia', Sun Zhon-qshan he ta de shidai, 
Vol 1, p 532. 64 U Yunhan, Cong ronciciong dao gingdang (From the Admission of the Chinese 
Communists to the Purification of the GMD), (Taibei: Commercial Press, 1966) p 110. 
65 'Sun Yat-sen Sent a Person to Russia for Investigation of the Situation of the 
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hopes for the Russian Revolution along the lines that "If the revolutionary regime in 
Russia can be consolidated, our revolution can be expected to develop rapidly in 
ý66 67 China. ' In the summer of that year , at a time when Soviet Russia was 
isolated, ý 
Sun Yat-sen sent a telegram in the name of the parliament of South China and the 
Chinese Revolutionary Party, which expressed congratulations on the victory of the 
Russian Revolution and stated: "Because of the Russian Revolution, mankind of the 
world has found great hope. ... The revolutionary parties of 
China and Russia 
should unite for a common struggle. t968 
Upon receiving it, Ixnin was said to have been deeply moved and to have 
regarded the message as "the light from the East". 69 On I August, Chicherin, 
Commissar of Narkomindel and an old friend of Sun Yat-sen, replied to Sun in an 
open letter. Here Sun Yat-sen was described as the Chinese revolutionary leader 
and an honoured teacher. Chicherin also wrote that "The Russian working classes 
turn to their Chinese brothers and call them on to the common fight. "70 
It was these common concerns and mutual sympathy and understanding 
which both sides demonstrated that became the basis of the early contacts between 
Russian Bolsheviks and Sun Yat-sen's party. Actual contact was initiated by Lenin 
October Revolution', Tuaniie bao (Unity Paper), (Beijing, March 30,1985). 
66 Shao Yuanchong, 'Daily Record of the Constitution Defending Movement in 
Guangdong', Jianguo vuekan (State Construction Monthly), (Nanjing, June 1935), Vol 
12, No 6. 
67 According to a news report in the Minguo ribao of 13 May 1918, Sun dispatched a 
telegram to the Soviet Government from Shanghai that May. But many scholars have 
thought that the telegram was sent in summer 1918. 
68 Sun Zhongshan quan'i (Collected Works of Sun Yat-sen), (Beijing: People's Press, 
1985), Vol 4, p 500; Song Oingling Xuanii (Selected Works of Song Qing-ling), (Beijing: 
People's Press, 1992), Vol 2, p 52. 
69 Zou Lu, Zhonqquo Guomin danq shigao (Draft History of the GMD), (Chongqing, 
1944), p 304; Quoted from Leng Shao-chuan and N. D. Palmer, Sun Yat-sen and 
Communism., (London, Thames & Hudson, 1961), p 48. 
Degras (ed. ) Soviet Documents on Foreign Polic , Vol 1, p 93. 142 
in 1918 when he enquired whether it would be possible "to find among the Chinese 
workers [in Russia] some brave men who could establish contact with Sun Yat- 
sen". According to Voznesensky, "a reliable man" was sent to Guangzhou to 
deliver Chicherin's letter at the end of 1918.71 Since Sun had already left 
Guangzhou for Shanghai by then, his later claim not to have received the letter 
might well have been true. 
The Bolsheviks never gave up their efforts to get in touch with Sun Yat-sen 
and his party. In June 1919, a Japanese newspaper reported that "Lenin's 
Government sent a secret emissary to meet Sun Hongyi and there are signs that Sun 
Hongyi also dispatched a secret emissary to Lenin's Government.,, 72 Sun Hongyi 
had been Sun Yat-sen's plenipotentiary in Shanghai since November 1917 and kept 
close relations with Sun Yat-sen. Therefore, the contact with Sun Hongyi could be 
considered as a means of establishing contact with Sun Yat-sen. Several months 
later, an intelligence report showed that five Chinese, one Japanese and one Korean, 
all of whom were Bolshevik emissaries, had recently arrived in Shanghai to call on 
Sun Yat-sen. The report added: "recently a Soviet emissary sent Sun Yat-sen a 
letter urging a Soviet revolution in China. "73 In the same month Reuters reported 
similarly and further noted that Mr. Zhongshan (Sun's alias) had denied that he had 
any contact with Bolshevik agents. 74 Despite Sun's denial, the British Intelligence 
Bureau offered detailed information to the effect that "Sun Yat-sen has been in 
71 Holubnychy, Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923-1925, pp 137-138. 
Perhaps the "reliable man'was Zhu Zhaisheng, who was born in Russia and acted as a 
liaison between Moscow and Sun Yat-sen. See Wu Yingguang, 'The Alliance of Sun 
Yat-sun and Wu Peifu and the Soviet Policy in China during 1920-23', Sun Zhon-qshan 
y; pýi_ý (Studies of Sun Yat-sen), p 109. 
73 
Min-quo ribao (The Republic Daily), 20 June 1919. 
FO 228/3211,2 November 1919. 
74 Min-quo ribao, 26,27, November 1919. 
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communication with the Bolshevik headquarters in Siberia through the medium of 
his secretary. ', 75 
At the end of 1919, a Russian named N. Matveev Bodryi, head of the 
Labour Society, which was organised by Russian 6migres in Shanghai, visited Sun. 
Later, Bodryi went back to Russia and reported on his interview with Sun. On 
returning to Shanghai he called on Sun again and talked with him about the Russian 
and Chinese Revolutions. 76 
Sun Yat-sen yearned to learn from the Bolsheviks' revolutionary experience 
and even arranged for several important cadres of his Party, such as Liao Zhongkai, 
Zhu Zhixin, Li Zhangda and Li Langru, to learn Russian in 1919, in order to send 
them to Soviet Russia for this purpose. Since Russia was in serious crisis, they 
failed to go there. 77 As news from Russia gradually filtered through to China, Sun 
became aware of Bolsheviks' conduct of War Communism, rule by terror and so 
forth. Such a turn of events did not accord with Sun's ideas of moderate social 
reform. Sun came to consider that the Bolshevik regime arose from "acutely 
abnormal" circumstances and thus Bolshevism was a kind of "unsound" doctrine. 78 
Sun did not believe that communism could be successfully achieved in Russia in 
this way. 79 However, the Bolshevik's military victory in the Civil War was 
75 FO 228/3211,2 November 1919. 
76 Matveev Bodryi, 'Two Meetings with Sun Yat-sen', Quoted from Zhou Gu, 'The 
Early Relations between Sun Yat-sen and Russian Revolutionaries', Zhuanii wenxue 
March, 1991) Vol 85, No 3. 
77 He Xiangnining, 'Some Recollections of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Weida de Sun 
Zhonashan (The Great Sun Yat-sen), (Hong Kong, 1957), p 39. 
" Sun Yat-sen also talked about the dangers of the spread of Bolshevism in China. 
Dai Jitao, 'Mr. Sun's Talks during My Visits', Xinggi ginglun (Sunday Review), 
(Shanghai), 22 June 1919. 
79 Sun expressed this opinion repeatedly during his talks with Potapov. See 
'Potapov's Report to Chicherin, 12 December 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 48. 
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undoubtedly inspiring to Sun and his followers, who had suffered one defeat after 
another since 1912. So Sun was still willing to follow the Russian situation and 
Bolshevik experience. 
In March 1920 Sun Yat-sen had a long conversation with Lundon, a Russian 
emigre, on the subject of Bolshevism. In the same month Sun admitted that he was 
indirectly in touch with the Bolsheviks from Russia. 80 Some accounts indicate that 
it was in March 1920 that "two Bolshevik agents came to Shanghai from 
Vladivostok and visited Sun Yat-sen vý8 1 Although they are not specific on the 
identity of the two men, according to Sokolsky, early in 1920 Colonel Popov, "who 
came with credentials from the Commander of Bolshevik troops of the Amur 
district", visited Sun with General Potapov, "who had been posing as a Bolshevik, 
but had no credentials". Popov and Potapov discussed with Sun the plan for co- 
operation between the GMD and the Bolsheviks. 82 They also tried to persuade Sun 
to approve the Karakhan Manifesto but failed as Potapov wrote later that Sun was 
too timid to respond to the Manifesto publicly, fearing that it would harm the 
revolutionary work he was doing and make trouble for his stay in the foreign 
settlement if his contacts with Moscow would thereby be revealed. 83 During the 
meetings with Sun Yat-sen, Potapov expressed his desire to visit Chen Jiongming, a 
military leader of the GMD in Zhangzhou. 
80 FO 228/3214,18 March 1920. 
81 FO 228/3214,25 March 1920. 
82 'The Reminiscences of George Sokolsky, Manuscript, dated 1956 and 1963, Oral 
History Collection, Columbia University, Quoted from Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated 
Patriot, p 115; Potapov had met Sun before this visit in March 1920. Luo Gang (ed. ), 
Zhonqhua minquo quofu shilu (The Factual Account of Sun Yat-sen), 6 Vols., Taibei: 
Zhengzhong Publishing House, 1988, Vol 5, p 3544. 
83 'Potapov's Report to Chicherin, 12 December 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 48. 
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General Chen Rongming's troops in South China were Sun Yat-sen's only 
important military force at that time. The siege of southern Fujian by the troops of 
General Chen in August 1918 was seen by some in Moscow as the beginning of a 
Soviet revolution in South China. 84 Before long, Chen's troops occupied an area in 
Southern Fujian with Zhangzhou as its centre, which was regarded by Sun Yat-sen 
as an important base area of revolution. Chen Jiongming was interested in 
socialism. He carried out a programme of propaganda and the encouragement of 
64 new culture" and "new social customs" in Southern Fujian and this area was 
, 85 therefore called "the Russia of Southern Fujian' . In Shantou, Zhangzhou's 
neighbouring city, there was a Soviet agent who reported on Zhangzhou's situation 
to the Soviet Government and disseminated news about Soviet Russia in the area. 86 
Soviet leaders attached much importance to Chen, for they considered that Chen 
held real power and had military strength and believed that to establish relations 
with Chen would be very useful for them. 
In spring 1920, the Bolsheviks in Shanghai established relations with Chen 
Jiongming via Lu Shikai, an assistant of Stopany. 87 Nearly at the same time that 
Potapov asked Sun Yat-sen to help him meet Chen Jiongming, the Comintern agent 
84 Leong Sow-theng, Sino-Soviet Dinlomatic Relations, p 132. 
85 Ru Shan, 'What I Saw and Heard during My Visit to Zhangzhou', Beining daxue 
xuesheng zhoukan (Beijing University Students' Weekly), (May 1st 1920) No 14. 
116 Fuiian dangshi vuekan., (11990) No 12. According to the above article all these were 
done by the Russian consulate in Shantou. In fact, there was definitely no Soviet 
consulate at that time; instead, a Russian, Mikulin, who worked at the Chinese Maritime 
Customs in Shantou, was serving Soviet Russia; see FO 228/3211, November 1920. 
117 'Report from K. J. McEuen, the Commissioner of Police in Shanghai', in American 
State Archives, Class 800,1920; quoted from LO Fang-shang, Geming zhi zaiqi, 
(Resurgence of the Revolution), (Taibei, The Institute of Modern History, Academia 
Sinica, 1989), p 93. 
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Polevoy informed General Chen, through a Chinese named Jiang who was working 
in Zhangzhou, that a Soviet representative would visit Zhangzhou. 88 
On 29 April 1920, General Potapov with his team, including a Swedish lady 
named Mrs Michemach and a Korean named Yo Unphyong, arrived in Zhangzhou 
via Shantou. They met Chen Jiongming and other prominent GMD members, such 
as Zhu Zhixin and Liao Zhongkai, who were assisting Chen in Zhangzhou at the 
time. Potapov presented Chen with a letter from Lenin in which Lenin expressed 
his concern for the Chinese revolution and his admiration for Chen. Potapov 
proposed that Soviet Russia could provide Chen's troops with ordnance if Chen 
needed such supplies. The two sides signed a memorandum on their talks. When 
89 Potapov left Zhangzhou he took Chen Jiongming's reply to Lenin. In this letter 
Chen congratulated Lenin on the achievements of the Russian Revolution, approved 
the Karakhan Manifesto and declared: "I firmly believe that Bolshevism will bring 
happiness to human beings. I will do my best to spread the principles of 
Bolshevism over the world and to fulfil this system in the world. Our task is to 
reform China and the whole of Eastern Asia. " This letter was later published in 
Vestnik Narkomindel (Bulletin of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs) in March 
1921. Chen was therefore praised by Russian Bolsheviks as a "convinced 
communist", "not only a revolutionary general ... but a brilliant organiser, receiving 
88 Haiyu Guke, Jiefanq bielu, 
89 Liang Bingxuan writes in Jiefang bielu that he forgot the envoy's name and only 
remembered that the name began with a letter V; Chen Qiyou, Chen Jiongming's chief 
of staff, writes in 'Soviet Russia Dispatched A Delegation to Zhangzhou in 1919' 
(Wenshi ziliao xuanii, (Beijing, 1980, No 24) that the Russian general who visited 
Zhangzhou was named "Lu Bo". Both "Wand "Lu Bo" were actually Potapov, as many 
historians have demonstrated. 
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the sympathies of the masses, " etc. 90 This indicates that the Bolshevik leaders were 
in favour of Chen Jiongming and their relations with Chen seemed quite warm. 
Later, Vilensky, Voitinsky, Stoyanovichy, Maring and some other Soviet agents 
also approached and talked with Chen Jiongming, believing he had socialist 
inclinations. 
Around this time, Voitinsky and other Soviet agents made contacts with 
many of Sun Yat-sen's followers, such as Dai Jitao, Li liejun, Cao Yabo, Zhu 
Zhuowen, Shen Xuanlu, Xu Qian, Wu Shan, Shao Lizi and Lin Boqu. 91 They tried 
to urge some of these persons to form a Communist Party in China. However, most 
of them were loyal adherents of Sun Yat-sen and therefore refused to go along with 
the plan because they did not want to betray their leader. 
Over a long period, some leading cadres of Sun's Party, such as Zhu Zhixin, 
Liao Zhongkai, Hu Hanmin, Dai Jitao, Feng Ziyou and Lin Yungai conducted 
research into socialism and Marxism. Their knowledge of socialism and Marxism 
was even greater than Li Dazhao's and Chen Duxiu's before 1920. And these 
people also appreciated the Bolsheviks' spirit of hard work and their well-organised 
Party and Army; they believed that Soviet Russia's foreign policy, which claimed to 
abandon the Romanov dynasty's policy of aggression against China and to abrogate 
all secret treaties, was "of benefit to China, "92 and welcomed the fact that "the new 
Russian Government's focus is to abolish the monopoly of the capitalists and the 
brutality of the officials", and declared that "China should learn from it. " 93 
Nevertheless, they believed that Sun's People's Livelihood Principle, which 
90 Vestnik Narkomindel, (Moscow, 1922), Nos 1,2. 
91 Geming renwu zhi (Biographies of Revolutionaries), (Taibel, 1969). 
92 Xinggi vinglun, 30 November 1919. 
93 
_ nquo ribao 
(National Daily), 27 May 1919. 
148 
included two essential policies of "the equalisation of land ownership" and "the 
restriction of capital", was the best form of socialism. In line with this, Sun and his 
party never adopted an attitude of either total and uncritical acceptance or total 
repudiation of Soviet Russia's experience. 
Encouragement to advance the cause of socialism in China also came from 
Britain. In June 1920 Sylvia Pankhurst, a British Communist leader and a 
participant in the Comintern, wrote a letter to Lizerovitch with whom she had close 
links. She desired him to get in touch with Sun Yat-sen and urged him to do his 
utmost for socialism in China. After Pankhurst's message was delivered to him, 
Sun in his reply, which was passed on by Lizerovitch, too, stated in effect that 
though his sympathies were with Soviet Russia, he was not at present able to 
proclaim his feelings openly, as owing to the political situation he was temporarily 
dependent on the capitalists; but as soon as he could dispense with their assistance 
he would again work for the socialist cause in China. 94 
In the same month, Sun Yat-sen was invited to visit Soviet Russia by a 
telegram, which was drafted by Chicherin, from Liu Zerong [Shaozhou], Chairman 
95 
of the All Russian Union of Chinese Workers. Another telegram which came 
from Lenin himself also urged Sun to see how they had done in Russia. 96 Both 
these invitations were sent to China on the eve of the Second Congress of the 
Comintern and the obvious hope behind them was that Sun would attend the 
Congress. However, Sun turned the invitations down. Sun's attitude towards 
Soviet Russia was circumspect not only because he felt dissatisfaction with Russia's 
94 FO 228/3214, June 1920; FO 228/3216, No 29,4 September 1920. 
95 Huang Xiurong, Gonqchan cluoii vu Zhonqcluo geming quanxi shi, p 72. 
96 Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot, p 117. 
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Communism but also because of he was afraid that his close relations with Soviet 
Russia would complicate his attempts to gain support from other Western countries. 
Regardless of Sun Yat-sen's absence in the 2nd Congress of the Comintern, 
Moscow still considered him a very important person with whom they could co- 
operate. In addition, they sought to influence Sun ideologically. The Communist 
International of August 1920 carried an article which said: "Sun Yat-sen is 
especially valuable to us, " for he was "the leader of the Chinese youth, which is 
growing more and more left wing; " and it continued that Soviet Russia and the 
Comintern must help him "by teaching him simple, clear, proletarian tactics in the 
internal theoretical-political struggle; so that he can break all connections, not only 
with the old past of his own country, but with the entire bourgeois world, and 
undeviatingly adopt the point of view of the Communist International This 
article reflected the Comintem's hope: to push the GMD to become a socialist party 
affiliated to the Comintem. 
The Chinese Communist organisation in Russia which was under the 
direction of the RCP(B) also considered Sun Yat-sen and his party as their 
"comrades". In Summer 1920 the Central Organisational Bureau of Chinese 
Communists in Russia drafted a plan for an armed drive on Beijing from three 
directions: Xinjiang, Manchuria and South China. At the beginning of September 
1920, Liu Qian (Russian alias Fedorov), a member of the Bureau, reached Shanghai 
to talk with Sun Yat-sen on two or three occasions and tried to reach an agreement 
on a co-operative military operation of the forces of Soviet Central Asian, the Far 
Eastern Republic, and South China with a city in the Russian Far East as the leading 
97 R. 'The Situation in Eastern Asia', The Communist International, (Moscow, August 
1920), No 13. 
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centre in order to overthrow the Beijing Government. 98 On Sun's recommendation, 
he met various important members of the GMD in Shanghai and other places. Liu 
Qian also brought a message from the Chinese Communists in Russia to the 
Chinese youth stating that Lenin had promised to help China if the Chinese helped 
themselves by understanding the new world tendencies and joining the socialists, 
and give up their dependence on foreigners. " The last remark was obviously 
directed to the GMD, since the latter always looked to other foreign countries for 
aid. Although Sun Yat-sen and the GMD did not "join the socialists" as Moscow 
hoped, they certainly intended to join hands with Russia in military operations and 
Sun sent Li Zhangda as his representative in the Russian Far East to fulfil this 
plan. 100 
In November 1920, Voitinsky visited Sun Yat-sen and the topic of their talk 
focused on how to combine the struggle in South China with the struggle in remote 
Russia. In order to implement this goal, they also discussed the possibilities of 
establishing a radio link between Soviet Russia and Guangzhou. 101 Shortly after 
this meeting, Sun Yat-sen moved to Guangzhou and established his second 
Southern Government there. From then on Soviet Russia's relations with Sun 
accordingly entered a new phase. Around this time, a Soviet representative, I. I. 
9" Persits, 'Eastern Internationalists of Russia and Some Questions of the National- 
Liberation movement, 1918-July 1920', Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, 
p 114; 'Liu Qian's Report to the RCP(B)'s Amur Committee', GLZIDC, Vol 1, p 44. Luo 
Gang (ed. ), Zhonghua min-quo quofu shilu, Vol 5, p 3544. 
99 FO 228/3214, September 1920. 
100 Yang Kuisong in his 'Sun Zhongshan's Plan for A Military Operation in the North- 
West and Its Failure' I'Llshi vaniiu (Historical Studies), (Beijing, 1996), No 3] does not 
mention that the military plan Was also proposed by the Chinese Communists in 
Russia. 
101 S. L. Tikhvinskii, Sun Yat-sen: His Views on Foreign Policy and His Practice, 
(Moscow, 1964), p 535. 
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Stelahov, entered to China and met some GMD leaders in Beijing and Shanghai. In 
a report he wrote later, Stelahov suggested that Soviet Russia should "establish a 
relationship with the Guangzhou Government as soon as possible. " According to 
him, the purpose for that was "to find some elements in the Guangzhou Government 
who can arouse the people of the whole country to rise up against the capitalist 
[powers'] oppression in the Far East", and to use the Government "as a tool to carry 
out national revolutions in the East. " 102 
Not long after the GMD's troops led by Chen Jiongming regained 
Guangdong in the fall of 1920, Soviet Russia and the Comintern sent several 
representatives there in order to establish a closer relationship with the United 
Provincial Government in Guangzhou. A Japanese journalist, K. Fuse, wrote: 
"When Sun Yat-sen was proceeding to Canton from Shanghai, he met a Soviet 
representative and discussed with him a certain action to be taken in concert with 
Soviet Russia. ... Soon, the Military Government sent its representative to Moscow, 
and Moscow specially detailed a Communist member in the person of Alexieff. " 103 
Some historians, while citing Fuse's work, only mention Alexieff and neglect the 
Soviet representative Sun met before Alexieff. 104 It is clear that they have misread 
Fuse's above phrase. However, the British archives offer detailed information 
about Soviet representatives in Guangzhou around that time. Some reports 
102-S. Stelahov's Report on Guangzhou Government', GLZIDC, Vol 1, pp 63-64. 
103 Fuse, Soviet Policy in the Orient, p 224-5. 
104 Wilbur in Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot and Cui Shuqin in Sun Zhongshan yu 
Gonqchan Zhuvi (Sun Yat-sen and Communism), (Hong Kong: the Asia Press, 1954) 
say so. They also state that Alexieff opened a branch of the Rosta in Guangdong. In 
fact, as early as the autumn of 1920, a branch of the Rosta-Dalta was established in 
Guangzhou by Stoyanovitch and Perlin. cf. 'Report of the Canton Communist Group, 
1921', Zhonaquo Gonqchan danq divici daibiao dahui danclan ziliao (Archival Sources 
for the First Congress of the CCP), (Beijing, 1984); 'Tan Zuyin's Memoirs', Yida 
clianhou,, Vol 3. 
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indicated that a Bolshevik delegate named Remankauff had arrived in Guangzhou 
by January 1921 and he later altered his name to Stark. This Russian had a good 
speaking knowledge of Mandarin and Hakka and was living in a monastery not far 
from Guangzhou, where he was very often in consultation with Sun Yat-sen at 
Sun's Yamen (office building). 105 Probably as one of the results of the talks 
between Remankauff and Sun, the mutual exchange of resident representatives took 
place. According to the British archives, Sun issued a mandate to appoint the 
representative of the United Provincial Government, Hsien Chen Feng, to go to 
Russia in March. 106 Alexieff reached Guangzhou at about the same time. Perhaps 
Alexieff was the famous Russian Sinologist of the same name, for during that time 
there was only a limited number of Russians who had knowledge of China and 
Chinese languages and they thus tended to be enlisted in the Bolshevik cause in 
China. It is worth noticing that Professor V. M. Alexieff's research topic between 
1920 and 1922 was "the Republic of China", 107 and he was also said to be in close 
touch with the Comintern. 108 
Fuse wrote further that Alexieff concluded an agreement with Sun Yat-sen 
in March 1921 and he even provided the text of the agreement which had been 
preserved in the form of a memorandum. Cui Shuqin, the author of Sun Yat-, sen 
and Communism, denies there was any such agreement. Wilbur and How also write 
in their book Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China 
that "for this we have no substantial evidence". But in the British Archives, a 
document of April 1921 enclosed a "Moscow-Canton Agreement", which originally 
'05 FO 228/3211, January and February 1921. 
106 FO 228/3211, March 1921. 
107 Nikiforov, SIOPK, p 84, p 371. 
108 FO 228/3211, October, 1921. 
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came from the vernacular press. 109 The content of this agreement is basically the 
same as the one given by Fuse. The following are the terms which sum up the two 
texts: the Soviet Government of Russia and the United Provincial Government of 
the Republic of China (U. P. ) agreed: (1) to recognise each other's sovereignty; (2) 
to resume their commercial relations at once; (3) to permit the diffusion of 
Communism in the territory under the U. P. Government's control; (4) to ensure 
that the Soviet Government would give financial assistance whenever the U. P. 
Government required it; (5) to ensure that the people of the respective countries 
would be treated according to the most favoured nation provision! 10 If the report of 
the Chinese newspaper is true, this would have been the first agreement between 
Moscow and the GMD or a draft of it. Soon the Far Eastern Republic started to 
give the Guangzhou Government "material support". "' 
On the occasion of Sun Yat-sen's inauguration as President of the U. P. 
Government in April 1921, the correspondents of Rosta-Dalta, Khodorov and 
Stoyanovich interviewed Sun. 112 They talked about the situation in Soviet Russia 
and the Far Eastern Republic and also Russia's revolutionary experiences. In June 
1921 Sun Yat-sen received another letter from Chicherin, which was written the 
previous October, and urged China to "enter resolutely the path of good friendship 
with us [Soviet Russia]" and proposed to set up trade relations between the two 
sides at once. The Far East Republic's "material support" and Soviet Russia's 
"financial assistance" were what Sun Yat-sen needed urgently to make up for what 
log FO 228/3211, April 1921. 
110 Fuse, Soviet Policy in the Orient, p 225-6; FO 228/3211 April 1921. 111 M. A. Persits, Sun Yat-sen. 1866-1966, (Moscow, 1966). 
112 Khodorov also visited Sun twice in 1920. Shi Keqiang (Sheveliaov), 'Sun Yat-sen 
and the Dalta Agency, Sun Zhon-qshan he ta de shidai, Vol 1, pp 562-563. 
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he was unable to obtain from the Western powers. Although Sun was willing to 
obtain substantive aid from Soviet Russia, he did not want to see Soviet diplomats 
dealing with the Beijing Government. 
On 7 November 1921, in a reply to a letter from Chicherin concerning 
Soviet Russia's relationship with Sun Yat-sen, Lenin directed: -"[We] should treat 
Sun Yat-sen as warmly as possible and write to him frequently but all this must be 
kept secret. Our representative should be sent to Guangzhou. " 113 
The first formal Comintern delegate Sun Yat-sen met was a Dutch 
Communist named Sneevliet (alias Maring), who had had considerable 
revolutionary experience in Indonesia. After participating in the founding congress 
of the CCP in July 1921, Maring remained in Shanghai for several months and got 
in touch with the GMD headquarters there. After talks with Zhang Ji and several 
other prominent members of the GMD, he formed a very good impression of their 
party. Then Maring travelled to Guilin, where Sun Yat-sen's military headquarters 
for the Northern Expedition campaign had been set up. In January 1922, with 
Zhang Tailei as his interpreter, Maring had talks with Sun Yat-sen on several 
occasions and lectured Sun and his cadres on the Russia Revolution and Lenin's 
recent New Economic Policy. They discussed the possibilities of co-operation 
between Soviet Russia and the GMD. 1 14 After his visit to Guilin and Guangzhou, 
Maring believed that most GMD leaders were inclined towards socialism, that some 
of them were even willing to propagate communism within the Party, and that the 
GMD supported the labour movement. Therefore Maring suggested that only the 
113 'Lenin to Chicherin', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 67. 
114 H. Sneevliet, 'My Association with Sun Yat-sen, Some Personal Memoirs', The 
China Quarterl No 48. 
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GMD was qualified to lead the national liberation revolution at that stage and that 
the CCP should work with them. ' 15 In August 1922, the ECCI approved Maring's 
suggestion that the Chinese Communists organised Communist groups within the 
GMD in order to form a United Front. 116 Dov Bing attributes the polices of co- 
operation between the CCP and the GMD to Sneevliet, calling it the "Sneevlietian 
S trategy". 1 17 In fact, that Communists should support the national liberation 
movement and form an alliance with the national bourgeoisie in colonial and 
backward countries was the pre-existing policy and strategy formulated by Lenin, 
and Maring's own contribution was merely to put them into practice in China using 
his own method of instructing the Communists to join the GMD as individuals. 
Soviet Russia's and the Comintern's purposes for their numerous contacts 
with Sun Yat-sen and his Party varied at different stages: to draw the Chinese 
nationalists into common anti-imperialist struggle led by Moscow; to urge the 
Southern Government to support Soviet diplomacy in order to use it as a bargaining 
counter in negotiations with the Beijing Government; to enlist the GMD as a 
socialist party under the control of the Comintern; and to persuade Sun Yat-sen 
himself and some of his followers to form a Communist party. 118 
"5 Maring, 'My Visits to the Revolutionaries in South China', 30 July 1922, Dan-qshi 
Yaniiu Ziliao, (1981), Nos 6-7; 'Report of Comrade Maring for the ECCI, 11 July 1922', 
GLZDC, Vol 1, p 239. T _16ý Instructions for the ECCI Representative in South China, August 1922, Sneevliet 
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117 Dov Bing, 'Revolution in China: SneevIietian Strategy', (MA thesis, University of 
Auckland, 1968). 
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Sun Yat-sen and his party were finally brought into an alliance with Soviet 
Russia and the Chinese Communist Party in 1923. But they did not give up their 
own political programme and doctrines. Sun believed that the pressing matter of the 
moment was to overthrow the reactionary Beijing Government and to unify the 
whole China by military force; to develop China's industry and to carry out social 
reform with moderate means. With the adoption of the New Economic Policy, Sun 
believed that Soviet Russia had discarded unrealistic "Communism" and had 
embarked on a policy in line with his own Principle of the People's Livelihood and 
his Plan of Industrial Development. ' 19 This shift in Soviet policy made the alliance 
possible. 
In 1923, Sun Yat-sen and Joffe, the Soviet Plenipotentiary, issued an Joint 
Statement. Its first clause read: 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communistic order or even the Soviet system cannot 
actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for 
the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism. 120 
This statement clearly showed Sun's attitude towards Communism and 
Soviet system. All of Sun's and other GMD leaders' responses to Soviet Russia and 
the Comintern demonstrated that they did not intend to co-operate with Soviet 
Russia unconditionally, did not accept the Bolsheviks' entire proposals 
unreservedly, and never had any intention to become uncritically obedient to the 
Bolsheviks. 
119 Sun expressed this view to Liao Zhongkai. See Li Yunhan, Cong ronqqon-cl dao 
gingdang, p 116. 
120 Cited from Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, p 141. 
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Although Soviet Russia and the Comintern did succeed in forging a United 
Front of the Communists and the Nationalists, they failed to make the GMD fully 
obey orders from Moscow. 
Section 3. Contact with Anarchist Groups 
As one school of socialist thought, anarchism had a significant influence 
upon the Chinese radicals during the first two decades of the century. Recently 
some foreign scholars have focused their attention on this aspect of Chinese 
radicalism. They correctly point to the fact that Chinese anarchists not only helped 
to introduce socialism to China but also played an important part in the radical 
organisations during the May 4 Ih period and that many anarchists even joined in the 
early Communist groups. 121 Since the anarchist movement in China had such close 
connections with the origins of the CCP, it is necessary to review briefly its history 
up to 1920. 
Anarchism as a trend of modern thought was introduced into China at the 
beginning of the 20 th century. In 1903, a number of books and booklets on 
anarchism from Japan were published in Chinese translation. Afterwards, many 
young intellectuals, especially those who were abroad, inclined to anarchism, and 
some of them took steps to form anarchist societies. The first Chinese anarchist 
group, consisting of Li Shi-zeng, Wu Zhi-hui, Chu Min-yi and Zhang Jing-jiang, 
121 A. Dirlik, Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1991); R. A. Scalapino and G. T. Yu, The Chinese Anarchist Movement, 
(Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1961). 
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appeared in Paris in 1906 and published in Paris an anarchist weekly magazine in 
Chinese entitled Xin Shiji (the New Century). The following year, some Chinese 
students studying in Japan, such as Zhang Ji, Liu Shi-pei and Jing Mei-jiu, formed a 
Society for the Study of Socialism in Tokyo. The purpose of this Society was 
actually the study of anarchism. Japanese anarchist pioneers such as Kotoku Shusui 
and Osugi Sakae often gave lectures at the meetings of the Society. 122 The Chinese 
anarchists in Tokyo published Tianyibao (Natural Justice) and Henjzbao (Balance). 
Through these anarchist publications, and thanks to students returned from abroad, 
the seeds of anarchism were sown in China. 
Liu Si-fu, better known as Shi Fu, was an important promoter of the 
anarchist movement in China. Liu converted to anarchism in 1905, at nearly the 
same time that he joined Sun Yat-sen's Tongmeng Hui. Shi Fu returned to China in 
1906 and organised the Chinese Assassination Corps in 1908, whose aim was to kill 
high-ranking officials of the Qing dynasty. When the Republic of China was 
founded, Shi Fu organised Huiming Xueshe (the Society of Crowing in the Dark), 
which started to publish Huiming Lu (the Record of the Society of Crowing in the 
Dark) in 1913, and after a few issues changed its title to Min Sheng (People's 
Voice), thus the Society was later called Minsheng She ( People's Voice Society). 
In 1914, Shi Fu founded the Anarchist Comrades' Association which soon had 
branches in several cities. When Shi Fu died in 1915 the Chinese anarchist 
movement lost a dynamic figure, but efforts to spread anarchism continued. More 
anarchist societies were established. Among them the most famous were Shi She 
(Real Society), Qun She (Mass Society) and Ping She (Peace Society). These three 
122 Gao Jun, et al. (eds. ), Wuzhenqfuzhuvi zai Zhonqquo (Anarchism in China), 
(Changsha: Hunan People's Press, 1984), Vol 1, p 22. 
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societies merged with the People's Voice Society into Jinhua She (Evolution 
Society) in 1919, and around the same time Zhen She (Truth Society) and Fendou 
She (Struggle Society) were set up. Each society published a magazine and various 
booklets and therefore, a prolific anarchist literature was widely distributed in 
China. 
The teachings of various anarchist thinkers - Proudhon, Stimer, Bakunin, 
Kropotkin and Tolstoy - were introduced to China, but most Chinese anarchists' 
favourite theory was Kropotkin's anarchist communism. As an ideology imported 
from abroad, anarchism could take root in China rapidly not only because it was in 
harmony with Chinese traditional Taoist thought, but also because the anarchist 
teachings of opposition to authority and oppression had a strong appeal for radical 
Chinese youth, who felt these ideas were simple and direct. For a period of time, 
anarchism became the mainstream of Chinese radical thinking. 
The GMD theorist Dai Jitao made a penetrating analysis on why anarchism 
became an ideological trend among Chinese youths: 
After a set of significant reforms ... over the previous 20 years and more, 
China's politics were still not clear; the system was not improved yet; the state 
could not be unified; social life was still rather poor; and education and 
culture could not be popularised. However, oppression from the surrounding 
world was increasing day by day. People were anxious about whether the 
nation would disintegrate, and the disaster of national subjugation and racial 
extermination would come soon. As they felt quite helpless, nobody could 
find a way to struggle. Therefore, the youth's thinking naturally tended to a 
mentality which cast aside politics, despised law, hated the army . ... The 
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ideological trend of anarchism from 1914 to 1917/1918 demonstrates a 
situation where the Chinese people had come to the end of their tether. 123 
After World War 1, many progressive Chinese intellectuals lost faith in the 
democracy of a Western-style Republic and turned to socialism. Anarchism then 
became the most popular and pervasive of all forms of socialism in China. 
Therefore many radical individuals and organisations were affected by anarchism to 
a greater or lesser extent. At first when the Bolshevik agents came to China they 
could not find Marxists or Communists in China. The most radical revolutionaries 
they could find were anarchists or persons influenced by anarchism and hence the 
latter naturally became the target and allies of the Bolsheviks. 
The Chinese anarchist who became the first to co-operate with the Russian 
Bolsheviks was perhaps Zhang Mochi. Zhang Mochi (alias Zhang Minquan and 
Sheng Guocheng), was an editor of Minsheng's Esperanto edition from 1914 .1 
24 
Before 1917, Zhang was sent abroad as a representative of the Chinese anarchists to 
attend some anarchist conferences in Europe. He happened to be in Moscow at the 
time of the October Revolution. Soon he began to work on behalf of Soviet Russia 
and returned to China in late spring or early summer of 1918 when the student 
movement against the Sino-Japanese Joint Military Defence Pact reached its climax. 
About 3,000 students who had been studying in Japan returned to China in protest at 
the military pact and a number of them organised the Returned Students' National 
Salvation League. Zhang joined the League in Shanghai and became the leader of a 
sub-organisation, the Slide-Show and Lecture Team. 
123 Dai Jitao, Oingnian zhi lu (The Road of Youth), (Guangzhou, 1942), pp 6-7. 124 'The Recollection of Zheng Peigang', (February-May, 1964), Gao Jun, et al. (eds. ), 
Wuzhenqfu zhuvi zai Zhonqquo, Vol 1, p 515. 
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Zhang Mochi admitted later that "he was a friend of Colonel Popov", 125 but 
did not indicate when he had come to know Popov. However, Popov's first visit to 
Shanghai almost coincided with Zhang's return and they both then concentrated on 
the same target - the Japanese imperialists. Zhang was also a member of the 
Chinese Socialist Party, to which Li Dazhao also belonged. In the Spring of 1919, 
Zhang presented several books and pamphlets on socialism to Bai Jian-wu, one of 
Li Dazhao's close friends. 126 
Another Chinese whom Popov visited was someone called Chin, who was 
reported to be an "anarchist working on a Chinese paper of Shanghai. ", 27 Since the 
British Intelligence report only gives the surname of this man, it is difficult to 
identify "Chin". It is worth noticing that, when Joffe arrived in Shanghai in 1923 he 
wrote a letter to a Chinese of the "New Russia Society" in Shanghai, whose 
surname was "Ch'in". 128 In the Wade alphabetic transcription, "Chin" and "Ch'in" 
can be rendered "Jin" or "Qin". There were certain Chinese anarchists with such 
surnames. For example, Jin Jiafeng and Qin Baopu, both of whom joined the 
Socialist Youth League organised by Soviet agents in 1920. Besides them, another 
possibility is that the "Chin" in question was Jing Meijiu, an old anarchist and an 
old member of the GMD, who was a member of parliament and the editor in chief 
of several anarchist papers. From time to time Jing translated several works from 
Esperanto into Chinese with Zhang Mochi as co-translator. One can surmise as 
much since, in another report of the British Intelligence Bureau in Shanghai, a 
Chinese named Chin Mei-cheu in 1921 was living with a Korean Communist leader 
125 FO 228/3140, p 76. 
126 Bai Jianwu riii, the diary of 3 April 1919. 
127 FO 405/233, No 107. 
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Pak Chin-sun. 129 Pak was then in China as a representative of the Comintern. No 
matter who this "Chin" or "Chin" was, it indicated that the agents of Soviet Russia 
and the Comintern were successful in gaining the co-operation of some important 
Chinese anarchists. 
Since Esperanto was a language many Chinese anarchists knew, and was 
used in some Chinese anarchist periodicals, the Soviet agents tried to have a hand in 
Esperanto teaching in Shanghai and Beijing. In February 1920, a Soviet agent V. A. 
Stopany, who had formerly been a bookkeeper with the Russian Publishing and 
Printing Company and was working on the Shanghai Life, started a free night 
school for teaching Esperanto in Shanghai with Lu Shikai, an old Chinese anarchist 
scholar of Esperanto and one of Zhang Mochi's close friends. The night school was 
held at the New China School (Xinhua Xuexiao), which was a peripheral 
organisation of the Anarchist Comrades' Association. 130 All the teachers at the 
Night School were anarchists. It was said that there were at most one hundred 
students attending the classes. Stopany often expounded his Communist ideas to his 
students, and encouraged "the study of Esperanto as a knowledge of that language 
would enable them to promote internationalism and Communism. " 131 Soon the 
Esperanto Night School and the activities of its staff aroused the suspicion of the 
authorities in Shanghai. In a secret interview, Lu Shikai admitted that he and his 
Russian confrere were working in the interests of the Bolsheviks. 132 
129 FO 228/3140, p 71. 
130 'Report from the Commissioner of Police in Shanghai', Reports of the American 
Consul General in Shanghai, Class 800,1920; Ge Maochun, et al. (eds. ), Wuzhen-qfu 
zhuvi sixian_q ziliao xuan, p 961. 
131 FO 228/3214,4 march 1920; FO 405/233, No 107. 
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In North China, the Bolshevik agents also got in touch with the Chinese 
anarchists, and especially with the members of the Evolution Society and Huzhu 
Tuan (Mutual Aid Corps), which mainly consisted of anarchists at Beijing 
University and Beijing Normal University. Polevoy, as a liaison man for the 
Comintern, had very close relations with Huang Ling-shuang and was on intimate 
terms with Chen De-rong, who even lived with Polevoy in the same compound in 
Beijing for a period of time. 133 In Tianjin, some Bolshevik agents who were living 
in that city made contacts with anarchists, especially the members of Zhen She 
(Truth Society) there. Jiang Banruo and Zhang Zhi are cases in point. They used to 
talk together about how to do revolutionary work. 
Polevoy and other agents ardently desired to expand their contacts with 
anarchists and other radicals throughout China. In a letter to Zheng Peigang, an 
important member of the People's Voice Society in South China, Polevoy claimed 
that he was a Bolshevik and was willing to liaise with the Chinese anarchists in 
order to make joint efforts for social revolution; and that he hoped the Chinese 
anarchists would join hands with the Russian Bolsheviks. 134 For this purpose, the 
Bolshevik agents used to make use of certain anarchists as intermediaries. For 
example, Huang Lingshuang accompanied Soviet agents to South China as an 
interpreter on several occasions; Chen Derong was sent to Jiangsu to make contact 
with a group of youths there; and Jiang Banruo went to Zhangzhou as a liaison man 
between Soviet agents and Chen Jiongming. 
133 'Guan Qian's Report, 28 February 1921', in [Beiyang Military Archives (24) 199], 
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""4 Zheng Peigang, 'Some facts on Anarchism in China', Ge Maochun, et al. (eds. ), 
Wuzhenqfu zhuvi sixiang ziliao xuan, p 956; From Zheng Peigang's whole account, we 
can see that Polevoy's letter was posted not later than the beginning of 1920; Haiyu 
Guke, Jiefan-q bielu. 
164 
Chen Jiongming was a believer in anarchism and had been a member of the 
China Assassination Corps led by Liu Sifu many years before. Towards the end of 
1919, Chen invited anarchists such as Liang Bingxuan, Liu Shixin, Yu Keshui and 
Xu Zhenfeng to Zhangzhou to promote "social revolution". They edited Min xing 
(Fujian Star) in order to propagate new ideas. By the spring of 1920 Zhang Mochi 
also went to Zhangzhou from Shanghai to take up a position as Chen Jiongming's 
advisor on education. 135 From the end of April to the beginning of May 1920, 
General Potapov's team visited Zhangzhou and they held several talks with the 
anarchists as well as with General Chen. In a talk, Potapov said: 
If you understand socialism and admit the necessity of social revolution, no matter 
which way you go and what action you take, you are our Russian Bolsheviks' 
comrades. Therefore, we should work together and help each other. The Soviet 
Government wish to have friendship with all revolutionaries in the world, especially 
in Asian countries. 136 
Some members of Voitinsky's team also plunged into work among the 
Chinese anarchists. Some anarchists recalled that a Bolshevik "Stromisky" 
organised a set of discussion meetings attended mainly by anarchists such as Yuan 
Zhenying, Yu Keshui, Zheng Peigang, Jin Jiafeng, Ye Tiandi and Shen Zhongjiu. 137 
In Autumn 1920, Voitinsky sent Stoyanovich and Perlin to Guangzhou to work 
among anarchists including Liang Bingxuan, Liu Shixin and so on. 
From around the summer of 1920, Lizerovitch began to devote his main 
energy to getting in touch with young Chinese anarchists. In September 1920 
135 FO 228/3214,12 April 1920; FO 228/2987,26 April 1920. 
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Lizerovich and other Bolshevik agents attended a conference of anarchists from 
Shanghai, Hangzhou and Suzhou. During the sessions they worked assiduously 
with the help of some Chinese to convert those attending to Bolshevism. 138 In April 
1921, Lizerovich with his friend Maher, a Portuguese, went to Wuhan, where they 
were joined by two Chinese anarchists Huang Lingshuang and Yuan Zhenying. 
Their purpose was to contact Yun Daiying and his friends, most of whom were 
believing in anarchism then. 139 Prior to this, Voitinsky's assistants Mamayev and 
Polevoy had also undertaken similar work in Wuhan. 140 
The Soviet agents also made contact with anarchists in some other cities, but 
it is not necessary to go into the same detail in each case. Suffice it to say that their 
goals were to enlist the help of the Chinese anarchists for their revolutionary 
propaganda campaign; to use their organisational network for the establishment of 
the Socialists' League (see Chapter 6) and early Communist groups and to persuade 
some of the anarchists to change their beliefs and to become Communists. Those 
activities, again, are outside the range of my discussion at this point, and will be 
dealt with in later chapters. 
Why was it that the largest groups of Chinese radicals whom the Soviet 
agents got in touch with at first were anarchists? To answer this we must take into 
account the special historical background and Soviet Russia's policies towards 
anarchists at that time. By doing so we will see then that what the Bolsheviks did 
among the Chinese was by no means accidental. 
13" FO 228/3216, No 37; No 41. 
139 'Yuan Zhenying's Recollections', Ge Maochun, et al. (eds. ), Wuzhengfu zhuvi 
swang ziliao xuan; FO 228/3211, May 1921. 
... Bao Huiseng, Bao Huiseng huivilu, (Collected Memoirs of Bao Huiseng), (Beijing: 
People's Press, 1981). 
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Firstly. as has been shown. anarchism was a type of radical socialist thought 
hich had long been disseminated and therefore had widespread influence in China. 
Anarchists were the only formation in China at that time to advocate a social 
revolution from below. In all. there were more than fifty anarchist societies in 
China during the Nby 4th periodL Moreover. all anarchists arc internationalists. 
Without exception, the Chinese anarchist movement kept close links with the 
international anarchist movement. With this tradition, the Chinese anarchists were 
attuned to accepting aid from foreign countries and, conversely. offering help to 
their foreign comrades. 
Secondly. anarchist and Marxist ideologies have certain points in common. 
Both advocate social revolution to overthrow capitalist rule and eliminate the 
system of exploitation. Ibcir ultimate aim is to rcalisc an ideal society without 
classes or states. Anarcho-communism's principle of production and distribution in 
a future communist society. namely "from each according to his ability, to each 
according to his needs". is identical with that of Marxism. Originally anarchism 
and Marxism wcrc different schools within the same working class movement, as 
KIM-! hen correctly pointed ouL Marxists and anarchists belonged to "the same 
category but to different schools". 141 
'Mirdly. many anarchists sympathised with and supported the Bolshevik 
Revolution from the very beginning. Since the events of the October Revolution 
followed in some wa)s the pattern anticipated by the anarchist theorists, for 
instance. the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, seizure of the means of production 
and establishment of workers' control and abolition of class distinctions and civil 
141 1A sheng (People's Voice), 1921, Vol 31. 
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ranks. some anarchists regarded them as having met -certain fundamental principles 
and methods of Anarchist CommuniSM. "142 The Chinese anarchists also hailed 
Russia's social revolution. A Chinese anarchist periodical Laodong (Labour 
Monthly) m-rote: -Now China's ncighbour Russia has waged a just and honourablc 
social revolution to make equal the rich and the poor. " 141 Another article in this 
periodical even described the Russian Bolsheviks as espousing anarcho-communism 
and thus regarded them as their "Russian brothcrs". 144 Zhu Qianzhi, an anarchist 
student at Beijing University, expressed the opinion of many Chinese anarchists 
when he wrote that: "at that time the ordinary youths in China who advocated 
revolution. admired Russia's success and tried to use violent force to achieve the 
goals [of anarchism]. "' 45 
Fourthly. the Bolsheviks made efforts to draw support from anarchists 
internationally. Since most anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists glorified revolution 
and advocated "direct action" by the masses to destroy capitalist rule, Lenin counted 
on them to play an important role in the "World Revolution-. Ilie Bolsheviks 
adopted quite different tactics towards anarchists in Russia and their co-thinkcrs in 
other countries. Not long after the October Revolution the Bolsheviks began their 
suppression of the Russian anarchist movement because the anarchists were 
denouncing the Bolsheviks' dictatorship. On the other hand, in their activities 
abroad the Bolsheviks were inclined to treat foreign anarchists in a friendly fashion. 
Lenin believed that proletarian elements were driven to anarchism by a natural 
'42 Alexander Berlanan, The Russian Tragedy (Orkney, 1976). p 37. 143 Chi Ping. 'Biographical Sketch of Lenin - the Pioneer of Russian Social RevOlution', Laodong (Labour MonthJy), (Shanghai, 20 April 1918), No 2. 
2. 
'44 Y1 Chun. 'Policies and Tactics of Russian Bolsheviks'. Laodong (20 April 1918), No 
14S hm - 1120.9M (People's M), (1923), Vol 4. No 4. 
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hatred of the opportunism and reformism of the Second International and he 
therefore thought that, once their misunderstanding of Marxism was cleared up, 
they would become sincere supporters of Soviet power. Some workers' 
organisations with anarcho-syndicalist leanings, such as the L W. W. of America, 
Britain and Australia and the organisations within the French syndicalist movement, 
were invited to join the Comintern and the Bolsheviks also sent emissaries to 
establish close relations with them. In a letter to the British Communist Sylvia 
Pankhurst in August 1919 Lenin pointed out that many anarchist workers had 
proved to be "our best comrades and friends, the best of revolutionaries". 146 In 
September 1919. the ECCI issued a "Circular Utter on Parliament and Soviets". 
which read: 
In France. America. England. Germany, as the class struggle grows more acute, all 
revolutionary elements arc joining the communist movement by merging or co- 
ordinating their activities under the slogan of Soviet power. The anarcho- 
s)mdicalist groups, and the groups which just call themselves anarchist, are joining 
in the general trcndL Tbc ECCI welcomes them most cordially. 147 
It is clear that the Bolsheviks made use of anarchists abroad to serve their own 
Purposes: to overthrow the capitalist governments in their respective countries; to 
check the armed intervention and economic blockade of Soviet Russia by the main 
imperialist powers*. to cripple the 'revisionist' forces of the Second International; 
and to expand the Communist forces of the Tbird International led by the Russian 
Bolshcviks. 
146 Lenin, Conected Works, Vol 29. p 562. 
Degras, The Communist Intemabonal. 19 19-1943, Vol 1, pp 66-67. 
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Finally, some Soviet agents were themselves anarchists or had had strong 
relations with anarchists before. For example, Ivanov was a disciple of Kropotkin 
and was also said to be an anarcho-sydicalist; '4s while ljzcrovitch was reported to 
have been on good terms with British anarchists before he came to China in 1917 . 
149 
Stopany made known his belief in an article published in Min sheng in 1921: 
1 am in extreme favour of anarchism, I believe that only by the realisation of 
anarchism can real happiness and freedom be attained. ... Non-govcmmcnt 
state is our goal, but if we wish to realisc the goal, we have to be engaged in 
various movements. ... I am a Bolshevik and Bolshevism is merely a way to 
reach the first stage of achieving our goal. So we cannot criticisc the Russian 
Rcvolution. lso 
Uke Stopany. many Russian anarchists rendered their help to the Bolsheviks at 
certain periods. In the October Revolution numerous Russian anarchists, alongside 
workers and sailors, many imbued with a strong spirit of anarchism, joined the 
insurrection to overthrow Kercnsky's regime. During the Civil War many 
anarchists helped the Bolsheviks defend the Revolution against the White Guards 
and the foreign interventionists in spite of their difference of views with the 
Bolsheviks and their suffering under the Bolshevik dictatorship. Some of them 
even joined the RCP(B) and were called "Anarcho-Bolsheviks". In August 1919 
Lenin was moved to remark that many anarchists were "becoming the most 
148 Kropotkin's theory is anarcho-corrimunism. whereas anarcho-syndicalism is the 
doctrine of Bakunin. Perhaps Ivanov believed in both schools of anarchism. 14" This might be a reason why Lizerovitch sometimes was not trusted by other 
BOLsheviks. One report said that Lizerovitch Is now only indulging the same passions 
Wit! "IOUt being in the confidence of the Bolshevik Govemment. '(FO 405/228, No 160). '50 Min sheng No 31, p 406. 
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dedicated supporters of Soviet power. " 15 1 But once the Civil War was over and in 
particular after the Soviet Government had suppressed the Kronstadt Rebellion and 
began to adopt the NEP, the Russian anarchists met merciless suppression. The 
famous anarchist Alexander Berkman expressed the feeling of most anarchists: "it is 
socialist ideals and the fate of the Revolution which are being destroyed. 9152 In 
March 1921 Stopany committed suicide and nobody knew the reason. It is more 
than likely that he had heard about these developments and the anarchists' fate in 
Russia and felt that his hopes had been shattered. 153 
As has been explained, many Soviet agents in China had connections with 
the Bolshevik headquarters in Siberia and some of them were sent from there. 
Initially the highest Bolshevik leader in Siberia was A. M. Krasnoschekov, who 
became the President of the Far Eastern Council of People's Commissars in 
February 1918 and later becamd General Secretary of the Dal'buro of the RCP(B) 
holding a concurrent post as President of the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia. This 
man had joined the I. W. W. when he was in exile in America and this was one 
reason why he was sometimes attacked by his opponents within the RCP(B) for 
"having a smack of anarcho-syndicalism". 154 He even summoned to Siberia the 
famous anarchist Bill Shatov, who had been a member of the Military- 
Revolutionary Committee at the time of the October insurrection, and appointed 
him Minister of Transport in the Far Eastern Republic. 155 With such leaders as 
151 Avrich, The Russian Anarchists, pp 196-199. 
152 Berkman, The Russian Tracled ,p 66. 153 His article in Min sheng continued: "Once an elite holds the state power, in the 
meantime controlling all enterprises and property, it will be liable to emerge as new 
caotalists again. ' (No 31, p 406). 
Kasanin, China in the Twenties. 
Avrich, The Russian Anarchists, p 197. 
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Krasnoschekov, it is not surprising that the Bolshevik headquarters in Siberia should 
have recruited anarchists as their agents in China. Logically, such agents would be 
likely to seek out Chinese with anarchist inclinations, too. 
The above factors may help to explain why Soviet agents came into contact 
with large numbers of Chinese anarchists, and why the Chinese anarchists were 
willing to co-operate with the Bolsheviks. Some scholars have noticed the 
Bolsheviks' "intimate contact with the anarchists in China7 156 and the "important 
parV' played by the Chinese anarchists in "the early organisational activities" of the 
CCp, 157 but they have failed to point out the reasons for this phenomenon and to 
indicate that this was one of the results of applying Lenin's tactics of allying with 
the anarchists abroad. 158 
Section 4. Contact with People of Other Political Forces and of Various Circles 
As early as June 1920, Voitinsky proudly claimed that since his team had 
come to China, their work to enhance the connections had "made headway", and 
they had "already made contact with all leaders of the Chinese revolutionary 
movement. " 159 As I have pointed out, their contacts were not confined to 
revolutionary organisations and elements. Besides the GMD, anarchist groups and 
some radical intellectuals who later became the founders of the CCP, the Soviet 
156 Scalapino and Yu, The Chinese Anarchist Movement, p 44. 
157 Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism, p 4. 
1-r'8 The same situation can be seen in Japan. The first persons the Comintern 
contacted in Japan were anarchists, among them Osugi Sakae. 
'59'Voitinsk)(s Letter, June 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 28. 
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agents also established relations with other political parties and factions in China. 
These included the Chinese Socialist Party, led by Jiang Kanghu; 160 the Research 
Clique, headed by Liang Qichao; the Communication Clique, headed by Liang 
Shiyi; and some warlords such as Wu Peifu 16 1 and Zhang Zuolin 162 among the 
Beiyang military forces. In addition, Soviet agents had good relations with some 
liberalistic intellectuals, such as, Cai Yuanpei, Hu Shi and Tao Mehe. Since such 
contacts were fairly limited and had no bearing on the origins of the CCP, I need not 
recount them here in any detail. Arranging those Chinese with whom the Bolshevik 
agents made contact by occupation, we find that they belonged to various circles: 
educational, journalistic, business, industrial, military, political and so on. It should 
be noted that some people had relations with different political forces and belonged 
to more than one category. For examples, Li Dazhao had close relations with 
radical intellectuals, the Chinese Socialist Party, the Research Clique and the Zhili 
Faction; while Huang Jiemin, a GMD member and an anarchist, was active among 
students and also in educational, journalist, industrial and political circles. Such 
people naturally attracted the attention of the Bolsheviks and were used by the 
160 One of leaders of the Central Organisational Bureau of the Chinese Communists 
in Russia once called Jiang Kang-hu as "intimate comrade" in 1920. (Li Yuzhen, Sun 
Zhongshan yu Gonqchanquoii, p 85). The Comintern invited Jiang to attend the F 
Congress of the Comintern in 1921. 
161 Wu Peifu was a general of the Zhili faction of warlords, who not only directed his 
anti-foreign feeling against the Japanese, but also accused the Beijing government of 
being subservient to all foreigners. After Wu brought down Duan Qirui's Beijing 
government with the use of military force in July 1920, he intended to adopt a pro- 
Russia policy in order to curb the Japanese and therefore was once regarded by 
Russians as an ally. Subsequently, Soviet agents Voitinsky, Vilensky, Polevoy and 
Khodorov visited Wu and his officers. Cf. GLZDC and Bai Jianwu riii. 
162 Zhang Zuolin was the head of the Mukden faction of warlords, whose troops were 
mainly stationed in Manchuria. Soviet leaders believed that Zhang was a "running dog" 
of the Japanese, but they still sent several representatives to negotiate with him. 
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Bolsheviks as intermediaries in their dealings with various political forces and 
professional circles within Chinese society. 
In addition to the wide range of contacts they established, the Bolsheviks 
adopted flexible tactics when forging links with the Chinese. They sometimes 
showed little discrimination with regard to the class status, political standing and 
religious beliefs of those whom they approached. Nevertheless, it can be found 
from the above that the group they most frequently contacted were intellectuals. As 
Borodin told Song Meiling, the Comintern had worked out various plans for 
working in different countries, but the first common measure was to recruit 
intellectuals to serve the Comintern and Soviet Russia; the best way to attract them 
was to make them believe that they were working for the poor and the oppressed 
and to stimulate their enthusiasm to struggle for an ideal society of Communism 
rather than use material benefits or bribes; and another method was to work among 
the religious groups which inclined to the left, because they were usually naive and 
less suspicious, and might possibly be won over to Communism. 163 Incredible as it 
may appear, there are several cases which illustrate the Bolsheviks' work with some 
Chinese with religious beliefs. For example, Zhang Tailei, Xu Qian and Huang 
Ping were Christians when they were first met by the Russian agents, and Chen 
Duxiu praised Christianity on the eve of becoming a disciple of Marx. Although 
Xu Qian did not become a Communist, he did a great deal of work for Soviet Russia 
and was later entrusted by Borodin, the chief Soviet advisor, with the highest post in 
the Wuhan Government. P. Mif, chief Comintern representative in China in the 
163 Cf. Jiang-Song Meiling, Yu Bao Luoting tanhua de huivi (Recollections of Talks 
with Borodin). 
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1930s, pointed out that during the early stage, the CCP contained several Christian- 
Socialists. 164 
****** 
The Soviet agents contacted different sorts of Chinese at different periods 
for various purposes. For instance: they made use of the GMD mainly in their 
struggle against imperialism and the Beijing Government; they co-operated with the 
anarchists mainly for revolutionary propaganda and actions in order to destroy the 
old social order; Wu Peifu, Zhang Zuolin and Chen Jiongming were useful to them 
when they were establishing a foothold in China; and Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu 
were treated as their instruments for founding a Communist Party in China. 
Soviet Russia's and the Comintern's relations with different forces in China 
varied according to changes in the political and military situation in the Far East and 
in Russia. When they felt that some people or organisations were no longer of use, 
relations with them would soon break down, as can be seen the way they treated 
anarchist organisations and many nationalists. In turn, once certain organisations or 
individuals realised they had become mere tools of Soviet Russia, they usually 
turned against both Russia and its creation, the CCP. This explains why some 
people, such as Zhang Ji, Zhu Zhuowen, Huang Lingshuang and Qin Baopu for 
example, who had been friends of Soviet agents at an early stage, later became 
resolute opponents of both the Communists and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, 
many Chinese people were convinced by Soviet Russia's "friendly" gestures, and to 
that extent China was opened wide to Bolshevik penetration. 
'64 P. Mif, Fifteen-vears of Heroic Stru-qqle, (Moscow, 1934, in Russian). Similar 
cases can also be found in the early Korean and Japanese Communist movements. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION IN CHINA 
PeoPle normally consider that the October Revolution had a great influence 
upon radical Chinese ideology, and Bolshevik propaganda played an important role in 
the rise of the Communist movement in China. An authoritative Chinese historian, He 
Ganzhi, points out: "The October Revolution brought Marxism-Leninism to the 
Chinese people, and showed them the way to their own liberation. "' This statement is 
similar to Mao Zedong's and remains the orthodox point of view in mainland China. 
But until now, scant evidence has been given to back this sweeping statement. 
Therefore it has recently been challenged by some historians. For example, Xiang 
Qing rejects any significant Leninist influence on China before the spring of 1920 and 
argues: 
It was not the case that the Russian revolutionaries came to China after the 
October Revolution and placed the works of Marx and Lenin into the 
hands of Chinese progressive elements. ... Instead, the Chinese progressive 
elements obtained news of the victory of the Russian Revolution from the 
news agenciesof the bourgeoisie. Under the condition of the blockade of 
Sino-Russian communication, such a history of disseminating Marxism- 
Leninism continued until March 1920 when Sino-Soviet communication 
was resumed. 2 
' Ho KanEchih, A Historv of the Modern Chinese Revolution, (Beijing: Foreign 
Language Press, 1959), pp 21-2. 
2 Xiang Qing, 'The Comintern and the Chinese Revolution in the Period of the 
Foundation of the CCP', Jinclaishi yanLu (1980), No 4. 
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M. Luk develops the argument: 
There was little doctrinal influence from Russia before the summer of 
1920. ... The early influence of the October Revolution was therefore a 
product of the self-generated interest of the Chinese themselves in that 
revolution, which was seen and analysed through their own spectacles. 
Soviet propaganda and Leninist ideas were definitely unimportant at this 
stage. 3 
Regardless of the different dates they give for the beginning of Soviet propaganda, 
both Xiang and Luk consider that there was no direct Soviet propaganda in China, or 
that Soviet propaganda was unimportant at this early stage and stress the initiative of 
Chinese radicals in accepting Marxism-Leninism and in following the way opened up 
by the October Revolution. Moreover, Luk confuses influence with propaganda. 
Influence is intangible and cannot be measured, and Soviet influence could have 
appeared before Soviet propaganda or might have been the result of the latter. The 
main reason why Xiang and Luk cannot see the early Soviet propaganda or even 
influence (aside from lack of evidence) is that they hold a narrow view of propaganda. 
Propaganda is a systematic, deliberate effort to disseminate ideas, information 
or rumours with the intention of persuading numbers of other people to do or think as 
the propagandist wishes in order either to further or to damage a cause. Sometimes it 
is difficult to draw a clear distinction between propaganda and agitation. To Lenin, 
agitation denoted the activity of inciting the masses to action by playing on their 
instincts and passions, whereas propaganda referred to the educational activity of 
spreading Communist doctrines and methods. Since the Bolsheviks always 
3 M. Luk, The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism, (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 
1990), pp 33-4. 
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emphasised the practical effects of propaganda, the content of their propaganda was 
not confined to doctrinal matters. In the early stages of Bolshevik activity, little 
dissemination of Marxism and Lenin's theory was conducted. Hence, if one limits 
oneself to a discussion of the dissemination of Communist ideology or Bolshevik 
doctrines, one will indeed find no propaganda. However, if one applies a broader 
definition of propaganda, different results emerge. In this chapter, I sometimes may 
use the term "propaganda" widely so that it encompasses agitation and, indeed, so that 
it covers both the ideological aspect and manipulative aspect of Soviet political 
communication. 
Before discussing the subject, I have to point out that the introduction of 
Marxism into China did not start with the October Revolution. As early as 1899, Karl 
Marx's name and his doctrines were briefly mentioned in Wanguo gongbao (The 
Globe Magazine), which was published in Shanghai by English and American 
Christian missionaries. From 1901, translations from Japanese books were the main 
channel for the introduction of socialist ideas, including Marxism. Froni 1907 several 
Marxist works were translated into Chinese. However, those Chinese who introduced 
Marxism in this period merely regarded Marxism as one school of socialism, and 
nobody completely accepted or believed in it. It is true that the October Revolution 
helped arouse greater interest in Marxism among radical Chinese, because the 
Bolsheviks claimed to be adherents of orthodox Marxism and their achievement was 
regarded as the victory of Marxism. But in fact, the doctrines the Bolsheviks tried to 
inculcate into China were mainly Leninism, a synonym for Bolshevism. 
The main issues I am going to investigate in this chapter are: the Bolsheviks' 
early propaganda in China and its main content; the intensive propaganda during the 
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CCP's founding period of 1920-21; and the tactics, means and effects of such 
propaganda. 
The Bolsheviks always attached great importance to propaganda. In their 
struggle for World Revolution, the spoken and written word played a more continuous 
and vital role than did bullets or roubles. An observer remarked that the whole of early 
Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy could be summed up by one word - propaganda. 
4 
The Comintern in its first year, as Zinoviev declared, "was nothing but a propagandist 
society" .5 Although the initial focal point of Bolsheviks' propaganda was the West, 
they did not neglect the East for they believed that the East was the backyard of 
imperialist countries. In November 1919, at the Second Congress of the Communist 
Organisations of the Eastern Peoples, Lenin pointed out that the immense task 
confronting the Eastern Revolutionaries was "to continue to ensure that Communist 
propaganda is carried on in every country in a language the people understand. o, 6 
Bukharin also declared that, "We must pursue the tactics of universal support of the 
,, 7 international revolution,... by propagating revolts and insurrection in the colonies ... . 
Some Bolsheviks even believed, "In comparison with the already corrupted West, the 
virgin land of the East is readily receptive to Communist ideas, "8 and they therefore 
considered the East was a better area to propagate Communism. 
From 1918 several special institutions were established by the Bolsheviks to 
run propaganda work in the East, such as the Department of International Propaganda 
4 J. B. Whitton and A. Larson, Propaganda, Towards Disarmament in the War of 
Words, (New York, 1964), p 27. 3'-D-egras, The Communist International, Vol 1, p 166. 6 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 30, p 162. 7 Quoted from Whitton and Larson, Propaganda, towards Disarmament in the War of 
the Words, p 26. T-Z--hizn ýatsionalnostei, 7 December 1919. 
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under the Central Bureau of Muslim Organisations of the RCP(B), the Information and 
Agitation Bureau under the Siberian Regional Committee of the RCP(B), the Council 
for International Propaganda under the Turkestan Commission of the Central 
Executive Committee of the RCP(B) and the Council for Propaganda and Action of 
the Peoples of the East under the ECCI. All of them were charged with spreading 
propaganda in China as well as in other Eastern countries and some of them even had 
Chinese sections. Many schools for training propagandists and agitators selected the 
Chinese in Russia to undergo a course in the principles and practice of Bolshevism and 
taught Chinese language to the people of other races. 9 In addition to the schools, a 
number of propaganda trains were formed, fitted with cinema apparatus and equipped 
with literature to meet the requirements of the various races. Once a train which was 
"composed of ten cars laden with literature intended for Korea, China, Mongolia and 
India" was reported to have left Moscow for the borderlands. ' 0 In August 1920, Radek 
spoke before the Congress of Eastern Peoples at Baku: "We have already called 
attention to the intense activity of the Bolshevik propaganda throughout the different 
countries of the East, extending as far as China and Japan, From the 
propaganda bases in Soviet Russia's borderlands and from Moscow, the apostles of 
Bolshevik principles spread to and penetrated nearly every Asian country. 12 China 
was certainly one of their destinations. 
In fact, Communism was not the major subject of Bolshevik propaganda 
during the period when Soviet Russia was suffering from foreign armed intervention 
9 In Turkestan alone, there were 54 such schools which opened before 1920. FO 
228/3211, Series of February 1920. 
10 Chapman, The Chinese Revolution,, p 60; China Advertiser, (Tianjin), 21 February 
1920. 
" Levy (ed. ), Revolutionary Radicalism, p 1613. 
12 Chapman, The Chinese Revolution,, p 60. 
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and economic blockade. In the early stages, their propaganda in China mainly played 
a supporting role in the Soviet Government's Far Eastern strategy and was conducted 
in accordance with Soviet policies towards China. The main menace to the Bolsheviks 
in Siberia and the Far East at that time was Japan's invasion. The Bolsheviks also 
worried that Japan would collude with the Chinese Government, based on the Sino- 
Japanese "mutual defence" pact, to use Chinaýs territory and troops for attacking 
Russia. So, their propagandists' first task was to incite the Chinese people to fight 
against imperialist Japan as well as other Western powers and to overthrow the pro- 
Japanese Chinese Govemment; the other task was to gain the friendship of the Chinese 
people and to establish diplomatic relations in order to help overcome the Bolshevik 
regime's isolation in the world. In the light of this, the gist of Narkomindel's 
instructions in February 1918 to local Soviets in Siberia was to employ "every 
opportunity in the press, at meetings, and in leaflets" to exhort the Eastern people to 
look to Socialist Russia as their "salvation" from the dangers of invasion, violence and 
lawlessness of the Japanese-European capitalists and aggressors. 13 In August 1919, 
when Vilensky was dispatched to the Russian Far East, the Politburo of the RCP(B) 
instructed him to arouse the masses of China, Mongolia and Korea to break away from 
the oppression of foreign capitalists; to strengthen agitation work in the East Asia by 
publishing books, pamphlets and leaflets. 14 
Under such instructions, early Soviet propaganda was centred on the theme of 
anti-imperialism, especially against the Japanese. For example, when Popov, who 
acted as an inspector of propaganda in the Far East, first came to China in May 1918, 
13 R. Mirovitskaya, 'The First Responses in China to the Victory of the Great October 
Socialist Revolution', The Far Eastern Affair, (1978), Vol 1, p 147. 14 GLZDC, Vol 1, pp 38-9. 
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he published an "Appeal from a Russian Proletarian" in a paper in Shanghai, attacking 
Japan and the White leaders of the Russian colony in Shanghai. 15 After the downfall 
of the Soviets in Siberia and the Russian Far East in summer 1918, many Russian 
Bolsheviks went to China with proclamations translated into Chinese to agitate for the 
boycotting of Japanese goods. 16 In August 1919, a leaflet was found entitled "Appeal 
to Chinese Workmen", which was mainly circulated among Chinese workers along the 
CER in the North East of China. It pointed out that the Paris Peace Conference had 
passed a resolution to put Shandong province under Japan's control, so Chinese land 
was going to be annexed by expansionist Japan and warned that 'we Chinese' would 
become the slaves of Japan. However, "our compatriots must not be disappointed by 
our isolated position, since Soviet Russia! s workers and peasants who are fighting 
against the Russian capitalists and the White Army have shown sympathy for the 
Chinese; 
... The Russians ... are not only 
fighting for themselves, but also fighting for 
the freedom of all oppressed races of the world. " It went on to appeal to Chinese 
workers to co-operate with their Russian comrades in strikes and to unite as one to 
combat the aggressor Japan. 17 
As for general Soviet propaganda on Chinese territory, it began at nearly the 
same time as the advent of the first Bolsheviks. Nearly all agents who were dispatched 
from Soviet Russia to China in 1918, such as Verestchak, Makaroff, Popov, 
Aromovitch and Janes de Mezey, were entrusted with the task of propaganda and 
agitation. 
15 FO 228/3214,30 May 1918; FO 228/3211, April 1921. 
16 FO 228/3211, Series of September 1919. 
17 FO 228/2020, No 37,12 August 1919. 
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In 1919, Bolshevik propaganda in China had advanced noticeably. In March 
1919 the Chinese Government was alerted to a Bolshevik conference in Shanghai for 
the purpose of spreading Bolshevik propaganda in China. 18 In the same month the 
Russian Minister to Beijing, Kudashev, informed the Chinese authorities that several 
Bolsheviks were agitating in Beijing and Tianjin. 19 Although the Chinese Government 
ordered local authorities to ban Bolshevik propaganda, it seems that they were unable 
to halt it. According to a report in the Japanese newspaper Nichi Nichi Shinbun (Daily 
News) of II April 1919, a Russian propagandist travelled up the Yangtze River from 
Shanghai. In the meantime five or six sorts of secret Bolshevik literature were 
circulating in Shanghai. The editorial of the paper expressed the fear that "China will 
become a breeding ground of Bolshevism. , 20 On 16 June another Japanese paper 
Osaka Mainichi Shinbun (Osaka Daily News) reported that "the Russian Bolsheviks 
have sent many partisans to the interior of China to preach Bolshevism., '21 Bolshevik 
agents were also said to be spreading propaganda among the Muslim population in 
Xinjiang. 22 Although these warnings obviously exaggerated the facts, not all of the 
reports were merely rumours. 
Some Soviet agents who could speak Chinese, English or Esperanto began 
their propaganda activity among Chinese intellectuals. Polevoy introduced the 
October Revolution and Soviet publications to certain Chinese intellectuals, such as Li 
Dazhao and Zhang Tailei, from 1918.23 Ivanov, who started teaching Russian at 
18 ZEGXSL, 21 March 1919; FO 228/3214,27 March 1919. 
19 TE--GXSL, 26 March 1919. 
20 Z5-hen bao, 17 Jun 1919. 
21 - 3ým`wen bao (Shanghai Newspaper), June 19,1919. 
22 =EGXSEL, 118 June -1919; FO 228/2767,5 June 1919. 
23 Cf. the relevant paragraphs in Section 1 of Chapter 3. 
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Beijing University in September 1919, sometimes expounded Lenin's theory of 
imperialism. 24 
Contrary to Xiang Qing's assertion, the Russian Bolsheviks did really put the 
works of Marx and Lenin into the hands of the Chinese before the spring of 1920. The 
first of such works brought into China might have been Lenin's Imperialism, the 
Highist Stage of Capitalism. MOller's memoirs tell that, in 1919 Burtman and MUller 
himself "acquainted the Chinese students [in Tianjin and Beijing] with Lenin's work 
Imperialism the Highest Stage of Cgitalism, often touching on problems relating to 
China. to25 Certain Chinese familiarised themselves with Lenin's main points on 
imperialism from this work. Luk mentions that from early 1919, many Chinese 
intellectuals were aware of the connections between capitalism and imperialism, but he 
unconvincingly asserts that "their understanding of the subject was not derived from 
Lenin but from Hobson" before the summer of 1920, simply on the grounds that 
Hobson's work was published in a Chinese paper in 1919.26 
Nevertheless, there were not many Russians or ex-POWs available to 
participate in propaganda work in China because of the language barrier. Moreover, 
their Western features made it hard for them to approach ordinary Chinese. Therefore, 
these propagandists' activities were limited in scope and effect. There was hence an 
urgent need to use the Chinese who were in Russia to do agitation and propaganda 
work. 
In January 1919 Lenin issued a decree placing Chinese labourers in Russia 
under the particular protection of the Soviet Republic and organised a special 
24 Nikiforov, SIOPK, p 146. 
25 Quoted from Meisner, U Ta-chao and the Oriclins of Chinese Marxism, p 115. 
26 Luk, The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism, p 27; p 57. 
184 
department for Bolshevik propaganda in China under a Chinese named Shun Yun- 
sun. 27 Several Chinese papers, such as Hua gong (The Chinese Labourers), Daton 
bao (Great Harmony), Zhendong bao (Shaking the East) and Gongchanzhuyi zhi xing 
(Communist Star), which were edited by the Chinese in Russia and subsidised by the 
Soviet Government, were published. These papers were mainly for the Chinese Red 
soldiers and workers in Russia, and some of them were also distributed along the Sino- 
Russian border or carried into China. According to the first Chairman of the All 
Russian Union of Chinese Workers, Liu Shaozhou, as soon as the Union's organ 
Datong bao (which sometimes carried poems praising Lenin and published the First 
Karakhan Manifesto to China) was off the press, Soviet military units transported large 
numbers of the paper for circulation along the Sino-Russian border. 28 Soon the 
Chinese press reported that the Soviet Government was distributing tens of thousands 
of copies of the Manifesto in Chinese. 29 Many other leaflets were also printed for 
propaganda purposes in China. In October 1919 the French Minister to Beijing 
informed the Chinese Foreign Ministry that "the Bolshevik Government has 
distributed many leaflets all over China which urge the Chinese people to oppose 
Britain, France and America. 00 Around this time, numerous Bolshevik leaflets 
directed at ordinary Chinese were circulated in several places in China. 
Literature distribution was closely combined with oral agitation. From the 
beginning of 1919, many Chinese labourers who had been trained at propaganda 
schools or had joined the Red Army were sent to China to engage in propaganda 
27 Levy (ed. ), Revolutionary Radicalism, p 244. 28 Liu Shaozhou, 'My Experiences in Soviet Russia before and after the October 
Revolution', Wenshi ziliao xuanoi (Selected Materials on Chinese History and Culture), 
(Beijing, March 1971), No 60, pp 217-8. 
29 Shi bao, 20 September 1919. 
30 YEGXSL, 17 October 1919. 
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31 
activities with the help of the Soviet authorities. It was reported that many militants 
among the homeward bound Chinese labourers carried large amounts of money and 
propaganda materials, which were hidden in double-bottomed suitcases, thermos 
flasks, clothes and hats. 32 As early as January 1919, the Chinese authorities in 
Manchuria found that "many Chinese labourers who had worked in Russia and 
03 supported the Bolsheviks agitated for Socialism on their return. The agitation was 
first carried on in the border regions, and later, it was brought right into the interior as 
these labourers returned to their home towns. Soon reports reached Beijing about 
these Chinese "carrying out Bolshevik propaganda activity" among the workers on 
railways, in factories, down coal mines and even among soldiers. 34 The Beijing 
Government was worried in particular about trouble in the 5th Division of the Army, 
whose soldiers reacted favourably to Bolshevism when it was recommended by some 
Shandong men who had been in Russia. 35 This division's soldiers also issued some 
agitation leaflets which circulated among other military units. 36 
Zhong Yong-song, who was in charge of propaganda, dispatched many 
agitators to distribute copies of Lenin's photograph and to make speeches among the 
Chinese people in the border regions; in their speeches, Lenin was described as a 
reborn Genghis Khan, who would rule Asia and conquer Europe again. 37 There was 
31 'Rosta wireless dispatch of 8 January 1919', as quoted by Whiting, Soviet Policies 
in China, 1917-1924, p 36. 
'? Telegram of Bao Guiqing to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Beijing 
Government, 27 January 1919; Zhonq-quo x1andaishi ziliao xuanii, Vol 1, p 613. 33 Archives of the Frontier Defense Section of the Chinese Government, 29 January 
1919. 
34 Archives of the Ministry of the Army of the Chinese Government, 29 January 1919. 35 FO 228/3214,1 April 1920. 
36 Shi bao of 29 May 1919 reported that the troops in Hubei Province received radical 
leaflets issued by the soldiers of the 5th Division. 
37 ZEGXSL, 5 April 1919. 
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also evidence that several Chinese Muslims in Russian Central Asia slipped into 
Xinjiang in June 1919 with leaflets and funds to preach the principles of Bolshevism 
among Chinese Muslims, and to incite them to rebel. 38 
According to one report, a Chinese delegation consisting of five 
representatives headed by Li Houng, who had lived in Kashgar, was received by the 
Soviet Government in Moscow in December 1919. After this interview, the Oriental 
Department of Narkon-tindel decided to give more funds for the edition and publication 
of brochures, pamphlets, etc. in Chinese and for the establishment of propagandist 
groups. A special commission composed of Lokhov, Vladimiroff and Evdokimoff 
was put in charge of propaganda for China. Afterwards Soviet propaganda was said to 
be concentrated in Kashgar in Xinjiang, Yarkend and Aksou in Manchuria and to be 
intense in some internal areas of China. 39 
In spring 1920, several hundred Chinese from Moscow (most of them had 
joined the Red Army) established a "Council" (Soviet) in Tashkent and Osh and drew 
many Chinese from Kashgar into the Council. These Chinese made public speeches 
among the Chinese in border areas. Yang Zengxin, the Governor of Xinjiang, in his 
telegram to the Central government expressed his concern: "Those extremists advocate 
equality and freedom, agitate for the abolition of class distinctions between officials 
and common people, and of barriers between different countries and races. ... I am 
afraid that extremism [Bolshevism], with which the frontier area is going to be 
contaminated, will also penetrate the interior and finally spread all over China. io4O 
38 Yang Zengxin, Buguo zhai wendu (Papers of the Buguo Study), Vol 4, p 32. 39 FO 228/2987, Political Report from Geneva, 23 February 1920. 
40 Telegraph of Yang Zengxin to the President of Republic of China, 28 March 1920,8 
June 1920; Archives of the Ministrv of Internal Affairs of the Chinese Government. 
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Although there were advantages in having Chinese undertake agitation, most 
Chinese labourers were illiterate and could not carry out protracted propaganda work 
without instructions and financial aid from the Russian Bolsheviks. Gradually, most 
of them gave up the work under the pressure of circumstances or because of the need 
to make a living. 
In order to conduct propaganda more effectively on a large scale, the 
Bolsheviks left no means untried. The press was a useful and convenient medium for 
them to carry out propaganda. 
Several Soviet agents contributed articles individually to foreign papers which 
were published in China or foreign language papers edited by Chinese and tried to 
make use of these journals for their own purposes. Journal de Min was a French 
magazine published in Beijing and was owned and edited by A. Nachbour, who had 
formerly been secretary to Albert Thomas, a noted French socialist and member of the 
cabinet during the War. Having been expelled from the Russian Legation in 1918, 
Ivanov started working on Journal de Min and publishing articles under the pen name 
Ivin. Nachbour depended on Ivanov for Russian news, which Ivanov received from 
Soviet Russia or obtained by interviewing Siberian 6migr6s. 41 Asa Russian historian 
remarked, Journal de Min "held high the banner of supporting the Soviet Far Eastern 
Policy" from autumn 1918 and was once the only outlet in the Far East to publish 
"correct information about Soviet Russia"; and through this journal, Ivin told the 
41 Evans, 'Looking East from Moscow, Asia, (December 1922), Vol 22, No 12, p 
1012. In his Letter to the Eastern Peoples Section of the Siberian Bureau, dated 17 
August 1920, Voitinsky mentioned: "Your telegraph to Journal de P6kin has been 
received. " GLZDC, Vol 1, p 31. Later, this journal was suspended by the French 
legation because it had released telegraph news from Moscow. ZEGXSL, 16 October 
1920. 
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Chinese people and the whole world the truth about Soviet Russia. , 42 Millard's 
Review was an influential English paper in the Far East which was published in 
Shanghai. In May 1918, Popov anonymously contributed an article to this paper 
entitled "Appeal from A Russian Proletarian". 43 China Press was an American daily 
newspaper published in Shanghai. In Spring 1920, Agarief wrote several articles on 
Russian affairs for it. 44 Voitinsky also provided this paper with Bolsheviks' articles 
including "Appeal to the Revolutionary People of the World" which was published in 
June 1920.45 Sokolsky, who once admitted that he was disseminating Bolshevik ideas 
in China, worked on North China Star in Tianjin and Shanghai Gazette during 1918- 
20. On the latter paper (the GMD's English-language paper), he reported information 
from Soviet Russia on the Russian section he edited and expressed his radical and pro- 
Bolshevik views therein. 46 
Soviet propagandists also published articles in the Chinese papers. For example, 
in September 1919, Sokolsky wrote an article for Xin Zhongguo (New China). 47 
Lizerovitch contributed an article entitled "May Day" to Xinggi pinglun of 25 April 
1920, which reads: 
The ruling class gradually realise that their fate will not be long in coming, 
... the working class will dominate everything in the end. ... At present, the 
whole world is sick ... There is no peace in the world. ... Poland, 
compelled by imperialistic France, is making an attack upon Soviet 
Russia. ... Shandong province of China was taken over by another country. 
42 Nikiforov, SIOPK, p 145. 
43 FO 228/3214,30 May 1918. 
44 FO 405/233 No 107. 
45 'Voitinsky's Letter, June 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 29. 
46 FO 228/3285, September 1919; FO 405/228, No 157,7 April 1920. 
47 Xin Zhonaguo, Vol 1, No 1. 
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... 
The working class declares: 'We can change this status and we will 
change this situation !, 48 
Articles by Voitinsky, Stopany and other Bolshevik agents can also be found in 
Chinese magazines. 
The organ of the Bolsheviks was an important tool for their propaganda. Lenin 
regarded the newspaper of the Party as "not only a collective propagandist and 
collective agitator - it is also a collective organiser. v, 49 It was also vital to the 
Bolsheviks to have their own media in China. In February 1920, Vilensky bought 
Shanghai Life, a progressive Russian paper in Shanghai and turned it into an entirely 
50 "Bolshevik organ which was propagating Bolshevism". Shanghai Life carried news 
from Soviet Russia and many articles by Bolshevik propagandists. Most articles were 
directed at Russian residents in China, but some were obviously aimed at the Chinese. 
For example, an article published in March 1920 claimed: 
Foreign influence is so strong in China that it keeps people fighting among 
themselves. Not long ago the position of Russia was similar, but 
conditions there are now improving. The country has been freed from 
foreign intervention, and the date is not far distant when Russia will appear 
in the world as a strong and united nation. Can China hope for such an 
ending to her present troubles? 51 
"The Karakhan Manifesto" was actually a propaganda document aimed at winning the 
Chinese people's good opinion of Soviet Russia. On 31 March 1920 Shanghai Life 
published the whole text of the Manifesto soon after it was formally wired to Beijing. 
48 Xinggi pinglun, No 47. 49 Lenin, What Is to Be Done? 
50 ZEGXSL, No 164,30 April 1920. 
*' FO 228/3214,25 March 1920. 
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Its last paragraph states: "If the Chinese people want to escape from a position which 
will bring them down to the level of Korea and India, the only people from whom they 
can expect assistance are the Russian workers and the Red Army. iM This Russian 
version and its Chinese translation were published by the Chinese journal Zhengheng 
(La Critique de la Politique) on the following day. 
In his report to the ECCI dated I September 1920, Vilensky said that Shanghai 
Life was owned by the East Asian Secretariat. 53 The Office of Shanghai Life was not 
only a Bolshevik organ, but also an organisation for conducting propaganda in China. 
Sinolinkoff, a reporter on Shanghai Life, sometimes travelled in the interior of China 
spreading Bolshevism. 54 Mikulin, who could speak Chinese, carried out propaganda 
55 in Fujian on the instructions of the staff of Shan hai Life. Khodorov, Ivanov and 
Agarief in Beijing all kept close connections with the Office of Shanghai Life for 
propaganda purposes. Shanghai Life also had two correspondents in Western 
countries, both of whom had formerly worked on the paper in China. One was A. 
Rosenberg in New York, who was "a constant correspondent on Bolshevik affairs" and 
sent "Red literature" from America. Another was Gerkovitch in Paris, who wrote 
regularly to Shanghai about the Bolshevik work that was being undertaken in France. 56 
In addition to Shanghai Life, there were some other Bolshevik or pro- 
Bolshevik Russian papers in other cities. For example, Advance in Harbin, Red Fla 
and Peasants' Truth in Vladivostok, from where it was easy to smuggle the 
52 FO 228/3214,1 April 1920. 
53 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 41. 
54 FO 228/3211, April 1921. 
55 FO 405/233, (16 September, 1921). 
56 FO 228/3211, April 1921; FO 405/233, No 107,16 September 1921. 
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publications into China. 57 Since Russian language paper naturally limited its impact in 
China, from 1921, the Bolsheviks attempted to establish a daily paper in English in 
Shanghai. For this, Khodorov and Turgarshief first tried to enlist an American woman 
58 Mrs Bena to help, but failed. In the fall of 1922, the Comintern allocated funds to 
publish a weekly journal in English entitled New Russia to replace Shanghai Life. 
Joffe entrusted Maring, Lconidov and Novitsky (a leading writer on Shanghai Life) 
with this task. It was said that this journal was under the editorship of Bouffier. 59 
In order to extend Soviet Russia's political influence, the Bolshevik 
propagandists endeavoured to make use of some Chinese papers as their medium. Luo 
Jialun 's memoirs reveal the Soviet agents' early connections with certain Chinese 
journals. He recalled: "At first, the Comintern sent somebody to China to organise a 
Communist Party in China. Having no way of doing this, he decided to whip up 
public opinion and then turned to dealing with press circles. Yet there was still no 
result. At last this person found a journal called Jiefang yLl gaizao (Emancipation and 
Reconstruction) when he arrived in Shanghai. He felt that the title of the journal suited 
their persuasion, and hence made contact with that journal . 
60 Luo specifically 
mentioned that the person in question arrived in China earlier than Voitinsky. 
Jiefang yg. Raizao started publication in September 1919 under the Beijing New 
Society, which belonged to the Research Clique. Its editors Zhang Dongxun and 
Zhang Junmai were inclined to Guild socialism. In spite of this, the journal introduced 
various schools of socialism, including Marxism. It carried numerous articles about 
57 Wang Yijun, Zhong-E waiiiao de xumu, p 173. 
58 FO 405/233, September 1921. 
'59 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 131; 'Shanghai Municipal Council Police Report', 19 January 
1923. 
60 Taibei lianhe bao (United Daily News), (Taibei), 3 July 1957. 
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Soviet Russia, in which the authors expressed admiration for the October Revolution 
and "Lenin's noble doctrines and his courageous actions" and called Lenin the 
"forerunner of social revolution". 61 Jiefang y2 gaiZao was among the first Chinese 
journals to report the foundation of the Comintern and to publish Lenin's works. It 
carried translations of Lenin's Political Parties in Russia and the Task of the Proletariat, 
The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government and ran articles such as "Lenin, 
Trotsky and Their Doctrines". The journal also published the Soviet Constitution, as 
well as laws on land, on the organisation of production, on the 8-hour working-day and 
on marriage. It also reported nearly every aspect of the circumstances of Soviet 
Russia. Zhang Dongxun, who later resolutely opposed Bolshevik-style Socialism, 
admitted at the end of 1920 that he had previously held the view that "China should 
form an alliance with Russia to establish a Workers' and Peasants' Country and 
overthrow world capitalism by the power of the two nations. , 62 
Besides Jiefang y! j gaizao, other papers of the Research Clique all showed an 
inclination towards the left between 1919 and 1920. Shishi xinbao (Current News 
Daily) and its literary supplement Xue den (Learning Light) carried many articles 
which advocated socialism, introduced Soviet Russia and reported news of the world 
revolutionary movement. Xue deng published "The Leader of the Bolshevik Party - 
Lenin", "Trotsky's Autobiography" and Trotsky's "The Bolsheviks and World Peace" 
in 1919. In October 1920 Xue deng carried portraits of Lenin, Trotsky, Sverdlov, 
Kalinin and Lunacharsky, and pictures of the flag of Soviet Russia and the insignia of 
the Red Army. The general manager of Guomin gongbao (The Citizens' Gazette), Lan 
Gongwu, was a professor at Beijing University and was on good terms with Chen 
61 Jiefanq vu gaizao, (November 1919), Vol 1, No 6. 
62 Xin gingnian, (i December 1920), Vol 8, No 4. 
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Duxiu and Li Dazhao. 63 Among the letters they took from Chen Duxiu's house in June 
1919, the police found a letter written by Lan to ask Chen Duxiu to seek some students 
at Beijing University who would write articles for Guomin gongbao and Shishi 
xinbao. 64 In October 1919, Guomin gongLao was closed down by the Beijing police 
and its editor Sun Jiyi was arrested because it carried some radical articles such as 
"Communist Hungary" and "The History of the Russian Revolution" and expressed 
sharply anti-Japanese views. 65 From spring 1919 Chen bao (Beijing Morning Post) 
and its supplement showed an extraordinary pro-Bolshevik stand. In April 1919, an 
article pointed out that since Bolshevism "grew out of Marxism, if anybody wants to 
understand Bolshevism, he must study Marxism seriously". The following month, a 
special column - "Marxism Studies" - was established in the supplement. 
Furthen-nore, Lenin's "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" and 
biographies of Lenin, Trotsky, F. A. Bebel, K. Liebknecht and R. Luxemburg also 
appeared in this paper. It is worth noting that from 27 March 1919, Chen bao began to 
report news about the First Congress of the Comintern, and in August it carried "The 
Manifesto of the Third International". A review of current affairs, published in Chen 
bao on 13 April, gave food for thought: 
At present, all newspapers, magazines, news agencies, as well as the state 
apparatus, are in the hands of the bourgeoisie, so the dominant information 
about Russia circulated over the world is opposed to Lenin's Government. 
... Some Chinese who have never studied Bolshevism have just heard that 
63 After 1949, Lan Gongwu became vice-chief of the Supreme People's Procuratorate 
of the PR China. After his death, Lan was posthumously admitted as a member of the 
CCP. 
64 Beiiing dangan shiliao (Archival Materials on the History of Beijing), (1987), No 1; 
Lan Gongwu later became the editor-in-chief of Shishl xinbao. 
65 ibid., (1987), No 4. 
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the British and Americans do not like Bolshevism and then followed them 
blindly. 
Another article in Chen bao on I March 1919, entitled "Studies of Russia", pointed out 
that the Chinese press always obtained news of foreign countries from Reuters, the 
Japanese newspapers, the English papers and several news agencies in Shanghai, 
which tended to distort the facts. Thus if the Bolsheviks' doctrines and deeds were 
judged from these news sources, it would lead to misunderstanding. The author 
further suggested that a news agency should be set up by various journals' offices 
jointly to subscribe to Russian newspapers, so that editors could learn and report the 
current situation in Russia correctly. 
The above passages suggest that the author(s) seemed to be familiar with 
Bolshevik views on the press: the press is in the hands of the bourgeoisie so long as 
they remain in power; they also hint that this author(s) at least, exceptionally, had 
found other channels to gain access to news about Soviet Russia and Bolshevik 
publications. 
Since the number of articles on Soviet Russia, its leaders and socialist theories 
carried by the Research Clique's journals in 1919 surpassed those found in Xin 
gingnian and other progressive journals in China, their radical tendency made people 
look at them with new eyes. The historian, Li Yunhan, was surprised to see that "these 
conservative papers suddenly took an interest in the new ideas of socialiSM. "66 This 
odd phenomenon is hard to explain and it suggests that certain Soviet propagandists 
might have dealt with the journals of the Research Clique, and either supplied them 
with materials directly or via Li Dazhao, who participated in editing Chen bao's 
66 Li Yunhan, Cong rongoong dao gingdang, p 82. 
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supplement after February 1919, or Zhang Zhi, who was a correspondent with Shishi 
xinbao and Chen bao, and some other radical journalists. It also helps to explain why 
the first delegates of the Chinese Journalists' Association who were selected to visit 
Soviet Russia were all from the journals belonging to the Research Clique. One was 
Qu Qiubai, who went as a correspondent for Chen bao, and others were Yu Songhua 
and Li Zongwu, who represented Jiefang yM gaizao and Shishi xinbao respectively. 
Though they set off for Russia in October 1920, their plan to visit the country had been 
made known to Moscow sometime before 24 June, when Izvestiia reported this news. 
On arrival in Moscow, these Chinese journalists declared that they were "disciples of 
Karl MarX". 67 
Turning our attention to the progressive journals, such as Meizhou pinglun 
(Weekly Critic) in Beijing, Xinggi vinglun (Sunday Review) in Shanghai, Xiangiian 
pinglun (Xiang River Review) in Changsha and Xinggiri (Sunday) in Chengdu, which 
were all weekly review journals, related to each other and with same edition formats, 
we find that these papers, in the main, defended and argued in favour of the Bolsheviks 
and their doctrines. For example, in an article in Meizhou Vinglun in March 1919, Li 
Dazhao satirised those who were afraid of Bolshevism. "How did they know what 
Bolshevism is? " he asked and went on: "in order to open these gentlemen's minds, we 
have to translate several Bolshevik works to let them read them. "68 Li Dazhao was not 
alone. In XianOiang 12inglun, Li's former assistant Mao Zedong, reproved the 
bureaucrats and politicians who were against Bolshevism, asking: "What is the 
Bolshevik Party? What are their doctrines and who are their leaders? Can those who 
67 Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, p 89. 613 Meizhou vinglun, (March 1919), No 11. 
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threaten that the Bolsheviks have come to China answer? , 69 The editors of Xingqiri 
(Sunday) wrote in the foreword to a translation of "The Bolsheviks' Education 
Programme" that "there are rather few books which have been translated directly from 
Russian, so we are not able to know the real facts regarding Bolshevism. Therefore, 
we cannot blindly follow others and join in the chorus of slander of Bolshevism. 00 If 
we examine these journals more carefully, we can see that they reported similar news 
about Soviet Russia, foreign affairs and international movements, for example, the 
Communist regimes in Germany and Hungary, the uprising in Afghanistan and the 
situation in Siberia. Even Mao Zedong, who did not know any foreign languages, 
reported on this type of news from abroad positively. It is not easy to explain how 
they can have obtained such news. 
It can now be confirmed that Xingqi Pinglun, at least, received publicity 
materials from Soviet agents. Before April 1920, Potapov handed Trotsky's article(s) 
and a pamphlet in English which contained documents such as the Soviet Constitution 
and Law on land to Xinggi vinglun. 71 And Lizerovitch, who received revolutionary 
literature from foreign countries and Vladivostok, passed some of them on to Xinggi 
pinglun and several other papers in Shanghai. 72 On 22 April 1920, Xinggi Pinglun 
69 Xiandiang ginglun, (21 July 1919), No 2; on No 1 of the journal there was an article 
entitled "To Study the Bolshevik Party". 
70 Xinggiri, No 21,30 November 1919. 
71 'Potapov to Chicherin, 12 December 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 48. 
72 FO 405/228, No 157,7 April 1920; FO 228/3211, April 1921; Those papers included 
Xinhan qinqnian and Zhentan, the journals in Chinese edited by activists of the Korean 
independent movement, which contained a good deal on Bolshevik matters and 
demonstrated that they were in favour of socialism and opposed to Japanese and 
British imperialism and to the Chinese Warlords. Wusl shicii qikan fieshao (Introduction 
to the Periodicals of the May 4 th Movement) Beijing: People's Press, 1958-59, Vol 2, pp 
179-185. 
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carried an article about Bernard Shaw's utterances in favour of Bolshevism, which was 
a translation from a British Socialist paper supplied by Lizerovitch. 
Using newspapers and periodicals which were published other than in Russia 
for propaganda purposes seemed more effective and less likely to arouse suspicion. 
What Lizerovitch obtained from abroad included Workers' Dreadnough 3, The Ca1174 
Daily Herald75 and New York CaIl76 . The first three British leftist papers used to 
be 
73 Workers' Dreadnouqhts editor was Sylvia Pankhurst, the leader of the Workers' 
Socialist Federation, which was extremely active in rallying support for the October 
Revolution and Soviet Russia. In June 1919 the WSF decided to rename itself the 
Communist Party. The Workers' Dreadnought carried some articles and speeches by 
Bolshevik leaders and the news on revolutionary movements over the world, including 
news from China and India. From January 1920 the emblem of the hammer and sickle 
appeared on the paper's masthead and from June 1920 the paper became an organ of 
the British Communist Party. 
74 The Call was the British Socialist Party's weekly journal, edited by F. Willis, one of 
the Party leaders. From Spring 1919 the BSP together with some other leftist parties in 
Britain began to discuss the formation of a single united Communist Party. With the 
foundation of the Communist Party of Great Britain in August 1920, the paper was 
replaced by The Communist, the official organ of the CPGB. (J. Klugmann, History of 
the Communist Party of Great Britain, (London, 1986), Vol 1, p 214). Before that The 
Call was regarded as "a Communist organ". (L. J. Macfarlane, The British Communist 
PaU. its Origin and Develooment until 1929, Britain: Macgibbon & Lee, 1966, p 256) 
" The Daily Herald was a journal of the Independent Labour Party in Britain. Russian 
affairs were then of major interest to the paper. One article of 20 October 1919 praised 
Soviet Russia as "the great hope of the world; ... the definite proof that a Socialist state 
can be successfully organised and administered. " In January 1920, its editor-in-chief G. 
Lansbury visited Soviet Russia and later wrote What I saw in Russia, in which he wrote 
that Lenin was a man of "devotion to the cause of humanity" and that "real democracy" 
was being fashioned in Russia. The 
, 
Daily Herald was once financed by the Comintern. 
(S. R. Graubard, British Labour and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1924, p 170, 
footnote 23). In 1920, part of the staff of the Dailv Herald were drawn into the 
preparation of the Communist Party. (J. Klugmann, History of the Communist Party of 
Great Britain, Vol 1, p 24) 
" The New York Call was first published by the Working Men's Cooperative 
Publishing Association and later became the organ of the American Socialist Party. 
After the October Revolution, the Call in its editorials urged support for the Bolsheviks, 
"from a sincere conviction that the Soviet government championed the cause of the 
working class in Russia and elsewhere" (14 September 1918). It was therefore 
attacked for "favoring the Soviets". (T. Draper, The Roots of American Communism, 
New York: The Viking Press, 1963, p 112). It carried Lenin's "Appeal to the World's 
Workers" (August 20 1919) and other Bolshevik pamphlets. In the issue for 1 January 
1919, M. Hillquit wished a happy new year to "the proletarians of Russia - the pioneer 
warriors of human rights and human dignity, for liberty and bread". Although Hillquit 
was considered by the Comintern as a "notorious opportunist", ironically, he helped 
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provided with Lenin's works such as The Collapse of the Second International, State 
and Revolution, Proletarian Revolution and the Reneizade Kautsk and numerous other 
articles and news by the People's Russian Information Bureau in London and the 
Socialist Information and Research Bureau in Scotland - the two information centres 
established by Soviet Russia. 77 The New York Call was the organ of the American 
Socialist Party (and later the Communist Party), which had relations with the Russian 
Soviet Information Bureau in the USA and the Comintern representatives there. 78 By 
the spring of 1920, these journals were being circulated among young Chinese 
intellectuals in Shanghai and some articles within them were translated into Chinese. 79 
In addition to these progressive papers, some articles which had been published in 
some Western countries' "bourgeois" papers, such as the Manchester Guardian, 
National Week] and New Republic were also issued to the Chinese press by the 
Bolsheviks for propaganda purposes . 
80 As far as I know, around 1919-20, several 
Chinese papers published reports on the Russian situation by Westerners who had 
visited Soviet Russia, these included, the head of the Intelligence Bureau of the 
American Army, W. C. Bullitt, the Manchester Guardian's correspondent, A. 
Ransome, and an American, W. K. Humphrie. For the Bolsheviks, these reports on 
Soviet Russia and the Comintern's first representative in America, Martens, to set up 
the Russian Soviet Information Bureau and Hillquit himself became the head of the 
legal department of the Bureau. (Levy (ed. ), Revolutionary Radicalism, p 634, pp 643- 
34. 
7 J. Klugmann, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1968, Vol 1, p 53. 
78 Levy (ed. ), Revolutionary Radicalism, pp 634-644; Draper, The Roots of American 
Communism, p 427. 
79 FO 405/228, No 157, April 7 1920. 
80, Voitinsky's Letter to the Eastern Peoples Section of the Siberian Bureau of the 
RCP(B), 17 August 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 32. 
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Soviet Russia by foreigners, who had no apparent bias, would be more likely to 
influence Chinese people. 
From the evidence above, we can see that it is by no means true that the 
Chinese were obliged to rely only on the bourgeois news agencies and press abroad to 
obtain information about Soviet Russia before the spring or summer of 1920, as some 
scholars have asserted .81 As to the Bolshevik leaders' articles, it was impossible that 
their publication in China was due solely to bourgeois channels. Rather, news and 
articles on Soviet Russia and Bolshevism were provided by Soviet agents directly or 
indirectly via the journals of the Communist or Socialist parties of Western countries. 
The Bolshevik propagandists sometimes also intentionally took passages favourable to 
Soviet Russia from the bourgeois press. 
From May 1920, when the East Asian Secretariat was established, the 
Bolsheviks' propaganda work in China entered a new phase. Under the Secretariat's 
leadership, the Propaganda and Information Section and Publication Section were set 
up within the Shanghai Revolutionary Bureau. 82 
One important task for them was to supply news regularly to the press in 
China. According to a report by Vilensky in September 1920, the East Asian 
Secretariat made use of some legal news agencies and set up several media services in 
Shanghai, Beijing, Harbin and Vladivostok. 83 It is not clear what can be counted as a 
"legal news agency". So far as I know, in addition to the formal Soviet news agency 
81 Those scholars include Dirlik, Mirovitskaya and Xiang Qing. In his article 'On the 
Channels for Introducing Marxism into China' Zuo Yuhe said that the first article 
propagating the October Revolution which was translated from Russian directly was 
one published in Xin gingnian in December 1920. [Mao Zedong sixiang L van iu (Studies 
of Mao Zedong Thought), (Chengdu, 1991), No 1, p 135]. 82 'Voitinsky's Letter to the Eastern Peoples Section of the Siberian Bureau of the 
RCP(B), 17 August 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 31. 83 Wilensky's Report to ECCI', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 41. 
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in China, some local media services, such as "the China Bureau of Public Information" 
(Zhonghua Gongtong Tongxun She) founded by Sokolsky and Tang Jiezhi in 
Shanghai in August 1919, and "News Edition and Translation Service" (Xinwen 
Bianyi She) created by Shao Piaoping84 in Beijing often reported news from Soviet 
Russia in positive terms. 
In June 1920, Rosta and Dalta News Agencies formally opened a branch in 
Beijing, headed by Khodorov. The Beijing branch, as the headquarters of the 
Agencies in China, received news items from Moscow and Chita via Kiakhta through 
the wireless, translated them into Chinese and English, and then supplied them to the 
Chinese, English and American press in the Far East. 85 
From the limited information available, we can see that Rosta! s Beijing branch 
had extensive contacts with the Chinese Press, which were not only confined to the 
progressive papers. After Yurin's delegation arrived in Beijing, Khodorov's Rosta- 
Dalta periodically arranged for Yurin to hold press conferences and large receptions 
for Chinese and foreign journalists. According to a report, at one such conference the 
Chinese journalists who were invited were from Chen bao, Yishi bao, Weivi bao, JinR 
bao, Shanghai xinbao, Zhonghua xinbao, Dalu bao, Zhongxin bao, Jingshi bao, Minfu 
bao and the Beijing News Agency. 86 
84 Shao was a key member of Beijing Universitys Press Studies Society. After his 
paper Jing bao was closed down by the Beijing Government in 1919, Shao escaped to 
Japan, where he wrote "New Russia Studies" and "Soviet Government and China". In 
1926, he was executed by Zhang Zuolin on a charge of "colluding with Red Russia and 
propagating Bolshevism. " Cf. Zeng Xubai, Zhonqquo xinwen shi (The Chinese Press 
History), (Taibei: Commercial Press, 1966), Vol 1, p 328; Zhuanii wenxue, Vol 44, No 4. 
115 Evans, 'Looking East from Moscow, Asia, (1922), Vol 22, No 12; FO 228/3216,21 
August 1920, No 27. 
86 Chen bao, 18 September 1920; 'Detective's Report', ZEGXS , 
27 February 1921. 
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As for the foreign press which received news and documents from Rosta- 
Dalta, Kasanin recalled that Khodorov had built up extensive contacts with the editors 
of several English-language journals, such as W. S. Ridge of the Befling Daily News, 
G. Clark of the Beijing Leader, C. J. Fox of the North China Star, T. C. Millard of 
Millard's Review, W. H. Donald of the Far Eastern Review and the correspondents of 
The Times and Reuters. These journalists are said to have liked publishing news and 
communiqu6s provided by Rosta-Dalta because they were "paid well". 87 Such papers 
were read not only by foreigners in the Far East, but also by Chinese who knew 
English; and some news and articles from them were translated and reprinted by the 
Chinese papers. 
After meeting Khodorov in Beijing in August 1920, Lizerovitch spoke highly 
of the former saying that he "is doing really good work to enlighten the Chinese on the 
truth about Soviet Russia; the propaganda is being conducted very carefully and 
successfully in Beijing. " He added that the Soviet agents had enlisted the co-operation 
of a few well-educated Chinese, who were spreading the gospel of labour and 
revolution in the interior. 88 This suggests that the Beijing branch of Rosta-DalUs 
propaganda work was conducted effectively. 
In the Summer of 1920, the East Asian Secretariat established Hua-E 
Tongxunshe (the China-Russia News Agency), which could be identified with Rosta. 89 
As an affiliated institute of the 
87 Kasanin, China in the Twenties, p 11, p 102. 8'3 FO 228/3214, August 1920. 
"9 'Voitinsky's Letter to the Eastern Peoples Section of the Siberian Bureau of the 
RCP(B), 17 August 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, pp 31-2. Rosta's Beijing branch was 
sometimes also called Hua-E Tongxunshe publicly by the Chinese. See ZEGXSL'S 
several reports in 1921. One of the staff of the Comintern, Slepark, who succeeded 
Khodorov as director of Rosta Beijing branch in 1922, was also seen as director of Hua- 
202 
Section of Propaganda and Information of the Revolutionary Bureau, the China-Russia 
News Agency, under Yang Mingzhai's direct leadership and Voitinsky's instructions, 
conducted propaganda with a more overtly Communist ideology. The East Asian 
Secretariat demanded that the Soviet Russia Telegraph Agency - Rosta - in Moscow 
supply not less than 1,000 words'news to them every day. 90 The China-Russia News 
Agency organised several radical Chinese to translate news from Moscow and articles 
from The Communist International, Soviet Russia and the journals of Communist 
Parties in Western countries, and then provided at least thirty one Chinese papers with 
translated materials that included "The History of the Bolshevik Party", "The 
Biography of Lenin" and "Lenin's Reply to an English Journalist". 91 According to 
incomplete figures, from July 1920 to July 1921, over 140 pieces of news and articles 
about Soviet Russia and the international Communist movement issued by the China- 
Russia News Agency were published in the Chinese press. 92 Voitinsky once even 
boasted that they could employ nearly all the newspapers and periodicals in China for 
propaganda. 93 Rosta-Dalta's branches in Guangzhou and Harbin also supplied news 
and other publicity to local papers. 
The Russian Press Review, which was described as "a weekly journal to 
provide information regarding Soviet Russia for the free use of editors and journalists", 
and which was published in English under the direction of the Soviet Government, was 
E Tongxunshe's Beijing branch. Cf. Huang Ping, Wanqshi huivi, p 4; GLZDC, Vol 2, p 
440. 
90'Vilensky's Letter to the ECCI, 1 September 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 37. 91 Kartunova, 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of China', Problemy Dal'neqo 
Vostoka, (1973), No 1; Ye Yonglie, Zhonqqonq zhi chu, p 175. U2 W-aýg Dong (ed. ), Zhonqquo Gonqchandanq dacidian (The Dictionary of the 
Communist Party of China), (Beijing: The Press of the Chinese Broadcast & TV, 1991), 
p 561. 
93 'Voitinsky's Letter, June 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 29. 
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circulated throughout the world and copies of it were also found in Asia around that 
time. It is difficult to know which Chinese journals received materials from Rosta- 
Dalta and the Russian Press Review, for not much evidence can be found. 
Nevertheless, the British Intelligence Bureau found that Rosta-Dalta supplied news- 
sheets regularly to some journals in Guangzhou and Shanghai, especially Oun bao 
(Masses Paper), Laodong yll fUnti (Labour and Women) and Minguo ribao during 
1921. Those papers' news columns often reported the situation in Soviet Russia, 
strikes and labour organisations, women's emancipation in China and abroad, and their 
articles advocated socialism and communism. 94 
Not content with supplying news to the press, the Bolsheviks even turned 
certain Chinese journals into their own propaganda organs. According to Vilensky's 
report to the ECCI dated I September 1920, the East Asian Secretariat owned a 
weekly journal, a socialist daily, and Xin gingnian in Shanghai and Xin Zhongguo 
(New China) in Beijing. Vilensky also counted Xin chao (The Renaissance) and 
BeiiinR daxue xuesheng zhongkan (Beijing University Students' Weekly), both of 
which had been published by the students in Beijing, as publications controlled by the 
Secretariat. 95 Bolshevik agents were more likely to use these Chinese papers to 
publicise Soviet Russia's achievements and to spread the Bolsheviks' stand and views. 
When Xin gingnian became an organ of the early Chinese Communist 
organisation in September 1920, it was aided financially by the Comintern. 96 It had a 
special column - "New Russia Studies", which reprinted many articles about Soviet 
Russia which had been published in Soviet Russia, Pravda and other Communist 
94 FO 228/3211, Series of September, 1921, No 530; Wus! shigi gikan fleshao. 9" GLZDC, Vol 1, pp 40-1. 
96 'Sokelov-Strolakhov's Report, 21 April 1921', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 58. 
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journals, such as La Vie Ouvriere and Le Revue Communiste, etc.. Since most of 
these articles came from Soviet Russia, Hu Shi, one of the former editors of Xin 
gingnian, satirised the periodical saying that "today's Xin gingnian has virtually 
become a Chinese edition of Soviet Russia. 07 Soviet Russia was actually "an official 
organ of Soviet Russia's Information Bureau" in New York, which was "devoted to 
spreading the truth about Russia. 08 Xin gingnian alone, between September 1920 and 
April 1921, published 137 articles about the October Revolution, the Bolshevik party 
and Soviet Russia. 99 
The "weekly journal" Vilensky referred to in his report of September 1920 was 
probably Xinggi pinglun (Sunday Review). In his speech at the 2nd Congress of the 
Comintern, the Chinese delegate Liu Shaozhou mentioned that a weekly newspaper in 
Shanghai "uninterruptedly propagates socialist ideas". He gave an example: "In its 
issue of the first of May we can find the slogans 'Those who do not work should not 
eat', and 'The whole world should belong to the proletariat'. " 100 These slogans were 
precisely the ones Xingqi vinglun carried in its special issue on Labour Day in 1920. 
Xin, -qi pinglun was a paper of the GMD and had close relations with Lizerovitch and 
Voitinsky. Besides advocating the doctrines of the GMD, this paper published many 
articles on Marxism, socialism, Soviet Russia and the labour movement. Its New Year 
issue of 1920 published a poem entitled "A Red New Year", which reads: 
Suddenly a red light is passing through the dark. 
97 Zhang Jinglu (ed. ), Zhonqquo xiandai chuban shiliao, (Beijing: Zhonghua 
Publishing House, 1954), Vol 1, p 10. 9'3 The Communist International, Nos 16-7, p 134; Levy (ed. ), Revolutionary 
Radicalism, p 641; T. Draper Arneýican Communism and Soviet Russia, (New York: 
The Viking Press, 1963), p 175. 99 Mirovitskaya, 'The First Responses in China to the Victory of the Great October 
Socialist Revolution', Far Eastern Affairs, (1978), No 1, p 156. 100 Second Congress of the Communist International, Vol 1, p 139. 
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What is it? 
That is a new tide which came from the remote North, 
Sweeping past the Near East and then reaching the Far East. 
Above the waves there are many hammers and hoes, 
Which will remove the unfair and unjust in the World. 
Greeting the light of the rising sun, 
The whole land will turn into red in a moment. 
The hammer and sickle was a symbol of Soviet power. In spite of the author's misuse 
of hoe instead of sickle for his imagery, this poem conjured up the image of a 
Bolshevik tide spreading towards the East which would soon reach China. It 
expressed well the political tendency of Xinggi Vinglun. 
Xin Zhongguo, which started publication in May 1919, claimed to be a paper 
without any party affiliation. The contributors to this paper included several famous 
journalists, such as Shao Piaoping, He Haiming, Hu Lin, Zhang Junmai, Sun Jiyi and 
Bao Tianxiao, and some professors, such as Hu Shi, Gao Yihan, Chen Qixiu and 
Zhang Houzai. The first issue of Xin Zhongguo carried Sokolsky's "The First Days of 
the Bolsheviks in Power" and He Haiming's "The Chinese Labourers and the 
Bolsheviks". This journal carried articles from Russian magazines, such as Sun, and 
Russian novels, which were translated by Geng Jizhi, Qu Qiubai and Zheng Zhenduo. 
Befling daxue xuesheniz zhoukan, which started publication in January 1920, 
was a magazine run by the Student Union of Beijing University. Its editors and 
regular contributors were almost all anarchist students belonging to the Beijing 
University Students' Mutual Aid League, such as Huang Lingshuang and Chen 
Youqin, who were on good terms with Polevoy. A periodical review points out that 
this journal's distinguishing feature was "exposing and attacking publicly the evils of 
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the Chinese warlord government, and openly advocating revolution. " 10, The journal 
called on people to "rise in revolt against the warlord government" (No 6) for the 
editors believed that "the present government in China is actually a Japanese 
Government and no longer the government of the Republic of China. " (No 7). The 
journal advocated Bolshevik doctrines. In the special issue for May Day in 1920, one 
article remarked: "Since Lenin and Trotsky waged the class struggle, labourers have 
become aware as if awakening from a dream that social revolution cannot be avoided 
and that class struggle is a convenient way to emancipate the proletariat. " Another 
article in Issue 10 affirmed that the Soviet Government's motives were "to reform the 
political system and to strive for the well-being of the great majority of the people. So 
their action cannot be described as violence. " 102 Since the content of Beijing daxug 
xueshena zhoukan was quite radical, the journal was considered by the Chinese 
authorities and British Intelligence as "one of the publications of a Bolshevik nature" 
and an "extreme" one. 103 
Having started publication under the help of Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu and Hu 
Shi in January 1919, Xin chao carried several articles which advocated the Bolshevik 
Revolution. For example, in its first issue, the paper's editor Luo Jialun in "Today's 
New Tide in the World" wrote: 
At the present, there is a vast and mighty wave coming from Eastern 
Europe. ... The new starting point for this new tide is the Russian 
Revolution, the Austro-Hungarian Revolution and the German Revolution. 
101 Wusi shiai aikan iieshao (Introduction to the Periodicals of the May 4th Period), 
(Beijing: People's Press, 1958-59), Vol 2, p 243. 102 Lbid., Vol 2, pp 245-252. 
1 03 Tianjin Police Bureau's Report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, April 1920; Quoted 
from Zhang Jinglu, Zhon-qauo xiandal chuban shiliao, Vol 1, p 48; FO 405/225, No 160, 
12 August 1920. 
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The French-style revolution was a political revolution, the Russian-style 
revolution afterwards is a social revolution. 
Another editor, Fu Sinian, also said: "From then on, the French-style revolution - 
political revolution - partly became an event of past; and the Russian-style revolution - 
social revolution - will spread everywhere. " 
104 It seems that they accepted Li Dazhao's 
view of the Bolshevik Revolution. Li repeatedly expressed the view that "The French 
Revolution of 1789 heralded the world revolution in the 19th century, and the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 heralded the world revolution in the 20th century. " 105 We can see 
that the wording used for commenting on the October Revolution was quite similar to 
what the Bolsheviks themselves were propagating at this time. Luk has also noticed 
this, but he believes that this vision showed "that Chinese intellectuals had been 
predisposed to look at the October Revolution in such a perspective", because "there is 
no evidence to suggest that the Chinese had been influenced by the propaganda of the 
Russians. " 106 This conclusion of Luk's is a bit too assertive, for we should not rule out 
the possibility that Xin chao and some other journals' editors were influenced by 
Soviet agents' propaganda either directly or via some Chinese such as Li Dazhao 
whether orally or in writing. 
In addition to making use of the existing Chinese press, Soviet propagandists 
tried to create some new papers. In May 1920, the Foreign Section of the Dal'buro in 
Vladivostok discussed the possibility of starting up new newspapers to enhance 
Bolshevik influence in China with Yao Zuobin, a representative of the China National 
104 An chao, (January 1919), Vol 1, No 1. 
105'The Victory of the Common People', Xin gingnian, (1918), Vol 5, No 5. 106 M. Luk, The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism, p 20. 
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Student Union. 107 Between 1919 and 1920, many new journals started publication. 
Luo Jialun remarked in May 1920: 
Since May 4th of last year new journals in China have suddenly increased to 
more than 400. But most of them are not mature. Mrs Dewey once asked 
me: 'In America it is not easy to start a periodical, it may need several years' 
preparation; why is it so easy to increase the number of journals to several 
hundred within several months in ChinaT 108 
Luo could not answer this question and maybe nobody can answer it. Although most 
journals were started by the Chinese themselves, there is no hiding the fact that some 
were started at the suggestion of Soviet agents, or were sponsored by them. One case 
can be confirmed by an intelligence report: in February 1920 at a meeting which was 
held at the restaurant of the Yong An Hotel in Shanghai, Zhu Zhuowen told the 
participants that some of the "true well-wishers of China" had suggested that "a 
magazine should be started for the propagation of Bolshevism and for the purpose of 
giving news of Soviet Russia. " The proposal was adopted, the new magazine was 
named "The Worker" and it was planned to publish 3,000 copies in Chinese. 109 It can 
be inferred that the "true well-wishers of China" were foreigners, probably Soviet 
agents, for Lizerovitch attended the meeting. "The Worker" was not published in the 
end, but the plan was significant. In August 1920, LaodonR iie (Labour Circle) started 
publication and was edited by Li Hanjun, one of those present at the above meeting. 
From then on, numerous magazines were launched with similar titles, such as Laodonz 
V 
107 'The Eastern Peoples Section of the Siberian Bureau of the RCP(B)'s Report to the 
ECCI, 21 December 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 50. 
108 Luo Jialun, 'Our Student Movement's Success and Failure in the Past Year and 
Our Guiding Principles in the Future', Xin chao,, May 1920. 
log FO 405/228, No 157 (April 7 1920). 
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zhe ("the Labourer", started in Guangzhou in October 1920), Lai bao ("Labour Paper", 
started in Tianjin in October 1920) and Laodong yin ("Labour Voice", started in 
Beijing in November 1920). The following year similar magazines commenced 
publication in Changsha, Wuhan and Jinan. To the best of our knowledge, at least 
Laodong iie, Laodong yin and Laodong zhe were sponsored and subsidised by the 
Comintern agents. 110 All of thesejournals were weekly magazines with similaredition 
formats, and they all reported news of Soviet Russia and the international labour 
movements. These magazines for labourers were edited by the Communist groups as 
their mouthpiece to propagate among the Chinese workers. 
The Bolsheviks in China had their publication transfer system. At first, some 
propaganda materials and publications were brought into China by the Bolsheviks 
themselves. For example, Luo Zhanglong recalled that at their first meeting with the 
Chinese radicals at Beijing University, Voitinsky "brought them some journals, such 
as The Communist International, which were available in English and German editions 
as well as Russian edition, in order to enable people who did not know Russian to read 
them; he also brought several books, one of which was Ten DUs That Shook the 
World written by an English [American] joumalist. "111 However, it was impossible 
for such publications to be brought into China regularly in this way. Luo Zhanglong 
remembered that before Voitinsky's departure from Beijing, he jotted down the 
110 Laodong iie was a paper published by the Publication Section of the Revolutionary 
Bureau of the East Asian Secretariat. GLZDC, Vol 1, p 32; the other papers were also 
financed by the Comintern agents. See Liu Shixin, 'Recollections of the Anarchists' 
Activities in China', Ge Maochun, et al., Wuzhenqfu zhuvi sixiang ziliao xuan,, Vol 2, p 
936. 
... Luo Zhanglong, 'Recollections of the Society for Studying Marxism in Beijing 
University', Yida gianhou, Vol 2, p 198. 
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addresses of Luo and others, and later they received publications in foreign languages 
from abroad continuously. 112 
Before long, the East Asian Secretariat set up channels to receive publications 
regularly from Moscow via Irkutsk to China or from Vladivostok to China. These 
publications included newspapers and periodicals which were issued by the Russian 
Newspapers and Periodicals Distribution Office and books which were published in 
Moscow. The publications were posted to Voitinsky c/o Grigoriyev of the 
Centrosoyus in Shanghai. ' 13 In North China, it was said that Polevoy obtained 
revolutionary pamphlets and Russian journals through his mother in Moscow and he 
could therefore often supply the Chinese radicals with pamphlets published in 
Moscow; once he gave the Library of Beijing University an English-language edition 
of ABC of Communism by Bukharin and Preobrazhensky. 114 Publications were also 
sent to Stoyanovitchy in Guangzhou through Harbin. 115 Around this time, 
International Press Correspondence published by the Comintern for international 
propaganda was also available among radical Chinese both in Shanghai and Beijing. 116 
As to other countries' Communist or progressive publications, possible channels were 
through the overseas correspondents of Shanghai Life and Lizerovitch, who received 
revolutionary literature from London, New York and Copenhagen, where a centre was 
set up by the Comintem to collect political literature from Western countries. 117 
112 'Luo Zhanglong's Memoirs on Voitinsky', GLZDC, Vol 2, p 110. 
113 GLZDC, Vol 1, pp 35-7. 
"' Zhang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Part , Vol 1, p 93; Guan Shanfu, 'Some Facts on Polevoy and Ivanov, Dangshi ton-qxun, (1984), No 3. More 
likely, Polevoy pretended that he received the publications from his mother. '15'Stoyanovitchys Letter, 29 September 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 43. 116 'Liu Renjing's Recollection', April 1957, Yida gianhou, Vol 2, p 117. 117 FO 405/228,7 April 1920; FO 228/3214, June 1920; FO 228/3211, July 1920; Cf. 
Lazich and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, p 145. 
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Nevertheless, it was obviously difficult either to mail or bring large quantities 
of Communist publications into China. In view of the inconvenience of smuggling 
large amounts of literature, the Bolsheviks decided to establish their own printing 
plants or to make use of some Chinese printing plants. Vilensky's report to the ECCL 
dated I September 1920, said that the East Asian Secretariat attached great importance 
to publishing Chinese, Korean and Japanese editions of the books published in 
Moscow and had set up several publishing and printing centres, in Shanghai, Beijing, 
Harbin and Vladivostok by then. According to him, Harbin was a basis for publishing 
English, Chinese and Japanese propaganda literature, and had published about 20 sorts 
of such materials; ' 18 about 50 Moscow-published pamphlets were reprinted in 
Vladivostok; while Shanghai was the main centre for the Chinese Communist 
publishing cause! 19 Voitinsky's report of 17 August 1920 revealed that the publishing 
department of the Revolutionary Bureau in Shanghai had its own printing plant and 
nearly all literature posted from Vladivostok had been translated and printed there. 
The Communist Manifesto, What Kind of People Are the Communists?, On the 
Communist Youth Movement in Russia were already off the press and fifteen other 
pamphlets and leaflets were waiting to be printed. 120 Besides the press of Shanghai 
Life, which could only print books and pamphlets in Russian, 121 a Chinese printing 
plant in Shanghai named "Youxin" was sponsored by a Comintern agent, Strornisky, 
11'ý Perhaps, there were several printing houses working for the Bolsheviks. 
According to a British intelligence report of 1922, the Bolsheviks got into an agreement 
for a large reward with a Chinese press named Fei-tschan at Mongolskaya street in 
Harbin in order to print the propaganda literature from Moscow. FO 228/3140, 'Agents' 
Information', 16 May 1922, p 59. 
119 GLZDC, Vol 1, pp 40-1. 
120 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 31. 
121 The publications which were printed by the press of Shanghai Life included 
Khodorov's World Imperialism in China, which was read by Lenin. See Nikiforov, 
SIOP ,p 92. 
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who transmitted 2,000 Yuan to Zheng Peigang via Chen Duxiu as starting funds. The 
first task the plant undertook was to print the Chinese translation of The Communist 
Manifesto. 122 Besides Communist pamphlets, journals such as GonRchan dan (The 
Communist Monthly) 123 and Laodong jie, some other revolutionary periodicals and 
leaflets were also printed by this plant. Kartunova listed several pamphlets published 
in China during that time, which included The Progamme of the Russian Communist 
Party, The Biography of Lenin, ABC of Communism, The Constitution of the Soviet 
Socialist Republic of Russia, On Trade Unions, What the People Gained from the 
October Revolution and Russia's Education. 124 Some other pamphlets in Chinese 
without date or place of publication were found by British Intelligence, and included 
Methods of Communist Teaching in Russi , China and the Russian October 
Revolution and The Manifesto of the American Communist Party. 125 
In Beijing, the Revolution Bureau made use of the Beijing University Press 
thanks to the help of some professors. 126 Those professors perhaps included the 
Bureau's members Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu, and the director of Beijing University 
Press, Li Xinbai. 127 It is still not clear how Beijing University Press was used for 
122 Zheng Peigang, 'Some Facts on Anarchism in China', Ge Mao-chun, et al., (eds. ), 
Wuzhen-qfu zhuyi sixiang ziliao xuan,, Vol 2, pp 958-59. 
'2*3 "Gongchan dang" means "the Communist Party", but on the front cover of this 
magazine, the English title was "Communism". One of the early members of the CCP, 
Shan Yanbing noticed that and pointed out the fault to LI Da, the editor of the , 
Gonqchan 
dang, but Li did not correct it. 'Shan Yanbing's Talk', recorded by LI Danyang in August 
1980 (unpublished). 
124 Kartunova, 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of China', Problemy Dal'nego 
Vostoka, (1971), No 1. 
T2*5 FO 228/3211, September 1921. 
126 Kartunova, 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of China'. 127 Li Xinbal kept good terms with Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu and Polevoy, and he 
participated in several revolutionary activities together with them. See Mao Chaoran, 'The CCP's Foundation and Beijing University', Beiiing daxue zhexue shehui kexue 
vouxiu lunwen xuan (Selected Highly Rated Theses on Philosophy and Social Sciences 
of Beijing University), Vol 2, p 48. 
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publishing Communist publications. However, from some journals which were 
printed by the Press, we can see traces of Bolshevik propaganda. In addition to Xin 
chao, Xin Zhonjzguo and BeijinR daxue xueshenjj zhoukan which I have mentioned 
above, Xin shenRhuo (New Life), edited by Li Xinbai, was a journal which agitated for 
anti-Japanese causes and against Chinese warlords. On National Day 1919 Xin 
shenghuo printed tens of thousands of extra copies of the journal and many more 
leaflets, hoping readers could help to distribute them to "every province, every county 
and every village". 128 Some other periodicals, such as Guomin (The Citizens), Xin 
, ahehui 
(New Society) and Shuggan (Dawn Light) also showed a radical tendency and 
were edited by people who had close relations with Polevoy and Li Dazhao, and who 
later became Communists, such as Deng Zhongxia, Qu Qiubai and Song Re. 
A part of propaganda literature in Chinese language from Moscow was also 
printed in District C of Tianjin. 129 Copies of Soviet documents and propaganda 
literature were often carried from Tianjin by Polevoy in person or via Zhang Tailei to 
Beijing. Around 1920, nearly every time Zhang Tailei arrived in Beijing from Tianjin, 
he "carried two suitcases which contained revolutionary leaflets and pamphlets. No 
sooner had Zhang reached Beijing University's 'Dong Zhai' (the Eastern Dormitory) 
than he put the two cases under the bed of one of his friends. " 130 In 192 1, Zhang also 
frequently carried propaganda literature with him from Tianjin to Changxindian. 131 
On 2 February 1920, the State Council of the Chinese Government issued a 
public notice warning that over 83 Bolshevik publications had been found in China. 
128 WUSi shigi aikan aieshao, Vol 1, p 300. 129 FO 228/3140, 'Agents' Information' (16,5,1922) p 59. 
130 Lin Hongnuan, Zhanq Tailei zhuan 
, 
(A Biography of Zhang Tailei), Guangzhou: 
Guangdong People's Press, 1981, p 18. 
131 Ding Zeqin and Wang Shudi, 'Zhang Tailei's Chronicle', Zhang Tailei wen'i. 
214 
Among them were Lenin's The State and Revolution, Marx's Capital, The 
Biographical Sketch of Lenin and The Autobiography of Trotsky in Chinese. 132 Since 
nobody in China had openly published a translation of The State and Revolution 
before then, the fact that such books were circulating raised doubts. It indicated that 
the publishing work of the Bolsheviks might have started before the foundation of the 
East Asian Secretariat. 
Soviet agents endeavoured to enlist the help of radical Chinese intellectuals in 
translating propaganda materials. From the autumn of 1918 Polevoy asked Zhang 
Tailei to translate "socialist documents". 133 Lizerovitch tried to engage the services of 
Cao Yabo (western name Abel Tsao) and some other Chinese in translating Bolshevik 
literature in 1920.134 Potapov handed some pamphlets and articles in English to a 
Chinese named Li, who translated them into Chinese. 135 Some other Chinese 
intellectuals such as Huang Lingshuang, Shen Yanbing, Yuan Zhenying, Luo 
Zhanglong, Geng Jizhi and Zheng Zhenduo also offered to help translate Communist 
literature from English, German and Russian into Chinese. 
With regard to the translation of The Communist Manifesto, there are some 
facts many historians have neglected. Chen Wangdao began to translate the work 
towards the end of 1919 at the suggestion of the Office of Xinggi 12inglun, which had 
close relations with Lizerovitch. Around this time a Korean, Yo Un-hyong, who was 
also on good terms with Xinggi Vinglun and Lizerovitch, started to translate the same 
132 Most of the pamphlets in the list were anarchist publications. Wusi aicluo yundong 
dangan ziliao, pp 633-35. 
133 Ding Zeqin and Wang Shudi, 'Zhang Tailei's Chronicle', Zhanq Tailei wen'i, p 327. 
134 Cao did not undertake this work for he was busy. FO 405/228, April 7 1920, No 
157. 
135 *Potapov's Report to Chicherin, 12 December 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 49. The 
footnote writes that this "Li" perhaps was Li Zhenying. It was probably wrong. This "Li" 
was more likely to be Li Hanjun. 
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work, too. Chen Wangdao's translation was first published by "the Society for 
Studying Socialism" in April 1920. Little is known for certain about this Shanghai- 
based Society around that time. However, in spring 1920 a Korean, Kim Man-gyom, 
who had come to Shanghai from Vladivostok as a Comintern propaganda agent and 
brought 40,000 yuan for sponsoring various Communist activities and publications, 
together with An Pyong-chan, another Korean who carried 300,000 roubles from 
Soviet Russia, established a "Society for Studying Socialism" in Shanghai. At nearly 
the same time as Chen Wangdao's translation of The Communist Manifesto was 
completed, the Korean translation by Yo Un-hyong, who then became the head of the 
Translation Service of the Koryo Communist Group, was also published in Shanghai 
in May 1920.136 
The Communist and revolutionary pamphlets and leaflets which were printed 
by the presses I mentioned above were read by numerous Chinese, especially young 
students. Mao Zedong remembered that he first read the Chinese translation of The 
Communist Manifesto and some other books on Communism and Soviet Russia in 
1920.137 Certain pamphlets were sometimes presented to young intellectuals free of 
charge; 138 and leaflets were mainly for circulating among ordinary people. It was 
recorded that students and workers in Beijing and Tianjin started in spring 1920 to 
distribute leaflets in which they publicised the successes of Soviet Russia. 139 On 10 
136 Kim Chun-yop and Kim Chang-sun, Hanquk Kongsan Chuui Undonsa, p 175; 
Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, pp 16-17; Nym Wales and Kim San, Song of 
Arýiran, p 117. The Society for Studying Socialism also started publication of a 
periodical entitled The Communist in Korean. 
137 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (London: Vicar Gollancz, 1937). 
1313 Wang Jueyuan, 'What I Knew about Chen Duxiu', Zhuanii wenxue, Vol 30, No 5, p 
42. 
139 Friendship with The Soviet Union Is the Basis of Freedom and Inder)endence of 
the Peonle's Democracy, (in Chinese, Beijing, 1950), p 30; Quoted from Far Eastern 
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October 1920, the National Day of the Republic of China, large quantities of 
Bolshevik and anarchist leaflets were distributed in Shanghai. One leaflet claimed: 
"When the fuse is lighted the governments and capitalists of the whole world will all 
be removed. " And it asked people: "Do you want real happiness? Rise quickly! 
Revolt to do away with the government! " One young Chinese, Hu Jiating, was 
arrested for the distribution of those leaflets. Fifty thousand pieces of propaganda 
literature and a number of Bolshevik books were found in his room. Hu was a teacher 
at the Esperanto school run by Stopany, so this propaganda campaign was believed to 
have links with the Bolsheviks. 140 At the Far Eastern Games which was held in 
Shanghai in autumn 1920, tens of thousands of leaflets in Chinese, English and 
Japanese were distributed. According to Wang Weizhou, the Koryo Communist Party 
sponsored and participated in this activity. 141 On October 9h of this year, several 
members of the Beijing University Students' Mutual Aid League distributed leaflets, 
whose content is for anti-warlord Government in Beijing, and two of them were 
arrested. 142 
The Bolsheviks always devoted much attention to conducting agitation and 
propaganda among workers and soldiers as well as students. There were a few cases 
of oral propaganda conducted directly by the Bolsheviks among Chinese labourers. 
Stopany once made a speech before an audience of some forty employees on ships and 
godowns on 29 February 1920, saying: 
Shanghai is a great industrial centre where the working classes are 
exploited to an appalling extent. The majority of the labourers here have 
Affairs, (1978), No 1, p 156. W-F6 228/2989,15 October 1920; FO 228/3216, No 42. 
141 Wang Weizhou, 'My Memoirs', Zhonqqonq danqshi ziliao, (1982), No 1, p 83. 142 Hu Qingyun, 'What Is the Socialists' League', Dan-qshi vaniiu ziliao, 1993, No 10. 
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to toil 14 hours per day and the wages they receive are not a tenth part of 
the value of their work. The capitalists enrich themselves by sweating the 
workers, and lavish their ill-gotten money on motor cars, carriages and 
other luxuries. This state of affairs has already existed too long. 
Stopany pointed out that the introduction of Communism was the only way to end it 
and explained the meaning of Communism; then he gave a brief account of its success 
as applied in Russia. Finally, he expressed the view that he saw no reason why the 
workers in Shanghai should not improve their status in the same way, provided they 
were united and prepared to make sacrifices. 143 A more efficient method was to 
use the media to propagate among workers. As we have seen, the Bolsheviks created 
and subsidised several weekly magazines produced specially for Chinese workers. On 
the third anniversary of the October Revolution, Voitinsky, using the assumed Chinese 
name of Wu Tingkang, wrote an article entitled "Chinese Labourers, and Soviet 
Russia" for Laodong fie and stated that three years before, Russian workers and 
peasants had overthrown the capitalists and warlords, and established a Soviet 
Republic. Now, there were no capitalists and landlords in Russia. Workers and 
peasants all over the world had shown their sympathy for it and supported it. He went 
on to appeal: 
Our Chinese workers and peasants! If we intend to break away from the 
oppression of the capitalists both in China and abroad, and to relieve 
ourselves from our sufferings under the rule of the warlords, ... we, 
workers and peasants, must unite and then ally ourselves with our 
counterparts in other countries and must do what the Russian workers and 
143 FO 228/3214,4 March 1920. 
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peasants have done. ... The brave and awakened Russian workers and 
peasants! Hurry to help your Chinese fellows who are still living in an 
abyss of misery. 144 
Since young intellectuals were more susceptible to such propaganda, the East 
Asian Secretariat was busy imbuing radical students with Communist and Soviet ideas 
first and training some of them to do propaganda work among workers and soldiers. 145 
"The Conditions of Admission to the Communist International" specially 
demanded "systematic and energetic propaganda in the army. " 146 In China Bolshevik 
propaganda in the army was not empty talk. As we have seen, Chinese labourers from 
Russia carried out agitation in the army from 1919. From May 1920, when the 
Chinese Section of the East Asian Secretariat was set up, it was instructed to conduct 
Communist propaganda in the Chinese Army. 147 
The Secretariat-funded Youxin Printing plant printed numerous leaflets, one of 
them calling on soldiers in the army to defy orders, kill officers and go over to the 
people's side. According to Voitinsky, one of such leaflets entitled "Bingshi xuzhi" 
(What Soldiers Should Know) was written by a Chinese revolutionary. 148 In fact, the 
leaflet "Bingshi xuzhi" was first printed by Zhenli She (the Truth Society) in April 
1919. Later, "Yige bing de tanhua" (Words of A Soldier) and "Mubing xuzhi" (What 
Soldiers Should Know) were printed by Sanwu Xueshe (Three Nihilists Society) in 
144 Laodong iie, (7 November 1920), No 13. 
145 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 29, p 32, p 40. 146 Degras, The Communist International, Vol 1, p 169. 147 'Vilensky's Report to the ECCI, 1 September 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 39. 148 Zheng Peigang, 'Some Facts on Anarchism in China', Ge Maochun, et al. (ed. ) 
Wuzhencif u zhuvi sixiang ziliao xuan, Vol 2, p 959; 'Voitinsky's Letter to the the Eastern 
Peoples Section of the Siberian Bureau of the RCP(B), 17 August 1920', GLDZC, Vol 1, 
p 31. 
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Shanghai between 1920-21 and their content was the same as "Bingshi xuzhi". 149 The 
author, in the guise of a soldier narned Li Desheng, wrote: 
One of my fellow villagers came from Harbin and told me that Guoji 
Dang (the Bolshevik Party) in Russia is an organisation consisting of 
peasants, workers and soldiers. They rose in revolt against the officials 
and landlords. It was a revolution of common people. It is called a 
Russian-style revolution. ... Recently the common people of Germany and 
Austria have also risen in revolt. ... It is the will of Heaven that our 
Chinese labourers in Europe have got in touch with them. If a revolution 
of common people is initiated by our soldiers, and we can justify it, I 
believe that nobody in this land would dare to fight us, for all lives and 
weapons are in our hands. 
It also contrasted the Russian Revolution with the French Revolution, saying the latter 
was a bourgeois revolution, while the former was a working-class revolution. 150 
Around this time similar articles and leaflets such as "Gao, junren" (Appeal to 
Army Men) published in Beijing daxue xuesheng zhoukan in February 1920, "Ku 
junren" (The Miserable Army Men) and "To Our Brothers among the Armed 
Forces"15 I were also distributing among troops. 
149 Fang Qingqiu, 'Some Issues on Mutinies under the Rule of the Beiyang Warlords', 
Lishi dancian (Historical Archival Materials), (Beijing 1982), No 1, pp 104-9. 
150 Ge Maochun, et al. (ed. ), iNd., Vol 1, pp 392-6. 151 Eugene E. Barnett, an American missionary in Hangzhou and Shanghai, recalled 
that he received one day in 1920 a batch of tracts issued by Chinese Communists, 
among others, such as 'To Our Dear Fellow-Students" and 'To Our Comrades and 
Blood-Brothers of Labor", there was a tract entitled 'To Our Brothers in the Armed 
Forces". Eugene E. Barnett, My Life in China. 1910-1936, East Lansing: Michigan State 
University, P 188. 
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Certainly, no one could deny that these leaflets showed an anarchist inclination 
and were circulated by anarchist groups, yet it is not known that Zhenli She, San Wu 
Xueshe and the editorial staff of Beiiiniz daxue xuesheng zhoukan were all anarchist 
groups which had close ties with the Bolsheviks. For example, the head of Sanwu 
Xueshe, Fei Zhewen, had been in Vladivostok before he organised the Society with 
Chen Jianai at the instigation of a Bolshevik called "Gorkov". This Society aimed for 
a revolution by the common people and tried to recruit soldiers into the Society. 152 1 
will discuss Zhenli She in the next chapter. Li Huang pointed out that the Chinese 
anarchists, who did not know what the Bolsheviks' Communism was, "offered a lot of 
help to the Russian Communist Party's propaganda in China. " 153 In such cases, 
Bolshevik ideas were unavoidably mingled with anarchism. 
Further evidence shows that the Bolsheviks actually participated in the 
agitation in the Chinese army. In spring 1920, a detective found that a Bolshevik 
named Diernav and several Chinese radicals were holding a meeting at the Hongyun 
Restaurant in Shanghai, and discussing how to disseminate Bolshevism among the 
Chinese troops and incite soldiers to rise in rebellion. It was reported that Diernav had 
brought in large sums from Russia and would provide funds for these kind of 
activities. 154 Later, anarchists Zhang Mochi, Suo Fei and so on, engaged in 
revolutionary activities among the troops in Baoding, Handan and other places. 155 In 
1,52 Zhonciquo wuzhenqfu zhuvi he Zhonqquo Shehuidang, pp 82-84. 
153 uang, Xuedun shi huivi Lu (Memoirs of the Xuedun Study), (Hong Kong: 
Min 
I 
pbao Press, 1979), p 110. 
'Note from Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 April 
1920', ZEGXSL, No 164. 
155 Lu Zhe, Zhonaguo wuzhenqfuzhuvi shigao (A Draft History of Anarchism in 
China), Fuzhou: Fujian People's Press, 1990, 
p 253. 
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1921, a lecturer who was teaching Russian language at Beijing University wrote a 
report to the Bolsheviks in Russia, which reads: 
The university students in China are all youngsters, who are very keen and 
sensitive. At present, most of them favour radical action. However, it is a 
pity that there are no such persons in the army, and therefore, armed 
struggle cannot start or spread for a short while. ... If soldiers are told the 
ideas of Communism and egalitarianism, they are sure to be glad to follow 
US. 
He went on, "If we did so, our cause would certainly succeed within a hundred 
days. " 156 This report was intercepted by the Chinese authorities and hence offers an 
absolute proof of the Bolsheviks' desire to instigate armed uprisings in China. 
The propaganda and agitation in the army exerted a certain influence upon 
soldiers. For example, the troops at Gaoyang in Hebei ran riot and issued and 
distributed the "Mutiny Song", in which they appealed to soldiers of other Chinese 
troops "to fight against the Government; ... Four hundred millions of compatriots will 
have the same happy life as in Russia. " 157 By the spring of 1920, the soldiers of the 
5th Division in Shandong, of the Longhua and Shanghai Garrisons in Jiangsu and the 
158 troops in Manchuria had secretly formed popular societies. The Chinese troops 
stationed at the lower reaches of the Amur river showed sympathy for the Bolsheviks, 
as a result of which they regularly received Bolshevik publications. 159 
156 Tu Baishan's Report to the Head of the Infantry Headquarters, Shen Zhenlin, 12 
April 1921', Quote from Fang Qingqiu, 'Some Issues concerning Mutinies under the 
Rule of the Beiyang Warlords', Lishi danqan, (1982), No 1. 157 Quoted from Wusi aiguo vundonq dangan ziliao, p 643. 158 FO 228/3214,1 Aprill 920. 
'59 TedoroVs Report to the Amur Committee of the RCP(B), 5 October 1920', 
GLZDC, Vol 1, p 46. Fedorov was the Russian name of Liu Jiang, who was a leader of 
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In 1921, the Bolsheviks' propaganda activities increased in intensity. A 
propaganda bureau under the Dal'buro of RCP(B) was established in Chita, conducting 
propaganda in China and other Far Eastern countries. The head of the Bureau was 
Vorvosky, who had had a successful Communist career in Europe. 160 In a report to the 
Comintem dated II April 1921, the head of the Dal'buro, Krasnochokov (Tobelson) 
claimed: 
We have achieved in no way a looser [lesser] success in the results of the 
work of our propaganda section. The significance of which is obvious. ... 
Our section has lately considerably increased its activities in Shanghai, 
Tianjin 
... . 
161 
It was the eve of the foundation of the CCP. Beyond doubt, their propaganda activities 
had a significant bearing on Chinese radicals' fervour for Bolshevism and therefore 
prepared the way for the birth of the CCP. 
***** 
To surnmarise Soviet Russia and the Comintern's propaganda and agitation in 
China, which started in 1918 and was intensified during 1920-21, its guiding 
principles, contents, tactics and effects should be dealt with briefly. 
1. Contents and Principles 
the Chinese Communists in Russia. 
160 FO 228/3211, July 1921. Some Bolsheviks who had worked in China, such as 
Agarief, joined this Bureau; and some Chinese, such as Zhang Minquan, also worked 
for it. FO 405/233, p 438; FO 228/3140, p 75. 161 FO 228/2774, No 244. 
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Soviet propaganda could be roughly divided into two aspects: an ideological 
aspect and a manipulative aspect. The Bolsheviks laid emphasis on different aspects at 
different times. 
Generally speaking, the manipulative aspect of Soviet propaganda was used to 
associate the goals and policies of Soviet Russia with non-Communist symbols in 
order to secure for Soviet policies the maximum possible support from non- 
Communists. 162 Since the function of the Eastern people's in a world socialist 
revolution was first defined by the Bolshevik leaders to aid in the general assault upon 
the capitalist-imperialist powers, the most important aspect of their early propaganda 
in China was to stimulate the Chinese people to throw themselves into the anti- 
imperialist, especially anti-Japanese movement. 
As to the ideological aspect of the propaganda, it was initially considered 
unwise to attempt to spread Communist ideology in China, for Lenin did not believe 
that Chinese coolies could wage a socialist revolution in a backward country like 
China. 163 So in the early stages, only a little Communist ideology was contained in 
Soviet propaganda. Hence, one cannot consider that there was no Bolshevik 
propaganda merely because no dissemination of Communism was visible. The 
doctrines with which the Bolsheviks first tried to make the Chinese familiar were 
Lenin's theory of imperialism and the Soviet Government's policy towards national 
self-determination. In April 1920 British intelligence observed that Bolshevism was 
spreading, and "it is made peculiarly acceptable to the oriental by its advocacy of race 
equality and self-determination. " 164 
162 Cf. F. C. Barghoorn, Soviet Foreiqn Propaganda, (Princeton, 1964), p 17. 163 Cf. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, p 544. 164 FO 405/228,7 April 1920. 
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Once Soviet Russia and the Comintern began to switch their global strategic 
centre of gravity from the West to the East, they not only encouraged people in 
colonial and backward countries to form national liberation movements against 
imperialism, but also attempted to "apply communist tactics and policy in pre- 
capitalist conditions" and to establish soviets and to build socialist societies in 
backward countries. 165 Thereafter, ideological elements, such as socialist and 
communist theories became an important part of Soviet propaganda. The Bolsheviks 
began to supply the Chinese with more works by Lenin and other Soviet leaders, 
Comintern documents and Soviet materials containing glowing accounts of the Soviet 
system and the new way of life in Russia, which sought to offer an appealing and 
convincing ideology, theory and model for the Chinese. 
2. Means and Tactics 
In order to ensure the widest possible dispersion of Soviet propaganda, the 
Bolsheviks resorted to every conceivable means: speeches, leaflets, pamphlets, the 
press and so on. One of the Comintern theses on the methods and content of the 
Communists' work pointed out that the principal forms of Communist propaganda and 
agitation were regular verbal personal persuasion and agitation combined with 
literature distribution. 166 As we have seen, Bolshevik propagandists sometimes made 
speeches before Chinese audiences or tried to convert people personally and handed 
out pamphlets to the Chinese. However, verbal agitation and literature distribution 
were mainly carried out by Chinese propagandists from Russia and Chinese anarchists 
165 Lenin, 'The Second Congress of the Communist International', Collected Works, 
Vol 31, p 242. 
166 Degras, The Communist International, Vol 1, pp 261-2. 
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who were made use of by Soviet agents. Among various means, perhaps the most 
successful one was to employ the press in China, since the press, whose existence was 
based on a public demand for news and information, afforded an ideal channel. 
Soviet propaganda could also be divided into direct and indirect ways. Direct 
propaganda could easily be seen, while it was hardly possible to identify indirect 
propaganda. Concealing its source was a customary tactic of Bolshevik propaganda. 
Sometimes Bolshevik propagandists contributed articles under assumed names as if 
they had been written by Chinese or non-Communist authors; sometimes they bribed 
newspapers and periodicals to publish their news or articles; 167 what is more, they 
created and subsidised journals, which appeared to be pure Chinese journals and which 
would not be perceived as Bolshevik publications. For example, in 1921, the 
representative of the Red Trade Unions International in China had a plan to start 
publication of a weekly journal with "an unnoticeable title". 168 It was just what Lenin 
had demanded "to overcome all obstacles, to found legal press organs ... under the 
most varied names, and when necessary to change the name frequently. "' 69 In these 
ways, the Bolsheviks extended their influence and moulded "public opinion", while 
most of those influenced were unaware of the motives or even the identity of the 
propagandists. 
167 For example, in 1922-23 the Joffe Mission bribed several newspapers in China 
with money under the pretence of offering travel subsidies. [Wang Yijun, Zhonq E 
waiaiao cle xumu, pp 341-42]; In 1927 Voitinsky once used large funds to reverse the 
trend towards anti-Communism in the Chinese press. [Pick, China in the Grin of the 
Reds, p 10]. 
16" Kartunova, 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of China', Problemy Dal'nea-o 
Vostoka, (1973), No 1; This weekly journal was Laodong zhoukan (Labour Weekly), the 
orv. 
9an 
of the Chinese Labour Organisations' Secretariat of the CCP. 
Degras, The Communist International, Vol 1, pp 123-4. 
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The Bolshevik propagandists aimed at a wide range of target audiences 
belonging to different classes, different political cliques, different circles and different 
educational levels. For the ordinary masses, normally oral agitation or popular 
literature were provided, for they could not be expected to master abstruse theories and 
could only be expected to be aroused to action. On the other hand, since the radical 
intelligentsia were capable of studying and accepting Marxism and Bolshevism, they 
were therefore considered capable of being trained as future Communist leaders in 
China. Journalists in particular found favour in the Soviet propagandists' eyes, since 
they were in a position to influence others once they responded favourably to Soviet 
propaganda. That was why Soviet propagandists first built up close relationship with 
many Chinese j ournalists and why the main founders of the CCP, such as Chen Duxiu, 
Li Dazhao, Li Hanjun, Qu Qiubai and Zhang Tailei, had all been editors orjournalists. 
In What is to be Done? Lenin wrote that the revolutionary propagandists 
should "speak literally different languages. " The Bolsheviks were quite flexible in 
their choice of language for propaganda, adapting to various circumstances, to diverse 
targets and for different purposes. For example, when addressing labourers, their main 
topic was to expose capitalist exploitation and the evils of the capitalist system; to the 
nationalists, they warned of the dangers of Japanese encroachment and aroused their 
anti-imperialist sentiment; and to the anarchists, they preached social revolution and 
described the magnificent prospects of communism. After the Versailles Conference 
resolved to transfer Shandong to Japan, the Bolsheviks took the opportunity this 
presented, issuing the Karakhan Manifesto and other publicity to convince the Chinese 
people that only Soviet Russia was an unselfish friend of China and the liberator of the 
Eastern peoples. In these ways, the Bolsheviks won over many Chinese in favour of 
Soviet Russia. 
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By speaking the "language the people understand" 170 , the Bolsheviks 
resourcefully adapted their propaganda message to the conditions in China, to the 
particular historical juncture, and to the needs, desires and sentiments of the Chinese 
people. What they said seemed to be in the interests of the Chinese people and the 
tone of their writings seemed Chinese in style and viewpoint, therefore most Chinese 
people at the time were not aware of the existence of Soviet propaganda, and even 
many present-day historians have failed to notice its significance in the early stages. 
3. Effects and Influences 
To judge the effects and influences of Soviet propaganda in China, one must 
examine whether the purposes of the propaganda were achieved and analyse whether 
the propagandists' language and mode of thinking were adopted. 
We can see that Soviet Russiaýs summons to fight against Japanese and 
European imperialists brought forth a favourable response from the Chinese people. 
As a British intelligence report indicated, "the Bolshevik creed of anti-imperialism 
with its cry for the liberation of Asia from European domination strikes a sympathetic 
note in China. " 171 Lenin's theory on imperialism and the Comintern's call to fight 
against imperialist powers were accepted by more and more Chinese people, and the 
Bolsheviks' anti-imperialist slogan was conducive to forming and pushing forward the 
Chinese national liberation movements. 
The Bolsheviks' messages that Soviet Russia was the sole country which 
would not commit aggression against other states and would emancipate all people in 
oppressed and colonial circumstances attracted many Chinese, and convinced them 
170 Lenin's Collected Works, Vol 30, p 162. 
171 FO 405/228,1920, No 82. 
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that Soviet Russia stood for "justice and humanity", and that the Bolsheviks were 
fighting for the "freedom, equality and well-being" of all people. 172 Soviet Russia 
therefore enjoyed a considerable reputation for several years, and as Mirovitskaya, 
pointed out, "the prestige and popularity of the land of Soviets increased and grew 
stronger in China between 1919 and 192 I. ttlD Many Chinese believed that to form an 
alliance with Soviet Russia would be of benefit to China. 
In 1920 a high tide in the propagation of socialism emerged in China. On his 
return from abroad, Pan Gongzhan found, to his astonishment, that "socialism seems to 
have become a pet phrase these days; newspapers and magazines spare no efforts to 
advocate socialism. Recently, even some people who know nothing about socialism 
parade themselves as socialists, too". 174 Feng Ziyou believed that this was "the great 
effect of various propaganda activities". 175 Between 1919 and 192 1, large quantities of 
books, pamphlets and journals propagating socialism including Marxism, and 
providing information about Soviet Russia, appeared in China. Pan Gongzhan thus 
remarked: 
This year (1920) the trend of socialist thought in China is like the rising 
wind and scudding clouds. Articles expounding Marxism and discussing 
Bolshevism have been published in newspapers and magazines 
everywhere. 176 
172 Zhonqquo xiandaishi ziliao huibian (Collected Source Materials of Modern Chinese 
History), (Hong Kong: Cultural Material Supply Service, 1978), p 40-41. 173 'The First Responses in China to the Victory of the Great October Socialist 
Revolution', Far Eastern Affairs, 1978, Vol 1, pp 153-154. 
Pan Gongzhan, 'Random Thoughts on Return to the Mother-Land', Taining van- q 
(The Pacific), (Shanghai, August 1920), Vol 3, No 6. 
175 Feng Ziyou, Shehuizhuvi W- ZhonqquO (Socialism and China), (Hong Kong, April 
1920); quoted from LO Fangshang, Geming zhi zaiqi, p 320. 176 Doncifang zazhi (The Oriental Miscellaneous), Shanghai, 25 February 1921, Vol 
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This showed that among various brands of socialism the dissemination of Marxism 
and Bolshevism was rather conspicuous. According to incomplete statistics, between 
1919 and 1920 out of around 400 Chinese journals there were over 200 journals which 
had socialist tendencies in varying degrees; 177 and from 1919 to 1921, over 300 
Marxist works, and works by Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders came off the press or 
were published in periodicals of various political inclinations. 178 The articles about 
Soviet Russia were too many to be counted. These publications "were widely 
circulated in all parts of the country and produced immense repercussions. "' 79 
The socialist publicity drive has been regarded as an important sign in the 
spread of Marxism-Leninism in China caused by the upsurge in socialist ideas after 
World War I and the October Revolution. This is true, yet the evidence provided 
above demonstrates that this string of such publications cannot be considered as a 
totally spontaneous tendency of the Chinese towards Marxism and Bolshevism or their 
"self-generated interest" in the Bolshevik Revolution without the factor of Soviet 
propaganda. 
Beyond doubt, the dissemination of information and doctrines of the 
Bolsheviks exerted a widespread influence on Chinese people. Chen Boxi wrote in an 
article published in 1920: 
Since the May 4th Movement last year, ... tens of publications on new 
thoughts have been published. The Chinese people then began to know 
about various deeds of the Lenin Government and the Bolsheviks in 
18, No 4. 
'77 Zhu Hanguo, et al., Zhonqquo qonqchandanq iianshe shi (History of the 
Establishment of the CCP), (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Press, 1991), p 5. 1713 Mirovitskaya, 'The First Responses in China to the Victory of the Great October 
Socialist Revolution', Far Eastern Affairs, (11978), No 1, p 155. 
179 Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Pa , Vol 1, p 128. 230 
Russia. Many of them therefore would welcome the advent of the 
Bolsheviks in China at once in order to put Bolshevism into practice. 180 
His statement was not a distortion of the facts. Even foreigners in China noticed the 
phenomenon. A Christian missionary H. T. Hotking found that Bolshevism was 
widespread among Chinese youth; 181 some others also observed that Bolshevism had 
taken "a firm hold of the mind of thousands of young would-be reformers in China. " 182 
Soviet propaganda served to influence people's ideology and it converted many 
radical intellectuals to Bolshevism as well as preparing the ground for the 
establishment of the CCP. To a certain extent, the Bolsheviks achieved the goals of 
their propaganda in China. 
180 Da guang bao (Bright Light Paper), (Hong Kong, 1920), quoted from LO 
Fangshang, Gerning zhi zaicli. 1 '31 A. Ivin, China and Russig, (Moscow, 1924), p 19. 182 FO 22 1,31 March 1920. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
WORKING TOWARDS UNITY AND ORGANISATION 
Organisation was the Bolsheviks' main weapon, as Lenin pointed out: "Our 
fighting method is organisation. We must organise everything, take everything into 
our own hands. "' For the Bolsheviks, organisation was also an important task in 
China and other parts of the East. In November 1919, Lenin told the Eastern 
revolutionaries that the task confronting them was "to arouse the working masses to 
revolutionary activity, to independent action and to organisation, regardless of the 
level they have reached. v12 As a first step, Lenin and the Comintern considered that in 
their work among the masses of the Eastern people, the Communists had to set up 
national revolutionary mass organisations of working people, which would be "non- 
party organisations". 3 Since the Chinese proletariat as a whole was rather weak at the 
time, the work of organisation was conducted firstly among radical intellectuals and 
then among the working class. 
In the following sections I will discuss some typical organisations which were 
formed around 1918 to 1920 and were related to the Bolsheviks or the foundation of 
the CCP. 
Section 1. Societies for the Study of Marxism and Socialism 
1 Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 23, p 133. 2 ibid., Vol 30, p 162. 
3 -A-716. Reznikov, 'The Strategy and Tactics of the Communist International in the 
National and Colonial Question', Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, p 153. 
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1. The Marxist Research Society 
Initial organisational activity relating to the birth of the CCP can be traced back 
to 1918. According to "A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party", Chen 
Duxiu engaged in "Communist Work" by "grouping around himself the best 
revolutionaries" as early as 1918.4 One may well object that the author emphasised 
only Chen Duxiu's role and did not mention Li Dazhao at all. The best explanation for 
this omission is that Li, as the person who drafted the "Brief History" deliberately 
chose not to push himself forward. With regard to organisational activities, the "Brief 
History" further indicates that "prominent individuals step forward, organise 
themselves into groups, and attract the best elements of society... " In fact this wasjust 
what Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu did. It is certain that from 1918 Li and Chen began 
to rally many radicals around them and organised various groups. It was from among 
these groups that the CCP emerged. In this loose sense Li and Chen can be said to 
have been engaged in Communist work since 1918. 
The first group to emerge from these activities was the Marxist Research 
Society, organised by Li Dazhao at Beijing University some time around the end of 
1918. Some historians, both in China and elsewhere, have accepted the emergence of 
this Society at this time as a historical fact. In the main, they have based their 
assertions on a Japanese book -Shina 
Kyosan Undo (The Chinese Communist 
Movement) published in 1933, which claimed that "in 1918, Li Dazhao, a Professor at 
Beijing University ... organised the Marxist Research Society. This was the precursor 
Quoted from Wilbur and How, CNSAC, p 48. 
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of the Communist groups in China. 0 More recently, however, some authoritative 
books on the history of the CCP published in China have denied or ignored this 
society's existence in 1918. For example, Zhongguo Gongchandang de Oishi Nian, 
which was written under the direction of the Central Committee of the CCP, asserts 
that "the first group in China to study and research Marxism" was the Marxist 
6 Research Society organised by Li Dazhao and Deng Zhongxia in March 1920. Dirlik 
provided the following explanation for this: "None of the later Communist recruits 
who were students at Beida [Beijing University] and participated in the indisputable 
Society for the Study of Marxist Theory established in 1920 can recall the existence of 
such a society in 1918. J He cited Zhang Guotao and Liu Renjing's memoirs as 
examples to confirm his views. But Dirlik and some other historians have neglected 
the recollections of 2hu Wushan, another Communist student at Beijing University 
during that time and a member of the Marxist Research Society in 1920. Zhu Wushan 
wrote in his "Recollections of the Marxism Research Society" that he remembered that 
Li Dazhao, together with another Beijing University professor Gao Yihan, had 
organised a society for researching Marxism in 1918. Initially, this society did not 
carry out much work and hence did not draw many revolutionary youths into its 
organisation. 8 Zhu's account is credible because he maintained a personal friendship 
5 Quoted from Sima Lu, Zhonclqonq de chengli yu chuqi huodong (The Founding and 
Initial Activities of the CCP), (Hong Kong: Zilian Press, 1974), p 252. 6 The CCP History Research Institute, Zhonqquo Gonqchandanq de qishl nian 
(Seventy Years of the CCP), (Beijing: The CCP History Press, 1991), p 19. Some other 
authorized works published recently, such as Zhonq-quo Gonqchandanq lishi (The 
History of the CCP), and Zhonqcluo Gonqchandanq lishi dacidian also hold the same 
point of view. 
7 Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism, p 44. 8 Gonqchan zhuvi xiaozu ' 
(The Communist Groups), (Beijing: The Press of the 
Historical Materials of the CCP, 1987), p 326. 
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with Li Dazhao for many years. Gao Yihan's memoirs are perhaps even more 
valuable. Gao recounted with certainty: 
Less than six months before May 4th [1919], Shou Chang organised a 
Marxist Research Society at Beijing University. We used the name of Ma- 
Er-Ke-Si instead of Marx, in order to befuddle the police. When the 
police authorities received reports that there was a society for studying [the 
theory of] "Malthus" (confused with Ma-Er-Ke-Si), they considered it to 
be a society for researching population theories, and therefore did not 
interfere in the affairs of our Society. This Society was initially open to 
the public, but soon became a secret society. Its internal activities 
consisted of studying Marxist theory, while its external work consisted of 
holding lectures. ... At the end of 
1918, we began publishing Meizhou 
Pinglun,... .9 
From Gao's recollection we can gather that the Society must have started in November 
or December 1918 before Meizhou Pinglun (Weekly Critic) started publication on 12 
December and that the participants were mainly Beijing University professors and 
lecturers, some of whom later became Meizhou Pinglun's editors and contributors, 
people such as Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Zhang Shenfu and Gao Yihan. From then on, 
translations of Marx's and Engels'works and articles on Marxism appeared in Meizhou 
pinglun and Xin gingnian. 
Another firm collateral evidence is from Dai Jitao, who wrote in Xingi pinglun 
of 7 September 1919: "Why was Meizhou Pinglun closed down? Didn't you see that 
newspapers say that they [the Government] tried to prohibit the dissemination of 'Ma- 
9 Gao Yihan, "Memoirs of Comrade Li Dazhao during the May 4th Period", Wusi 
vundonq huivilu, pp 340-41. 
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er-ge-shi-zhuyi' [Marxism]? " Dai's article actually reveals that there was a group of 
people related to Meizhou Pinglun had propagated Marxism before the middle of 
1919. In view of the fact that the members of the Marxist Research Society in Beijing 
had very close connections with Meizhou viniziun, it is hard to deny the existence of 
the Marxist Research Society in Beijing before 1919. It is not at all surprising why 
many radical students from Beijing University, such as Zhang Guotao, Liu Renjing 
and Luo Zhanglong were unaware of the existence of this Marxist Research Society. 
Although some students might well have attended the Society's lecture meetings, they 
would not have known who sponsored them. However, Qu Qiubai, then a student at 
the Beijing Russian Language Institute, remembered that he had attended meetings of 
the Marxist Research Society as a Chinese Marxist observed, towards the end of 1919 
or at the beginning of 1920.10 
In fact, the Marxist Research Society of 1920, which I shall deal with later, can be seen 
as a continuation of the society of the same name that had been organised in 1918. 
It is difficult to understand why Li Dazhao organised the Marxist Research 
Society at the end of 1918, when he understood so little about Marxism. Many 
scholars have demonstrated that there was no hint in Li's articles before then that he 
had any knowledge of Marxism. Hence, simply by reference to his ideas alone, it is 
difficult to believe that he could have established such a society on his own initiative at 
that time. What is more likely is that he received an impetus from elsewhere. It is 
worth noting that the establishment of the Marxist Research Society and the 
publication of Li Dazhao's famous articles "The Victory of Bolshevism" and "The 
Victory of the Common People" occurred almost simultaneously. In the latter article 
Li seemed to be applying Lenin's theory on imperialism to the analysis of the nature of 
the World War. Since Li could not possibly have read Lenin's works at this time, it is 
'0 Qu Qiubai, Duovu de hua (Surplus Words), quoted from Sima Lu, Zhonqqonci de 
chenqli vu chuqi huodonq. 
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reasonable to surmise that he learned some views from Soviet agents. Of course, this 
can be verified only by finding more historical evidence, but from the data available so 
far one can only draw the inference that the establishment of the Marxist Research 
Society in 1918 was connected with the efforts of Soviet agents as well as with Soviet 
Russia. 
Davidson-Houston, a western historian, writes: "Marxist ideas had already 
been introduced into China at the end of the World War by well-known scholars such 
as Chen Duhsiu and Li Tachao, who had contacts with Moscow. "" AsIhaveshown 
in Chapter 2, before Li organised the Marxist Research Society he had already been in 
contact with Soviet agents Ivanov and Polevoy, who worked under direction from 
Moscow. 
Since the Marxist Research Society in 1918 was a small group most of whose 
members were not really converted to Marxism, and since the scope of its activities 
was narrow, it did not make a notable impact on Chinese thinking. Nevertheless, the 
emergence of such a society in China was an event of a symbolic significance. 
11. The Socialist Studies Society 
In the second half of 1919, a Socialist Studies Society emerged in Beijing. It 
had a larger membership than the Marxist Research Society, but few historians have 
paid attention to it. None of the books on the subject of the origins of the CCP 
published in PRC have mentioned it. Certainly my knowledge of this society is still 
far from complete and further research is required. Nevertheless, various points can be 
made in connection with it. 
11 J. V. Davidson-Houston, Russia and China, From the Huns to Mao Tse-tung 
(London: Robert Hale Ltd, 1960) p 108. 
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First of all, it is necessary to make clear the background to the Society's 
formation. The Socialist Studies Society was set up by Zhang Ximan, a member of the 
GMD who had studied Russian at the Oriental Language Institute in Vladivostok in 
the period 1911-1914. Between 1917 and 1918, Zhang often visited some Bolsheviks 
in Harbin and said to them that Chinese should learn from the Russian Revolution. 12 
In winter 1918, Zhang went to the Russian Far East and Siberia to investigate the facts 
regarding the dispatch of Chinese troops to Siberia in accordance with the Sino- 
Japanese Mutual Defence Military Convention. According to Zhang Ximan's 
reminiscences, during his stay in Siberia, he wrote a letter to Cai Yuanpei, Chancellor 
of Beijing University, and Wan Fuhua, an old member of the Tongmeng Hui, 
suggesting that they organise a Socialist Studies Society in China. Cai and Wan 
approved the suggestion and sent a telegram inviting Zhang to return to Beijing as 
soon as possible, in order to make preparations for the setting up of the Society. In 
July 1919, Zhang went to Beijing and worked with Cai Yuanpei and Li Dazhao 13 
(Wan Fuhua had died before Zhang's return) to found the Socialist Studies Society. 
The purpose of organising the Society was to "learn the organisational methods and 
experiences of the great Russian October Revolution, in order to help to bring about 
the achievement of the Chinese national revolution. " 14 From the way in which the 
12 This is on the basis of the recollection of one of those Bolsheviks, Rilomsky; 
quoted from Zhang Xiaoman's letter (6 January 1998). 
13 Li Dazhao told Zhang Guotao in 1920 that before the May 4th Movement he had 
thought about organising a Socialist Research Society to study Marxism and a Russian Research Society to study the Russian Revolution. But he had never actually done 
anything about organising them. See Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Partv, Vol 1, p 94; This could not rule out the possibility that Ll joined the 
Socialist Studies Society after the May 4th Movement. 14 Zhang Ximan, Lishi huivi, p 126. 
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Socialist Studies Society was formed, we can see that Zhang Ximan's trip to Russia 
was the key to the foundation of the Society. 
During the period he studied the Russian language in Vladivostok Zhang read 
a few works by Plekhanov and Lenin and learned about the Russian Revolution of 
1905, but he did not become a socialist. Before his second trip to Russia, he had not 
the slightest intention of organising a Socialist Studies Society in China. So it is 
reasonable to suspect that the idea of founding such a society came from someone else. 
During his stay in Siberia and the Russian Far East in 1918,2hang obtained the 
Programme of the Russian Communist Party (B) and other important Bolshevik and 
Soviet documents and news about the Bolsheviks' activities. On his return Zhang 
conveyed the message to Sun Yatsen that the Bolsheviks intended to convene the first 
congress of international socialist parties in February 1919 and persuaded him to send 
a delegate of his Party to attend the Congress in Moscow. A recent article by Zhang 
Xiaoman (Zhang Ximan's daughter) reveals that Zhang Ximan made contacts with 
Russian revolutionaries during this visit. 15 These events suggest that Zhang might 
have received some ideas from the Bolsheviks, including that of establishing the 
Socialist Studies Society. 
The Socialist Studies Society was formed clandestinely in Beijing, probably 
between July and October 1919, some time after Zhang Ximan arrived in Beijing in 
July and before Xu Deheng left Beijing in October. Xu Deheng, a student of Beijing 
University, later remembered that he had attended a meeting of a group of the Socialist 
Studies Society at Beijing University before he left Beijing for France in October 
"9 Zhang Xiaoman (ed. ), Zhancl Ximan 'inian wenii, (Collected Articles in Memory of 
Zhang Ximan), (Beijing: The Chinese Culture and History Press, 1995), p 197. This 
book shows that Zhang Ximan was a secretary at the Soviet Russian Legation in 
Beijing in 1923 (p 428). 
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1919.16 Hence we can be sure that the Socialist Studies Society must at least have 
been in existence by October. 
At first the Society's meeting place was not fixed, but later it held regular 
meetings in the Library of Beijing University. The society's members worked 
carefully among the youth in order to avoid interference by the Beijing Government. 
Before long the Society expanded into other large cities and its membership increased. 
Zhang Ximan remembered that the members of the Society included: Li Dazhao, Chen 
Duxiu, Chen Guyuan, Fan Tiren, Xu Liuji, Guo Mengliang, Yi Keyi, Yi Junzuo, Meng 
Shouchun, Zhu Qianzhi, Fei Juetian, Deng Zhongxia, Zhang Guotao, Qu Qiubai, Mao 
Zedong and Zhou Enlai. 17 Since its members held different political views and 
convictions, there were within its ranks splinter groups of varying persuasions. For 
example, one could cite the Society for Studying Guild Socialism, the Society for 
Studying Syndicalism and the Society for Studying Anarchism. In addition, some of 
those who followed the Bolsheviks formed a Marxist Studies Society in Beijing in 
March 1920 and a Russian Research Society in Changsha in August 1920. Although 
the Socialist Studies Society was thus fractured along ideological lines, nominal unity 
was maintained. At the end of 1920 its main branch at Beijing University made itself 
known to the public and issued its general regulations, in which its aim was described 
as "mustering the comrades who believe in socialism and have the ability to help each 
other with researching and spreading socialism. " It further defined its main methods 
of work as "the translation and compilation of a series of books on socialism and the 
16 Xu Deheng, 'The 60th Anniversary of the May 4th Movement', Wenshi ziliao 
2 xuan 1, (1979), No 61, p 18. iý, *i 
Zhang Ximan, Lishi huivi, p 144. 
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publication of treatises on socialism. "18 The public notice gave a list of the names of 
Society members. Many of these were mentioned by Zhang Ximan in his 
recollections, but nearly all the persons in the list with the exception of Li Dazhao 
were in fact inclined to Guild Socialism and Syndicalism. Maybe some of the 
members who joined the Marxist Studies Society in March 1920, had broken away 
from the Socialist Studies Society. 19 In 1921, the Socialist Studies Society ceased to 
exist as its members moved on ideologically. At any rate, the Society completed its 
mission as a transitional organisation and helped to bring about the birth of the CCP. 
Section 2. Mass Organisations Which Emerged during the May 4th Period 
Many historians have noticed that the Chinese Communist Party's early groups 
in 1920 took shape around a national network of previously existing radical 
associations which had come into being in the course of the May 4th movement. 
These radical organisations, whose members had believed in various ideologies, later 
came to serve as the nuclei of the Communist organisation. Further investigation is 
required into how the various radical groups scattered in different geographical 
locations came to be unified into certain nation-wide associations; how such 
associations' national network was used as the basis of the first Communist 
organisations; and whether the unification and conversion was a spontaneous process 
or not. 
"' Befling daxue xueshen-q rikan (Beijing University Students' Daily), 4 December 
1920. 
19 A possible reason why LI Dazhao remained in the Socialist Studies Society was 
that he intended to unite more socialists. 
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1. Some Societies Founded in Beijing before the May 4th Demonstration 
It is an accepted fact that Beijing University was the cradle of Chinese 
Communism. Around the May 4th period many radical student societies were formed 
at Beijing University and some nation-wide youth organisations were started up by 
people based there. Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu played important roles in the 
formation of some of these organisations. 
In the summer of 1918 Li Dazhao supported the students of Beijing University 
and of some other universities and colleges in Beijing in setting up the Students' 
Patriotic Association, which was a nation-wide organisation initiated by the Returned 
Students' National Salvation League. The catalyst for the establishment of this 
organisation was the Sino-Japanese Joint Military Defence Convention. In January 
1919 the Association's organ Guomin (The Citizens) started publication and its main 
aims were to propagate anti-imperialism and to oppose the warlords' government. The 
Society of Citizens' Magazine was set up in October of the previous year, and most of 
its members were students at Beijing University with Li Dazhao as their supervisor. In 
December 1918, a famous literary society, the Renaissance Magazine Society, which 
was formed by some Beijing University students, such as Luo Jialun, Fu Sinian and 
Kang Baiqing, invited Li Dazhao to became one of its advisors. Li set aside a room in 
the University Library for the Society to use; Chen Duxiu, dean of the Faculty of 
Literature, also lent the Society important support. 20 In January 1919 the Renaissance 
Magazine started publishing Xin chao. In March 1919, with Li Dazhao's help, some 
Beijing University students, such as Deng Zhongxia, Huang Rikui and Xu Deheng, 
20 Fu Sinian, 'The Renaissance's Review and Prospects', An chao, (1919), Vol 2, No 
1, pp 199-200. 
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founded the Common People's Educational Lecturing Corps, which was affiliated to 
the Students' Patriotic Association. When the Corps set up a school for railway 
workers at Changxindian, Li Dazhao, with Polevoy, Li Xinbai and other teachers at 
I 
Beijing University, donated money to it. 
Most students belonging to the above organisations were very active in the 
May 4th Movement. The Society of the Citizens Magazine was an important 
organisation which initiated the May 4th demonstration. On May 3rd 1919, it was this 
Society that convoked a meeting of students of Beijing University and student 
representatives of thirteen other universities and colleges, and at this meeting the May 
4th demonstration was decided on. Many members of the Society, such as Xu 
Deheng, Duan Xipeng, Huang Rikui, Meng Shouchun and Xia Xiufeng played active 
roles in the demonstration. 
Li Dazhao took an important part in directing the movement. According to 
Luo Zhanglong, "On the eve of the May 4th Movement the radical elements 
represented by Li Dazhao had already formed an organised power, which was the 
antecedent for the Marxist Studies Society [in 1920]; they initiated and led the May 4th 
Movement ideologically and organisationally. , 21 Zhang Guotao gave a detailed 
account of how Li Dazhao directed students during the Movement: "In the 1919 
summer vacation, Li regularly went to his office in the Library, and I saw him more 
often than anyone else. Not only did he give me many valuable suggestions, but he 
often drafted important documents for me. He also did his best to co-ordinate the 
views of teachers and students, while maintaining constant contact with the press. 42 
21 Luo Zhanglong, 'Recollections of the Marxist Studies Society at Beijing University', 
Yida gianhou, Vol 3, pp 187-8. 
Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Pa , Vol 1, p 67. 243 
In 1920 when Li became a professor at Beijing University, he tried to exert more 
influence on the students. No other teachers at the University lent a hand to students' 
organisations or played such an important part in the movements as Li did. Zhang 
Shizhao, a former professor at Beijing University and Li's immediate predecessor as 
Director of the Library, said of Li that "Shouchang assumed the directorship of the 
Library first, and became a professor afterwards ... . While the democratic movement 
in Beijing was germinating, Shouchang aspired to get a position at Beijing University, 
in order to direct, instruct and control ... . Having entered Beijing University ... 
Shouchang behaved as if he were running an army ... and made banners and flags 
change their colours. , 23 Zhang was not exaggerating when he wrote this, since Li 
Dazhao spared no efforts to do organising work. In April 1919, in a letter to Hu Shi, 
who was then an advisor to the Renaissance Society, Li expressed the idea that so long 
as members of these progressive societies headed for the light, it would not matter if 
they held different views. 24 In such a way, Li Dazhao grouped around himself many 
young radicals in Beijing. 
Li Dazhao's organisational activities were not confined to Beijing. In June 
1918 Li Dazhao participated in the establishment of the Young China Association, 
which was a nation-wide organisation. The Young China Society was formed at a 
time when large numbers of Chinese students were returning from Japan in protest 
against the Joint Military Defence Convention between China and Japan. Before their 
return, some of these students, such as Zeng Qi, Zhang Mengjiu and Lei Meisheng, 
23 Zhang Cixi, Li Dazhao xianshenq zhuan (Biography of Mr. Li Dazhao), (Beijing, 
1951), p 3; Since Zhang Shizhao knew Li well, he was invited to write the preface to the 
above book. 
24 Li Dazhao wenii (Selected Writings of Li Dazhao), (Beijing: People's Press, 1959), 
Vol 2, p 936. 
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had dreamed of founding an organisation similar to "Young Italy". On arrival in 
China, they frequently consulted Chen Yusheng, Li Dazhao, Zhou Taixuan and Wang 
Guangqi about this plan. At first they could not make up their minds whether to 
establish a political party or a society. Zhang Mengjiu recalled that they felt that 
building a party was a major undertaking, and moreover, they followed differing 
ideologies: Li Dazhao and Chen Yusheng were inclined towards Soviet Russia and 
favoured Communism, while the others favoured anarchism and narrow nationalism 
[Guojia zhuyi]; therefore, they decided to form an association as a compromise. 25 
The Young China Association came into being in July 1918. Since the 
Association's head was an anarchist, Wang Guangqi, Li Dazhao's original plan was 
thus not realised. As he told Zhang Guotao later, he had hoped that this Association 
would shoulder the responsibility for publicising Marxism, but some of its members 
did not believe in Marxism. 26 Nevertheless, after the formation of the Young China 
Association, Li Dazhao tried his best to exert an influence on the thinking of other 
members of the Association. According to Li Huang, a member of this Association, 
from about November 1918 Li Dazhao "began to speak approvingly of the Communist 
Revolution in Russia, and believed it to be of more significance than the French 
Revolution of 1789, for the Russian Communist Party supported the liberation 
movements of small and weak nations. ... [therefore] it was better to learn from the 
Russian Communist Party. , 27 When expressing such opinions, Li Dazhao was 
challenged by Wang Guangqi, however, his views seemed to have been accepted by 
some other members of the Association, including Mao Zedong. From October 1918 
25 Zhang Mengjiu, 'Reminiscences of the Young China Association', Zhuanji wenxue, 
Vol 53, No 1, p 144. 
26 Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Pa , Vol 1, p 94. 27 Li Huang, Xuedun shi huivilu, pp 46-7. 
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to February 1919, Mao worked at Beijing University Library as an assistant librarian 
under the direction of Li Dazhao; he joined the Young China Association after Li 
recommended him to the group. Mao later acknowledges the influence of Li by telling 
Edgar Snow, the American journalist: "Under Li Ta-chao as assistant librarian at 
Peking National University, I had rapidly developed towards MarxiSM. "28 Although 
there is no proof that Mao was converted to Marxism until late 1920, it remains clear 
that Li Dazhao's words left a deep impression on him, so that he decided to learn from 
Russia. In a "Questionnaire of the Future Causes and Careers of the Members of the 
Young China Association", Mao indicated that he intended to study in Russia for at 
least five years . 
29 Li Dazhao also tried to win over Wang Guangqi and others. 
Sometimes, he invited Wang to his office, 30 and accompanied by Chen Duxiu and Gao 
Yihan, visited Wang and Zhao Shiyan's dwelling place - Penglu - to talk with them. 31 
The Association published its own journals Shaonian Zhongguo (Young 
China) and Shaonian shiiie (Youth World). Li Dazhao was director of the editorial 
department of Shaonian Zhongguo, which mainly published members' articles 
reflecting their various beliefs and views. Shaonian shiiie carried a large number of 
articles on Soviet Russia and the international labour movement. An article by Zong 
Zhihui published in Shaonian Zhongjyuo in December 1919 stressed that it was 
necessary to "unite the youth over the whole of China in order to form a large 
organisation ... to wage a revolution ... to break down the oppression of all reactionary 
28 Snow, Red Star over China, p 154. 
29 Quoted from Zhuanii wenxue, Vol 35, No 2, p 145. 30 Fu Sinian, 'Recollecting Wang Guang-qi, Wang Guanc a iinian ce lqi xianshenc 
(Memorial Book for Mr. Wang Guanggi), (Beijing, 1936), p 55. 3' Guo Youshou, 'Wang Guangqi in penglu', ibid, p 28. Zhao Shiyan was the 
President of Sichuan Students' Union in Beijing, and was also an anarchist then. 
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forces. 02 One of the Young China Association's slogans was "small groups which can 
forrn a great union". In actual deeds, the Young China Association played an 
important role in uniting radical youth groups scattered in different cities. This 
Association had connections with many youth organisations and drew key members of 
those organisations in as its own members. In this way, the Young China Association 
became a nation-wide organisation with more than one hundred members, who were 
dispersed around Shanghai, Tianjin, Wuhan, Changsha, Nanjing, Chengdu and Xian, 
as well as Beijing. Some of its Beijing members also belonged to the Society of the 
Citizens' Magazine, the Renaissance Society and the Common People's Education 
Lecture Corps, while its members in other cities were leading elements in the New 
Citizens Studies Society in Changsha, the Coexistence Society in Wuhan, the 
Awakening Society in Tianjin and the Society of the Sunday Magazine in Chengdu. 
Later, nearly all of them attended the Youth Labour-Leaming Mutual Aid Corps in 
various cities. 
As one of the leaders of the Young China Association, Li Dazhao did all he 
could to exert his influence on other societies and to bring them together. In 
September 1919, just a few days after the Awakening Society was founded, Li Dazhao 
went to Tianjin to discuss the October Revolution and Marxism with the members of 
the Society there, and to establish a relationship with Zhou Enlai and other Tianjin 
radicals. Later, Li Dazhao invited several members of the Awakening Society to 
Beijing to talk with them. Zhang Zhi, a member of the Young China Association, may 
have been the intermediary between Li and the Awakening Society, because Zhang 
was editor-in-chief of Nankai rikan (Nankai Daily), which was the journal of Nankai 
32 Shapnian Zhonqguo, (Beijing, March 1920), Vol 1, No 5. 
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Secondary School. Most members of the Awakening Society belonged to the School. 
Both 2hang Zhi and Li Dazhao had close contacts with Soviet agents. Li Dazhao also 
attended the joint meeting of the Young China Association, the Dawn Light Society, 33 
the Humanity Society, 34 the Awakening Society and the Youth Labour-Learning 
Mutual Corps in Beijing in August 1920 and told the participants that "every 
organisation must have a clear ideology. 05 Two days later the representatives of these 
organisations held a meeting at Beijing University Library and decided to form an 
organisation named "Reform and Unite". The aim of this new organisation was to 
, 36 unite organisations in various locations "in order to realise social refonn. ' 
At the same time, Li Dazhao urged the Young China Association to tum in the 
direction he desired. At a meeting of the Young China Association on the day after the 
above-mentioned Joint meeting, Li Dazhao emphasised: "We have researched 
earnestly for two years. It is necessary now to clarify the doctrine of our 
Association. 07 What is of particular relevance to my theme is that Li Dazhao, Deng 
Zhongxia, Gao Junyu and Huang Rikui, who had by then become the members of the 
Communist Group in Beijing, attended the Congress of the Young China Association 
in Nanjing in July 1921 and urged the Association to adopt Marxism and Bolshevism. 
Because of this, Li did not attend the Founding Congress of the CCP, which was also 
33 The Dawn Light Society was made up of Song Jie, Ou Shiying (Qu Qiubai's uncle), 
Geng Jizhi, Zheng Zhenduo and so on. They were editors of Shucluang (The Dawn 
Light). 
,4 Its members were the editors of Rendao (Humanity), the predecessor of which was 
Xin Shehui (The New Society). Qu ubal was editor of both magazines. 7"'- -Cen ýiaocen, 'Recollections of the May 4th Movement in Tianjin and the 
Awakening Society, Tianiin wenshi ziliao (Selected Materials on the Culture and History 
of Tianjin), (Tianjin, 1979), No 3, p 23. 
'16 Zhou Enlai nianpu (A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai's Life), (Beijing, 1989). 37 -F-7--- 
Ulvuan tonqxun, (The Circular Letters of the Members of the Young China 
Association), (1922), Vol 2, No 11. 
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convened in July 1921. This showed how much importance Li attached to the 
conversion of the Young China Association's members to Bolshevism. However, in 
the end, the Young China Association could not resolve to accept a single ideology 
and it therefore split into several factions. But this still left a considerable number who 
became key members of the CCP, including Li Dazhao, Deng Zhongxia, Huang Rikui, 
Gao Junyu, Zhao Shiyan, Liu Renjing, Zhang Guotao, Mao Zedong, Yun Daiying, 
Zhang Wentian, Shen Zemin and Yang Xianjiang. 
The Young China Association finally dissolved. Nevertheless it was 
successful as a nation-wide progressive youth organisation which "united with other 
societies to form a joint front", and "played a certain role in the May 4th Movement", 
as Xu Deheng remarked. He went on, "it was possible to form fighting forces during 
the May 4th period thanks to the unity of various forces; at first the unity of [youth] 
within Beijing University, and then the unity of the youth of the whole country. "38 
In his book on Chinese Communism, Dirlik noted the sense of unity during the 
May 4th period, which had no common ideology as its basis; consequently he only 
sees the "patriotic reasons" involved in the yearning for unity. 39 He failed to see other 
reasons and forces which motivated it. Xue Deheng pointed out: "It was Comrade Li 
Dazhao who brought about the unity,, 40 Li's efforts in organising cannot be seen as 
merely his personal actions intended only to strengthen the patriotic movement; they 
also contributed to developing Communist organisations as "A Brief History of the 
CCP" indicates: "The work of the three years from 1918-1920 was concentrated on 
313 Xu Deheng, 'The 60th Anniversary of the May 4th Movement', Wenshl ziliao xuan*i, 
(1979), No 61, p 18. 
39 Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism, p 258, p 265. 40 Xu Deheng, 'The 60th Anniversary of the May 4th Movement', Wenshi ziliao xuanii, 
No 61, p 18. 
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grouping together individual revolutionaries and organising them into small units 
capable of serving as [Communist] nuclei at different places. "1 According to this 
explanation, several radical societies, which were organised by or had connections 
with Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu around the May 4th Movement, can be classified into 
the category of such nuclei, from which the first batch of Chinese Communists were 
produced. In a sense, it is right to say that the May 4th Movement provided the future 
Communist movement with cadres. There is thus also no difficulty in comprehending 
why some early CCP leaders regarded the Young China Association, the New Youth 
Society, the Sunday Review Society, the New Citizens'Study Society, the Awakening 
Society, the Coexistence Society and the New China Society 42 as "having close 
connections to the birth of the CCpto43 and as "the [original] cells of the CCPII . 
44 
11. The National Students' Union, Trade Unions and the National Federation of 
All Circles of the People 
The National Students' Union, which was brought into existence during the 
high tide of the May 4th Movement, mainly originated from the Students Salvation 
Association, which, in turn, was initiated by the Returned Students National Salvation 
League. Soon after establishing its headquarters in Shanghai on 12 May 1918, the 
League dispatched teams to Beijing, Tianjin, Guangzhou and other cities to contact 
students there. As a result, the Students Patriotic Association was organised in Beijing 
and Tianjin. During the summer vacation, the Association established ties with 
41 Quoted from Wilber and How, CNSAC, P 51. 
42 The New China Society here may refer to the Society which edited New China; 
around the same time, Kang Baiqing and Meng Shouchun, who were members of the 
Young China Association, organised a New China Society. 43 LI Lisan, 'Report on the History of the CCF, ZDBX, p 211. 44 Qu Qiubai, 'Outline of the History of the CCP', ibid., p 200. 
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student organisations in Tianjin, Jinan, Wuhan, Jiujiang, Nanjing and Shanghai. At the 
end of July, Shanghai students also held a meeting about organising the Students' 
Patriotic Association, which was attended by representatives of the Associations of 
Beijing and Tianjin. In this way, the Students' National Salvation Association (the 
name was changed from the Students' Patriotic Association) was finally founded on 
10th October, the National Day of 1918, and it was the start of uniting the students 
organisations throughout China. The Students' National Salvation Association 
commenced publication of its organ Guomin, which worked in concert with the 
Returned Students National Salvation League's organ Jiuguo Ribao (The National 
Salvation Daily), which started publication in Shanghai in July 1918, to undertake 
propaganda work against the Japanese aggression. 
R. Mirovitskaya believes that the students who participated in the anti- 
Japanese movement before the May 4th demonstration were inspired by the October 
Revolution and armed themselves with some of the ideas and principles of the 
Revolution. She gives the following illustrations: the students decided to make use of 
methods "to try to arouse the people" and "to establish contacts with all the strata of 
the people"; that they seemed have understood the importance of unity in action; and 
that their press publicised the foreign policy principles and practices of the Bolsheviks, 
and presented Soviet Russia as an ally in the struggle to liberate China from Japanese 
rule. 45 Her argument is not groundless. A circular issued by one branch of the 
Students National Salvation Association, the New Society of Guangdong, definitely 
stated that the Society had for its object the establishment of a Soviet Government in 
China, supported by the working and trading classes. The circular claimed further: 
45 Mirovitskaya, 'The First Responses in China to the Victory of the Great October 
Socialist Revolution', Far Eastern Affairs, (1978), No 1, pp 148-9. 
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The recent movement among the students in Beijing was caused by the 
influence of recent events in Russia, and the students have taken one step 
further in the direction of Bolshevism. ... As announced by the students, 
both the Northern and Southern governments will be disowned and a 
Soviet government will be set up. 46 
This showed that the October Revolution and Soviet Russia exerted a certain influence 
on some student organisations formed before May 4th 1919, such as the National 
Salvation Association, as well as on the May 4th Movement itself. 
In June 1919, the National Students' Union was founded in Shanghai on the 
same political and organisational basis as the National Salvation Association and under 
the auspices of the Shanghai Students' Union. The establishment of the latter on II 
May was inspired by the May 4th demonstration and was also encouraged by a 
member of the Returned Student National Salvation Ixague, Li Guo, who suggested 
that the students in Shanghai should show their power through a general strike. 47 The 
first statement of the Shanghai Students' Union declared its desire to organise a 
national students' union. On June Ist a preparatory meeting attended by student 
representatives from Beijing, Tianjin, Nanjing and Shanghai was held at the Global 
(Huanqiu) Chinese Students Union's building, which was also the temporary office of 
the Shanghai Students'Union. 
Having founded its headquarters in Shanghai, the National Students Union's 
network was set up all over the country on a grand scale and there were about 193 
affiliated local student unions. The president of the Union was Duan Xipeng, a student 
46 FO 228/3211, September 1919; FO 405/228, Enclosure 2 in No 169. 
47 Cheng Tianfang, 'Four Years at the Li's Temple', Zhuanii wenxue, Vol 1, No 7, p 
26; Liu Yongming, Quomin dangren vu Wusi yunclong (The Members of the GMD and 
the May 4th Movement), (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1990), p 160. 
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of Beijing University and a member of the Students' National Salvation Association; 
the vice-president was He Baoren, who also held the post of president of the Shanghai 
Students' Union simultaneously. The leading bodies of the Union were the Pingyi Bu 
(the Presidium) and the Zhixing Bu (the Executive Committee). The former 
committee consisted of 18 representatives of local student unions and overseas 
students; the latter had 6 people from various major cities. Some historians have 
considered that the National Students' Union was so "well-organised" that no other 
organisations or parties, even the GMD, could compare with it. 48 Vilensky also valued 
the National Students' Union highly, which, he said, "had strict discipline and was 
founded on the basis of a rigid system of centralisation. , 49 
The National Students' Union played an important role in leading the anti- 
Japanese and anti-warlords movement. As a strong permanent organisation, it 
continually extended the scope of its activities and changed its front to undertake what 
it regarded as its patriotic and revolutionary tasks. 
The Bolsheviks, of course, tried to make use of this important organisation. 
With regard to this, K. Fuse remarked: "It goes without saying that the Bolsheviki left 
no stone untumed for shaking hands with the Federation [The National Students' 
Union] in proceeding with their policy in China. " But he believed that the Bolsheviks 
50 
approached the Union from 1922 onwards. In fact, during the time when the Union 
was still under preparation, the Russian Bolsheviks already had their hands on it. 
Around this time, the Global Chinese Students Union's office, where the preparatory 
4" Li Jiannong, Zhonqquo iinbainian zhenqzhi shi (Chinese Political History in the last 
Hundred Years), (Taibel: Commercial Press, 1968), Vol 2, p 606; LO Fangshang, 
Geming zhi zaiqi, p 414. 
49 Vilensky, 'On the Eve of the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', Die 
Kommunistische Internationale, (Petrograd, 1921), No 16. 
50 Fuse, Soviet Policy in the Orient, p 286. 
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work for the National Students Union was being carried out, was sometimes visited by 
Sokolsky, who was once found talking with the Shanghai Students Union president, 
He Baoren and the Global Chinese Students'Union leader Zhu Shaoping, 51 who both 
played an important role in the creation of the National Students' Union. Although 
Sokolsky was not a Bolshevik, he acted as an intermediary between some Chinese 
radicals and the left-wing Russians and Bolsheviks. These Russians tried to enlist 
some Chinese organisations' support in their protest against Japanese action in 
Siberia. 52 A delegate from the Russian Far East even joined the Presidium of the 
National Student Union. 53 In February 1920, the Russian Students' Union of 
Vladivostok sent an appeal to the Shanghai Students' Union, saying: "We extend the 
hand of friendship to the Chinese students who form the vanguard of the protectors of 
the rights of their mother country, who are fighting against the foreigners; ... Demand 
of your Government most resolutely the withdrawal of their troops from Russian 
territory and form a solid foundation for the construction of a new life. " The appeal 
ended with the slogan "Long live the world-wide fire of revolution !,, 54 
After the expiry of the first term of the Union's leading body, some persons 
who had direct or indirect relations with the Comintern agents became important 
leaders of the National Students'Union. Yao Zuobin was one of them and he actively 
51 'Shanghai Municipal Council Police Report', dated 7 June 1919, Ouoted from Wus! 
yundong zai Shanghai shiliao xuanii (The Selected Materials on the May 4th Movement 
in Shanghai), (Shanghai: People's Press, 1960), p 844. 
52 'The General Police Officer of the Shanghai Concession to the British Consul 
General, 7 June 1919', Wusi ai-quo yundonq (The May 4th Patriotic Movement), Vol 2, 
pp 311-12; George E. Sokolsky, The Tinder Box of Asia (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1933), p 321; FO 405/228, No 157. 
53 Vilensky, 'On the Eve of the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', Die 
Kommunistische Internationale, (1921), No 16. 
54 FO 228/3214,1 April 1920. 
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directed the student movement. 55. On I March 1920, several Russian Bolsheviks were 
found at the head office of the National Students' Union talking with Yao Zuobin, Xu 
Deheng and others. 56 As a representative of the Union, Yao Zuobin reached 
Vladivostok in May 1920 to discuss with the Bolshevik representative of the local 
committee of the Dal'buro of the RCP the possibilities of aiding the Chinese labour 
movement and helping Chinese students to study in Soviet Russia. 57 The Bolsheviks 
and their followers also tried to approach some other key members of the Union. In 
the spring of 1920, Voitinsky invited the leaders of both the National Students' Union 
and the Shanghai Students' Union Di Kan, Cheng Tianfang and He Shizhen, to his 
house to find out about the situation of the student movement and to urge the students 
to bring about social revolution. 58 Around the same time, Chen Duxiu asked Gong 
Debai, the President of the National Students' Union's Presidium, to his house and 
unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Gong to become a Communist adherent. 59 
Recently published Comintem archives show that the East Asian Secretariat did a lot 
of work to exert direct influence upon student organisations, especially the National 
Students' Union and tried to take them under their control, and by this way, they could 
"give ideological and organisational leadership to the revolutionary student 
movement. "60 
55 Cf. Ishikawa Yoshihiro, 'History of the Phony Chinese Communist Party', Hvofu 
(Strong Wind), (Kyodo, December 1994), No 30. 
56 'Lu Yongxiang to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 13 March 1920', Wusi aiquo 
vundonq dangan ziliao, pp 618-9. 
" Kartunova, 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of China, 1920-1922', 
Problemv Dal'neqo Vostoka, (1973), No 1. 
" Cheng Tianfang, 'Four Years at the Li's Temple', Zhuanji wenxue, Vol 1, No 7, p 27. 
59 Gong Debai huivilu (Gong Debai's Reminiscences), Hong Kong: News World 
Press, 1963, Vol 1, p 50. 
60 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 40, p 54. 
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During the high tide of the May 4th Movement, Chinese labourers took part in 
the movement by way of strikes, boycotts and demonstrations in many big cities. 
Trade unions and other workers' organisations mushroomed throughout China. It was 
reported that there were 26 unions in Guangzhou and over fifty in Shanghai by the end 
of 19 19.61 In Shanghai, China! s industrial centre, many such organisations' names 
were preceded with "Zhonghua" or "Quanguo" and claimed to represent labourers or 
industrial circles in the whole of China. Among them the important ones were: the 
All-China Industrial Federation, 62 the Chinese Trade Union (later the General Society 
63 64 of Chinese Trade Unions), the Chinese Labour Party, the Chinese Labourers' 
Alliance '65 and the All-China Society for Labour Harmony and Advance. 
66 In fact, 
61 Lowe Chuan-hua, Facing Labour Issues in China, (London, 1934), p 39. 
62 In February 1919, the Federation was organized by Feng Ziyou, Cao Yabo and 
Huang Jiemin, who were all members of the GMD. Huang and a key member of the 
Federation, Li Danian, were also members of the Returned Students' National Salvation 
League. 
63 It was set up by Chen Guoliang, a representative of workers returned from France, 
and some workers' representatives of other industrial and service trades, with the help 
of Chen Jianai, a member of the GMD. The first preparatory meeting was held on 28 
May 1919. The first president was Chen Kong, who was followed by Chen Jianal. 
Many former members of the Labour Party joined the Union. 
64 The Chinese Labour Party was established by Xu Qiwen and Huan Hui in 1912 
with Zhu Zhiyao as its president and Sun Yat-sen as honorary leader. It had about 
seventy branches before it was dissolved under Yuan Shikai's order of suppression. In 
June 1919, Shen Ruoxian, an anarchist and a member of the GMD, and some workers 
re-established the Labour Party by publishing a declaration. But the revived Party 
seemed to have no real organisation, and itjust issued a few leaflets. On 8 March 1919 
Shen Ruoxian wrote a letter to Jiefanq Vu qaizao concerning the strike of rickshawmen, 
in which he warned the capitalists not to oppress the workers too hard, otherwise the 
fate of the Russian capitalists would befall them. 
65 It was organised in July 1919 by members of the National Salvation League, such 
as Yan Juewu, Tan Xiajun, Fei Zhemin, Shen Ruoxian, and Zhao Shilong. Most of 
them were anarchists. According to Fei Zhemin, the formation of the Federation was 
actually initiated by Shen Ruoxian, who was mainly responsible for reestablishment of 
the Labour Party. Shen later became a Communist. See Fei Zhemin, Can'ia geming de 
huivi (11919-25) (Recollections of My Revolutionary Career, 1919-25), (The Posthumous 
Manuscripts of Fei Zhemin, collated by Fei Minsheng in 1980, unpublished). 66 This Society, which was founded in July 1919, was created by important members 
of the GMD, such as Hu Hanmin, Dai Jitao, Liao Zhongkal, Zhu Zhixin, Cao Yabo and 
Huang Jiemin. It was very active in enlightening labourers and in working for labourers' 
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those organisations could hardly be called labourers' organisations or trade unions, 
since most of them were controlled by non-proletarian elements and even members of 
the bourgeoisie. For example, Cao Yabo of the Industrial Federation and Zhu 
Zhuowen, a key member of the Labour Party, were factory owners; Wu Canhuang of 
the Industrial Federation was the manager of a newspaper. Moreover, some 
organisations did not consist of real workers. For example, most members of the 
Industrial Federation were foremen; the Chinese Labour Union, the revived Chinese 
Labour Party and the Chinese Labour Federation even had no constituent labour 
unions or workers' organisations at the basic level, and were therefore just empty 
boxes; 67 and some were actually phoney unions concerned with publicity. 
From 5 June 1919, massive workers' political strikes, which were directed 
against the Japanese and the pro-Japanese Beijing Government, were staged in 
Shanghai. But it was not a totally spontaneous movement by the labourers: most of 
the strikes were the result of organised actions which were instigated and "utilised by 
9 68 students and politicians'. After careful research, Jean Chesneaux, a Marxist scholar, 
who studied the Chinese labour movement during this period, pointed out: "At first 
glance, these strikes give the impression of having been sudden and spontaneous. In 
each concern, they were initiated by the zealous few who persuaded the rest to follow 
welfare and even planned to set up a school and a hospital for labourers. The source 
of their financial support aroused suspicion. Cf. Ma Chaojun, Zhong-guo laogong 
yundong shi (History of the Labour Movement in China, (Taibel, 1959), p 139. 
67 This was the comment by a contemporary labour leader, Ma Chaojun, on the 
Chinese Labour Union. In his opinion, other similar organisations were also merely 
nominal. See Ma Chao-chun, History of the Labour Movement in China, (Taibei, 1955) 
P 111. 
6" Cai Hesen, 'The Historical Development of the CCP', (1926), ZDBX, p 5. 
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SUit. "69 The famous sociologist Chen Da also considered that the strikes were 
"infected with the new tide of thoughts or were made use of by some persons. "70 
Between 1919 and 1920, several leaders of important Chinese labour 
organisations had close ties with the Bolsheviks. They included Chen Jianai 71 the 
president of the General Society of the Chinese Trade Union, Cao Yabo and Huang 
Jiemin of the All-China Industrial Federation and the All-China Society for Labour 
Harmony and Advance, Zhu Zhuowen, who was then in charge of the GMD's labour 
activities and was called by Sun Yat-sen a "labour movement specialiSt"72, Xia 
Qifeng, 73 the president of the Returned Chinese Labourers' Association, Cao Futang, 74 
the promoter of the Ship and Godown Workers'Union, and Fei Zhemin, 75 one of the 
founders of the Chinese Labour Federation. 
According to a Shanghai Police Commander's report of December 1919, a 
Bolshevik arrived in Shanghai to contact some of the leaders of the Chinese Labour 
Party and the All-China Society for Industrial Harmony and Advance, Sun Wen (Yat- 
sen), Chen Jianai, Cao Zixiang and Yu Yalong, in order to organise an All-China 
Peasants'and Workers' Council. The Council's draft constitution stated that it strove to 
establish the direct rule of peasants and workers, and that the central and local powers 
69 Chesneaux, The Chinese Labour Movement, p 152. 
70 International Labour Review, 1927, No 3. 
71 Several Bolshevik agents contacted Chen. Cf. A document of the State Council 
kept in the China Second Archives, quoted from Zhonq_quo wuzhen-qfu zhuyi he 
Zhonqciuo Shehui dang, p 84; 'Note from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs', 30 April 1920, ZEGXSL. 
72 Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, p 83. Zhu Zhuowen 
had good terms with Lizerovitch. 
73 Xia Qifeng was a journalist and went to Paris to report the news of the Paris Peace 
Conference. In spring 1920, he reached Shanghai via Siberia with a Russian Bolshevik 
and two Koreans. See Scalapino and Lee, The Origins of Korean Communism, p 14. 
74 In the British archives, this man's name is given as "Tsang Foh Daung", who had 
close relations with Stopany; FO 228/3214,4 March 1920. 
75 Fei Zhemin, Caniia gerning de huivi (1919-25). 
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must be controlled by the Peasants' and Workers' Councils; all lands, forests, mines 
and others must be turned over to the whole society in order to prevent the exploitation 
of man by man; the Council decided to arm working people and form a national army 
of volunteers; during the period of transition, the Union aimed to establish a dictatorial 
government in order to destroy capitalism and to realise socialism. 76 It is clear that the 
so-called "Peasants' and Workers' Council" was a synonym for Soviet, and its 
constitution was brimming with Bolshevik language. 
The foregoing evidence shows that the Bolsheviks had a hand in several labour 
organisations. 
Not confining their activities to students' and workers' organisations, the 
Bolsheviks targeted all circles. In a letter to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Lu 
Yongxiang, the Chinese officer in charge of Songjiang and Shanghai, reported in 
March 1920 that about twenty Bolsheviks had come to Shanghai and attempted to 
make contact with Chinese in industrial, agricultural, commercial, educational and 
military circles and they had already got in touch with several delegates to the National 
Federation of All Circles of the People. 77 
The National Federation of All Circles of the People was founded under the 
sponsorship of the National Students'Union in November 1919. Its first chairman was 
Yu Yuzhi, who was a member of the GMD and vice-director of the Returned Students' 
National Salvation League. The Federation proclaimed its aim was "to unite all circles 
of the whole of China in order to pool their wisdom and efforts, ...; to organise a 
76 'Order No 9 of the Frontier Defence Affairs Supervisory Section of the Beijing 
Government', Quoted from Peng Ming (ed. ), Zhonqquo xiandalshi ziliao xuanii, pp 415- 
6. The order mistakenly regarded Chen Jianai as the leader of the Chinese Labour 
Party. Actually Chen was the President of the General Society of the Chinese Trade 
Unions. Perhaps some leaders of the Labour Party also took part in this plan. 77 Wusi aiquo vundonq dan-q'an ziliao, p 618. 
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genuine institution of the will of the people for making statements on foreign affairs 
and for making decisions on domestic affairs. 08 
On I March 1920, some Soviet agents such as Potapov and Rosanov 79 held a 
meeting with several delegates to the Federation, including Chen Jianai, Yao Zuobin, 
Cao Yabo and Xu Deheng, in the presence of prominent members of the GMD, Sun 
Hongyi and Dai Jitao. The main subjects under discussion were how to organise 
branches of the National Federation of All Circles of the People in several other cities, 
to distribute leaflets and to rouse the entire people over the country to act in unison. 80 
Between April and May of 1920, after the Karakhan Manifesto reached China, 
many mass organisations issued open letters in reply to the Soviet Government. 
Among these letters, the one by the National Federation of All Circles of the People 
was worthy of notice, stating: 
We are very pleased to receive the Soviet Government's Manifesto, and 
we believe that the Chinese people, except for a few stubborn and 
decadent bureaucrats, warlords and politicians, are willing to co-operate 
with the Russian people. ... Hence the dreams of the old politicians and 
capitalists can no longer come true; and the time when the people of the 
world break down the barriers between different countries, different races 
and different classes will come soon. ... At present, the awakening 
78 Minquo ribao, 19 October 1919. 
79 It is not sure who Rosanov was. The British Archives recorded that a Bolshevik 
agent named Roosanof was sent to Shanghai from Vladivostok before 1921 for special 
propaganda work. (FO 405/233, No 107); In a Memorandum by the Dutch acting 
Consul-General of Shanghai, dated 11 April 1922, when Maring was living at 6 Wayside 
Road in the International Settlement in Shanghai in 1921, a Russian woman Rjazanoff, 
Sudakoff's daughter, was his landlady for a lengthy period. (Saich, OFUFC, p 270). 80 'Lu Yongx1ang to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, (13 March 1920)', Wusl aiquo 
vundonq clang'an ziliao, pp 618-9. This report added that the meeting had also 
discussed the issue of propagating Bolshevism and Communism. 
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Chinese people are preparing to fight against the stubborn and decadent 
bureaucrats, warlords and politicians. The latter have only an army of a 
few tens of thousands of people to rely on, whom we plan to awaken to 
our cause. 81 
The interesting thing is that the open letters of the National Students' Union, the 
National Journalists'Union and some other mass organisations contained the following 
similar sentences: "Hoping that the peoples of China and Russia will develop a good 
friendship and devote every effort to eliminate the disparities between countries, races 
and classes. A2 Since the language used in those letters was so similar to that of the 
Bolsheviks, 83 it aroused the Chinese authorities' suspicions. A spy who was sent to the 
head office of the National Federation of All Circles of the People found that the 
Federation, the National Students' Union and some trade unions representatives, such 
as Xia Qifeng, Chen Jianai, Ming De and Yao Zuobin, were holding a meeting to 
discuss the issue of replying to the Karakhan Manifesto. The Russians Potapov and 
Stopany, the Chinese Lu Shikai, who worked for the Bolsheviks, and some Koreans 
and Japanese also attended the meeting. It was reported that an agreement was 
reached at the meeting: if the Central Government refused to accept the Soviet 
Government's telegram, they would organise an alliance of Chinese, Koreans, 
8' Shi bao (Shanghai Times), 11 April 1920. 
82 Zhonqquo x1andaishl ziliao huibian 0 919-45) (Collection of Source Materials of the 
Chinese Modern History, 1919-45), (Hong Kong: Cultural Materials Supply Service, 
1978) p 40-1. 
83 'The Platform of the Communist International' pointed out that the proletariat should 
use "the class power of its mass organisations, its Soviets, to abolish the privileges of 
the bourgeoisie and to ensure the transition to the classless communist society. " ... "abolish State frontiers, change the entire world into one co-operative community. " 
(Degras, Communist International, pp 19-20. ) 
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Japanese and Russians in Shanghai to overthrow the warlords' rule. 84 Although the 
National Federation of All Circles of the People published an article denying the 
report, from the content of these open letters we can see that these mass organisations 
seemed to act in unison; and from the Chinese who attended the meeting we know that 
these organisations' representatives, with the exception of Ming De (who has not been 
identified so far), all had close connections with Soviet agents. With regard to the idea 
of an alliance of Chinese, Koreans, Japanese and Russians, it was not merely a rumour. 
Around this time an article published in Shanghai Life said that the fates of China, 
Japan and Korea were closely allied; all three nations suffered from foreign 
interference, and the people of the three countries should learn from Russia! s example 
85 to free themselves from foreign intervention. This demonstrated that the Bolsheviks 
intended to ally themselves with the Far Eastern peoples. 
The May 4th Movement, like the Rice Riot in Japan and the March Ist 
Uprising in Korea, was one of the most remarkable events of the time in the Far East. 
Mao Zedong emphasised: "The May 4th Movement actually took place at the 
summons of the world revolution, of the Russian Revolution, and at the call of Lenin. 
It was part of the world proletarian revolution of the time. Although the Communist 
Party had not yet come into existence, there were already large numbers of 
intellectuals who approved of the Russian Revolution and had the rudiments of 
Communist ideology. , 86 Some scholars, especially those in Taiwan, argue that Mao 
was wrong in saying that the events in Russia sparked off the May 4th Movement. In 
their opinion, the most important motivating force behind the May 4th Movement was 
84 Xinwen bao (Shanghai News Post), 5 May 1920. 
135 An extrac m Sl"ýanghai Life; FO 228/3214,25 March 1920. 
86 Mao Zedong, 'On New Democracy', Mao Zedonq Xuanil, Vol 3, p 86. 
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nationalism, rather than CommuniSM. 87 They are quite right to stress the role played 
by nationalists. But in doing so they might run the risk of forgetting that supporting 
and promoting national liberation and anti-imperialist movements in Eastern countries 
like China was an important strategy of Soviet Russia and the Comintern. I also 
believe that the May 4th Movement was an authentic mass patriotic movement that 
could not have been initiated by a few Bolshevik agents. However, we cannot rule out 
the possibility of the Bolshevik agents' incitement of and intervention in the 
Movement. For example, after the downfall of the Soviets in Siberia and the Russian 
Far East in summer 1918, many Bolshevik commissars fled to China and the majority 
were agitating for the boycotting of Japanese goods. 88 As we have seen, the 
Bolsheviks really had a hand in some important mass organisations during the May 4th 
Movement, especially the later stages of it. It was quite clear that if the Bolsheviks did 
not cause the sea to surge, they at least made a stormy sea stormier. 
According to the "Brief History of the CCP", the forces in the May 4th period 
were "properly utilised by the true revolutionaries who joined the Communist 
movement as individuals for the purpose of organising an embryo for the future 
Communist Party. "89 Here, "the Communist movement" implied the international 
Communist movement directed by Moscow, because there was no Communist 
movement in China in 1919, while the "true revolutionaries" referred to were actually 
Li Dazhao, Huang Jiemin and their like. These radical Chinese, who were influenced 
by the October Revolution and who had close ties with Bolshevik agents, took the lead 
in the movement. 
87 Chou Yusun, 'The May 4th Movement and the Chinese Communist Party', Issues 
and Studies, (Taibei, July 1989), Vol 25, No 7. 
"" FO 228/3211, No 271. 
89 Quoted from Wilbur and How, CNSAC, p 43. 
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The Bolsheviks had plenty of experience of carrying out organisational work in 
a planned way. Lenin even pointed out: "The whole of society would be converted 
into a network of front organisations; ... controlled and guided by the conscious 
leadership. "90 Such exactly was the case in China, where various Chinese radicals 
rallied together in "mass" and "non-party" organisations. In his report to the ECCI, 
dated I September 1920, Vilensky wrote that the organisational task for the newly 
established Chinese Section (the Revolutionary Bureau) of the East Asian Secretariat 
was: "to carry out the work of organising the Party in China by establishing 
Communist basic cells among the students' organisations and the workers' 
organisations in the coastal industrial areas. "91 In Vilensky's mind, as he mentioned in 
a later article, these students' organisations were the National Students' Union in 
Shanghai and some students' unions in North China, including some societies at 
Beijing University; as to the workers' organisations, he mainly referred to the workers' 
organisations in Shanghai. 92 In October 1920, Liu Jiang, the representative of the 
Chinese Communists in Russia, also reported to the Amur Committee of the RCP(B) 
after his visit to China that the central student organisation [the National Students' 
Union] and several workers' organisations in Shanghai were supporting socialiStS. 93 
Beyond doubt, working in those mass organisations was the first step to forming 
radical organisations which would lead to the establishment of the Communist Party. 
90 Lenin Collected Works, Vol 5, p 189. 91 Z; -LZDC, Vol 1, p 39. 
92 Vilensky, 'On the Eve of the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', Die 
Kommunistische Internationale, (1920), No 16. Those organisations were also 
mentioned by other Bolshevik agents of that time. 93 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 45. 
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Section 3. The Great Harmony Party and the Truth Society 
Among various revolutionary organisations, the Bolsheviks attached 
importance to Datong Dang (the Great Harmony Party) and Zhenli She (the Truth 
Society). In "On the Eve of the Establishment of the Communist Party in China", 
Vilensky pointed out specifically that Datong Dang and Zhenli She were "two parties" 
formed from among the organisations which had been set up since the October 
Revolution. 94 In some Comintern agents'eyes, the Great Han-nony Party and the Truth 
Society could be used for a period of time as bases to develop into Communist 
organisations. Yet these two organisations have never been mentioned in any books 
on the Chinese Communist Movement. Therefore, it is necessary to deal with them in 
detail here. 
1. The Great Harmony Party (Datong Party) 
The name of the Datong Party came from the word "Datong" (Great Harmony 
or universal concord). Originally, "Datong" was an ancient political concept of an 
ideal society. Realising great harmony in the whole world was also Sun Yatsen's 
ultimate aim; and to him, Datong was a synonym for Communism. " 
In the programme of the Datong Party, its guiding principle was the "human 
equality and world harmony" and its general plan relating to China was divided into 
two parts: the internal policy was to denounce all warlords' rule and the temporary 
military govemment in particular; to convene a National Conference to decide state 
94 Die Kommunistische Internationale, (1921), No 16. 
95 CUi Shuqin, Sun Zhongshan vu Gongchan zhuvi, p 90; Leng and Palmer, Sun Yat- 
sen and Communism, p 97. 
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affairs; or to raise a common people's revolution to resolve all problems. The external 
policy was to denounce all unequal treaties between China and foreign governments, 
the foreign concessions and consular jurisdiction in China. Internationally, they 
denounced the imperialist powers'rule in Korea, Taiwan, India, Vietnam and all other 
weak nations. On the basis of the programme, Wang Jueyuan argues that the Datong 
96 Party was a nationalist organisation. But in Vilensky's opinion, the Datong Party 
was a "Socialist party" or "International Socialist Party", and "Communist ideology 
infiltrated into the party". 97 As an "International Socialist Party", the Party consisted 
of Koreans, Indians and Vietnamese and Taiwanese as well as Chinese. 
The Datong Party was closely connected with the Comintern. In 1941, a 
Chinese Communist author gave the following account: 
At the beginning of 1920, the Comintern dispatched a Korean comrade 
named Kim Sen who had attended its first congress to China in order to 
lay the groundwork for the organisation of a Communist party. When he 
arrived in China, he contacted Huang Jiemin, a member of the Datong 
Party, and twenty-one anarchists, and organised a Communist party which 
98 elected a Central Executive Committee of nineteen. 
According to Li Danyang's research 99, "Kim Sen" here might be Pak Chin-sen, the 
general secretary of the Korean People's Socialist Party. Although Pak did not attend 
96 Wang Jueyuan, Zhonciguo dancipai shi (The History of the Parties of China), 
(Taibei: Zhengzhong Press, 1983), pp 94-5. 
97 Vilensky, 'On the Eve of the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', Die 
kommunistische Internationale, (1920), No 16. 
9" Liu A sheng, Zhonaguo minzu minzhu qeminci vundon-q shi iiaochen-q (A Textbook 
on the History of the Chinese National Democratic Revolutionary Movements), (North 
Shanxi, 1941); Quoted from C. Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China, (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp 21-2. 
99 Li Danyang, 'Pak Chin-sen's Efforts on the Establishment of A Party in China', 
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the first congress of the Comintern, he occasionally took part in meetings of the ECCI 
as Korean representative between the spring and summer of 1919 while he was in 
Moscow. 100 After meeting certain Soviet leaders, who promised to provide Comintern 
funds for the Korean independence movement, Pak and other Korean representatives 
pledged themselves to espouse the Communist cause. In November 1919, Pak, 
carrying a large sum from the Comintem fund, arrived in Shanghai. 101 
Pak Chin-sen's purpose in China was not only to establish relations with the 
Korean Provisional Government and to direct the Korean People's Socialist Party, 
which moved its headquarters to Shanghai in the autumn when the Party's chairman Yi 
Tong-hui was elected the premier of the Provisional Government, but also to set up a 
Chinese party which would be subordinate to the Comintern. 102 Actually, the work of 
establishing a Chinese party was not performed by Pak Chin-sen alone, because Pak 
only stayed in Shanghai about two months on his first visit to China. Yi Tong-hui and 
other Korean Communists also played an important role, acting as a "chief channel for 
the Comintern's contact with the Chinese and the Japanese. " 103 Besides Pak Chinsen, 
the Comintern. also sent other Koreans to China with money for promoting the 
Communist movement there. 104 These people included Kim Man-gyom, who also 
contacted Huang Jiemin and his comrades and provided them with Comintern funds. 
Jindaishi vianjiu,, (11992), No 4, pp 162-76. 
'uu Lazitch and Drachkovitch (ed. ), Biog aphical Dictionarv of the Comintern, p 350. 
101 Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p 11; Scalapino and Lee, Communism in 
Korea, pp 9-10; Kim Chun-yop and Kim Ch'ang-sun, Han-quk Kon-gsan Chuui Undonsa, 
p 169. 
102 D. W. Treadgold, 'Russia and the Far East', 1. J. Lederer (ed. ), Russia Foreign 
Polic , (Yale University Press, 1962), p 555. 103 Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p 17. 104 j. P. Harrison, The Long March to Power, (London: MacMillan, 1972), p 27. 
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Huang Jiemin, whose original name was Huang Jue, was a member of the 
GMD and an anarchist. In 1918, as a returned student from Japan, Huang became one 
of the contributing editors of Jiugllo ribao and also took charge of liaison matters at the 
paper. 105 Apart from Huang Jiemin, some other active workers in the Datong Party, 
such as Wen Li and Yao Zuobin were also returned students from Japan and worked 
on Jiuguo ribao. Wen Li (original name Wen Jincheng) was the editor-in-chief of 
Jiuguo ribao and was an important leader of the student movement. Yao Zuobin was a 
member of the GMD, he joined the Chinese Revolutionary Army (Zhonghua Geming 
Jun) in 1916.106 Since Jiuguo ribao's aim was "to arouse people's patriotic feelings 
and consciousness" to fight against the Japanese, 107 and it often reported news about 
the Korean independence movement, this paper thus attracted the attention of Korean 
nationalists and socialists and had close ties with them. Cho Tong-woo, who was then 
a member of the Korean Provisional Government and later became a leader of the 
Korean Communist Party, was a correspondent for Jiuguo ribao. The Korean People's 
Socialist Party regarded Jiuguo ribao as one of the principal socialist papers in 
China. 108 Some members of the Datong Party such as Kang Baiqing, Wang Dexi and 
Yao Zuobin were key workers in the National Students' Union,. Kang Baiqing was a 
member of the Young China Association and the New Tide Society in Beijing and 
Wang Dexi was one of the leaders of the Nanjing StudentsUnion. A source show that 
Wang Ping was a member. 109 According to Potapov's report, Sun Yat-sen's secretary 
105'Yu Yuzhi's Oral Account, recorded by Yu AnIan', 1992-93. 
106 See the caption under a photograph of the exhibition at Sun Yat-sen's Memorial 
Hall in Taibei. 
107 Guomin, Vol 1, No 3. 
108 R. ýThe Situation in Eastern Asia', The Communist International, (August 1920), 
No 13. "R" is said to be R. W. Kim; 
'09 Kimura Ikujiro's Chvo-qoku Rodo Undou Shi Nenpvo (Chronicle of Events in the 
268 
and financial minister were members of the Datong Party, and Potapov himself also 
joined the Party in 22 May 1920 and became a member of the Central Committee. 110. 
Some questions about the organisation of the Datong Party, such as, when the 
Datong Party was founded and what its activities were, have so far remained 
unanswered. According to Wang Jueyuan, the Datong Party had a history of ten years, 
but he does not give the date when the Party was founded. "' 2hangGuotao recalled 
that when he was in Shanghai between the end of 1919 and spring 1920, he heard that 
Huang Jiemin was trying to organise a Datong Party. 112 However, Liu A Sheng's book 
shows that the Datong Party already existed before Pak Chin-sen came to China in the 
fall of 1919. U Huang's reminiscences offer a very interesting story about Huang 
Jiemin and his party. On his arrival in Shanghai in January 1919, Li Huang was 
recommended to meet Huang Jiemin, who called himself an anarchist and was trying 
to enlist as many gallant people as he could. Huang talked to Li incessantly about the 
world revolution. Some Korean revolutionaries were also present and they asked Li to 
assist in the Korean revolution against Japan. Afterwards, Huang wrote Li's name 
onto a piece of paper and then burnt it. These were the formalities with which Li 
Chinese Labour Movement), (printed in 1966 but unpublished, one copy is kept in the 
Library of Cambridge University, p 85) showed that Wang Ping and Yao Zuo-bin as 
members of the Chinese Communist Party received Eizo Kanto, a Japanese 
Communist in Shanghai. Minquo ribao of 6 October 1920 reported that Wang Ping 
attended the sponsoring meeting of the Shanghai Machinery Workers' Union with Chen 
Duxiu, U Hanjun, U Qihan and other people, who were members of the CCP. But there 
was no mention of Wang Ping in any name list of the early members of the CCP. So 
Wang was probably a member of the Communist party which was derived from the 
Datong Party. 
110 'Potapovs Report to Chicherin, 12 December 1920', GLZDC, Vol 1, p 48; 
'Potapov's Explanation about His Reporf, Quoted from U Yuzhen, Sun Zhonqshan Vu 
on ch Mguo i, L uo*-i p 57. 
Wang Jueyuan, Zhonaguo dan-qpai shi, p 94. Yang Kuisong writes in his article 
'Some Facts concerning the Communist Organisations in China in the Early Period' 
that according to Wang Jueyuan, the Datong Party was established by Yao Zuobin in 
September 1921. (Dan-qshi vaniiu ziliao, 1992, No 4. ) 12 Chang Kuofao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, Vol 1, p 89-90. 
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Huang was admitted into Huang's party. ' 13 Li Huang did not give the Party's name, 
and only mentioned that it was an "anarchist" party. This might refer to the Datong 
Party, because many members of the Party believed in anarchism and thus it was 
called a "Utopian Party". Moreover, the Datong Party also had Korean members. In 
addition, around this time, the Korean nationalists also secretly formed a "Datong 
League" or "Datong Party" in the spring of 1919, which consisted of Koreans of 
various circles. After its leaders were arrested by the Japanese authorities, many of its 
members escaped to China. 114 
In light of the above facts, the Datong Party might have been set up at the 
beginning of 1919, at the latest before Pak Chinsen's first visit in autumn 1919. The 
Party Huang Jicmin was trying to establish around the beginning of 1920 was perhaps 
a "Communist party" based on the Datong Party. In fact, the Communist Party was 
the Datong Party's descendant and most likely they were never separated. The Datong 
Party could not have lasted for ten years, as Wang Jueyuan claimed, for some persons 
in the know, such as Yo Un-hyong and 2hang Guotao, believed both the Datong Party 
and the "Communist Party" were short-lived! 15 
Nobody can give any evidence of the operations and activities of the Datong 
Party. Yet its programme stipulated that the Party's primary scope of activity was in 
the educational and industrial fields. Since the Datong Party was a secret party, an 
indication of its activities is best seen in some mass organisations which were 
113 U Huang, Xuedun shi huivilu, Part 1. p 80. 114 Hanauk Donanir) Undonsa, Vol 3, p 98; Jin Jiu, Baifan v1zhi -(Kim 
Ku's 
Autobiography). translated by Zhang Minghui, Beijing: Democracy and Construction 
Pressý 1994, p 200. 115 Chang Kuo-rao. The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, Vol 1, p 122; 
Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, p 29. 
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associated with iL So far as I know, nearly aH the members of the Datong Party 
belonged to either trade unions or students'unions. 
The key members of the Datong Party were involved in the labour movement 
and tried to lay the foundation of the Party among the working classes. For example, 
Huang Jiemin was one of founders of both the All-China Industrial Federation and the 
All-China Society for Labour Harmony and Advance. As the only national 
organisation in industrial circles founded on the eve of 4 May, the All-China 
Industrial Federation in collaboration with several organisations of other circles 
convened an emergency meeting on 5 May 1919 to prepare a mass rally of the 
Shanghai citizens and to start up the movement. The Industrial Federation actively 
undertook the work of mobilising and organising workers in the patriotic movement. 
Many members of the Federation took the lead, going on strikes and boycotts. In July, 
the Industrial Federation took a more radical stand "to overthrow the Beijing 
Government and to organisc a new government by the Chinese people in order to 
strive for national independence. " 116 On 27 January 1920 the representatives of the 
All-China Industrial Federation, the Electrical Workers' Union, (which had close ties 
with the Industrial Federation, ' 17 ) and three other labour organisations held a meeting 
in Shanghai with the object of forming a central organisation "The Chinese Labourers' 
"I Uu Yongming. Guomindangren yu Wusi yundong, p 236. 11 7 The President of the Union was an electrician LI Henglin, a Protestant. He was 
active in the AH-China Industrial Federation around the May 4th. (Chesneaux, The 
Chinese Labour Movement ,p 160, p 457) While organising the Electrical Workers' Union in June 1919. Li was ýrrested. After he was released, the Union formally was set 
up on 9 August 1919. Four representatives of the All-China Industrial Federation 
attended the founding meeting and one of them made a speech on behalf of the 
Sponsors. (Uu Yongming, Guomindangren yu Wusi vundonq . This demonstrates that the Union was established by the Industrial Federation. 
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Union" and later a further meeting was held to discuss details of the amalgamation. 118 
In the same month, the Union of Allied Chinese-Korean Labourers was formed in 
Shanghai to undertake anti-Japanese activities and propagate "Extremism" 
(Bolshevism). ' 19 The unification of Chinese labour organisations and co-operation 
between the Chinese and the Koreans seemed to be steps leading to the formation of a 
party. On 29 January 1920 an article entitled "Labour Organisation and the Political 
Party" was published in Nlinzuo ribao, with the author, Shao Lizi, suggesting that the 
labour organisations themselves should "form one large party. " 120 
Around this time 2hang Guotao heard that Huang Jiemin "enjoyed discussing 
socialism" and that he "was trying to organise a TaTung (Utopian) party on the 
platrorm that all Socialists in China should unite, co-operate with the Korean 
revolutionafics, and establish connections with Russia. " 121 In fact, at this time Huang, 
as Liu A Sheng pointed out, was setting up a Communist party basing the organisation 
on the Datong Party, with the All-China Industrial Federation as its front. 
The All-China Industrial Federation, which was administered by a committee 
of twenty five peoples, claimed more than ten thousand members. As the resident 
director, Huang was in charge of the day-to-day work of the Industrial Federation. In 
March 1920, he managed to rcorganise it as a truly national trade-unions' federation 
and appointed Zhang Guotao, as the general secretary. 
To a certain extent, the Chinese National Students' Union was also influenced 
by the Datong Party through its members. Merely in the Union's leading body there 
1 'a FO 228/3214,29 January 1920. 
119 Hanauk Donanir) Undonsa Vol 3, p 400. '20 Shao LIA was an old meýber of the GMD and also a founding member of the 
CCP. 
'2' Chang Kuo-fao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist PaV, Vol 1, p 84, pp 89-90. 
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were several members of the Party, such as Kang Baiqing, Wang Dexi and Yao 
Zuobin. 
Labourers' organisations headed by the Industrial Federation and students' 
organisations headed by the National Students' Union frequently acted in concert. 
From January to April 1920, several major strikes and demonstrations took place in 
Shanghai to oppose the Beijing Government dealing directly with Japan on the 
Shandong issue and to protest against the beating of students by the Chinese 
authorities in Tianjin and Shanghai. During this period, the National Students Union 
called all-China students' strikes several times. With extraordinary zeal, Yao Zuobin 
of the Executive Committee of the Union participated directly in making the decisions 
and leading these actions, 122 and afterwards he went to consult with the Bolshevik 
representative in Vladivostok on the possibilities of giving aid to the Chinese labour 
movcmenL 
The students' strikes soon caused citizens'. especiafly workers' , strikes. In 
April, some of the students and workers who were on strike in Shanghai marched 
along the streets and urged shopkeepers to strike. 123 'Mis period was regarded as the 
second high tide of the mass movement after 4 May 1919. He Fenglin, the Acting 
Military Commanding Officer (Hujun Shi) of the Songjiang and Shanghai regions, 
considered that "this unrest" was "coerced and agitated by certain labour organisations' 
leaders who were the henchmen of the Bolsheviks. " 124 
122 Ishikawa Yoshihiro, 'The Whole Story of the Phoney Chinese Communist Party, 
LIM, (1994), No 30, pp 93-4. 
Wusi vundona zal Shanahai shiliao xuanii, pp 564-574. 
124 ibid. p 579. 
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With the upsurge of the movement, the All-China Industrial Federation 
convened a meeting on 18 April 1920 to make preparations for a mass rally on May 
Day. Besides the Industrial Federation, representatives of six other labour 
organisations attended the meeting and agreed to sponsor the May Day 
commemoration rally. Huang Jiemin, the convenor and chairman, addressed the 
meeting. Cao Yabo, Chen Duxiu and the representatives of the Shanghai Students' 
Union were also present at the meeting. 
Before the May Day rally, the Industrial Federation printed and distributed a 
large number of leaflets, appealing to workers to attend the rally. The National 
Students Union also published a circular summoning students from all regions to join 
in unity with labourers in Labour Day celebrations. On I May 1920, the army and 
police took stringent measures to prevent the mass rally and parade. Owing to 
pressure from the authorities, the commemorative rally could not be held at the 
proposed assembly place and only lasted five minutes. Nevertheless, a large number 
of pamphlets were distributed, and one of them urged workers "to overthrow the 
Government and the capitalists; and to establish a new government. " 125 Such a slogan 
reflected the political stand of the organisers of this rally. 
An open letter on behalf of aH the workers of China to the Soviet Government, 
which could not be read out at the May Day rafly, as originally planned, was published 
in the newspapers afterwards. It proclaimed: "We are trying to create a new, happy 
and permanently peaceful world for humankind and are determined to shoulder the 
responsibility for it with you. " It further expressed the hope that the working class in 
Soviet Russia would offer "vigorous" aid and guidance to their fellow labourers in 
125 Zhonaguo gonawn shiliao (Historical Materials on the Chinese Labour Movement), 
(Beijing. 1984), Part 2 p 17. 
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China, India, Korea and Vietnam, who were still under the oppression of the capitalist 
class. 126 This gives us a clue that this letter might have been drafted by someone of the 
Datong Party, because the Party consisted of Koreans, Indians and Vietnamese, as well 
as Chinese. A leaflet entitled "May Day", which was issued by the Beijing 
Communist Group in May 1921, indicated that the May Day celebration on I May 
1920 was held by various trade unions and the Socialist Party. 127 We may remember 
that Vilensky wrote that the Datong Party was a "Socialist Party", or "International 
Socialist Party". 128 
Although this May Day celebration was not a success, it made a great impact. 
The military authorities in Shanghai considered the rally to be "a disturbance created 
by the Bolsheviks", and even "a Russian Movement". 129 
At this time, Pak Chin-sen, who had returned to Moscow, was participating in 
the work of the ECCI and Narkomindel. He later attended the Second Congress of the 
Comintern as the Koryo Communist Party's delegate and was elected the sole member 
of the ECCI to represent the Far Eastern Communists. 130 He published an important 
article entitled "The Revolutionary East and the Next Tasks of the Communist 
International", in which he pointed out: 
126 Shi bao, 2 May 1920. Moscow's newspapers reported this rally and carried 
"Chinese Workers Send Greetings", which reads: 
"A Chinese Labour Union ... sent the, following telegram to the Siberian Soviet: 'We 
welcome the Russian Red Army, ... We Chinese labourers and peasants are quite 
willing to stand shoulder to shoulder with you under the flags of the army of right in the 
hope that ultimately we shall up-root the evil of capitalism and class distinction. '" 
Workers Dreadnought of September 1920 reprinted this news report. 127 Gonachan zhuyi xiaozu, Vol 1, p 287. 
1213 Vilensky, 'On the Eve of the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', Die 
Kommunistische Internationale, (1921), No 16. 
129 Zhonaguo qon-qvun shiliao, Part 2, p 17. 130 The Second Congress of the Communist International, Vol 2, p 306, p 194. 
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The barbarous policy of the larger imperialist powers in the colonies has 
created favourable conditions for a revolution. This policy has developed 
strong nationalist tendencies. ... Certainly, amid the revolutionaries, there 
are elements which united with us, internationalists, only with the object of 
attaining national-political liberation, but we shall use their revolutionary 
zeal for the struggle against world capitalism, for the triumph of a social 
revolution in the whole world. 131 
The "revolutionary East" interested Lenin a great deal. In his opening speech to the 
Congress, Lenin optimistically said that the Soviet movement had already laid a 
foundation in Asia. And before his draft outline of the theses on national and colonial 
problems was published, Lenin wrote a letter to seek opinions. At the end of this 
letter, he listed "China - Korea - Japan" as discussion points for the National and 
Colonial Commission, while not including India, the most important target in the East. 
Pak probably reported what was happening in the Far East to Lenin. 
Before long Pak Chin-sen went to China again to direct the Communist 
movement in the Far East as the representative of the ECCI and arrived in China in 
December 1920.132 He offered advice and financial support to help Koreans, Chinese 
and Japanese organise Communist parties. Since he only stayed in China quite briefly 
during his two visits, Pak Chin-sen was not the only one to sponsor the Communist 
Party organised from the Datong Party. Other Korean Communists, such as Kim 
Man-gyom, Yi Tong-hui and Kim Ri, also helped Huang Jiemin and Yao Zuobin set 
up the Communist Party. 
131 The Communist International, Nos 11-12. 
132 Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p 14. 
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Busily agitating against imperialism and in favour of Soviet Russia, Huang 
Jiernin's party shared a common temporary goal with the Bolsheviks and therefore 
became a useful tool for Soviet Russia to fulfil its strategies in the Far East at the time. 
However, the Datong Party only included "a weird conglomeration of people who had 
nothing in common" 133 and its leaders were anarchists and nationalists who did not 
understand Marxism. So the "Communist Party" derived from the Datong Party could 
not be a real Communist party. 
There appeared representatives of five different Chinese Communist and 
Socialist parties at the Congress of Toilers of the Far East and most of them were there 
just to make up the numbers. Yao Zuobin, who had arrived in Moscow with Yi Tong- 
hui and Pak Chin-sen, was present as the envoy of the "Dongfang" (Oriental) 
Communist Party. 134 The Dongfang Communist Party was probably the party derived 
from the Datong Party. Yet, Yao Zuobin's representation was challenged by the 
Chinese Socialist Youth League's members who were studying in Moscow, and Yao 
was even detained in Moscow and sent into exile in Siberia. 135 
"Should the revolution demand it in future, " Pak Chin-sen once wrote, "we 
shall know how to turn our an-ns against our quondam 'ally'. " 136 Here Pak made no 
secret of the Comintern's tactics of making use of the nationalists and other 
133 Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Pa , Vol 1, p 691. 134 Jiang Kanghu, Xin-E vouii (Travels in New Russia), (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 
1923) p 51; Jiang perhaps made a mistake by saying that Yao Zuobin attended the 3rd 
Congress of the Comintern, for Yao and the two Koreans departed from Shanghai in 
July 1921 and they could only have attended the Far Eastern Toilers' Congress. Cf. 
Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, p 40. 135 Bao Pu, 'Travels in Red Russia', Chen bao, 28 August 1924. 
136 Pak Dinshun, 'The Revolutionary East and the Next Task of the Communist 
International' Communist International, (June-July 1920), Nos 11-12. 
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revolutionaries' zeal and then casting them aside once they were no longer necessary. 
Writing this, Pak could not have foreseen the fate awaiting him and his party. 
In the factional struggles of the Korean Communist movement, the Koryo 
Communist Party fell into disfavour with the head of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the 
Comintern, Shumiasky, who backed the Korean Communist Party he had fostered in 
Siberia and withdrew the Comintern's support for the Koryo Communist Party. At the 
end of 1922, Pak Chinsen was dismissed from all leading positions within the Party 
and the Comintern. 137 As a result, Huang Jien-tin's party, which relied on Comintern 
funds channelled through the Koryo Communist Party, soon disintegrated. 138 
Therefore, Pak Chin-sen's effort to organise a Chinese Communist Party proved to be 
"an abortive attempt". 139 
11. The Truth Society 
Although the Truth Society was regarded by the Bolsheviks as a party which 
propagated Communist ideas and supported the Soviet system, 140 up to now, very little 
historical research has been published on the Truth Society (Zhenli She or Zhen She in 
Chinese). 
137 Pak remained in Moscow, where he was later found in "pathetic decline ... and was having difficulty in finding enough to eat. " Kondo Eizo, Cominterun no Misshi (Secret 
Messenger of the Comintern), (Tokyo, 1949), pp 128-9. 
13" A close friend of Huang Jiemin, Yo Unhyong, who was one of the leading 
members of the Koryo Communist Party, once said: "Of course, the Chinese 
Communist Party assisted by Yi Tonghwi soon dissolved. It was a separate one from 
that organized by Chen Tuhsiu. " Quoted from Scalapino and Lee, Communism in 
9. 
140 
gold, 'Russia and the Far East', Lederer (ed. ), Russia Foreign Polic ,p 555. Vilensky, 'On the Eve of the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', Die 
Kommunistische Internationale, (1921), No 16. 
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According to Wusi shigi de shetuan (The Societies of the May 4th Period) 
edited by Zhang Yunhou, the Truth Society was an organisation formed by anarchists 
in 1923. In fact, as early as April 1919, a pamphlet printed and distributed by the 
Truth Society appeared, which publicised anarchism, supported the Russian 
Revolution and called for soldiers' uprisings to carry out a common people's 
revolution. 141 As far as I know, a society named Zhen She was established in 1919 as 
the first anarchist organisation among the Chinese anarchists in Nanyang (the countries 
around the South China Sea) and its real head was said to be Hua Lin. 142 This Zhen 
She's headquarters was in Guangzhou, and there were several branches in Singapore, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and other South East Asian countries. This Zhen 
She had close connections with other anarchist societies in China, such as Minsheng 
She (People's Voice Society) and Jinhua She (Evolution Society), and with certain 
mass organisations, such as the Returned Students' National Salvation League. Zhen 
She also engaged in labour movements there. It issued and circulated various pieces of 
literature, such as "Original Doctrine of Revolution", "Conversations regarding 
Anarchism7' and "How to Spread Revolution to Its Fullest Extent". One of them 
contained the words: "The people in China are still asleep and the Government and 
wealthy classes are still cruel and arbitrary; " while the compatriots in Russia, 
Germany, England and other countries "have made preparations to declare war against 
our enemy. " Another circular stated: "If the resulting revolution is not a socialistic 
one, it will certainly be a revolt of the proletariat. " Zhen She's activities and 
propaganda were so extreme that they were considered "Bolshevik" by the colonial 
141 Lish! dangan (Historical Archives), (Beijing, 1982), No 1, pp 105-112. 142 6-U Xi, 'The Brief Account on the Anarchist Movement in Nanyang', Min zhong 
(The People's Bell), Vol 2, No 1,25 January 1927, Wuzhenqfu zhuvi sixianq ziliao xuan, 
Vol 1, p 722; FO 228/3211, August 1919. 
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authorities, and as a result, many of its members were expelled from the Nanyang 
area. 
143 
In the same year, a society with the name "Zhen She" (or sometimes called 
"Zhen Xuehui") was organised in Tianjin by the anarchists Jiang Banruo of Tianjin, 
and Yang Zhidao and Xu Zhenfeng of Nanjing. The latter two were formerly the 
organisers of Qun She (the Masses Society) of Nanjing. 144 This Truth Society started 
publication of a periodical entitled Xin shengming (New Life) in August 1919, which 
was edited by Jiang Banruo, Yang Zhidao and Huang Lingshuang. The latter was a 
key member of Shi She (the Real Society) in Beijing. Xin Shengming was reviewed 
as a paper of "socialist colour" with the aim of "awakening the working class and 
reforming [China] society". 145 The journal exhorted the Chinese working people to 
"overthrow the present social system" (issue no. 2) and strive for a society in which the 
working class would run the state and manage production (issue no. 1). In an article 
entitled "Labour Problems and the Russian Revolution", the author stated: "There has 
been a precedent in Russia already. ... Russia! s working people were the vanguard in 
overthrowing the old society and creating a new society. " Because of Xin 
Shengmin 's revolutionary nature, it was banned by the local authorities after only 
three issues and was condemned for "poisoning and bewitching the workers' minds 
and harbouring the intention of revolution". 146 
143 FO 228/3211, August 1919; FO 405/228, No 157, No 169; FO 405/233, No 107; 
Liu Shixin, 'Some Recollections of Anarchist Activities, Wuzhen-qfu zhuvi sixianq- ziliao 
xuan, Vol 2, pp 935. 
144 'List of Anarchist Organisations', Wuzhenqfu zhuvi sixiang ziliao xuan. 145 Yu Henian, 'The Cultural Movement in Tianjin', Xin ren (New People), (118 August 
1920), Vol 1, No 4. 
146 Quoted from Wusi shigi qikan iieshao, Vol 2, p 323, p 327; Vol 3, p 95. 
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The Truth Society to which Vilensky referred was based in Zhangzhou, Fujian 
province. Vilensky wrote: "This Party's leader was Chen Jiongming, ... whose troops 
occupied Fujian province; " and the Party's task was to "fight against the warlords' 
governments both in the South and the North. " 147 
Whether these societies with the same or similar names were branches of one 
organisation or not has not been ascertained so far, but they surely had connections. A 
clue to this was that Hua Lin, the leader of the Nanyang Zhen She, went to Tianjin to 
edit Xin chungiu bao at about the time that the Tianjin Zhen She was founded. 148 
Moreover, the only member of Zhenli She Vilensky mentioned was Feng Fuguang, a 
leading member of the National Students' Union and the National Federation of All 
Circles of the People, who was a representative of the Tianjin Students Union and 
came from Tianjin. 149 Furthermore, between 1919-1920, many of the members of the 
Truth Societies both in Nanyang and Tianjin went to South Fujian, where Chen 
Jiongm-ing "was eager to strive for the realisation of Socialism". 1 50 At the end of 1919, 
several members of the Nanyang Zhen She, including Liu Shixin, were invited by 
Chen Jiongming to Zhangzhou to launch a social revolution. Around the same time, 
some students' unions in North China also sent their representatives to Zhangzhou to 
help Chen Jiongming. The persons from Tianjin are worthy of note. According to 
Zhang Zhi's recollection, in February 1920, after a meeting with a Russian Bolshevik 
147 Vilensky, 'On the Eve of the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', Die 
Kommunistische Internationale, (1921), No 16. 
148 XU Shanguang and Liu Jianping, Zhonciguo wuzhencifu zhuyl shi (History of the 
Anarchist Movement in China), (Wuhan: Hubei People's Press, 1989), pp 89-90; FO 
405/228, No 169, July 1919. 
149 Public Letter of the State Council, 16 September 1919, 'Archives of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs of the Beijing Government', Quoted from Wusi aiguo yundong danclan 
ziliao, p 390. Feng was a student of Beiyang School of Law and Politics. 150 Chen Jiongming's letter to Sun Zhongshan, 5 December 1919; quoted from La 
Fangshang, Geming zhi zaigi, p 263. 
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and Li Dazhao in Tianjin, the main founder of Tianjin Zhen She, Jiang Banruo, who 
151 
was the inspector of Nankai Secondary School , together with Zhang 
Zhi, the editor 
in chief of Nankai rikan (Nankai School's Daily), and a Shanxi comrade, left for 
Fujian. 152 In addition, another organiser of the Tianjin Zhen She, Xu Zhenfeng, also 
went to Zhangzhou. 153 After the core members of the Truth Societies of Nanyang and 
Tianjin arrived in Zhangzhou, they probably also established a branch of the Truth 
Society or moved their headquarters there and asked Chen Jiongming to join as its 
figurehead. At any rate, the Truth Societies in Nanyang and Tianjin can be seen as the 
predecessors of the Truth Society in Zhangzhou. 
At the time of 1919-1920, Zhangzhou was considered by the Beijing 
government and foreign diplomats as the centre for disseminating "Extremism" and 
"Bolshevism". 154 Many pamphlets and magazines were circulated among the masses. 
For example, a pamphlet published on I April 1920 stated that the object of anarcho- 
communism was that "All productive necessities ... must be restored to and owned by 
the community. To abolish personal ownership of property and, at the same time, the 
monetary system. ... There shall be no army, police and prisons . ..... With regard to the 
proceedings to reach the objective, it called for "a great revolution by the common 
151 Nankai Secondary School was a famous school in Tianjin. The students of this 
school took an active part in the May 4th Movement and played an important role in 
organising the Tianjin Students' Union. 
12 Beiwinq dangshi vaniiu wenii (Collected Theses on the History of the CCP in 
Beijing), (Beijing: The Beijing Press, 1989), p 44; The "Shanxi comrade" was probably 
Yu Keshui, the organiser of Ping She (The Equality Society); cf. Haiyu Guke Jiefang 
bielu. 
153 Liu Shixin, 'Some Recollections of Anarchist Activities', Wuzhencifu zhuvi sixiang 
shiliao xuan, Vol 2, p 935. 15 ýz -Shen bao (Shanghai Daily), Shanghai, 29 April 1920; American Consulate, Amoy, 
'Bolshevist Propaganda in the Amoy Consular District' (Dispatch No 306), 10 April 
1920, in records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of China, 1910- 
29, (The National Archives, 1960), Quoted from Dirlik, Anarchism in the Chinese 
Revolution, pp 150-1. 
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people", which, according to the author, meant "a great world revolution". The 
pamphlet praised strongly the Russian Revolution: "Our Russian brothers have already 
risen and pushed to the utmost degree our principles in undermining their Government 
and private property. ... the influence of the Red Army has reached as far as Northern 
Europe and Central Asia, and it is seeking its way down from Siberia to Vladivostok, 
... A world revolution is to materialise in the near future. " And it went on to say that 
China should "go as fast as possible to catch up with the predecessors and to exercise 
her best energy in one way in preaching the doctrine and arranging to make a rising. " 
In another pamphlet, the final phrase was "If you want your sons and grandsons to 
have food you must follow Bolshevism. The doctrine of Bolshevism is to let every 
man have food to eat and work to do. " 155 
The claim that Bolshevism was spreading in Zhangzhou was obviously 
overstated, because most publications publicised anarcho-communism. However, 
judging from some pamphlets, it cannot be reckoned as pure anarchist propaganda, as 
some historians have suggested, because these pamphlets called for a Bolshevik-style 
revolution in China. 
According to a Reuters' report in April 1920, propaganda highlighting what 
had been accomplished in Russia and declaring that the Chinese would follow the lead 
of their Russian brothers was conducted by a society which openly advocated 
Bolshevism and which was established by General Chen Jiongming in Zhangzhou . 
156 
This report did not give the society's name, however, we may still remember that 
Vilensky clearly attributed the propagation of "Communist ideology" to the Truth 
155 The translations of such pamphlets are kept in FO 405/228, No 82. 
156 FO 228/3214,29 April 1920. 
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Society which was under the auspices of Chen Jiongming. Therefore, the society in 
question was probably the Truth Society. 
Vilensky further pointed out that the institutions for propagating "Socialist 
doctrine" in Zhangzhou were the Educational Bureau and the office of Min xing 
(Fujian Star). 157 Some key figures who worked in these two institutions were 
members of the Truth Society. Around spring 1920 Zhang Minquan 158 came from 
Shanghai to Zhangzhou and joined the Educational Bureau as Chen's advisor on 
educational affairs and became one of editors of Min xing (Daily). Zhang Minquan 
was reported by British Intelligence to be an "active spirit in the Bolshevik 
propaganda", because some pamphlets were drafted by him. 
In April 1920, a notice appeared in Chen Jiongming's daily paper Min xing n 
Zhangzhou urging those who advocated Bolshevism and intended to join the Party to 
register themselves with Lu Shikai of Post Box No. 105 in Shanghai. 159 Lu Shikai was 
an anarchist who collaborated with Stopany, a Bolshevik, at the Esperanto School in 
Shanghai. Lu was on very close terms with Zhang Minquan. Both were famous 
scholars of Esperanto and Zhang sometimes also delivered speeches at the Esperanto 
School. So the notice might have been put in Min xing (Daily) by Zhang Minquan. 
The notice did not tell what "Party" it was drawing people to join. But when 
the Soviet representative Potapov visited Zhangzhou, 160 an important task for him was 
157 Vilensky, 'On the Eve of the Establishment of the CP in China', Die 
Kommunistische Internationale, (1921), No 16. 
"58 Cf. Section 3, Chapter 3. 
159 ZEGXSL, 29 April 1920. 
160 This visit was the result of the liaison between Shanghai and Zhangzhou through 
Lu Shikai. 'American Consular in Amoy's Report of 11 November 1920', American 
National Archives, Class 800,1920. Jiang Banruo also complied with Polevoy's 
directive from Tianjin requesting Chen Jiongming to grant permission for a Soviet 
mission to Zhangzhou; cf Haiyu Guke, Jiefang bielu. 
284 
said to be to make use of Chen Jiongming's connections to set up a Communist Party 
in China. 161 Perhaps that was why Vilensky used to say "Party" when mentioning the 
Truth Society and call the members of the Society Communists". 162 This Party might 
be the so-called "Zhina (China) Communist Party", because in 1921 Zhang Minquan 
and another anarchist, Chen Kong-San, bearing a cipher letter of introduction by 
Chicherin, went to Soviet Russia in order to attend the Third Congress of the 
Comintem and the Congress of Toilers of the Far East as representatives of 7hina 
163 Communist Party" . The "Zhina Communist Party", which was 
different from the 
CCP founded by Chen Duxiu, was actually a party descended from the Truth Society 
and some other anarchist societies. 
The Truth Society consisted of the former members of Minsheng She, Qun 
She, Ping She and Shi She, most of whom were anarcho-communists and belonged to 
the Anarcho-Communist Comrades'Union founded by Shi Fu in 1914; there was an 
effort in 1919 to form a unified anarchist organisation - the Anarcho-Communist Party, 
but this failed. 164 In Chita, Zhang Minquan told Qin Baopu that their aim in Soviet 
Russia was to obtain funds for the anarcho-communist movement, and before they left 
for Russia the Koryo Communist Party's deputy chairman, Kim Rip gave them - the 
Chinese anarcho-communists - 1,000 Yuan to convene a Congress in Shanghai in May 
161 Zhou Gu, 'Sun Yat-sen's Relations with Russian Revolutions at the Early Stage, 
Zhuanii wenxue (1 March 1991) Vol 85, No 3, p 112. 
... Vilensky, 'On the Eve of the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', Die 
Kommunistische Internationale, (1921), No 16. 
163 Jiang Kanghu, Xin E youii; Bao Pu, 'Travels in Red Russia', Chen bao, 26 August 
1924; FO 228/3140, p 77. 
164 'The Proclamation of the Comrades' Union of Anarcho-Communists' claimed that 
they would establish an union of 'Zhina Anarcho-Communist Party, Min sheng, No 17; 
and in August 1914 the Comrades' Union of Anarcho-Communists published an article 
entitled 'On the Aims and Means of the Anarcho-Communist Party' Min sheng, No 19; 
Fang Qingqiu, 'The Chinese Anarchist Factions during the May 4th Period', Lishi 
danc ian, (1981), No 2. 
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1921. At this Congress, only a minority supported sending representatives to the Third 
Congress of the Comintern and co-operating with the Bolsheviks, whereas the majority 
opposed these moves. This caused a split in the anarcho-communist organisations. 165 
In fact, what Mang Minquan and Chen Kongsan represented was a small section of 
the anarcho-communists which was determined to co-operate with the Bolsheviks and 
tried to get funds from the Comintern. These anarchists were mainly members of the 
Truth Society, the Evolution Society and the Mutual Aid Society. For example, Chen 
Kong-san was a representative of the Beijing anarchists, such as Chen Derong, Liu 
Guohang and Chen Youqin, who had a close association with Polevoy and published 
Shehui y2ndong (Social Movement) in Beijing. 166 Most of these anarchists also 
entered into an alliance with Marxist Communists and formed the Socialist League. 
Since the formation of the Socialist League was closely related to the founding process 
of the CCP, I will deal with it in the next chapter. 
***** 
The spring of 1920 saw a tendency towards the unity of diverse factions of 
Chinese socialists. Besides Chen Duxiu, a Beijing University professor, some Beijing 
University students, such as Zhang Guotao 167 , Luo Jialun, Xu Deheng, and Kang 
Baiqing, with Liu Qingyang, a leading member of the Tianjin Students Union, all went 
to Shanghai to participate in the activities of the National Students' Union and the 
165 Bao Pu, Travels in Red Russia', Chen bao, 26 August 1924. 
166 'Zai De's Report to the Infantry Headquarters of the Beiyang Government', 5 June 
1922, in Wuzhen-qfu zhuvi sixianq ziliao xuan,, p 1058; Bao Pu, Travel in Red Russia', 
Chen bao, 26 August 1924. 
r67 -Zhaýg and another student, probably Luo Jialun were deputed by LI Dazhao to 
Shanghai. Zhang kept up a correspondence with Li and reported all his activities in 
Shanghai to I-I after his return to Beijing. Cf. Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese 
Communist PaMt, Vol 1; FO 228/3214,15 April 1920. 
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National Federation of All Circles of the People. They contacted journalists, including 
Dai Jitao, Li Hanjun, Shen Xuanlu and Shao Lizi, leaders of some trade unions, Cao 
Yabo and Zhu Zhuowen, the key founder of the Datong Party, Huang Jiemin, and 
several Koreans who belonged to the Korean Socialist Party and the Korean 
Provisional Government, for example Yo Un-hyong and Kim Kyu-sik. They also 
established close relationship with Chen Jiongming and the anarcho-communists 
around him in Zhangzhou. Zhang Minquan, who later became the representative of 
the Zhina Communist Party, returned to Shanghai from Zhangzhou to lead the May 
Day celebrations on I May 1920 in Shanghai with Huang Jiemin, who was later to 
become the leader of the Dongfang Communist Party and Chen Duxiu, who became 
the founder of the CCP. 
Having seen for himself this unification of various radical forces, Vilensky 
wrote in his article "On the Eve of the Establishment of the Communist Party in 
China7' that, centering on Beijing University, the advanced elements of Chinese 
revolutionary youth acted under the guidance of several long-tested socialist professors 
and; that Beijing University students had a great influence over the Beijing Students' 
Union. He pointed out: 
The students' unions in North China have established direct relationship 
with the students' unions in the South. They have also kept close 
connections with the reliable representatives of some political 
organisations (Chinese and Korean), the strike committee of the [National] 
Students' Union, trade unions and journalists in Shanghai. Through 
regular contacts, they maintain links with several other cities which have 
students unions, such as Jinan, Nanjing, Hankou and Zhangzhou. They 
have close connections with the latter, in particular. General Chen 
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Rongming - Governor of Fujian province - has established a commune, 
which is spreading socialist ideas widely. " 168 
Having studied the details, one can clearly discern a picture of the distribution 
and connections of the main revolutionary forces. 
Behind the unity of the revolutionary forces, we can see the concerted efforts 
of the Bolsheviks. They were active in directing organisations of many different kinds 
and at different levels. Some organisations were used for making an empty show of 
strength. 169 , and some "socialist" or "communisf' parties were merely established for 
serving as stopgaps. 170 Ostensibly, there were no connections between those 
organisations, but sometimes they were held together by common actions. When the 
time was ripe, some of these units began merging and converging in a process of 
division and elimination of the previous ones. 
"The Brief History of the CCP" pointed out: "the initial work of collecting 
material for laying the Party's foundation may be said to have been accomplished in 
three years [1918-20] .,, 
17 1 At the first representative assembly of members of the 
RCP(B) in China, which was held from 5 to 7 July 1920, the first subject under 
discussion was their achievements in organisational work. Summarising the 
organisational work, Vilensky pointed out: "We have already laid a preliminary 
foundation in organisation building, and we need to make use of the existing 
168 Die Kommunistische Internationale, (1921), No 16. 
169 0, Yang Mingzhai, Voitinsky's interpreter, wrote a report to the Comintern, in 
which he suggested that they must change the methods of work entirely and not to 
employ masses to make an empty show of strength as before. This report offended 
some leaders of the Comintern and as a result of it, Yang was sent to Tomsk into penal 
servitude and later died there. [Zhonq-qonq danqshi ziliao, (l 995), No 2]. 170 According to Jiang Kanghu, there were delegates of five Chinese communist 
parties to the 3rd Comintern congress. [Xin E you'j, p 60. 171 Wilbur and How, CNSAC, p 52. 
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organisations and the experience we have accumulated to continue the work of 
organisation building. "' 72 The "existing organisations" included some of the 
organisations I have discussed above. 
172'Vilensky's Report to the ECCI, 1 September 1920', GLZDC Vol 1, pp 42. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE CREATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 
The establishment of the Chinese Communist Party is a topic which has been 
studied by many historians for nearly as long as it has been in existence. I do not 
intend to repeat their detailed accounts of the CCP's founding process. My task here is 
to clarify the Comintern's role in the establishment of the CCP. 
In regard to the initiation and dynamics of the founding of the CCP, so far 
there have been a variety of views. The former Soviet scholar V. I. Glunin maintains: 
The first communist groups in China were set up with the direct participation of 
the Comintern which furnished the Chinese Communists with organisational and 
other assistance. It should be mentioned that prior to the arrival of the 
Comintern delegation no one in China had ever raised the question of forming a 
Communist party! 
Although this account seems too extreme, similar views have been expressed by more 
and more historians in recent years. For example, Dirlik confirms that "the 
Communist Party of China was a product of direct Communist International 
intervention. t, 2 A Chinese professor, Xiang Qing, also admits that the founding of the 
CCP was a direct consequence of Comintern effort to establish a Comintern Chinese 
branch in the Far East. 3 However, the CCP's official historians are reluctant to accept 
1 V. 1. Glunin, 'The Comintern and the Rise of the Communist Movement in China', 
Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, p 281. 2 Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism, p x. 3 Xiang Oing, 'The Establishment of the CCP', Zhu Chengjia (ed. ), Zhonqcionci 
clangsh! vanjiu lunwen xuan, Vol 2, p 296. 
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such views, so they attempt to explain the Russian role away. Liao Gailong's comment 
is typical: 
The assistance of the Comintem and Soviet Russia only promoted the 
foundation of the CCP. But it should not be considered as the main reason why 
the CCP was established. We cannot say that the CCP was transplanted from 
Russia by the Comintern and Soviet Russia. 4 
Hans van de Ven goes further, writing that "Comintem efforts to expand the forces of 
Communism into East Asia were not a sine qua non for the founding of the CCP"; and 
that "the role of ... Comintern agents was not a determining 
factor in the rise of 
Communist cells in China. 0 
Which point of view is closer to the historical facts? This is the question I shall 
attempt to clarify in this chapter by giving more details of the process of the founding 
of the CCP. 
Before doing so I have to point out that what I will discuss here is the CCP 
which is still in power today, because there were several Chinese Communist parties 
and organisations during that time. I have already dealt in the previous chapter with 
some "Communist" parties and organisations which once existed in China, and it is 
worthwhile to briefly introduce the Chinese organisations in Russia here, because they 
have a bearing on the subject I am discussing. 
4 Liao Gailong, 'On the Comintern, Soviet Russia and the Chinese Revolution', 
Dancishi ziliao toncixun, (1983), No 11 -2, pp 114-16. 5 Hans J van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade. The Founding of the Chinese 
Communist Party. 1920-1927, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p 56, p 
68. 
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Section 1. A Chinese Communist Party in Russia 
As early as the end of 1918, when the All-Russia Union of Chinese Workers 
was formed in Petrograd, a Communist organisation was simultaneously established in 
it with the help of the RCP(B). Afterwards, several local Chinese Communist 
organisations were formed, and one such organisation in Blagoveschensk called itself 
the Chinese Communist Party of the Amur Region. On I July 1920 the Central 
Organisational Bureau of Chinese Communists was set up under the RCP(B) in 
Moscow. Chicherin declared that this organisation's task was to become a tie linking 
the current and the future revolution in China. The Bureau's constitution stated that 
the Chinese Communists' direct duties were to accomplish a social revolution in 
China, to organise the working class and to establish Communist branches in their 
motherland. The Constitution even required the Bureau to move to China in the 
future. 6 These clauses suggest that Moscow at one stage intended to establish a 
Communist party in China through the Chinese Communist organisation in Russia 
under the direction of the RCP(B) or to move the Communist organisations which had 
already established in Russia to China directly, just as they did in Turkey and Iran. A 
leader of the Central Organisational Bureau, Liu Qian (his Russian name was 
Federov), even wrote letters in the name of the "Chinese Communist Party". In the 
autumn of 1920, the Bureau discussed the necessity of establishing branches in China 
and dispatched its members to China with this intention. From then to 1922, some of 
6 Persits, 'Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the International 
Liberation Movement', Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, pp 101-2; Xue 
Xiantian and Li Yuzhen, 'The Chinese Communist Organisations in Russia and Some 
Issues concerning the Establishment of the Communist Party in China', Jinclaish! van**u ILI 
(11989), No 5, p 16 1. 
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them contacted and even joined the CCP's local branches and also drew several 
members of the CCP into the "Chinese Communist Party" belonging to the Central 
Organisational Bureau in Russia. 7 According to Russian archives, the head of the 
Chinese Socialist Party, Jiang Kanghu, and an important member of the Datong Party, 
Yao Zuobin, joined the "Communist Party". 8 Yet the activities of the Chinese 
Communists who lived in Russia did not became a major current in the establishment 
of a Communist party in China, mainly because of its members' low level of education 
and limited capacity. 9 However, the attempt of the Chinese Communists in Russia to 
spread Communist organisation to China was a component part of the Bolsheviks' 
plan to establish a Communist party in China, and therefore should not be overlooked. 
Section 2. The Socialist League and the Origins of the CCP 
While studying the origins of the CCP one cannot ignore the Chinese Socialist 
League, which had very close relations with the CCP's early organisations. But up to 
now, only a few historians have paid attention to the Socialist League, and most of the 
books concerning the origins of the CCP have not even mentioned it. Even in Dirlik's 
book The Origins of Chinese Communism, which deals much with the important role 
of the anarchists in the early organisational activities that culminated in the founding of 
the CCP, there is not one word about the League. 
7 Xue Xiantian and Li Yuzhen, 'op. cit. ', pp 168-170. 
'3 Li Yuzhen, Sun Zhoncishan vu Gonqchanguoii, p 85. 9 According to Persits, they were "weakly grounded in Marxism-Leninism. " Ulyanovsky 
(ed. ), The Comintern and the East, p 103. 
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The Socialist League was an organisation for rallying Chinese socialists of 
different ideological persuasions, especially Marxists and anarchists, to take part in 
social revolution in China and it can be seen as an alliance of smaller groups. Since 
some CCP groups grew from within it, it is necessary to make clear the Socialist 
League's formation and development. 
As concerns the establishment of the Socialist League, Zheng Peigang's 
recollections tell us that in spring 1920 he received a letter from Hang Lingshuang, in 
which Huang wrote that after meeting Polevoy, he and Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Hua 
Lin, Wang Jingcheng plus some other people formed a Socialist League in Beijing and 
elected Chen as leader; Huang also urged Zheng to go to Shanghai to help Chen 
Duxiu, who was due to leave for Shanghai to organise the League there. 10 This 
indicates that the Socialist League must have been formed before Chen left Beijing for 
Shanghai in February 1920. Other sources suggest that the Socialist League was 
established in 1919. One source claims that not long after Chen Duxiu was released 
from prison in fall of 1919, the Socialist League was formed in Beijing. " Liang 
Bingxuan remembered that there had been a Socialist League in South China before 
Liang went to Zhangzhou in autumn 1919.12 According to Xu Deheng's 
recollections, in the winter of 1919, Li Dazhao telegraphed Xu, who was in 
Shanghai, asking him to find accommodation in Shanghai for Chen Duxiu. 13 This 
10 Gao Jun, et al. (eds. ), Wuzhenqfu zhuyi zal Zhonqquo (Anarchism in China), 
(Changsha: Hunan People's Press, 1984), p 519. 
11 Sima Lu, Zhoncigong cle chencili vu chual huodong, p 306. 12 Haiyu Guke, Jiefang bielU, pp 8-9. Thomas A. Stanley in his Osu-qi Sakae: 
An rchist in Taisho Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982, pp 132- 
4) writes that the Socialist Alliances [Leagues] founded in 1919 were products of a 
conference of Far Eastern socialists held in Shanghai. In fact, the Conference was held 
in the fall of 1920. 
13 Wang Shudi, et al. (eds), Chen Duxiu r)inqlun xuanbian (Selected Comments on 
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might hint that the plan to expand the Socialist League into Shanghai was conceived 
of as early as the end of 1919. 
In any case, the Socialist League was considered to have been organised on the 
initiative of Comintern agents. In a letter to Zheng Peigang, Polevoy declared himself 
a Bolshevik and described his desire to get in contact with the Chinese anarchists in 
order to make joint efforts in social revolution. 14 Polevoy was even a member of the 
Socialist League's first organisation. 
In Shanghai, one of Chen Duxiu's tasks was to form the Socialist League there. 
Zheng Peigang rushed to Shanghai to help Chen and introduced several anarchists, 
such as Zhang Mochi, Fei Zhemin, Zhao Shilong and Huang Bihun to him, and later 
Shen Xuanlu, Li Hanjun, Shen Zhongjiu, Wang Fuquan, Shi Cuntong, Wei Jinzhi, 
Yuan Zhenying, Wei Keshui and so on joined them. 15 The Shanghai branch was 
founded in May 1920.16 Later, a small branch of the League was set up in Hangzhou 
by Shen Zhongjiu. 17 In the summer of that year, a Soviet agent named Stromisky and 
Yang Mingzhai held a meeting of the Socialist League at Chen Duxiu's house to relay 
the Comintern's instructions to the League members and discuss how to develop social 
revolutionary work more actively. The Chinese members who were present at the 
meeting included Marxists, such as Chen Duxiu and Li Hanjun and anarchists, such as 
Chen Duxiu), (Zhengzhou: Henan People's Press, 1982), Vol 2, p 275. 
14 Zheng Peigang, 'Some Historical Facts about Anarchism in China', Ge Maochun, et 
al 
15 
(eds. ), Wuzhenqfu zhuyi sixiang ziliao xuan, Vol 2, pp 956-57. 
16 
ibid., Vol 2, pp 957-8. 
Tang Tingfen, 'The Anarchist Factions and Their Split during the May 4th Period', 
Huazhonq shifan xuekan (The Journal of the Central China Normal University), 
(Wuhan, 1981), No 3. 
17 Liu Shixin, 'Some Recollections of Anarchist Activities', Ge Maochun, et al. (eds. ), 
Wuzhenqfu zhuyi sixian-q ziliao xuan, Vol 2, p 939. 
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Zheng Peigang, Yuan Zhenying and Wei Keshui. A Korean and an Indian also 
attended the meeting. 18 
The Guangzhou branch of the Socialist League was founded by Soviet agents 
Stoyanovich (alias Minor) and Perlin in autumn 1920. With the exception of the two 
Russian Communists, all the members of the Guangzhou branch were anarchists and 
included Liang Bingxuan, Liu Shixin, Ou Shengbai, Tan Zuyin and so on. 19 
By the fall of 1920, the Socialist League had become a nation-wide 
organisation with branches in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hangzhou. 
Under the direction of the Revolutionary Bureau in Shanghai, the League's main work 
was to promote the labour movement and launch social revolution. The Socialist 
League, financed by Stromisky, set up the Youxin Printing House, which printed 
Communist and anarchist periodicals, pamphlets and leaflets. 20 Some of the League's 
branches also started publication of several weekly magazines for labourers, such as 
Laodong iie (Labour Circle) in Shanghai, Laodong yin (Workers' Voice) in Beijing 
and Laodong zhe (Labourers) in Guangzhou, which were subsidised by Comintern 
agents, and which are also counted as publications of the Communist groups. 21 These 
periodicals described the labourers' miserable life and hard work, explained to 
labourers how capitalists were exploiting them and urged them to organise trade 
unions. 
"' Zheng Peigang, 'Some Historical Facts about Anarchism in China', Ge Maochun, et 
al. (eds. ), ibid., Vol 2, p 958. We may remember that Datong Party had Korean and 
Indian members. 
19 Haiyu Guke, Jiefanq bielu; 'A Summary of the Guangzhou Communist Group', 
Gonqchan zhuvi xiaozu (The Communist Groups), Vol 2, p 679. 
2') Zheng Peigang, 'Some Historical Facts about Anarchism in China', Ge Maochun, et 
al. (eds. ), Wuzhenqfu zhuvi sixian-q ziliao xuan, Vol 2, pp 958-9. 21 2heng Peigang's Recollection', Gao Jun, et al. (eds), Wuzhen-qfu zhuvi zal 
zhonqciuo, p 520; Goncichan zhuvi xiaozu. 
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Around early 1921, an open debate on Marxism and anarchism started. Many 
members of the Socialist League were involved in it. Chen Duxiu and other Bolshevik 
followers' criticism of anarchism and the anarchists' objection to the idea of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat caused a rift within the League. As a consequence of 
this, and of the suppression of the anarchists in Russia after the Kronstadt uprising, 
many anarchists withdrew from the Socialist League. With the loss of its function as 
an alliance, the Socialist League withered away. 
The relationship between the Socialist League and the founding of the CCP 
often confuses people. In some ways, the Socialist League seems to have been a 
predecessor of the CCP, as nearly all the branches of the Socialist League became 
Communist groups within a year. For example, the Beijing Communist group was 
formed almost entirely by former members of the Socialist League with the exception 
of Zhang Shenfu and Zhang Guotao; the League's Guangzhou branch was simply 
regarded as a Communist group in a report to the Comintern. 22 But the parallel 
development in founding some branches of the Socialist League and cells of the 
Communist Party made their relations more complicated. For example, when the 
Socialist League was formed in Shanghai, the CCP's first group was also founded there 
in the same month. 
If we compare the Chinese Socialist League with the Japanese Socialist 
League, with which it had close relations and which was also supported by the 
Comintern, 23 we find that their development was similar in some ways. In a collection 
22 'Report of the Guangzhou Communist Group', Zhon-qqonq zhon- i qvanq weni an 
L Lqan i (Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the CCP, 1921-25), (Beijing: 
The CCP's Central Academy Press, 1989), pp 20-1. 23 The Japanese Socialist League was formed in July 1920, shortly after the East 
Asian Secretariat sent an agent to Japan to contact Japanese socialists, including 
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of articles published in the spring of 1922 to commemorate the Far Eastern Toilers' 
Congress, Katayama wrote that a Communist cell existed inside the Japanese Socialist 
League in 1920, and Safarov's article pointed out that the Communist Party of Japan 
was first organised in 1920.24 Since the first Communist Party in Japan - the 
Enlightened People's Communist Party - was organised by Eizo Kondo, a key member 
of the Socialist League, in August 1921, it is quite evident that Safarov counted the 
foundation of the Socialist League as the beginning of the Communist Party. Such 
being the case, we can easily explain why "A Brief History of the CCP" states that "by 
the beginning of 1920, an embryo of the CCP existed in Shanghai. By the middle of 
1920 this organisation numbered about seventy persons. ... Since the Party 
had not 
then been established, these persons cannot be called Party members but comrades. 
There were about ten comrades in Peking and ten in Canton. ... A small number 
among our comrades had had some experience and this served as the foundation of 
their future work"25 This "organisation" with about ninety members must have been 
the Socialist League, for the CCP had just over fifty members until its first congress in 
1921. The statement in the "Brief History" and the Japanese case indicate that the 
to embryo of the CCP" may have also existed inside the Socialist League. 
In view of this, the founding of the CCP cannot be treated separately from the 
founding of the Socialist League but they must also not be confused with each other. 
Marxists and anarchists there. After its foundation, a key member of the League, the 
famous anarchist Osuge, went to Shanghai to hold meetings with Voitinsky and Chen 
Duxiu and obtained Comintern funds to publish Rodo Undo (Labour Movement). 
[Iwamura Toshio, Cominterun to Nihon Kvosanto no Seiritsu (The Comintern and the 
Founding of the Communist Party of Japan), (Tokyo, 1977), p 105]; Li Dazhao and 
three other Chinese joined the Japanese Socialist League. [Jindaishi van Liu, (1985), No 
11. 
24 Quoted from lwamura Toshio, Cominterun to Nihon Kvosanto no Seiritsu), p 105. 25 Quoted from Wilbur and How, CNSAC, pp 49,52. 
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Unless the history of the Socialist League is clarified, it will be impossible to give a 
comprehensive account of the full founding process of the CCP. 
Section 3. The Process of the Formation of the Communist Groups 
The early organisations of the CCP were non-nally called "the Communist 
Groups". But according to many participants, when the first cell of the CCP was 
formed in Shanghai in 1920 it was named the "Chinese Communist Party". 26 Since the 
term "the Communist Groups" was first adopted by the Communist International and 
has been used by many histories for a long time, and in order to differentiate the early 
organisations of the CCP from the fon-nally founded CCP after its first congress, it is 
convenient to call these early organisations "the Communist Groups" here. 
There is a shared consensus among most scholars about how the Communist 
Groups were formed in China, although there are still some questions which remain to 
be examined further. However, Hans van de Ven challenges this agreement by 
arguing: "A number of early Communist organisations emerged independently of 
Comintern efforts, " and therefore, "The CCP's birth was not dependent on the activities 
of a few Comintem agents and intellectuals in Shanghai, but resulted from the 
initiatives of Chinese intellectuals throughout China and in Europe. oo27 
In order to set the historical facts straight, while giving a brief account of the 
process of the formation of the Communist groups, I would like to focus my 
discussion in the following sections on the Comintern's efforts to persuade Li Dazhao 
26 Ll Da's letter to Wang Laidi, 16 May 1957. See Wang Laidi, 'Some Problems on the 
Early Organisation of the CCP', Zhe*ian-q xuekan, (1981), No 3. 27 Hans van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade, p 56, p 243. 
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and Chen Duxiu to form the CCP, and their roles in founding the first Communist 
nucleus in Shanghai and Communist groups in other cities and also overseas. 
The Initiatives of Soviet and Comintern Agents 
Who took the initiative in establishing the CCP is a question we must answer here. 
For a long time, Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu were believed to be the originators 
of the CCP. Many historians in the PRC assert that it was Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao 
who first contemplated setting up a Communist party in China. 28 They say this 
because Gao Yihan once recalled that when Li Dazhao accompanied Chen Duxiu to 
Tianjin in February 1920, the two men talked about the possibilities of forming a 
political party in China; 29 and they believe that as a result of this discussion, Li and 
Chen agreed to make efforts to accomplish this task in the South and North 
respectively. 30 They also think this because they take for granted that Li Dazhao and 
Chen Duxiu's discussion preceded Voitinsky's arrival, before which Chinese radicals 
had no contact with Comintern and Soviet agents. This interpretation tallies neither 
with the historical facts nor the development of Li and Chen's thoughts. 
Before 1920, Chen and Li had no intention of establishing a Communist Party 
in China. Chen Duxiu even condemned any efforts to form a political party in China. 
Not long after the May 4th Movement, seeing the strength of mass organisations, Chen 
213 Xiao Chaoran and Sha Jiansun (eds. ), Zhongguo geming blannianshi (Annals of the 
Chinese Revolution), (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1984), p 57. 
29 WU Jialin and Xle Yiming, Beiging dancizuzhi de chuang'ian huodonq (Attempts to 
Establish the Beijing Communist Organisation), (Beijing, 1991), p 93. 30 Zhou Youxin, 'Li Dazhao and the Founding of the CCP', Zhu Chengjia (ed. ), 
Zhoncigong dancishi vaniiu-lunwen xuan, (Selected Theses on the History of the 
Chinese Communist Party), (Changsha: Hunan People's Press, 1983), Vol 1, p 51. 
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said: "There need be no political parties except various mass organisations. 01 In 
November 1919, in one of his articles, Chen warned the people: "Do not let them (the 
political parties) use our pure labourers and young students to form any political 
parties or labour parties. " Before autumn 1918, Li Dazhao's opinions of political 
parties were based on his tendency to conciliation. He once believed that there should 
be no room for the existence of an opposition when the nation was in crisis. 32 
Although Li later claimed that he liked to talk about Bolshevism, he was still interested 
in the "New Village" and "Mutual Aid" movements till early 1920. Even in May 1920 
Li said to Zhang Guotao that he did not think that the time was then right for the 
formation of a Communist party. 33 Unless there had been pressure from outside, Li 
Dazhao and Chen Duxiu would not have started the work of organising the CCP. 
In fact, such an outside factor existed even before 1920. The foundation of the 
Comintern in March 1919 triggered the establishment of Communist parties all over 
the world. Around the fall of 1919 the Bolsheviks placed the setting up of Communist 
parties in the Eastern countries on their agenda. The resolution which was passed by 
the Second Congress of the Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East 
stressed the "necessity of a gradual formation of communist parties in the countries of 
the East as sections of the Communist International. 04 This congress was a turning 
point for organising Communist parties in the East, and afterwards the Comintern and 
RCP(B) sent more agents to the Eastern countries with that aim in mind. 35 
31 Chen Duxiu, 'The Shandong Problem and Citizens' consciousness', 26 May 1919, 
Duxiu wencun, Vol 1, p 646. 
; 3z LO Mingzhuo, U Dazhao sixiang vanjiu, p 115. 33 Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Pa , Vol 1, p 90. 34 Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, p 164. 35 In early 1920, in a letter to the Central Bureau of the Communist Organisations of 
the Peoples of the East, Mustafa Subhi, the head of the Council for International 
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According to Peng Shuzhi's account, which is based on Li Dazhao's 
recollections, at the end of 1919, a Russian Communist, Hoholovkin, mandated by the 
Comintern, visited Li at Beijing University and discussed with him the possibility of 
forming a Communist Party in China. 36 One of Hu Shi's talks revealed that a Soviet 
representative also visited Chen Duxiu in Beijing to talk about the establishment of a 
Communist party in China. 37 This visit was probably made in the fall of 1919. Li 
Lisan's report in 1930 shows that when Chen Duxiu once went to Tianjin, a 
correspondent of the Comintern News Agency contacted him and then they went 
together to Shanghai to discuss the fon-nation of a Communist party. 38 Li Lisan did 
not mention when this event took place, but it probably happened in January or 
February of 1920 for Chen went via Tianjin to Shanghai twice during those two 
months. 39 In February, at a meeting held at the Yong-An Hotel in Shanghai, the main 
speaker revealed that some "true well wishers of China" advised the Chinese to forrn a 
Bolshevik-style society. 40 The "true well wishers of China" meant Bolshevik agents, 
especially Lizerovitch, who attended the meeting; and the people present included Li 
Hanjun, who later collaborated with Chen Duxiu in establishing the CCP in Shanghai. 
Around this time, Pak Chin-sen, who came from the Comintern, also attempted to set 
up a Communist Party in Shanghai and established contact with Chen Duxiu through 
Huang Jiemin. 
Propaganda, reported: "We have already sent hundreds of comrades for responsible 
Party work to all countries, but they have to be sent in thousands . ..... See Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, p 89. 
36 Peng Shuzhi, 'How Did the First Communist Group Take FormT, Peng Shuzhi 
Vol 1, p 43. In another article, Peng wrote that this visit took place in early 1920. 
Ergang, 'Some Facts about Hu Shi', Yan Zhenwu (ed. ), Hu Shi vaniiu conqlu, 
Beijing: Sanlian Press, 1989, p 13. 38 U Lisan, 'A Report on the History of the CCP', ZDBX, p 211. 39 Wang Guangyuan (ed. ), Chen Duxiu nianpu, pp 78-81. 40 FO 228/3214,8 April 1920; FO 405/228,7 April 1920. 
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The above evidence indicates that the Comintern and Soviet agents proposed to 
establish a Communist party in China before spring 1920, and they especially 
contacted Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Li Hanjun and Huang Jiernin directly or indirectly 
and urged them to take a lead in starting organisational work. Chen Duxiu later 
admitted frankly that he had only "followed the appeal to organise the Chinese 
Communist party in 1920. , 41 Zhang Shen-fu, a close friend of Chen and Li and one of 
the CCP founders, also recalled: "We were rather childish at the time. Establishing the 
CCP was promoted by the 3rd International. oo42 These show that without the Soviet 
agents' influence and suggestions, Chinese radical intellectuals would not even have 
thought of establishing a Communist party in China at the time. 
Voitinsky is considered to have played the part of "chief architect" in founding 
the CCp. 43 However, his team's dispatch to China related to the earlier agents' 
preparatory activities. As Voitinsky told the Chinese, before he was sent to China the 
RCP(B) and the Comintern's relevant authorities had received several telegrams from 
Vladivostok and were made familiar with the situation in China-44 They probably 
obtained reports from their agents such as Hoholovkin and Burtman. 45 On their arrival 
in Beijing, through the recommendation of Polevoy and Ivanov, Voitinsky's team held 
several meetings with Li Dazhao and several young students. Polevoy and Ivanov's 
41 Chen wrote this to refute the Comintern's accusation against his "opportunistic 
policy" which led to the failure of the Great Revolution of China in 1927. Quoted from 
Daniels (ed. ), A Documentary History of Communism, Vol 2, p 293. 42 Yida qianhou, Vol 2, p 588. 
43 ik, The Origins of Chinese Communism, p 191. 
44 Li Da, 'Memoir of the CCP's Foundation and Its First and Second Congresses', Yida 
gianhou, Vol 2, p 6. 
45 Peng Shuzhl wrote in his 'How did the First Communist Group Take Form? '[ Peng 
Shuzhi xuanii, Vol 1, p 45] that Voitinsky was dispatched to China as soon as the 
Comintern obtained the report by Hohonovky; According to Kasanin [China in the 
Twenties, pp 14-5], after Burtman returned to Siberia in early 1920, he was appointed 
the director of the Eastern Nationalities Section of the Siberia Bureau of the RCP(B). 
This section directly led the work of Voitinsky's team. 
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recommendation was never an "accidental case", as some scholars believe, 46 they had 
already established contacts with radical Chinese. Nevertheless, Voitinsky's visit was 
obviously crucial in triggering the establishment of the CCP. In talks with radical 
Chinese in Beijing, Voitinsky suggested to them that what they needed most was "an 
organisation similar to the Russian Communist Party. , 47 Voitinsky's team's advent 
almost coincided with the foundation of the Marxist Study Society of Beijing 
University. It was said that Li Dazhao encouraged Voitinsky to discuss the problem of 
forming the CCP with Chen Duxiu in Shanghai. In fact, going to Shanghai was the 
original plan of Voitinsky's team, since one of their tasks was to study the possibilities 
for setting up the East Asian Secretariat of the Comintern in Shanghai. 48 
As soon as Voitinsky's team arrived in Shanghai, they got in touch with the 
office of ShanRhai Life. This had probably been arranged previously by Vilensky, 
who financed Shanghai Life and dispatched Voitinsky's team. On the foundation 
which had already been laid by several Soviet agents, and with their assistance, 
Voitinsky started his work of organising a Communist Party in China. Voitinsky' role 
in this was important. However, he was not the first or the only Bolshevik agent who 
initiated the formation of the CCP, and Soviet and Comintern agentsjoint efforts to set 
up a Communist Party can be noted before and around the time of his arrival in China. 
The Birth of the First Communist Nucleus in Shanghai 
46 Xue Xiantian, 'The Comintern's Strategy of Establishing Parties and the Way of the 
Formation of the CCP', Shiiie lishi (The World History), (Beijing, 1989), No 4. 
47 'Luo, Zhanglong's Recollection', Yida gianhoU, Vol 2, p 197. 48 Shevelyov, 'On the History of the Formation of the Communist Party of China', Far 
Eastern Affairs, (1981), No 1, p 129. 
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As early as 1912, Lenin hoped that a Chinese proletarian party, similar to the 
Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, would appear in Shanghai - the most 
advanced industrial city in China. 49 Establishing a Communist party based on the 
organisations of industrial workers in Shanghai was obviously the Bolsheviks' original 
plan. For this reason, the Comintern and Soviet agents once tried to turn the Datong 
Party, which had close relations with trade unions in Shanghai, into a Communist 
party; and they also urged radical Chinese intellectuals, such as Chen Duxiu, to 
participate in the labour movements in Shanghai. 
When talking about the origins of the CCP, Cai Hesen pointed out that Chen 
Duxiu's move to Shanghai in early 1920 was not his personal action and was part of a 
50 larger plan. We shall remember that a Comintem agent accompanied Chen to 
Shanghai in early 1920 to discuss the formation of a Communist party there. 51 Chen's 
purpose for going to Shanghai, was said to be to use Shanghai "as the base of the 
labour movement and the centre of his work", because he "fully realised the close 
connections between party and labour organisation". 52 Soon after he reached 
Shanghai, Chen devoted the greater part of his attention to the labour movement and 
came into contact with the All-China Industrial Federation, the Shanghai Ship and 
Godown Workers' Union and several other worker organisations which had close 
relations with the Datong Party and Soviet agents. He was also involved in the 
preparations for the World Labour Commemoration Rally of I May 1920, of which 
49 Lenin, 'Democracy and Narodism in China', Lenin Collected Works, Vol 18, p 169. 
'90 Cal Hesen, 'Development in the History of the CCP', (1926), ZDBX, p 10. 51 Li Lisan, 'A Report on the History of the CCP', ZDBX, p 211. 52 'A Brief History of the CCP', Wilbur and How, CNSAC, p 48. 
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Huang Jiemin of the Datong Party took charge. The 1920 May Day movement was 
specially regarded as an important event related to the origins of the CCp. 53 
However, the co-operation lasted a very short time. Vilensky, after making 
investigations in China by himself and Abramson during the summer of 1920, found 
that in Shanghai and elsewhere "there was not a single workers' cell" and hardly any 
proletarian movement to speak of; meanwhile, he noticed that a group of Chinese 
professors such as Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao were leading a big student movement. 54 
This might be a reason that the Bolsheviks decided to make Chen and Li's group the 
centre of gravity for the formation of the CCP. 
Now, let us focus our attention on some radical intellectuals' organisations 
which laid the direct foundation for the CCP. 
After reaching Shanghai, Chen Duxiu soon got in touch with the weekly 
Xinggi vinRjun, whose editors Dai Jitao and Li Hanjun were writing articles 
introducing Marxism, and Chen Duxiu was said to have participated in the editing of 
the journal, too. 55 Chen also prepared to move Xin gingnian to Shanghai. Having 
studied the situation in Shanghai, Voitinsky's team worked out a plan to unite the 
forces grouped around some progressive journals, such as Xin ginlznian, Xinggi 
53 Qu Qiubai, 'Outline of the History of the CCP', Qu Qiubal wenii, (Writings of Qu 
Qiubai), (Politics), (Beijing, People's Press, 1996), Vol 6, p 875. 54'Vilensky to Trotsky, 8 April 1928'; Quoted from Leong Sow--theng, Sino-Soviet 
Relations: The First Phase. 1917-20, (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 
1971), p 147. It was reported that Vilensky's Chinese interpreter, Abramson, made 
contact with workers and students in Shanghai and had an intimate understanding of 
their thinking, emotions and activities. See LI Yuzhen, Sun Zhongshan vu 
Gonqchanquoii, p 86. 
" Gesalyov, "The formation of the CCP', in Dancishi ziliao (Materials on the History of 
the CCP), (1953), No 7. 
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Vinglun and Shishi xinbao, hoping that these publications' leaders would take the lead 
in forming a Communist or Socialist Party in China. 56 
According to "A Brief History of the CCP", at the beginning of 1920, Chen 
and his associates, Dai Jitao, Shen Xuanlu, Chen Wangdao, Li Hanjun, Shi Cuntong 
and Yu Xiusong, organised a group in Shanghai. 57 This group can be identified with 
the Society for Studying Marxism in Shanghai, which actually formed around May, 
instead of the beginning of 1920; the Society for Studying Marxism in fact served as a 
front for the "embryo" of the CCp. 58 At first, this "Society" or "Group" consisted only 
of persons who belonged to or had connections with the office of Xinagi 12inglun. 
Zhang Dongxun of Shishi xinbao was not involved, perhaps because as a guild 
socialist, he was not willing tojoin a Marxist group. Voitinsky and other Soviet agents 
had something to do with the formation of this organisation. Before May Day 1920, 
Voitinsky visited the Office of Xinggi Pinglun, and talked with the staff of Xinggi 
Pinglun and Chen DuxiU. 59 Lizerovitch and Lundon were also in frequent contact with 
Xinggi pinglun's key editors then, especially Li Hanjun. 60 
56 Qiwu Laoren, 'Before and After the Formation of the CCP', Quoted from Far 
Eastern Affairs, (1981), No 1, p 129. Those journals were therefore regarded as the 
"cells" for forming the CCP. Also see Qu Qiubal, 'Outline of the History of the CCP', 
ZDBX, p 200. r7Q6oted from Wilbur and How, CNSAC, pp 48-9. 
*5'3 Ibid., 49. Also see Chen Wangdao, Shao Lizi and Li Da's recollections in Yida 
qianhou. According to Chen Wangdao, before the foundation of the Shanghai 
Communist Group, Chen Duxiu, Li Hanjun, Chen himself and some other people 
organised a Marxist Research Society in Shanghai. The Society for Studying Marxism 
was the public, external name, while they called it "Communist Party" internally. 
I'Dancishi ziliao conqkan (The CCP's Historical Materials Series), (Shanghai, 1980), No 
8]. 
59 'Chen Gongpei's Collections', Yida gianhou, Vol 2, p 564, 60 FO 228/3214,22 April 1920; May 1920. 
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In June, "Voitinsky proposed establishing a Communist party". 61 From then 
on, he and some other emissaries convoked several semi-overt discussion meetings, 
whose topic was to discuss "the methods to organise the Communist Party". 62 ZhOU 
Fohai in his recollections gave a detailed account of Voitinsky's speech at one such 
meeting. According to Zhou, Voitinsky said that without a dominant theoretical 
current and without organisation, the Chinese revolution could not be pushed forward; 
and he concluded with the hope that those present at the meeting "should organise a 
Chinese Communist Party". 63 Since there were no organisational formalities at this 
stage, the people who attended such meetings could withdraw freely and attendance at 
every meeting was not quite the same. That is why several participants were 
mistakenly counted among the founding members of the CCP. Shortly after the 
proposal to form a Communist party was put forth definitely, Dai Jitao, the editor of 
Xinjzqi vinglun, dropped out; so did some other participants. 
In the middle of June, a preparatory meeting for establishing a Communist 
Party was held by Chen Duxiu, Li Hanjun, Shen Xuanlu, Shi Cuntong and Chen 
Gongpei in Shanghai, and at the meeting the Party's programme was drafted . 
64 yU 
Xiusong's recently discovered diary dated 10 July recorded that he and some other 
people had formed a "Social Communist Party" several days before, and that he had 
felt confused about Bolshevism and anarchism during that time, but realised he was 
61 Shi Cuntong: 'Some Problems during the Period of the Formation of the CCP', Yida 
gianhou, Vol 2, p 34. 
62 'Yuan Zhenying's Recollections', Yida gianhou, Vol 2, p 472. 
63 Chen Gongbo Zhou Fohai huivilu hebian (collected Memoirs of Chen Gongbo and 
Zhou Fohai), (Hong Kong: Chunqiu Press, 1967), p 114. 64 Shi Fuliang (Shi Cuntong), 'Some Problems on the foundation of the CCP', Yida 
gianhou, Vol 2, p 34; 'Chen Gongpei's Recollections', ibid., Vol 2, p 564. According to 
Ishikawa, Yoshihiro's textual research, this meeting was also a farewell party for Shi 
Cuntong to Japan, which was held before June 17th. See his article, 'Shi Cuntong in 
His Youth', Tovoshi Kenkvu, (1994), Vol 53, No 2. 
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wrong to have followed anarchism blindly. 65 This suggests that the Social Communist 
Party Yu Xiusong and others formed might have served as an interim organisation 
between the Socialist League and a purely Communists organisation. Anyway, this 
meeting of five people was very important in the process of establishing the CCP since 
the report of the First Congress of the CCP to the Comintern writes: "the Chinese 
Communist organisation was established in the middle of last year [i. e. 1920]. 
Initially, the Shanghai organisation had only five members in total. P966 
Around this time a "Socialist Party" appeared in Shanghai. Liu Shaozhou in 
his speech at the Second Congress of the Comintern said that Xingqi pinglun was 
published by the "Socialist Party" of Shanghai, and that this party was "Marxist". 67 
The party Liu referred to was surely not the Socialist Party founded by Jiang Kanghu, 
and might not be the Socialist League because most members of the League did not 
believe in Marxism. It was probably an alternative name for the Social Communist 
Party or the Communist Party, which grew from the Society of Studying Marxism and 
which had close connections with Xinggi pinglun. 68 This can be confirmed by the 
following evidence: in the summer of 1920, Chen Duxiu wrote a letter to Li Dazhao to 
65 Shanghai dangshi (The History of the CCP in Shanghai), (Shanghai, 1991), No 7. 
66 First Congress of the Communist Party of China', written in the second half of 
1921, Gonqchan zhuyi xiaozu, Vol 1, p 52. 
67 Liu Shaozhou's speech at the Second Congress of the Comintern, Second 
Congress of the Communist International, Vol 1, P 139. Xiang Oing asserts: 'This 
speech of Liu's showed that he did not know the activities of the Party establishment in 
China at all. " [The Comintern and the Chinese Revolution during the Period of the 
Establishment of the CCP', Jindaish! vaniiu, (1980), No 4]. 1 believe that what Liu said 
was not purely fictitious, and we should not deny it arbitrarily, but instead, should try 
harder to find more historical evidence about "the Socialist Party". 
68 When 
, 
Xingal ginglun stopped publication in June 1920, its staff stated that they 
intended to study socialism and publish periodicals on propagating socialism and books 
on socialism. [Xingal vinglun, 6 June 1920, No 53]; Afterwards, a "Social Sciences 
Study Society" appeared in Shanghai and the Society was located in Ll Hanjun's house, 
which was also used as a place of the Communist group's activities ['Shen Yanbing's 
Recollections', Yida gianhou, Vol 2, p 46]. 
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solicit Li's opinions on what name would be better for his new party: "Communist 
Party" or "Socialist Party", and Li's reply suggested that it should be called the 
Communist party. 69 Chen Duxiu himself wrote in an article published in September 
1920 that "our party" was the "Socialist Party". 70 In October 1920, in a telegram to the 
Beijing Government He Fenglin reported: "Chen Duxiu of the Socialist Party, 
colluding with the Russian [Bolshevik] Party and Liu Helin, have organised a 
machinery workers' union in the foreign settlements [of Shanghai], and published 
journals to spread socialiSM.,, 71 
The "Social Communist Party" and "Socialist Party" have puzzled some 
historians. If we probe into the process by which the CCP was established, indeed we 
find that a number of Bolsheviks explicitly intended this process by which smaller and 
various communist and socialist organisations should be conglomerated, or established 
the Communist party step by step. Therefore, there is nothing strange about there 
being so many organisations with "communist' 'or "socialist" in their names, or there 
being several alternative and temporary names for the Communist Party's early 
organisations. 
In June 1920, Voitinsky wrote in a letter: "Our task at the moment is to unify 
the various scattered revolutionary organisations into one centre. Qunyi Publishing 
House can be the core of those groups. ... In order to co-ordinate and concentrate the 
activities of different organisations, we are making preparation for a joint conference 
697hang Shenfu's Recollections', Yida gianhou, Vol 2, pp 220-21. 70 Chen Duxiu, 'My Views on the Current Situation', Xin clingnian, Vol 8, No 1, 
September 1920. 
Shen bao, 16 October 1920. 
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of socialists and anarchists in North China. "72 This indicates that Voitinsky did not 
intend formally to organise a purely Communist party at once. 
Around this time, Vilensky, the supervisor of Voitinsky's team, came to China. 
As soon as he arrived in Beijing, he convened a meeting of the Russian Communists 
working in China on 5-7 July 1920. One topic of this meeting was to discuss the 
establishment of the Chinese Communist Party. Vilensky pointed out that the 
conditions for establishing a Communist Party in China had matured, and the 
participants agreed that it would be possible to convene a congress and to complete the 
work of founding the CCP thoroughly. 73 Afterwards the work of establishing the CCP 
was speeded up. On 19 July, a meeting of "the more active Chinese comrades" took 
place in Shanghai, at which Chen Duxiu, Li Hanjun and Shen Xuanlu firmly 
advocated the establishment of a Communist Party. Shortly they were joined by Yu 
Xiusong, Li Da (the latter returned from Japan in August), Zhou Fohai and others. It is 
claimed that the meeting in July laid the foundations for the future CCp. 74 Around 
August, the CCP was set up in Shanghai with Chen Duxiu as the secretary. Li Hanjun 
drafted the Party Constitution, which contains six or seven items, the main ones being 
"the dictatorship of the workers and the peasants and co-operative production". 75 
This Communist organisation in Shanghai was the founding cell of the CCP 
and worked as a sponsoring group of the CCP. Around the same time, a 
72 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 28. The Qunyi Publishing House once printed Xin Qin-qnian and 
was located in Shanghai. 
73 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 41; Yang Yunruo and Yang Kuisong, Gonqchancluo'i he ZhonC--lquo 
geming (The Comintern and the Chinese Revolution), (Shanghai: Shanghai People's 
Press, 1988), p 16. 
74 Shevelyov, 'On the History of the Communist Party of China', Far Eastern Affairs, 
(1981), No 1, p 128. 
75 Ll Da, 'Memoirs on Founding of the CCP and its First Congress', Yida gianhou, Vol 
2, p 7. 
311 
"Revolutionary Bureau" was established in Shanghai, consisting of five members: 
Voitinsky and four Chinese Communists, including Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and Li 
Hanjun. The Bureau in Shanghai acted as a central bureau and subsidiary bureaux 
were set up one after another in Beijing, Tianjin and Guangzhou with Polevoy, 
Stoyanovich and some other members of the RCP(B) in charge. 76 
Yang Kuisong believes that the Revolutionary Bureau was the "leading core" 
which "derived from the Socialist League" and was the same thing as the sponsoring 
group of the CCp. 77 This is quite wrong. The Revolutionary Bureau must not be 
confused with the sponsoring group of the CCP, for the latter included all the members 
of the Shanghai branch of the CCP, whereas the Revolutionary Bureau and its 
subsidiary bureaux' leading cadres were mainly Russian Bolsheviks with a few very 
important Chinese Communists. The (Chinese) Revolutionary Bureau, in common 
with its parallel organisation - the Korean Revolutionary Bureau - was a subsidiary 
section of the East Asian Secretariat, and it was an organisation superior to the 
sponsoring group of the CCP for leading revolutionary movements in China. At any 
rate, it is unquestionable that there was a centre in Shanghai for directing the 
establishment of the CCP. 
The Communist Groups in Other Cities 
76 Kartunova, 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of China, 1920-1922', 
Problemv Dal'neqo Vostoka, (11973), No 1. 
" Yang Kuisong, 'The Historical Facts of the CCP's Shanghai Sponsoring Group from 
the Archives of the Comintern', Zhonciclong danqshi vaniiU, (1996), No 4; in this article, 
Yang considers that the meeting of 19 July 1920 was a founding meeting of the 
Socialist League and denies there was any Communist group in Shanghai before the 
Revolutionary Bureau was formed. 
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Under the direction of the Revolutionary Bureau, the sponsoring group of the 
CCP took the responsibility for promoting Communist groups across China. The key 
members of the sponsoring group, such as Chen Duxiu and Li Hanjun, tried their best 
to find their personal links separately and persuaded their radical friends in other cities 
to set up local Communist groups. 
Through Chen Duxiu's regular correspondence with Li Dazhao in Beijing, Li 
had kept abreast of developments in Shanghai before Chen demanded that he form a 
Communist group in the capital of China. When their colleague at Beijing University, 
Zhang Shen-fu, stayed in Shanghai in September 1920, Chen Duxiu asked him to urge 
Li Dazhao to set up a Communist organisation in Beijing as soon as possible. Later 
that month, the Beijing Communist Group was established with three initial members: 
Li Dazhao, Zhang Shen-fu and Zhang Guotao. All these people were members of the 
Marxist Research Society at Beijing University and had met with Voitinsky in the 
spring. Before long, Zhang Shenfu went to France, and six anarchists, Huang 
Lingshuang, Hua Lin, Chen Derong, Zhang Bogen, Wang Jinglin and Yuan 
Mingxiong, were drawn into the group. These anarchists were said to have "sneaked 
into" the Communist organisation in Beijing. 78 Some historians also cannot explain 
why there were so many anarchist members in the Beijing Communist Group. If we 
take account of Polevoy's role in establishing the Beijing group, this phenomenon will 
be easy to explain. Qu Qiubai in his report to the Comintern in January 1921 wrote 
that Professor Polevoy's group assisted Voitinsky in establishing Communist circles in 
78 'The Report of the Beijing Communist Organisation', 1921, Translated from the 
Archives of the CCP's Delegation to the Comintern, quoted from Gon-cichan zhuyi 
xiaozu, Vol 1, p 14. 
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North China . 
79 Now we know that Polevoy was a member of the Beijing Bureau of 
the Revolutionary Bureau. Since he was an initiator of the Socialist League and had 
close relations with some anarchists in Beijing and Tianjin, it was natural for him to 
recruit members of the Socialist League into the Communist Group. Luo Zhanglong, 
who laterjoined the Beijing group with Liu Renjing, recalled that they (the believers in 
Marxism) were once on very intimate terms with the anarchists and co-operated well. 80 
But when the group discussed the draft programme of the CCP, the anarchist members 
disagreed with the clause on the dictatorship of the proletariat. After an argument, 
Huang Lingshuang and two other anarchists withdrew from the group, but three 
remained, including Chen Derong. Afterwards, more former members of the Marxist 
Research Societyjoined the group. 
Under the direction of the Beijing Bureau, the Beijing Group (Branch) of the 
CCP also acted as a centre in North China to help the formation of the Communist 
groups in other cities. 
In April 1920, when Voitinsky's team left Beijing for Shanghai, they stopped 
off in Jinan, Shandong province, which was the home town of Yang Mingzhai, 
Voitinsky's interpreter. They talked with Wang Jinmei, Deng Enming, Wang 
Xiangqian and some other secondary school students, most of whom were members of 
the Society for the Promotion of the New Study (Lixin Xuehui) organised in the latter 
half of 1919, about propagating Marxism and organising a Communist organisation 
79 Bulletin of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern, No 1, February 1921; 
quoted from Glunin, 'The Comintern and the Rise of the Communist Movement in 
China', Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East, p 283. '30 Luo Zhanglong, 'Recollections on Some Problems of the Founding of the CCP', 
Yida gianhoU, Vol 2, p 200. 
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there .81 This meeting had probably been arranged by Li Dazhao previously, because 
he had met Wang Jinmei during the May 4th Movement. Afterwards, Li Dazhao's 
Beijing Communist Group sent comrades to assist them in the work of establishing a 
group. From Shanghai, Chen Duxiu wrote a letter in summer 1920 to his friend Wang 
Leping, an old member of the GMD and a member of Parliament, who had founded a 
book society - Qilu Shushe in early 1920, asking him to form a Communist group in 
Shandong. Wang passed on those words to Wang Jinmei and Deng Enming and 
encouraged them to take up the work. Although Wang Leping joined the CCP, he 
himself was not much involved in organisational. activities. 82 The Jinan Communist 
Group was founded around winter 1920 with members such as Wang Xiangqian, 
Wang Fuyuan, Jia Naifu as well as the above three founders. It was the second 
Communist group to appear in North China. 
The establishment of the Wuhan Communist Group was directly initiated by 
the Shanghai sponsoring group. In summer 1920, Li Hanjun wrote to his friends Dong 
Biwu and Mang Guoen in Wuhan, whom Li had met in Shanghai in the previous year 
and talked about following the path of the October Revolution to reform China 
83 completely, and asked them to organise a Communist group in Wuhan. Around the 
same time, when Liu Bochui, a lawyer, stopped over in Shanghai, he was admitted into 
81 Zhou Zixin, 'The Shandong Communist Group', Dancishi van'iu (Studies of the Party 
History), (1980), No 2. 
82 Wang Leping set up the Qilu Book Society at the end of 1920 to promote the sale 
of progressive books in Shandong. He was later invited to attend the Far Eastern 
Toilers Congress as a representative of the CCP. Cf. Zhou Yangru, 'The Shanghai 
Communist Group, Zhu Chengjia (ed. ), Zhonciciong dancishi vaniiu lunwenxuan, Vol 1, 
p 101; Li Zhao, 'Wang Leping Should Be the Founder of the Jinan Communist Group, 
Renwu (Outstanding Personages), (Beijing, Sanlian Press, 1993), No 5. T3 - 
Dong Biwu, 'The Founding of the CCP', Yida gianhou, Vol 2, p 292; Dong Biwu, 
Wuhan sili zhonqxue lianii. Dong therefore described Ll Hanjun as "my Marxism 
teacher". 
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the Communist Party and was entrusted by Chen Duxiu with responsibility for setting 
up a group of the CCP in Wuhan. Upon his return to Wuhan, Liu Bochui contacted 
Bao, Huiseng, Dong Biwu, Chen Tanqiu and Zheng Kaiqing, who was a university 
janitor and had met Chen Duxiu by chance in Wuhan early that year, to discuss matters 
relating to the establishment of the Wuhan Communist Group. Sometime in autumn 
1920, the above-mentioned people plus Zhang Guoen and Zhao Zijian held a meeting 
at which they decided to form a Communist Group in Wuhan. 84 Around the same 
time, a Marxist Study Society was formed by the same people. Later, Li Hanjun came 
to Wuhan to give advice and lectures to this Group. 
The Soviet agents also offered assistance to the Communists in Wuhan. In the 
winter of that year, Mamayev and Polevoy were sent to Wuhan to do organisational 
work. Their tasks included establishing the Wuhan Branch of the Revolutionary 
Bureau 85 and a foreign language school. In addition, they gave instructions to the 
Wuhan group and encouraged them to study revolutionary theory and stressed "the 
Communist Party's iron discipline. " They tried to enlist members of the Book Society 
for Benefiting the Masses (Liqun Shushe), a radical local student group, which had 
anarchist tendencies and was actively involved with the "new village" and the labour- 
leaming movements, into the Communist group. 86 In April 1921, Lizerovitch and 
Maher, in the company of Huang Lingshuang and Yuang Zhenying, two anarchists, 
came to Wuhan, 87 and they further persuaded the Liqun Book Society members to join 
84Bao Huiseng, 'Recollections on the Period of the First Congress of the CCP', Yida 
qianhou, Vol 2, pp 312-3. "5 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 35. 
136 Fao Huiseng, 'Some Problems on the First Congress of the CCP', Yida qianhou, 
Vol 2, pp 373-4. 87 FO 228/3211, May 1921. 
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88 the Communist group. As a result of their joint efforts, this Society was reorganised 
as the Coexistence Society (Gongcun She), aiming to achieve human coexistence by 
way of class struggle and the dictatorship of the workers and peasants. The soýiety's 
leaders, Yun Daiying and Lin Yunan, who had played leading roles in the May 4th 
Movement in Wuhan, later became famous Communists. 
Guangzhou is an important city in South China. In August 1920, Chen Duxiu 
wrote a letter to Tan Pingshan, Chen Gongbo and Tan Zhitang in Guangzhou, 
suggesting to them that a Communist group should be set up there. Tan Pingshan, 
Chen Gongbo and Tan Zhitang were former students of Beijing University and after 
graduating, they started publication of Zheng heng in Shanghai in April, so they had 
kept close personal links with Chen Duxiu. After receiving Chen Duxiu's letter, they 
first set up the Socialist Youth League and prepared to establish a Communist 
organisation in Guangzhou. Unexpectedly, the course of events changed this. 
In September 1920, Voitinsky sent Stoyanovich (Minor) and Perlin to 
Guangzhou with instructions for the establishment of a Guangzhou branch of the 
Revolutionary Bureau . 
89 The two agents were first introduced by Huang Lingshuang, 
a member of the Socialist League in Beijing, who accompanied them as interpreter, to 
seven anarchists, Liang Bing Xuan, Liu Shixin and others. They soon formed a branch 
of the Socialist League there. Towards the end of 1920, the Socialist League branch 
became a Communist group. Tan Pingshan and Chen Gongbo refused to join this 
group, which Chen Gongbo later called "an anarchist communist party", for, "of the 
nine members of its executive committee, only Peslin [Perlin] and Minor were 
13'3 'Recollections of Yuang Zhenying', Yida gianhou, Vol 2, p 475. 89 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 33. 
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Communists". 90 In view of this group's anarchist inclinations, this episode of the 
formation of the Guangzhou Communist Group has been belittled and neglected by 
many historians. 
In January 1921, Voitinsky and Chen Duxiu arrived in Guangzhou. At first 
they still held that the Marxists and anarchists "should co-operate" and "would not 
separate". 91 But the anarchist members were reluctant to obey and carry out orders 
from the central body, so they withdrew from the organisation. Around the spring of 
that year, the "true Communist Party" was organised by Chen Duxiu, Chen Gongbo, 
Tan Pingshan and Tan Zhitang in Guangzhou. 
The Changsha Communist group's first members came from among the radical 
members of the New Citizen's Society including Mao Zedong, Peng Huang and He 
Shuheng. This Communist group was also, set up at the urging of Shanghai. During 
May-July 1920, while Chen Duxiu was organising the CCP, both Mao and Peng took 
part in the Work and Study Mutual Aid Corps in Shanghai, and they often visited Chen 
at his residence. Mao later recollected: "The words Chen Duxiu uttered about his 
beliefs made a deep impression on my mind at the turning point of my life. 02 On their 
return to Changsha, Mao and Peng Huang organised the Russian Study Society in 
August 1920. This plan had been contemplated several months earlier and discussed 
with Li Dazhao, with whom Mao kept in close contact after he left Beijing University 
library. The Society purchased books on the October Revolution and Soviet Russia 
90'Report of Guangzhou Communist Party, Zhonqc vanc LI, pp gong zhon-a i weniian xuan** 
20-1. 
91 U Changren's Recollections', Tan Pingshan yaniiu shiliao (Research Material on 
Tan Pingshan), (Guangzhou: Guangdong People's Press, 1989), p 408. 92 'Mao Zedong's Recollections on the Period of the First Congress of the CCP', Yida 
gianhou, Vol 2, p 245. 
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and tried to invite some Russians from Shanghai to teach Russian. It also tried to 
contact Soviet representatives in Beijing. 
After receiving Chen Duxiu and Li Da! s letters about the developments in 
Shanghai, Mao set about organising a Communist group in Changsha. Later, the 
Shanghai sponsoring group posted its organ, Gongchan dMZ and some Communist 
93 documents and pamphlets to Mao. Around late autumn 1920, the Changsha 
Communist Group came into existence. 
The Overseas Conununist Groups 
In addition to the Communist groups in China, similar groups were also 
established abroad - one was in France and the other in Japan. Neither group was an 
autonomous Communist organisation; both had close connections with the Shanghai 
sponsoring group and were organised by the people who had joined early Communist 
organisations in China. 
Between 1919 and 1920, thousands of Chinese students went to France under a 
work-study scheme. Before Chen Gongpei went to France to study, he had attended 
the preparatory meeting to establish the CCP in Shanghai in June and even took a draft 
Party programme with him. Zhao Shiyan, who had been active in Beijing during the 
May 4th Movement, was admitted to the CCP's sponsoring group by Chen Duxiu in 
Shanghai before his departure to France. In the fall of 1920, Zhang Shenfu, one of the 
founding members of the Beijing Communist Group, came to take up a teaching post 
at the Sino-French University in Lyon. These three people had the task of developing 
Communist organisations in France and other European countries. At the beginning of 
93 7hang Wenliang's Diary', 27 December 1920; Goncichanzhuvi xiaozu, Vol 2, p 518. 
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1921, Zhang Shenfu recommended Liu Qingyang and Zhou Enlai, who were both 
members of the Awakening Society in Tianjin, for party membership. In spring of that 
year, after receiving a letter from Chen Duxiu in Shanghai, Zhang Shenfu, Zhao 
Shiyan, Chen Gongpei, Liu Qingyang and Zhou Enlai formed a Communist group in 
Paris, which remained secret until 1922 when Zhao Shiyan and Zhou Enlai founded 
the Youth Communist Party. Many members of this organisation later became 
important Communist leaders, including such people as Zhou Enlai, Cai Hesen, Deng 
Xiaoping, Li Lisan, Wang Ruofei, Li Weihan, Xiang Jingyu, Nie Rongzhen, Chen Yi 
and Li Fuchun. 
In Japan there were two members of the CCP: Shi Cuntong and Zhou Fohai, 
who had both been involved in preparing to establish the CCP in Shanghai before they 
went to Japan to study in summer 1920. Shi Cuntong, who was studying in Tokyo, 
later got in touch with Zhou Fohai in another city for the purpose of exchanging ideas, 
and they also kept in correspondence with the Shanghai sponsoring group. Before the 
founding congress of the CCP, they did not recruit any new Party members, but 
established relations with several radical Chinese students in Japan, such as Peng Pai, 
Lin Kongzhao and Yang 7-izhen. In summer 1921, Shi Cuntong helped Zhang Tailei, 
who had been then sent by the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern to Japan, to 
contact Japanese Communists. 94 
94 Cf. 'The Chronological Table of Peng Pai's Life', Peng Pal wenil (Collected Works of 
Peng Pai), (Beijing: People's Press, 1981), p 366. Ishikawa Yoshihiro, 'Shi Cuntong in 
His Youth', Toyoshi Kenkyu, Vol 53, No 2, pp 96-7. 
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Other sources suggest that some CP groups were also set up in Tianjin, 
Nanjing, Xuzhou, Henan and Hong Kong before July 1921.95 However, there is not 
enough available evidence to prove their existence. 
Section 4. The Founding of the Chinese Socialist Youth League 
The Chinese Socialist Youth League (SY) groups were sometimes considered 
as Communist groups for they served as a reserve force of the CCP, or a Communist 
preparatory school. For example, Zhang Tailei's report to the 3rd Congress of the 
Comintern accounted the group of the SY in Tianjin a Communist organisation. 96 
95 'Zhang Tailei's Report to the 3rd Congress of the Comintern' says that before May 
1921 there were communist organisations in Tianjin, Nanjing and Hong Kong besides 
other cities. [Persits, 'The History of the Formation of the CCP', NAA, (1971), No 4, p 
48]; while 'A Brief History of the CCP'claims that a Communist nuýlTuý was established 
in Henan. These accounts do not come out of a void: a group of the Socialist Youth 
League (SY) was organised by Zhang Tailei in Tianjin in November 1920. Xie Guangyi 
in his article 'New Query about the Number of Delegates to the First Congress of the 
CCP' [Shancihai shifan xuevuan xuebao (Academic Journal of Shanghai Normal 
Institute] shows that Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu dispatched two Beijing University 
students, Chen Derong and Bi Desheng, to Nanjing and Xuzhou to help radical 
students organise the CP groups there, which later sent two delegates to the first 
congress of the CCP. Because of their anarchist beliefs, the two telegates left the 
Congress. Judging from this account and other sources, I believe that the two groups 
might be the branches of the SY or the Socialist League. The Henan group was 
probably organised by Zhao Zijian, who had joined the Wuhan group of the CCP, and 
was later appointed a teacher in Zhengzhou Railway Workers' School in the early 1921. 
Zhao once invited Ll Dazhao to give lectures in the School. They recruited some 
railway workers into the Party. [Zhang Jiang, 'Li Dazhao and the Establishment of the 
Communist Organisations in Henan', Henan daxue xuebao (Academic Journal of 
Henan University), (1985), No 3]. According to Liang Furan's recollection, Lin 
Changzhi, Zhang Rendao and LI Yibao published a magazine entitled Zhen shan mei 
(The True, the Good and the Beautiful) in Hong Kong in 1920 and after hearing that 
Chen Duxiu was going to Guangzhou via Hong Kong by sea at the beginning of 1921, 
they went to see Chen on the ship. With Chen's encouragement they organised a 
group for studying Marxism. The CCP's Hong Kong branch grew out of this group later. 
[Yida gianhoU Vol 2, p 456]. There was also a Socialist Study Society in Hong Kong, 
which published Feng Ziyou'sThe Past and Future of Socialism in China'in April 1920. 96 Quoted from NAA, (1971), No 4, p 48. 
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No sooner had the Bolsheviks set out to establish the Communist Groups than 
they started to "enlist revolutionary and left-wing youths to organise the Socialist 
Youth League". 97 For this purpose, the Organisation Section of the Revolutionary 
Bureau increased their work among students, and convened a conference in Beijing of 
student representatives from Beijing, Tianjin, Hankou, Nanjing and other cities on 17 
August 1920; and at the conference, the Bolshevik agents and some student 
representatives agreed on the establishment of the Socialist Youth League. 98 The 
founding meeting of the SY was held in Shanghai on 22 August 192099 and was 
attended by Shen Xuanlu, Chen Wangdao, Li Hanjun, Yu Xiusong, Yuan 2henying, 
Jin Jiafeng and Yie Tiandi; Yu Xiusong was elected the secretary of the SY. Two 
Koreans named Pak and An, and a Japanese, Bansai Taro, were also present at the 
meeting. The Korean An was said to have just come from Russia and brought a large 
amount of money to Shanghai. 100 
I The SY central group's organisation and activities were under the cover of the 
Foreign Languages Supplementary School in Shanghai. 101 Yang Mingzhai held the 
post of head of the School, and Yu Xiusong was its secretary. As a centre to enlist and 
97 Fang Lu, 'Liquidating Chen Duxiu', quoted from Zhoncicluo shehuizhuvi 
gingniantuan chuangiian wenti lunwen'i (Collected Theses on i-he Establishment of the 
Chinese Socialist Youth League), pp 4-5. 
98 Kartunova, 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of China', Problemy Dal'nego 
Vostoka, (1973), No 1. 
r9 -'The Report of the Chinese Delegation to the Second Congress of the Communist 
Youth International', quoted from Dov Bing, 'Voitinsky and the Foundation of the CCP', 
Feiging vuebao (Information on the CCP, Monthly), (Taibel, 1976), Vol 19, No 5. 
'uu Fang Lu, 'Liquidating Chen Duxiu', Zhonciguo shehuizhuvi gingniantuan chuan-giian 
wenti lunwenoi, p 5. "An" might be An Pyong-chan, who was the president of the Korean 
Youth League founded in 1919; he was sent to Moscow to seek financial support from 
the Comintern, and after his return became one of the leaders of the Korean 
Communist Party. "Banzai Taro" is perhaps the assumed name of Yoshihara Taro, a 
Comintern agent. 
101 Li Da, 'The First of July Memoirs', Qivi vuekan (The July First Monthly), (Beijing, 
1958), No 7. 
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train radical youth, the School provided them with many Communist courses and 
books. Yang Mingzhai and Voitinsky's wife taught Russian, Li Hanjun, Li Da and 
Yuan Zhenying taught French, Japanese and English respectively. Nearly all the 
students at the School joined the SY and some were selected to study at the 
Communist University for the Toilers of the East in Moscow. Among them, were Liu 
Shaoqi, Ren Bishi, Luo Yinong, Ke Qingshi and Xiao Jinguang, who later became 
important communist leaders. A similar school was planned to be set up in Wuhan. 
The work to rally more radical youths around the SY was also taken further by 
Soviet agents. Lizerovitch and other Bolshevik agents attended a conference of 
anarchist youth from Suzhou, Nanjing and Shanghai in the fall of 1920 and tried to 
convert them to Bolshevism. 102 Voitinsky was optimistic about the results of work 
among young Chinese men, for he saw that the numbers of them who had pledged 
themselves in writing to support Soviet and Communist principles were increasing 
daily. 103 
Soon SY branches were established in various cities. Besides Beijing, Tianjin, 
Wuhan, Changsha, Jinan and Guangzhou, where Communist groups already existed, 
Tianjin, Nanjing, Shanxi and Tangshan also set up SY groups. Some of these SY 
groups at first consisted of many members of the CP, and some of them also enlisted 
anarchists, because the standards for admission were not strict. However, most of 
them were said to be willing to "make great efforts to go towards Soviet-style 
Socialism. " 104 
102 FO 228/3216, No 41,4 December 1920. 
103 FO 228/3216, No 37,6 November 1920. 
104 B. Shumyatsky, 'Historical Episodes of the Chinese Communist Youth League and 
the Communist Party, 1928, quoted from Oinqvunshi ziliao vu yaniiu (Materials and 
Research on History of the Chinese Youth Movements), (Beijing, 1983), Vol 2. 
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The Comintern and Soviet agents guided the activities of the SY of China 
directly. In spring 1921, the secretary of the Eastern Secretariat of the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern of Youth, Green, went to China in order to invite the 
Chinese SY to send delegates to the Second Congress of the Youth Comintern. He 
attended some meetings of the SY, reported on the situation in Soviet Russia and 
directed the work of the Sy. 105 Because of his frequent attendance at the meetings of 
the Beijing branch of the SY, Polevoy was regarded as "a person who joined the SY in 
China", and he also offered money for some youths' travelling expenses to Soviet 
Russia. 106 
After Yu Xiusong, representing the SY, went to Moscow to attend the 
Congress of the Comintern of Youth, some of the SY's branches disbanded or stopped 
work, due to their heterogeneous membership and the lack of key cadres and funds. 
The SY was re-established in November 1921 by Zhang Tailei, who was working for 
the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat. 
In the spring of 1922, Dalin, the Youth Comintern's plenipotentiary to the Far 
East, reached China. With Zhang Tailei's help, Dalin drafted the Programme and 
Constitution of the CSY, which were adopted by the I" Congress of the CSY in May 
1922. This Congress resolved that the CSY wouldjoin the Youth Comintern. 107 
105 'Eastern Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Youth Comintern to the 
Chinese SY in Shanghai', March 1921, Oincinian clonqchanquo'i vu zhonq - nian guo ging yundong (The Comintern of Youth and the Chinese Youth Movements), (Beijing, The 
Chinese Youth Press, 1985), pp 37-9; Luo Zhanglong, 'Some Problems on the 
Founding Period of the CCP', Yida clianhoU, Vol 2, p 202; 'Guan Qian's Report', 17 
March 1921, Zhonqciuo wuzhencifu zhuyi he Zhonqquo shehuidan-q, p 86. 106 'Guan Qian's Report to the Beijing Government', Zhonq-quo wuzhengfu zhuyi he 
Zhonqquo shehuidang, p 80. 
"'7S. A. Dalin, Zhonaquo huivilu. 1921-1927 (China Memories, 1921-1927), (Beijing: 
The Chinese Sciences Press, 1981), p 59; p 95. 
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It can be noted from the above accounts that the groups of the CCP and the 
CSY which emerged in several cities around the same time were not formed 
spontaneously by the Chinese themselves, but organised as the result of the 
suggestions and guidance of the Revolutionary Bureau led by Voitinsky in Shanghai. 
Apparently ignorant of this fact, Hans van de Ven insists that not all Communist 
groups were connected to the Shanghai Centre, and he cites the Communist cells in 
Beijing, Sichuan, Hunan and France as exceptions. 108 Since I have already discussed 
the cases of all the above groups except the one in Sichuan, I intend only to say 
something briefly about the latter here. 
According to "Report from the Communist Organasation in Chongqing, 
Sichuan", a Communist cell formed in Chongqing of Sichuan Province on 12 March 
1920 and it then dispatched a four-man delegation to link up with Communist 
organisations in all provinces and to travel to Soviet Russia. 109 He Shengming and 
Cao Zhongbin's researches show that this report was written by the delegation from 
Sichuan which consisted of four anarchists while they were in Soviet Russian in 1921, 
and therefore, the so-called "Communist Organisation in Chongqing" was probably in 
reality an anarchist organisation. 110 Nevertheless, this cell grew up around Wu 
Yuzhang, who was said to have become a member of the Socialist League since 1919. 
108 Hans van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade, pp 71-7. 
109 Cf. Zhonqquo Gonqchandan-q divici daibiao dahui dan-gan ziliao (Archival Sources 
for the First Congress of the CCP), (Beijing: People's Press, 1984), p 100. An 
American missionary remembered that in the fall of 1920 he heard of Communists 
meeting in Shanghai, and one of the delegates was a school teacher from Sichuan. 
Barnett, Mv Life in China, pp 188-9. 
110 He Shengming: "An Provisional Assessment of 'the Report from the Communist 
Organisation in Chongqing, Sichuan"', Sichuan danqshi vaniiu ziliao (Historical 
Research Materials of the CCP in Sichuan), 1985, No 1; Cao Zhongbin: "Discussion 
and Analysis of 'the Communist Party in Chongqing", Dangshi vaniiu ziliao, 1992, No 
2. 
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As we have seen, the Socialist League was organised by the Bolsheviks. In 1922 Wu 
organised the Chixin Society with Wang Weizhou, who had been a member of the 
Koryo Communist Party and had just returned from Soviet Russia. Later, Wu with 
some people established in Sichuan "the Youth Communist Party". "' In Chengdu, 
some youths such as Wang Youmu, Tong Yongsheng, Li Shuoxun and Liu Nongchao 
established the Sichuan Socialist League in the fall of 1921. This organisation's 
formation was also not the result of an isolated development. From spring 1921, these 
young people started to correspond with Li Hanjun, who was then in charge of the 
work of the CCP's sponsoring group in Shanghai. Later, at the invitation of Chen 
Yusheng, a close friend of Li Dazhao and a member of the Young China Association, 
Deng Zhongxia, Huang Rikui and some members of the Young China Association, 
(most of whom had joined the early groups of the Communist Party or the Society for 
Studying Marxism), at Li Dazhao's request, went to deliver lectures in Sichuan during 
the summer vocation of 1921. In the autumn of that year, Yun Daiying, who had 
converted to Bolshevism, also went to Sichuan. It was under Yun's direction and in 
accordance with the Constitution of the CSY, which was published in Xin gingnian, 
the organ of the CCP, that the Sichuan Socialist League was organised. 1 12 This 
evidence indicates that the early Communist and Socialist youth organisations in 
111 Yang Angong riii, pp 32-3; 'Wu Yuzhang's Talk about the Youth Communist Party 
in Sichuan', Dangshi van'iu ziliao (Sichuan People's Press, 1982), Vol 3, p 62; Haiyu 
Guke, Jiefanq bielu; Zhonqquo Gonqchandanq divici daibiao dahul dan-qan ziliao, p 
100; Wang Weizhou, 'My Recollections, Zhonqqonq danqshi ziliao, (1982), No 1. 112 Cf. Liu Nongchao, 'in Memory of Li Hanjun, - One of the CCP's Founders', Li Danyang and Liu Jianyi (eds. ), Li Haniun van'iu ziliao ii; Shaonian Zhon- quo, (October q- 
1921), Vol 3, No 4; Wu Yuzhang, 'in Memory of Martyr [Zhao] Shiyan', Renmin ribao 
(People's Daily), 1962; Yang Hansheng, 'in Memory of [Li] Shuoxun', Renwu 
(Outstanding Personages), (Beijing, 1983), No 3. 
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Sichuan, without exception, also came into being thanks to the influence of Soviet 
Russia and the direction of the CCP's central and local organisations. 
Hans van de Ven correctly suggests that "the formation of cells was not the 
result of all those committed to Marxism-Leninism joining a cell, ... Instead, people 
previously connected to each other on the basis of study-society or school ties set up a 
cell. "' 13 This exactly indicates that the Communist groups were organised in such a 
rash that they had to depend on personal links and to base the groups upon some pre- 
existing study societies instead of on shared Communist beliefs. 
Section 5. Building a BoIshevik-Style Party 
Most historians of the People's Republic of China maintain that the CCP was a 
Bolshevik-style proletarian party guided by Marxism-Leninism from its foundation 
since it was under the direction of the Comintern from the outset. 114 Many foreign 
scholars have shared this assessment. But, recently a few Western scholars have 
proposed different views. For example, M. Meisner stresses the indigenous roots of 
the development of the CCP ideology, and considers that the direct influence of 
Lenin's doctrines upon the Chinese Communists in the early stage was negligible. ' 15 
Hans van de Ven asserts that the CCP was not a Leninist Party before 1927, for he 
believes that the foundation of the CCP was not solely a result of the Comintern efforts 
to expand the forces of Communism into East Asia, and that therefore the early 
113 Hans van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade, p 80. 114 Zhoncigong clangshl tonqxun (Bulletin of the History of the CCP), (1993), No 1. 11,5 Meisner, 'Li Ta-chao', in Hsueh (ed. ), Revolutionary Leaders, p 382. 
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Chinese Communists lacked a concept of a centralised leadership possessing 
ideological authority. 116 Yet the historical evidence suggests otherwise. 
Seeking Unity in Thinking and Organisations 
Towards the fall of 1920, the Provisional Centre of the CCP emerged out of the 
Shanghai sponsoring group. In November, with the help of Voitinsky, the Provisional 
Centre drew up a "Manifesto of the CCP" as the basis for admitting Party members. 117 
This document claimed: "The Communist party will lead the revolutionary proletariat 
to struggle against the capitalists and seize political power from the hands of the 
capitalists, for it is that power that maintains the capitalist state; and it will place that 
power in the hands of the workers and peasants, just as the Russian Communist Party 
did in 1917. " The Manifesto stressed it would be necessary to use the dictatorship of 
the proletariat to eliminate the system of private ownership and to create a new society 
according to the ideal of Communism. 118 
It is obvious that this Manifesto totally ignored the native conditions of China 
as it was articulated in Bolshevik dogma and coloured by Russian experience. 
Nevertheless, it became a document used for unifying the thinking of the members of 
the Communist groups in various places. 
On 17 November 1920, on the third anniversary of the Russian October 
Revolution, Gonchan dang (the Communist Party) started publication as the secret 
formal organ of the CCP. For the purpose of Communist theoretical education, this 
periodical published many works and documents from Soviet Russia, such as the State 
116 Hans van do Ven, From Friend to Comrade, p 2, p 56. 
"' Yang Kuisong and Dong Shiwel, Haishi shenlou vu damo 10zhou (Mirage on the 
Sea and Oasis on the Desert), (Shanghai, 1991), p 172. 
118Gonqchan zhuyi xiaozu, Vol 1, pp 48-51. 
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and Revolution by Lenin, the "Constitution of the RCP(B)", "Conditions of Admission 
to the Communist International" and the "Manifesto of the Second World Congress of 
the Communist International". The latter specially pointed out: "The Communist 
International has proclaimed the cause of Soviet Russia as its own. " and "The question 
of Soviet Russia has become the touchstone by which all the organisations of the 
working class are tested. "119 In Gonchandang's first issue, Chen Duxiu declared: 
"Chinese workers must unite and use revolutionary methods to overthrow the capitalist 
class in China and abroad, and must follow the Russian Communist Party. " This 
showed that the early Chinese Communists were determined to take the Russian path. 
After setting the tune, Voitinsky left Shanghai for Guangzhou in December 
1920 with Chen Duxiu, who went there to assume the post of Commissioner of 
Education in Guangdong Province, leaving the secretary duties to Li Hanjun. 120 The 
Party's Provisional Centre soon set up an Education Committee with Yang Mingzhai 
and Bao Huiseng in charge and an Labour Movement Committee with Yu Xiusong 
and Li Qihan in charge. 
In January 1921, Fromberg, who had worked for the Eastern People's Section 
of the RCP's Siberian Bureau, was dispatched to China by Smurgis, the representative 
of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Profintem (Red Trade Union International) in Chita, 
and he worked mainly in Shanghai in contact with Voitinsky. 121 After Voitinsky went 
back to Russia in March 1921, Fromberg remained in China and probably took over 
some of Voitinsky's duties, since the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern and the 
119 Degras, The Communist International, p 177. 120 According to Li Da, Li Hanjun gave up the position of acting secretary and handed 
over the post to Li Da in March 1920. But other sources show that Ll Hanjun was still in 
charge of the work of the Provisional centre till the Party's first congress. 121 Holubnychy, Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, p 149; Huang Xurong, 
Gonqchanquo'i vu Zhonmuo gerning guanxi shl, p 90. 
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Far Eastern Bureau of the Profintern reached an agreement to co-operate in the Far 
East. 122 
In March, a preparatory conference for the founding congress of the CCP was 
convened in Shanghai, with Communist groups from various cities attending. 
According to Zhang Tailei's report to the Comintern, there was no unified Communist 
organisation until the conference. A temporary programme was drafted at the meeting, 
which stipulated the Party's organisation and work methods, and its relations with and 
attitudes towards the SY, the Trade Unions and other organisations. One important 
purpose of this conference was to get rid of anarchists in order to purify the Party. 123 
In addition to achieving the unity of organisations, efforts were also made to unify 
thinking. 
Co-ordinated Preparation for Establishing the Communist Parties in the Far 
East 
In March 1921, one member of the Revolutionary Bureau, Li Dazhao, wrote: 
We should form an organisation quickly. This organisation ... should be a 
common working people's party. Recently, our Communist friends in 
many countries have been eager to have a try at fon-ning organisations, and 
have a leading centre - the Third International. Why don't we Chinese 
Communists form a big organisation quickly in order to work in concert 
with Communist friends in other countries? 124 
122 Kartunova, 'Internationalist Aid to the Working Class of China', Problemy Dal'nego 
Vostoka, (1973), No 1. 
711 Vostok (the Revolutionary Orient), (1928), Nos 4-5, pp 215-6; 
quoted from Oingnian 
-qonqchanciuoii vu 
Zhonaguo gingnian vundonci. 
124 U Dazhao, 'Organisational Training and the Reform Cause', LI Dazhao wen'i, p 
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This article shows that Li Dazhao was overtly inspired by the Comintern and also 
suggests that he knew that the formation of a united CCP, with establishment of 
Communist parties in some other countries, was a co-ordinated. action under the 
direction of the Comintern. As someone already in the Revolutionary Bureau, Li 
would have been privy to these efforts at co-ordination, even if he could only openly 
express them as a call to action. 
In the summer of 1920, the East Asian Secretariat established the Korean 
Revolutionary Bureau and sent Korean Communists Yi Chun-suk and Yi Chun-grin to 
Japan to launch a Communist movement there. In the middle of November 1920, a 
joint conference of the socialists of the Far East took place in Shanghai, and it was 
attended by 40 Chinese delegates, 3 Koreans, 18 Japanese and one Indian. 125 As far as 
I know, Voitinsky, Kim Man-gyorn, Chen Duxiu, Yi Tong-hwi, Toshihiko Sakai, 
Osugi Sakae, Yo Un-hyong and Huang Jiemin attended this conference or the 
preparatory meetings. The central theme of their discussions was the feasibility of 
establishing a league of Far Eastern revolutionary parties to be directed by the 
Comintem. 126 
On 12 January 1921 Izvestiia published an article entitled "The Growth of 
Communism in the Far East"by Vilensky, who stated triumphantly: 
East Asia has laid down a foundation for an organised unification of the 
revolutionary work among the toilers of China, Korean, Japan, and India, 
i. e., among almost all Asian peoples who make up the 800 million 
444. 
125 North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, p 56; Eudin and North, Soviet Russia 
and the East, 90. 
Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p 18; Beckmann & Genji, The Japanese 
Communist Party, p 30; Chang Kuot'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Pa , Vol 1, p 691. 
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population of the East Asian continent. The conference marks the growth 
of communism in the Far East and the organisational shaping up of 
communist parties, of which the Chinese Communist Party is an example. 
This is a great historical event in the life of the peoples of East Asia. Let 
the imperialists of the world know that even without any "evil intention 
and participation" by Soviet Russia, the toilers find the ways and means 
for the struggle against their oppressors. We can only welcome them, and 
send our fraternal greetings to the new fighters for the cause of 
communism. 127 
Here, Vilensky attempted to conceal the roles played by Soviet Russia and the 
Comintern in establishing Communist parties in the Far East. But Izvestiia of 11 
January 1921 revealed that the conference had decided to "establish on Siberian 
territory a central bureau in order to be able to carry on productive work and to 
conduct it in contact with the world proletariat. " This "central bureau" was, in fact, the 
Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern in Irkutsk, which was formed in January 
1921. 
At the time when the CCP's preparatory conference was taking place, an ECCI 
member, Pak Chin-sun, was in Shanghai as a representative of the Comintern. 
Although it is not clear what role he played at that conference, it is certain that Pak was 
in charge of the work of establishing the Korean Communist Party and the Japanese 
Communist Party. The first congress of the Korean Communist Party (the Shanghai 
faction) was held in May 1921; in the same month, the newly formed Preparatory 
Committee of the Japanese Communist Party sent Kondo Eizo to Shanghai to attend a 
127 Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, 90. 
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Comintern-sponsored meeting presided over by Pak Chin-sen with the attendance of 
the Chinese and Korean Communists. In August, the Enlightened People's 
Communist Party was formed in Japan with Kondo Eizo as Chairman. 128 The co- 
ordinated operations in founding Communist Parties in the Far East around the middle 
of 1921 seemed to derive from a general plan of the Comintern. The founding 
congress of the CCP, according to Shumyatsky, the head of the Far Eastern Secretariat 
of the Comintern, was also planned to convene in May 192 1.129 However, it did not 
happen as scheduled, perhaps because the Chinese Communists had to wait for some 
important figures from the Comintem to arrive. 
The First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 
Following Voitinsky's return, the Party Provisional Centre found itself in 
financial difficulties. Some Communists in Shanghai had to sell their articles to 
contribute the Party funds. However, they still managed to continue publishing Xin 
gingnian and other magazines and pushed forward workers strikes. In April 1921, 
several meetings were held for preparing the May Day commemorative rally. But on 
29 April the French Concession police made a raid upon the Party's offices in No 6 
Yuyang Li in Shanghai and wrecked the plan. In view of the facts of the funds 
shortage and the police's raid, Li Hanjun in May convened a meeting, at which he 
suggested that Party activities be suspended and that either Party headquarters be 
moved Guangzhou or Chen Duxiu be asked to return to Shanghai. 
128 Beckmann and Genji, The Japanese Communist Party, p 390; lwamura Toshio, 
Comintern to Nihon Kyosanto no Seiritsu, p 105. 
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Around this time, the Comintern sent two other representatives to Shanghai. 
Maring (Sneevliet), the secretary of the Committee on the National and the Colonial 
Questions of the Comintern's Second Congress and a member of the ECCI, was 
regarded by Lenin as a suitable person for establishing "working people's Soviets" in 
the colonial East. On Lenin's recommendation, Maring was dispatched to China by 
the Comintern as its plenipotentiary. 130 On 3 June 1921, he arrived in Shanghai with 
the deputy leader of the Indonesian Communist Party, Darsono. 13 1 Through 
Fromberg, Maring soon got in touch with Nikolsky, who was sent to China by the Far 
Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern. ' 32 Nikolsky appeared to be Maring's assistant, 
because he was only a new member of the RCP. But Maring later revealed that during 
his stay in Shanghai, he limited himself to assisting Nikolsky to fulfil the task assigned 
by the Far Eastern Secretariat. 133 
Not long after that, Maring and Nicolsky established contact with Li Hanjun 
and Li Da, who were jointly in charge of the work of the Provisional Centre of the 
CCP. At their first meeting, Maring demanded that Li Hanjun hand in a work report 
and asked for a program of activities and a budget. Li Hanjun refused these demands 
by announcing that the CCP had not yet been officially formed and even if it decided 
130 R. T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, (Ithaca, 1965), p 76. 
131 J. H. Brimmell, Communism in South East Asia. A Political Analysis, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1959), p 80; FO 228/3211, June and July, 1921. Later, Baars, 
who with Sneeviiet "sowed Communist seeds" in Indonesia and was regarded as the 
No 2 of the Dutch founders of the Indonesian CP, Semaun, the general secretary the 
ICP, and Najoan, an important member of the ICP, also came to China for a short time. 
Fo 228/3211, July 1921; Saich, OFUFC, Vol 1, p 242. 
132 Many participants of the First Congress of the CCP recollected that Nicolsky was a 
representative of the Profintern, but according to Kartunova, Nicolsky was one of the 
staff of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern. In March 1921, the two 
organisations reached agreement to cooperate in the Far East, so Nicolsky probably 
also undertook to act on behalf of the Profintern. Cf. Kartunova, 'Unknown Participant 
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133 'Sneeviiet's Archive', quoted from Ye Yonglie, Zhonggong zhi chu, p 292. 
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after establishment to join the Comintern, the Party's relationship with the Comintern 
would still have to be looked into further. 134 In spite of this disagreement, Maring and 
Nikolsky suggested convening the founding congress of the CCP, and Li Hanjun and 
Li Da then wrote to the local Communist groups asking them to send delegates to the 
Congress and remitted money from the Comintern funds to them as delegates' 
travelling expenses. 
In July, 13 delegates gathered in Shanghai. They were Li Hanjun and Li Da, 
the Shanghai delegates; Zhang Guotao and Liu Renjing from Beijing; Dong Biwu and 
Chen Tanqiu from Wuhan; Mao Zedong and He Shuheng from Changsha; Chen 
Gongbo and Bao Huiseng from Guangzhou; 135 Wang Jinmei and Deng Enming from 
Jinan; and Zhou Fohai from Japan. These delegates represented 53 members of the 
Communist organisations in China and abroad. The two main founders of the CCP, 
Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, did not attend this important congress because they were 
busy with other work elsewhere. However, the Party's platform and programme 
outlined by Chen Duxiu was brought forward for discussion. In these Chen 
emphasised the following points: the leadership of the Party in accordance with 
democratic centralism; Party discipline; and the education and training of Party 
members. 136 These were obviously Bolshevik doctrines. 
On 23 July, the First Congress of the CCP was inaugurated in a classroom of 
the Bowen Girls' School, and most meetings were held at the house of Li Hanjun's 
134 Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Part ,p 138. 135 Bao Huiseng was not a representative of the Guangzhou group, but he was sent 
by Chen Duxiu from Guangzhou. 
136 'A Brief History of the CCP', Wilbur and How, MRSANC, p 53. 
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brother, Li Shucheng, 137 both of which were located in the French Concession and 
therefore beyond the reach of the Chinese authorities. 
Maring and Nikolsky, as representatives of the Comintern, were present at 
some of the meetings of the Congress. After setting the agenda, the delegates reported 
to the Congress on their work in various areas. Maring made a speech on the world 
situation, the mission of the Comintern and the tasks of the CCP, and he also stressed 
that the CCP should pay special attention to establish workers' organisations. Then 
Nikolsky gave a presentation on the newly founded Far Eastern Secretariat of the 
Comintern and the work of the Profintem. They also suggested that the Congress 
make a report to the Comintern and select a committee to draft the Party's platforrn and 
working programme. Afterwards, the main topic of the meetings was discussing these 
draft documents. 
The basic points of the drafts were approved by all participants. A few 
differing views mainly focused on some tactical issues, such as: whether Party 
members could become government officials or Members of Parliament; whether the 
CCP should co-operate with other revolutionary parties, especially the GMD; and 
whether it was right for the Party to recruit more intellectuals. The Congress'report to 
the Comintem recorded: "One side firmly believed that acceptance of parliament 
could turn our party into a yellow party. They quoted the example the Social 
Democratic Party in Germany to show that when people entered parliament they 
gradually abandoned their principles and became a part of the bourgeoisie, becoming 
137 Li Shucheng was one of the founders of Tongmeng Hui. In the Revolution of 1911 
he was the Chief of Staff for Huang Xing, the General Commander at the Wuchang 
front, and in 1912 he became an advisor to Sun Yat-sen. During the founding congress 
of the CCP, Li Shucheng was in Hubei and Hunan provinces leading a struggle to drive 
out the military ruler of Hubei, Wang Zhanyuan, a Beiyang warlord. 
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traitors, and recognising the parliamentary system as the only means of struggle and 
wok. So as not to undertake any common activities with bourgeoisie, and in order to 
concentrate our forces for attack, we certainly should not participate in parliament but 
should engage in struggle outside of it. ... The others persisted in advocating that we 
musk link open work with secret work. If we did not believe that the state could be 
abolished within 24 hours, and that a general strike could be suppressed by the 
capitalists, then political activities were a necessity. Although opportunity for 
uprisings were few and far between, we had to make preparations in the meantime. 
We had to improve the workers' conditions, expand their outlook and lead them to 
take part in the revolutionary struggle and to fight for freedom of publication and 
assembly. The open propagation of our theories is an indispensable condition for 
success and the adoption of common activities with other parties and factions 
oppressed in parliament could bring partial success. However, we must point out to 
the people that it is futile to hope to build a new society within the old system, ... . The 
working-class must emancipate itself because it is not possible to force them to carry 
out revolution. ... ." 
138 
According to Dong Biwu, this report was written by Li Hanjun and Dong 
himself. 139 Apparently the latter opinions were mainly held by Li Hanjun, for he 
expressed the view at the Congress that most delegates did not know political tactics, 
and he was later criticised as a "legal Marxist" 140 . His opinions were sometimes 
138 Quoted from Zhonqauo Gonqchandanq divici daibiao dahui dangan ziliao, pp 12-3. 139 'Dong Biwu's Letter to He Shuheng', 31 December 1929 in Moscow. 
140 The term "Legal Marxist" was first used to criticise Li Hanjun by Communists such 
as Cai Hesen and Chen Tanqiu, when they were in Moscow between the late 1920s 
and 1930s. It is certain that they copied the term from the Russians. 'Legal Marxism' 
dated back as Russian political label to the 1890s. 
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supported by Li Da and Chen Gongbo, 14 1 but their views were rejected by most of the 
delegates, and later they were criticised as the "sitting on the fence" group. 142 
However, while persisting in his views, Li Hanjun promised to abide by the decision 
of the majority. 143 
Thus, the resolutions passed by the Congress were quite left-leaning ones, 
which included items such as: the Party should take an entirely independent stand and 
only safeguard the interests of the proletariat; it must adopt the policy of attacking all 
other current parties, and never establish any relations with other parties; Party 
members should not become government officials or members of Parliament. 144 Such 
resolutions obviously neglected the tactics set out by Lenin in the theses adopted by 
the Second Congress of the Comintern namely that the Communists should support 
national revolutionary or bourgeois democratic movements in colonies and backward 
countries; and that Communists should use all the means and methods available, 
combining illegal forms of struggle with every form of legal struggle in their war with 
the enemy; and legal means included participating in bourgeois parliaments. 145 zhang 
Guotao later explained that most delegates had not yet seen the text of the theses on the 
colonial problem and only a few delegates had obtained a few rough ideas about them 
from Maring or from Western European Communist publications. 146 
141 Chen Pan-tsu (Chen Tanqiu), 'Reminiscences of the First Congress', The 
Communist International, (1936), Vol 7, Nos 4-5. 
142 'A Brief History of the CCP', Wilbur and How, MRSANC, p 53. 
143 Bao Huiseng, 'Recollections of the First Congress of the CCP', Yida qianhou, Vol 
2; 'Liu Renjing's Talk', in summer 1981, recorded by Li Danyang; Chang Kuo-t'ao, The 
Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, p 147. 
144 Zhonaqonq zhonqvan-q weniian xuanii, Vol 1, pp 4-5; p 8. 145 'Theses on the National and Colonial Question' and 'Theses on the Basic 
Tasks of the Comintern', see Degras, The Communist International, Vol 1, p 139; p 
143; pp 122-23. 
146 Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Pa , Vol 1, p 143. 338 
In spite of the arguments about some tactical problems, the Congress 
unanimously adopted the basic items of the Party Programme, which stipulated: "(1) 
The proletariat and revolutionary army must overthrow the state power of the capitalist 
class, ...; (2) To introduce a dictatorship of the proletariat until the class struggle is 
over and all class distinctions are abolished; (3) To destroy the system of capitalist 
private property and to expropriate machines, land and factories and to turn the means 
of production over to public ownership; (4) To ally with the 3 rd International. 047 As to 
organisational. principles, the Party's Platform stipulated very strict rules about Party 
organisation and its member recruitment: for example, the Party and its members must 
absolutely break with other parties and "yellow" (opportunistic) intellectuals; each 
Party member should attend one local branch and new members would have a two- 
month probationary period; all Party members must abide by Party discipline to keep 
Party secrets and not reveal their identity; local organisations, policy, activities and 
financial budgets must be subject to the supervision of the Party's Central Committee. 
The Party's first resolution on its working programme especially demanded that all 
publications whether published by central or local Party organisations should be ran by 
Communists and must not carry any article which run counter to the principles, politics 
and resolutions of the Party. It was quite possible that when drawing up these articles, 
certain of the "Conditions of Admission to the Communist International" were referred 
to, for they seem quite similar in many ways. 
One evening when the sixth meeting had just begun, a stranger came into Li 
Hanjun's house and peeped in. Alerted to the possibility that the man might be a 
detective of the French Concession, Maring at once proposed that the meeting should 
147 'The First Platform of the CCP', Zhonaqonq zhongyanc H, Vol 1, p 3. 1 wenilan xuanL 
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adjourn immediately and everyone must leave by separate ways. All the participants 
evacuated the house except Li Hanjun and Chen Gongbo, who remained there to cope 
with the search and interrogation by the police and detectives of the French 
Concession. 
After this incident, the meeting place had to be moved somewhere else. At the 
suggestion of Li Da's wife, Wang Huiwu, a member of the SY, all the delegates except 
Chen Gongbo, went to Jiaxing -a small town near Shanghai - by train the following 
day, and held the last meeting on a houseboat on the South Lake. At this meeting, the 
delegates passed the Party's Platform and the working programme, and elected persons 
to form a Provisional Central Executive Bureau of the Party. The result of the vote 
was: Chen Duxiu, general secretary, Li Da in charge of propaganda and Zhang Guotao 
in charge of organisation; while Zhou Fohai was selected to act on behalf of Chen 
Duxiu until Chen returned to Shanghai. The Congress was then closed and the CCP 
was formally born. 
When talking about the CCP's first congress, Chen Duxiu commented that "the 
first Party platform was drawn up in the light of Lenin's ideas on party-building and 
the Bolshevik Party's organisational principles, and it was therefore a good one, more 
revolutionary than the platforms of other parties in European countries. "' 48 Chen 
Tanqiu also said that the first congress had decided to adopt the Bolshevik party's 
organisational principles and experience to organise the CCp. 149 
However, this is not to say that the CCP emerged as a full-blown Leninist 
structure at first, and that there was no opposition within the Party to totally imitating 
148 Pu Qingquan, What I Know about Chen Duxiu', Wenshi ziliao, (11980), No 71, p 33. 149 Chen Pan-tsu, 'Reminiscences of the First Congress', The Communist 
International, (1936), Vol 7, Nos 4-5. 
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the model of the Bolshevik party. We may have noticed that this congress did not 
resolve to join the Comintern. According to "A Brief History of the CCP", this was 
due to the "opportunistic current of thought at the Congress". 150 Obviously, this 
passage mainly referred to Li Hanjun's position. 
Li Hanjun was the first important CCP founder who dared to question the 
rightness of Bolshevism and the authority of the Comintern. In February 1921, Li and 
Chen Duxiu began a dispute over a draft Party platform sent by Chen to Shanghai, in 
which Chen advocated a more centralised Party leadership, whereas Li preferred a 
more democratic one. In Li's opinion, an overly centralised central committee of the 
Party would lead to the dictatorship of the Party leader. At the first congress Li still 
insisted on this view. Moreover, Li Hanjun held that applying Marxism to practice at 
different times and in different countries would bring forth various forms; for example, 
its manifestation in Russia was Bolshevism, which was dictatorial, and in Germany it 
was democratic socialism. He suggested that the different systems should be 
examined and one which would be more suitable to national conditions should be 
chosen. As to the Party's relationship with the Comintern, Li considered that the CCP 
alone should assume the responsibility of developing the Communist movement in 
China, with the Comintern doing nothing but helping; the CCP could accept 
theoretical guidance from the Comintern and act in accordance with it, but should not 
depend upon Comintern subsidies to carry on the Party's work; the representatives of 
the Comintern must not be considered as anything more than advisers. 151 
Quoted from Wilbur and How, CNSAC, p 53; 
Cf. U Da, 'The Foundation of the CCP', Yida clianhou, Vol 2; Chang Kuo-t'ao, The 
Rise of the CCP, p 138, pp 145-6; 'A Brief History of the CCP', in Wilbur and How, 
CNSAC, p 53; Bao Huiseng, 'Recollection of the First Congress of the CCP, Yida 
qianhou, Vol, 2. 
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Nevertheless, the existence of different opinions within the CCP did not mean 
that the early CCP was a loose organisation only consisting of former "friends" 
without ideological identity, as Hans van de Ven has asserted. On the contrary, the 
CCP tried to purify its organisation and define its ideology by purging dissenters and 
criticising other opinions at a very early stage. Li Hanjun was excluded from the 
leading centre of the CCP soon after the First Congress. Before long, some other 
founding members, who held independent ideas, or had different views from Chen 
Duxiu, such as Li Da, Chen Wangdao, Shen Xuanlu and Shao Lizi, also left the Party. 
Chen Tanqiu pointed out that around the time of the Party's First Congress, the CCP 
unified its thinking by fighting against "legal Marxism" as well as anarchism and guild 
socialism, thus laying a foundation for Bolshevising the Party. 152 Although the CCP 
did not join the Comintern for a while, all its activities and work were conducted on 
the general instructions of the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat and direct guidance 
of the Comintern agents. 153 In sum, the First Congress made the CCP embark on a 
path towards becoming a Bolshevik party. 
The Second Congress of the CCP 
In June 1922, before its 2nd Congress, the CCP's Central Committee issued its 
"First Manifesto on the Current Situation", which declared that the Chinese 
proletariat's urgent task was to "act jointly with the democratic party to establish a 
152 'Chen Tqnqiu's Speech at the Celebration Meeting of the 15th Anniversary of the 
Founding of the CCP in Moscow', Zhonggong danqshi ziliao, (1982), No 3; Peng 
Shuzhi also wrote that after the First Congress of the CCP, "the newly born Party's 
general inclination was to go in the direction of the Bolsheviks. " Peng Shuzhi xuanii, Vol 
1,03. 
3 'Riutin's Report to the Eastern Department of the ECCI, 20 May 1922', GLZDC, 
Vol 1, p 88. 
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united front of democratic revolution ... to liberate the Chinese people from a dual 
yoke - the yoke of foreigners and the yoke of powerful militarists in our country -a 
war which is just as urgently needed as it is inevitable. " We may remember that at the 
Party's I st Congress a majority of the delegates took a harsh stance and rejected the 
suggestion to unite with the democratic party - the GMD, and intended to wage a pure 
proletarian revolution in China. Why was there a great change in basic tasks and 
tactics within one year? One view is that it was a result of the fact that the Chinese 
Communists by then had a more sound understanding of China's particular conditions 
and they themselves had adopted the tactics set by Lenin. In fact, it was the First 
Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, which was inaugurated in Moscow on 21 
January 1922, that brought about this change. At this Congress the Comintern leaders, 
Zinoviev and Safarov clearly expounded Lenin's theory on revolution in the colonies 
and backward countries, and appealed to the Far Eastern peoples to wage national 
democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism with the aid of the Russian 
and Western proletariat. Safarov specially pointed out that the first task for the CCP 
was to liberate China from the yoke of foreign powers, to overthrow Dujun (the local 
military heads of provinces), and to establish a democratic republic. Lenin himself did 
not attend the Congress, but he received the representatives of the CCP and the GMD, 
hoping that the two parties could co-operate in the national democratic revolution in 
China. 154 In April 1922 Chen Duxiu called the CCP's important cadres together to 
discuss the gist of the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East and on 23 May he 
wrote an essay claiming that the CCP should form a united front with the GMD, 
anarchist organisations and other parties in labour movement. Later Chen admitted 
'54 Huang Xiurong, Gonqchan quoii vu Zhonqquo qeminq quanxi shi, Vol 1, p 110. 
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that this First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East's resolutions on democratic 
revolutions in Eastern countries encouraged the CCP to make its new programme. 155 
According to Saich, the stress at the P Congress of the Comintern. on the need for the 
Communist parties to break out of their isolation and to try to become mass parties was 
of importance to later policy towards China. The CCP's shift in emphasis on the 
United Front came about not only through the discussions with Maring before his 
departure to Moscow in spring 1922, but also from pressure by Dalin. 156 
The Party's Second Congress was held in Shanghai in July 1922. The 
delegates to this Congress were not elected by the local branches, but were appointed 
by the centre of the Party. The more prominent among them were those who had just 
returned from abroad, and therefore were better acquainted with Bolshevik principles. 
The Party Constitution adopted by this Congress stressed Bolshevik organisational 
principles: strict, highly centralised and disciplined organisation and training within the 
Party. This Congress unanimously resolved to participate in the Comintem and to 
become one of its sections, which brought the Party under complete Comintern 
control. In consequence, the CCP would obey all decisions made by the Comintern. 
In such a way, the Party was pulled into Russian waters. The 2nd Congress worked 
out the Party's maximum programme and minimum programme. While insisting that 
its aims were to establish the dictatorship of the labourers, to abolish the system of 
private ownership and to realise a Communist society, the CCP made clear its 
immediate aims were to overthrow the feudal rule of the warlords and to end the 
155 LI Yanqi, 'The CCP's Early Views on Its Relations with Other Parties', Zhon-q-qon-q 
dangsh! vanuiu, 1997, No 6, p 36; 'Chen Duxiu's Remark about the West Lake 
Conference and the GMD-CCP Co-operation', 10 December 1929, GLZDC, Vol 2, 
p 340. 
156 Saich, 0 FU FC, Vol 1, p 93, p 111. 
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oppression of international imperialist powers. The Congress also passed a resolution 
"On the Democratic United Front", which stated that the CCP prepared to establish a 
united front with democratic party - the GMD - and democratic Parliament members 
during the democratic national revolution. 
Some scholars consider that Bolshevik concepts of organisation and the united 
front policy were imported into China by the Comintern, and that both the drive for 
centralisation and the adoption of the united front policy were the steps toward the 
Party's Bolshevisation. 157 Beyond any doubt, the 2nd Congress marked the CCP's 
more rapid development into a Bolshevik-style party. 
After a comprehensive survey of the process of the founding of the CCP, it 
is safe to say that it was impossible for radical Chinese intellectuals to have formed 
the CCP at that time without the direction and assistance of the agents of Soviet 
Russia and the Comintern. It is no exaggeration to say that the CCP, as Maring 
remarked, "was born too early and was supported too strongly by foreign means. " 158 
As a party, which was established and propped up by the Bolsheviks, the CCP 
naturally adopted Bolshevik concepts as its theoretical basis and organisational 
principles from the very beginning. It has been rightly remarked that the first wave 
157 G. Benton, Bolshevising China: From Lenin to Stalin to Mao, 1921-44, (Leeds East 
Asia Papers, No 22), p 7; H. Gruber, Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern, (New York: 
Anchor, 1974), p 349 and 399. 
"58'Maring's Letter to the ECCI, 20 June 1923', GLZDC, Vol 2, p 477-8. According to 
Chen Duxiu's report to the Comintern on 30 June 1922, only from October 1921 to June 
1922, the CCP's Central Committee's expenditure amounted to a sum of 17,655 yuan, 
in which, 16,655 yuan came from the Comintern., GLZDC, Vol 2, p 304. 
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of Bolshevisation in China started from the CCP's founding period. 159 For the CCP 
to develop into a Leninist party only required a course of quantitative change, rather 
than a qualitative one, it is certainly incorrect to speak of the CCP as a non-Leninist 
Party in its first phase. 
"59 Benton, Bolshevising China, p 26. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
ANALYSES AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis I have carefully examined the origins of the Chinese 
Communist Party and emphasised the importance of the role played by Soviet 
Russia and the Comintern in founding the CCP. I have pointed out that establishing 
a Communist party in China was a part of the Bolsheviks' general global strategy of 
world revolution, and of the Comintern's efforts to expand Communist forces into 
the Far East. The formation of the CCP was by no means a spontaneous action 
which Chinese radicals undertook by themselves. Rather, it was initiated and 
promoted by Soviet Russia and the Comintern. In other words, without the 
influence of the October Revolution and the endeavours of Bolshevik agents, the 
CCP could not have been founded at a time when the prerequisites for organising a 
Communist party were totally lacking in China. The rudiments of such an 
interpretation have been held by many other scholars in Western countries, Russia, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong; recently even several historians in the PRC essentially 
endorse this view. ' 
As mentioned in my Introduction, there are also several other positions 
which are different or partly different from mine. 2 In order to explain why I believe 
1 For example, Dirlik, The Oriqins of Chinese Communism; Brandt, Stalin's Failure in 
Lhina; Shevelyov, 'On the History of the Formation of the Communist Party of China', 
Far Eastern Affairs (1981) No 1; Glunin, 'The Comintern and the Rise of the 
Communist Movement in China' Ulyanovsky (ed. ), The Comintern and the East; Sima 
Lu, Zhonggong de Chenqli vu Chugi Huodon-q Ronqc 
-i 
clao ; Li Yunhan, Cong -- jonc Oin-qdanq; Xiang Oing, Goncichanquooi he Zhonqquocleminq Guanxi Shiqao. 
For instance, Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi(The CC of the CCIP' 
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some of those arguments are wrong and some cannot be completely accepted, I 
would like to make our divergence of views more clear and do further analysis here. 
By doing so, I also try to strengthen my own argument. 
Section 1. On the Assumed Prerequisites for the Foundation of the CCP 
The official explanation in the PRC for the birth of the CCP is that it was 
established as 
a result of Marxism-Leninism combining with the Chinese labour movement; and 
that it only obtained some help from the Comintern led by Lenin. Even had there 
been no Comintern and no assistance from Soviet Russia, a Communist party was 
bound to have emerged in China eventually. 3 In answer to this, we must first 
establish whether there was a mature proletarian movement and a wide diffusion of 
Marxism or not before the CCP was born. 
In order to demonstrate that there was a social basis and class foundation for 
fonning the CCP, official Chinese historians have described the Chinese working class 
Institute for Study of the History of the CCP), Zhonqquo Gonqchandan-q lish! (The 
History of the Chinese Communist Party), Beijing, People's Press, 1991; Van de Ven, 
From Friend to Comrade; 'Yang Kuisong, Zhoncicionq vu Mo-si-ke de Guanxi (The 
CCP's Relations with Relations with Moscow), Taibei: Dongda Book, 1997. 
3 Hu Sheng, Zhonqquo Gon- chandang de gishinian, p 19; 'The Central Committee a- 
of the CCP's Resolution on the Presidium of the ECCI's Proposal for Disbanding the 
Comintern', Jiefanq ribao (The Liberation Daily), (Yan'an, 27 May 1943); Zhou 
Wenqi, 'Commentary on the Studies of the Relations between the Comintern, Soviet 
Union and the CCP during the Recent Decade', Zhonqqonq dangshi van'iu, (1991), 
No 5, p 46. 
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entering the political arena as an awakening independent force during the May 4th 
Movement and playing a decisive role in achieving the success of that struggle. 4 
It was true that China's industry and trade made considerable progress during 
World War I. However, China was still in the early stage of industrial development 
even after the War. In 1920, national industrial output represented only 6.2% of the 
total gross output of industry and agriculture measured by value. 5 There was almost 
no heavy industry in China and modem factories and mills were found mainly in a few 
port cities. Most industrial enterprises were small in scale, often with inadequate 
capital resources, and their technology and equipment were usually outmoded and 
obsolete. In 1919, there were only two million Chinese workers, accounting for a 
mere 0.5% of the total Chinese population. Most Chinese workers had just recently 
changed their status from peasants or workers in small handicraft enterprises to 
industrial workers and, therefore, still possessed to a considerable extent a non- 
proletarian consciousness. 
Most early Chinese labour organisations took the form of guilds and had strong 
connections with the old secret societies. Even trade unions founded during the May 
4th period were actually mixed associations, consisting of factory-owners, workers, 
engineers and foremen. They were controlled by non-proletarian elements. As Jean 
Chesneaux has pointed out, many of these organisations were without any definite 
class basis and were far from being genuine trade unions. 6 
It is well known that the Chinese working class displayed its united strength by 
strikes during the May 4th movement, but this does not necessarily indicate that the 
Chinese working class already had class consciousness and political initiative. Cai 
Hesen pointed out that "the workers' strike in the May 4th Movement was due on the 
one hand to their hatred of the oppression and invasion of the Powers; and on the other 
54 
Zhonggong zhongyang clangshi yanjiushi, Zhonqquo Gonqchandanq lishi, p 34. 
Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming (ed. ), Zhonciquo ziben zhuyi fazhan shi (History of the 
Development of Chinese Capitalism), (Beijing: People's Press, 1990), Vol 2, p 1051. 6 Chesneaux, The Chinese Labour Movement, p 163. 
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hand, was a result of their being utilised by students and politicians. " Cai believed that 
the Chinese workers participated in the movement only "passively". 7 Deng Zhongxia, 
a prominent leader of the Communist labour movement, admitted that the Chinese 
capitalists "supported and encouraged" anti-Japanese patriotic strikes, and that some of 
them even "commanded" the workers to go on strike, because the Movement was 
directed against their foreign competitor - Japanese capital and therefore accorded with 
the Chinese bourgeoisie's self-interest and direct needs. 8 
Not only were there no genuine workers' organisations or independent labour 
movement during the May 4th period, but even in the summer of 1920, when the CCP 
came into being, these circumstances remained unchanged. On August 22 Chen 
Duxiu remarked that "the dirty politicians played the main role and were in the 
limelight in most new trade unions, while most old guilds were fully monopolised by 
factory-owners or foremen. " Ironically, the representatives of the Comintern and 
Soviet Russia also took a pessimistic view of the Chinese workers' level of 
consciousness, their organisations and the state of the labour movement. Vilensky and 
Maring in Shanghai and Markhlevsky in the North, found that the workers were not 
numerous and therefore did not represent an effective force; that trade unions had 
generally not been organised; and that the working class lacked political 
consciousness. In other words, there was no labour movement comparable to that 
found in Europe. They therefore believed that the conditions for building a Chinese 
labour movement were wanting and the Chinese working class could not play an 
important role in national political affairs in the short term. 9 
7 Cai Hesen, 'The Historical Development of the CCF, (1926), ZDBX, p 5. 8 Deng Zhongxia, Zhonaguo zhiciong yundong flansh! 
, 
(A Concise History of the 
Chinese Labour Movement), (Beijing, 1957), p 8. His comment is backed by a lot of 
evidence. For example, Zhu Zhuowen, who was the owner of Housheng Ironworks in 
Shanghai, encouraged his employees to join the patriotic movement; under his 
influence, the Metalworkers' Guild organised strikes. (Min-quo ribao, 20 May 1919) 9 Cf. Leong, Sino-Soviet Relation Relations: the First Phase,, p 17; U Yuzhen, Waring 
in China and His Tragedy', Jindaishi vanLu, (1991), No 1, p 81; GLZDC, Vol 2, p 241. 
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One can thus convincingly argue that, around the time the CCP was founded, 
the Chinese working class had not stepped upon the historical stage as an independent 
political force. Even several Chinese scholars have argued that, at the time of the May 
4th Movement, the Chinese working class had neither worked out any guiding 
principles nor put forward its own class political demands; in addition, the working 
class organisations had not cast off their predominantly backward, primitive and 
spontaneous forms. Moreover the scale of the labour movements and their social 
influence were rather limited. It follows that it was impossible for the Chinese 
working class to become either an independent political force or a class-for-itself at 
that time. 10 All of this is contrary to what many supposedly authoritative Chinese 
historians have asserted. I can therefore confidently state that, under such 
circumstances, the combination of the Chinese labour movement and Marxism- 
Leninism. was impossible, due to the lack of development of the former. 
As for the latter, we should examine whether there was widespread 
dissemination of Marxism-Leninism in China. Despite the fact that Marxism was 
introduced into China at the beginning of the 20th century, Marxist influence was for a 
long time rather weak compared with some other socialist schools of thought. 
Although several intellectuals became interested in Marxism during the May 4th 
period, there were nearly "no Marxist converts in a genuine sense". " At that time 
there was no such term as "Leninism", although some of Lenin's doctrines had been 
introduced into China. 
Li Dazhao, who is normAy recognised as the "first Marxist in China7, 
10 Cf. Chen Chuanhai and Xiu Youli, 'On the Leading Force of the May 4th Movement, 
Shehui kexue pinglun (Social Sciences Reviews), (1989); Wang Xueqi and Zhang 
Jichang, 'Re-consider the Viewpoint that the CCP Was the Product of the Combination 
of Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese Labour Movement', Han-qzhou daxue xuebao 
(Journal of Hangzhou University), (1989), No 9; Zhang Jingru and Jiang Xiuhua, 'The 
May 4th Movement Was Not the Beginning of the New Democratic Revolution', 
Doncivue luncong (Dongyue Tribune), (1989), No 5. 
11 Luk, The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism, p 34. 
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believed that establishing a socialist system had to rely not only on a change of 
material conditions but also had to use moral principles and human sympathy to 
persuade people to abandon evil and do good. 12 Li used Kropotkin's theory of 
"mutual aid" to reinterpret the Marxist theory of class struggle. He claimed that, for 
revolution, both Marx's idea of class struggle and Kropotkin's idea of mutual aid were 
necessary. 13 If even Li Dazhao's knowledge of Marxist theory was at this level, one 
can imagine the deficiencies of the other founders of the CCP. 
Around this time, Chen Duxiu's ideas were in confusion. In December 1919 
Chen still held that China should follow the example of Britain and America and put 
democracy into practice. 14 In February 1920, he claimed that his new belief was 
Christianity, for it was "a religion of love" and "the Gospel of the poor". 15 Until 
spring 1920, Chen Duxiu still considered that Marx's historical materialism, 
Kropotkin's mutualism, Darwin's evolutionism and Malthus' population theory were 
all "aspects of the truth". and that "there was no universally applicable truth". 16 This 
indicates that Chen did not believe solely in Marxism even just before he started to 
organise the first Communist group. Talking to Edgar Snow in 1936 about his state of 
mind after the May 4th Movement, Mao Zedong reminisced that "my mind was a 
curious mixture of ideas of liberalism, democratic reformism and utopian socialism. " 17 
Liu Shaoqi admitted frankly that, when he joined the SY in 1920,1 only knew 
socialism was good, knew of Marx and Lenin, knew of the October Revolution and the 
Bolshevik Party; but I did not understand what socialism was. " 18 According to Deng 
Yingchao, Zhou Enlai's wife, during that time the members of the Awakening Society 
12 U Dazhao, 'My Marxist Views', Xin gingnian, May 1919. * It was said the 
publication of this issue was actually delayed. 
13 Li Dazhao, 'Class Competition and Mutual Aid', Meizhou vinglun, 6 July 1919. 
14 Chen Duxiu, 'The Basis for Democracy, Xin qin-qnian, Vol 7, No 2. 
15 Chen Duxiu, 'The Christian Religion and the Chinese', Xin gingnian, Vol 7, No 3. 16 Chen Duxiu, 'Malthus' Population Theory and China's Population Problem', 1 
March 1920, Duxiu wencun, Vol 1, p 285. 
17 Snow, Red Star over China, pp 148-9. 
18 Liu Shaoqi xuanii (Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi), (Beijing: People's Press, 1985), p 
485. 
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in Tianjin "did not have any firm beliefs, and did not understand what Communism 
was"; what they knew was that Communist society was "the most ideal society", "the 
October Revolution had succeeded thanks to Lenin, and their revolution had liberated 
the majority of the oppressed and had created a classless society. "19 Bao Huiseng, also 
remembered: "During the founding period, we only had a limited knowledge of 
Marxism. The majority of our comrades did not learn Marxism-Leninism until they 
became members of the CCp.,, 20 Li Da said later that in the early 1920s the Chinese 
Communists hardly knew any theory, and what they had was only a political 
inclination. Moreover: 
During the period of the founding of the CCP, only a few people had read the 
works of Marx and Lenin, because there had not been enough time for us to 
study these classical works. On the whole, the theoretical preparation for 
founding the CCP was not adequate. 21 
Even the Russian advisers complained about the 'immaturity' of the Chinese 
Communists as far as their understanding of Marxist theory was concerned. 22 
This situation was in marked contrast to that found in Europe, where the 
socialist movement was long established and Marxism had been studied deeply before 
the foundation of the Marxist parties. Thus the usual model was for Marxist 
ideological activity to occur prior to the setting up of socialist or communist 
organisations. Judging from the process of the CCP's establishment, we can find an 
interesting phenomenon - it was the organisation that determined ideology, as Dirlik 
19 Deng Yingchao, 'Recollections of the May 4th Movement', Wusi yundong huivilu, 
Vol 1, Beijing: People's Press, 1979, p 75. 
20 Bao Huiseng, 'Recollections of the First Congress of the CCP', Yida qianhuo, Vol 2, 
p 313. 
21 Li Da, 'The Ideological Struggles During the Founding Period of the CCP, Yida 
gianhou, Vol 2, p 53. 
22 Meisner, Ll Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism, pp 119-120. 
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correctly suggests: 
Understanding of Marxism was not a precondition for Party membership, 
what was essential to begin with was 'belief in Bolshevik goals and methods. 
... The ideological presuppositions of the Party were articulated in the very 
process of its organisational formation. 
In other words, the CCP "was the condition for the emergence of Marxism as an 
identifiable alternative in Chinese socialiSM.,, 23 
This interpretation can be confirmed by the fact that most Marxist Studies 
Societies were only set up after the formation of the Communist groups and that most 
Chinese translations of Marxist writings and Lenin's works were available only after 
they were printed by the CCP's sponsoring group and the East Asian Secretariat of the 
Comintern. 
At that time, the material conditions for the realisation of the Marxist socialist 
programme were lacking in Chinese society. The Chinese radicals had no experience 
of living in a large-scale industrialised society. Hence it could be said that the social 
environment and the backward mode of production restricted the Chinese radicals' 
ability to understand abstruse Marxist theories, especially the theories dealing with the 
nature of commodities in capitalist society. Frankly admitting the complete lack of 
theoretical preparation for the foundation of the CCP, Chen Duxiu said to Zhang 
Guotao in summer 1920 that there were no fully-fledged Marxists, only some students 
of Marxism who would simultaneously put into practice what they were studying 
when starting to organise a Communist Party in China. 24 
Recently, some Chinese scholars have made comments on the early Chinese 
Communists' level of Marxist knowledge which are more objective and less 
23 Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism, p 251; p 9. 24 Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the CCP, Vol 1, pp 101 -102. 
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influenced by official ideology. In their opinion, these intellectuals had not become 
Marxists, most of them had not properly completed their conversion from radical 
democrats to Communists, and therefore could only be called "intellectuals with 
Communist tendencies". Likewise, most of the so-called Communists were merely 
people who advocated Bolshevik revolution, intended to follow the Russian way and 
therefore joined the Communist organisation. 25 
From the above, we can see that before the foundation of the CCP in the 
summer of 1920, there was no widespread diffusion of Marxism-Leninism, nor even a 
group of intellectuals who had grasped Marxism-Leninism correctly. Hence there was 
by no means a coming together of Marxist-Leninism and the labour movement. 
In view of these facts, some Chinese scholars such as Wang Xueqi and Zhang 
Jichang suggest that such a combination occurred only after the Party's foundation. 26 
This means that the fusion was not a prerequisite for founding the CCP, rather it was a 
direct outcome of it. This interpretation seems more convincing. 
In a sense, the fusion of Marxism-Leninism with the labour movement needed 
to be achieved by intellectuals with Communist tendencies. With regard to the 
interrelations between Marxism-Leninism, the labour movement and radical 
intellectuals, Dirlik believes that it was the growing attraction to labour, the labour 
movements and the consciousness of the people that "forced on Chinese radicals the 
realisation that socialism was of immediate relevance to their society", and 
"predisposed them to the Bolshevik message. "27 On the other hand, Schwartz 
remarks, in contrast to Dirlik's arguments: "A close reading of the writings of Chen 
25 Wu Guo'an and Gao Jun, 'The Development and Peculiarities of Studies of Modern 
Chinese History', Dancishi vaniiu yu a iaoxue (Studies and Teaching of the CCP History), 
(Fuzhou, 1991), No 1; Han Lingxuan, 'Some Issues about Intellectuals with Communist Tendencies', Jindaishi vanuiu, (1983), No 2. 26 See their article 'Reconsider the Viewpoint that the CCP was the Product of the 
Combination of Marxism-Leninism and the Labour Movement', Hancizhou daxue 
xuebao, (1989), No 9. r7Uirlik, The Oric iins of Chinese Communism, p 260; p 263. 
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[Duxiu] and Li [Dazhao], does not suggest that the rise of a Chinese proletariat was 
itself an important factor in their conversion. It would be more correct to say that 
Leninism turned their attention to the proletariat rather than that the proletariat turned 
their attention to Leninism. ... their concern for the deplorable living conditions of the 
Chinese industrial workers after 1920 was not genuine .,, 
28 Historical evidence 
suggests that Schwartz's reasoning is sounder than Dirlik's. In addition to Communist 
ideology, the Bolsheviks' direct encouragement and direction and the Comintem's 
financial support were also responsible for the intellectuals' radical turn towards the 
working class and their involvement in the early labour movements. 
The establishment of the Secretariat of the Labour Organisations marked the 
beginning of the labour movement led by the CCP and was regarded as the real start of 
the alliance of Marxism-Leninism and the labour movement as well. Nevertheless, 
Maring, who had organised the Secretariat, drafted the declaration for it and financed it 
with Comintern funds, admitted in 1923 that "it is a Secretariat without real 
labourers .,, 
29 The above evidence demonstrates that the state of the labour movement 
led by the Communists did not improve much even after the CCP's birth. 
In sum, the birth of the CCP was not an outgrowth of the combination of 
Marxism-Leninism with the Chinese labour movement, because there was neither a 
mature proletarian movement nor a wide diffusion of Marxism and the self-declared 
prerequisites - the class foundation and the theoretical basis - for forming the CCP did 
not exist in China. 
213 Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, p 25. 
29 Waring's Letter to the ECCI, 20 June 1923', GLZDC, Vol 2, p 478. 
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Section 2. The CCP's Birth Was Brought about by Soviet Russia and the 
Comintern 
One may ask: if there were no such prerequisites for organising a Communist 
party in China at the time questioned, how could the CCP have been established in 
1920-21? 1 agree with Dirlik's comment that there was nothing "spontaneous" either 
about the conversion to Marxism, or about the organisation of the Party. 30 The more 
probably conclusion is that the CCP's premature birth was brought about by Soviet 
Russia and the Comintern, whose propaganda and organisation activities were 
strengthened after the spring of 1920. 
This is not a new viewpoint. However, for a long time, works taking this 
position have not substantiated with sufficient reliable historical documents to confirm 
the role played by Soviet Russia and the Comintern. Making the widest possible use 
of newly-published former Soviet documents, Chinese and British archives, and other 
available sources, my thesis provides much detail about what the Bolsheviks did to 
establish the CCP. Several findings and explanations may make new contributions to 
this field of study. 
First of all, I have tried to set the origins of the CCP against the big picture of 
the world as a whole, and to examine its international background. Obviously, the 
foundation of the CCP was not an isolated Chinese event, and it was closely related to 
the October Revolution in Russia, the Bolsheviks' general global strategy of world 
revolution and the Comintern's efforts to expand Communist forces into the Far East. 
There is no doubt the CCP was only one of the Communist parties promoted by the 
Comintern during 1919-1922. Therefore, one distinguishing feature of this thesis is to 
examine the origins of the CCP as an integral part of the whole international 
Communist movement. Only by such an approach can we explain many of the events 
30 Dirlik, The Ori_qins of the Chinese Communism, p 258. 
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that happened in China in this period. A Russian historian, A. V. Pantsov, pointed out 
at the International Academic Conference on the History of the Revolutionary and 
National Liberation Movement in China, which was held in Berlin in October 1998, 
that the first phase (1918/19-1922) of the Bolsheviks' policy over China was based on 
Trotsky's drive for a universal dictatorship of the proletariat, China included. 31 
Of course, as Russia's largest neighbour, China also became one of Soviet 
Russia's major targets in the East because of its important position in the latter's 
consideration of geopolitics. As part of the Bolsheviks' pursuit of state self-interest, 
their revolutionary strategy was closely connected with Soviet Russia's foreign policy 
of allying itself with adjoining Asian countries in order to reduce the pressures from 
the imperialist powers and to break the diplomatic deadlock. Its ultimate aim was to 
turn the colonies of imperial powers into reserves and support for Soviet Russia. 
China was being used by Japanese troops as a base for invading Siberia, and the 
Chinese government, too, was sending its own troops to join the Entente intervention 
from 1918. So it was imperative for the Bolsheviks to frame a preliminary policy 
towards China not long after the October Revolution, with the aim of building a 
friendly relationship with the Chinese government and creating a revolutionary China. 
Contrary to the widely accepted view that after the October Revolution hardly 
any Soviet and Comintern agents were dispatched to China until the spring of 1920 
when the blockade of the Sino-Soviet border lifted, 32 my research shows that as early 
as the spring of 1918, agents from Soviet Russia arrived in China and started recruiting 
there. From then to 1921, agents of Soviet Russia and the Comintern were numerous 
and varied: they were not all pure Bolsheviks as many historians have imagined, but 
also included Mensheviks, anarchists and even former Tsarist officers; in addition to 
Russians, various other nationalities also engaged in work in China, for example, 
former prisoners of the First World War, former Chinese labourers in Russia and 
31 'International Academic Conference on the History of the Revolutionary and 
National Liberation Movement in China', Far Eastern Affairs, 1998, No 6. 
32 Cf. First three footnotes in Chapter 2. 
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Communists from some European and Asian countries. In order to conceal their true 
identities and as a cover for their secret activities, many of them had different overt 
professions, such as journalists, scholars, teachers, businessmen and tailors. 
Therefore, these agents were not easy to identify. Several leading Bolshevik bodies, 
centres and working institutes, for example, the East Asian Secretariat of the 
Comintern, the Yurin Legation of the Far East Republic of Siberia, the office of 
Shanghai Life and the Beijing branch of the Rosta, were fon-ned in China for the 
purpose of directing the activities of the agents and the Chinese revolutionary 
movements, and to conduct propaganda and organisational work. , These agents and 
bodies were subordinate to the different organisations of the RCP(b), the Comintern, 
the Red Army, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the Cheka and the Far Eastern 
Republic of Siberia, etc.. In spite of the fact there were sometimes conflicts among 
these organisations, their representatives sometimes worked together in China for their 
common cause. Maybe this is the first work to have given much detail relating to 
Soviet and Comintern agents and their organisations in China during 1918-22. 
A newly-published collection of documents - Far Eastern Policy of Soviet 
Russia (Collection of Documents by the Siberian Bureau of the RCP(b) Central 
Committee, Siberia RevolutionaEy Committee and Others (in Russian, compiled by M. 
P. Malishva and V. R. Poznansky, published in Novosibirsk, 1996) - provides 
supporting for my thesis. M. Persits, in his book review of this collection, writes that 
"the right to carry out communist work in Russia's neighbouring countries in the East 
was contested by many a party, state and Comintern organisation, as well as by their 
numerous representatives. ... Everyone wanted to be a party to the creation of an 
eastern front for the global revolution that seemed just around the comer. ... despite 
,, 33 the rivalry, communist work advanced satisfactorily, ... . 
Many scholars have focused their attention on Bolshevik agents' contact with 
33 Persits, "A New Collection of Documents on Soviet Policy in the Far East in 1920- 
1922", Far Eastern Affairs, 1997, No 5. 
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Chinese "progressive elements", who later took part in the Communist movement. 34 
In fact, before the arrival of the agents, there were no Communists or Marxists in 
China at all. Even Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu's conversion to Marxism and 
Bolshevism was mainly the result of persuasion by Soviet agents. Contact was not 
confined to the above category of Chinese; the scope and targets were quite wide- 
ranging. This thesis shows that in order to achieve their various goals, Bolshevik 
agents also came into contact with Chinese belonging to various factions with widely 
differing political beliefs, party affiliations, and various social strata. For a period of 
time, they regarded any Chinese who were opposed to the Japanese as being their 
friends and even tried to establish relations with warlords. Such contact started not 
long after the first group of Soviet agents appeared in China. Thus, it is quite wrong to 
suggest, as some historians have done, that there was no direct contact between the 
Bolsheviks and the Chinese revolutionaries until the spring of 1920.35 
As for their connections with the Chinese nationalists, my study shows that 
the Bolsheviks' attempts to form an alliance with Sun Yat-sen and his party started 
in 1918, prior to the 2 nd Congress of the Comintern, the moment when Lenin 
formally proposed the Comintern's policy of supporting bourgeois revolutionaries' 
national liberation movement in colonial countries. The purpose of this was to 
attract the GMD to the common struggle against the imperialist powers, to oppose 
the Pro-Japanese Beijing Government's participation in the Allied intervention in 
Siberia and to help them create a pro-Soviet Chinese government. B. A. Elleman's 
34 Huang Xiurong, Gonqchan quoii vu Zhon-qquo geming cluanxi shi, p 53; Xue 
Xiantian and Li Yuzhen, 'The Communist Organizations of the Chinese Residents in 
Russia and Some Issues concerning the Establishment of the Communist Party in 
China', Jiandaishi Yanjiu, (1989), No 5. 
35 Xiang Qing, Gonqýhan- uoii vu Zhong q- quoqemin-q Guanxi Lunwenji, p 81; Huang 
Xiurong, Gonachan 
-quoui vu 
Zhonq-quo geming -quanxi shi. 1 p 
53. 
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recent research comes to the same conclusion as mine, which stresses that the 
United Front policy was originally adopted prior to the foundation of the CCP, and 
that Maring's contribution to the United Front was merely to persuade the Chinese 
Communist leaders to adopt this pre-existing policy. 36 
Furthermore, my thesis shows that the Bolsheviks did not limit their dealings 
with the Chinese nationalists only to encouraging a national liberation movement. 
At this early stage the Bolsheviks also endeavoured to persuade several nationalist 
leaders, including Sun Yat-sen himself, to take the lead in forming a socialist or 
Communist party which would then be subordinated to the Comintern. The 
documents of the RCP(b)'s local organisations in Siberia suggest that, sparing no 
efforts or resources, the Bolsheviks really tried to exert influence on the more active 
members of the growing national liberation movement in the hope that it might 
eventually head towards socialist revolution. Perhaps because the GMD had not 
followed the Bolsheviks in this, the Comintem Far Eastern Secretariat was eager to 
"take on the leadership of all the [Chinese and Korean] opposition elements" by 
means of "infiltrating [Communists] into those nationalist revolutionary 
organisations to carry out organic work there. " The Russian scholar Persits believes 
that this Trojan horse tactic by which Communists joined the GMD, cannot be 
totally credited to Maring, and it "had its origin in the depths of the Comintern Far 
36 B. A. Elleman, 'Soviet Diplomacy and the First United Front in China', Modern 
ý9ýhina, 1995, No 4. 
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Eastern Secretariat, way back in late 1920.9,37 In the final analysis, this tactic was 
only one of the methods which was creatively used to realise Lenin's strategy in the 
East. 
Generally speaking, not enough attention has been paid to Soviet propaganda 
in China between 1919 and 1921 and its scale has been underestimated. Some 
scholars have hardly even been able to find any evidence of Bolshevik propaganda 
before the summer of 1920 . 
38 My study reveals that the focus of the Bolsheviks' 
propaganda in China in its first stage was to the anti-imperialist movement, 
especially the anti-Japanese movement, and so it contained scarcely any elements of 
Communist ideology; it was not so much propaganda as agitation before 1920. 
Around 1920, the Bolsheviks launched an intensive propaganda campaign in 
China and made use of various media, methods and channels to publicise their 
principles and ideology. At first, they mainly conducted oral propaganda, directing 
certain Chinese intellectuals individually or in groups; later, their agitation and 
propaganda expanded to workers, soldiers, as well as students. In order to extend 
Soviet Russia's political influence, the Soviet news agency set up branches in 
several cities in China, which regularly supplied news and publicity free of charge 
to the Chinese and foreign press. For the sake of disguising the source of their 
propaganda, the Bolsheviks used very flexible tactics: they enlisted some Chinese to 
37 Far Eastern Affairs, 1997, No 5. 
38 ang Qing, 'The Comintern and the Chinese Revolution in the Period of the 
Foundation of the CCP', Jindaishi van Lig (1980), No 4; Luk, The Origins of Chinese 
Bolshevism, pp 33-4. 
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help with propaganda work; they made use of several Chinese journals to serve their 
own purposes and created and subsidised some new magazines; they even 
established some printing houses in China to print large quantities of books and 
pamphlets for distribution there. Moreover, the Bolsheviks also obtained socialist 
and Communist publications from other countries by the means described earlier 
and used them as propaganda materials in China. Most of the above facts have 
hitherto been ignored. 
The arrival and publication of the Karakhan Manifesto in China aroused 
among the Chinese masses a sentiment of friendship for Soviet Russia. In 
consequence, Soviet Russia's call for national liberation and the Bolsheviks' 
interpretation of imperialism, which simplified the explanation of China's affliction 
by attributing it to foreign aggression, attracted more and more Chinese. In 
addition, many Communist publications not only contained works by Marx, Engels 
and the Bolshevik leaders, but also included many articles which portrayed Soviet 
Russia as a fair socialist society. This encouraged the belief that Soviet Russia was 
a successful example of national regeneration and therefore that China also needed a 
socialist revolution of the Bolshevik type. Those were the main reasons why 
Chinese public opinion suddenly inclined to praising Soviet Russia; and why many 
radical intellectuals were attracted to Bolshevik theory and practice around this 
time. 
It is generally acknowledged that the May 4th Movement was a turning point 
in the Chinese modem history and a very important event in the run-up to the 
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founding the CCP; the date 4 May 1919 was even regarded by someone as "marking 
the birth of the CCp, 9.39 Having carefully re-examined the whole May 4th 
Movement (in a broad sense, it lasted from 1917 to 1921 as Zhow Tse-Tsung 
argues). 40 1 have found that this movement, especially its later part, was made good 
use of by Soviet Russia. As I have written in some preceding chapters, 41 since 
opposing the Japanese was an important strategic aim of Soviet Russia in the Far 
East, from 1918 numerous agents (including former POWs) in China did their best 
to carry on anti-Japanese agitation, propaganda and even incited Chinese to boycott 
Japanese goods. 42 Some Chinese intellectuals who had already worked for the 
Communist cause tried to rally radicals around themselves and to form several 
societies which played an important role in the May 4 th Movement. After the 
patriotic demonstration of 4 May 1919, several important Bolshevik agents 
approached Chinese student activists and mass organisations which emerged as part 
of the Movement in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, and attempted to manipulate 
them by attending their meetings or talking with their leaders individually. Mao 
Zedong pointed out that the emergence of the May 4th Movement was "a response 
, 43 to the call of the October Revolution and of Lenin. Although his comment 
cannot be treated seriously, I have every reason to say that even if Soviet and 
39 A Brief Historv of the CCP, in Wilber and How, CNSAC, p 43. 40 TsemTsung Chow, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern 
China (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1960). 
ZrCf. Chapters 1-5. 
42 Therefore, a British official report of August 1919 pointed out "there is a Bolshevist 
element in the anti-Japanese agitation. " F0228/ 3211. 
43 Mao Zedong xuan'i, Vol 2, p 693. 
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Comintern agents did not initiate the May 4th demonstration, they at least gave an 
impetus to this Movement in order to attain their own goals. 
The official view of the PRC is that the May 4th Movement prepared large 
numbers of cadres for the formation of the CCP. This is quite true. My study 
demonstrates that it was mainly from among those activists and organisations with 
close connections who had Soviet and Comintern agents during the May 4'h period 
that a batch of radicals emerged who later became the key members of the 
Communist party. That is why A Brief History of the CCP states that the two forces 
formed in 1919 "were properly utilised by the true revolutionaries who joined the 
Communist movement as individuals for the purpose of organising an embryo for 
the future Communist Party. , 44 
Among various socialisms which were prevalent during the May 4th period, 
Dirlik especially singles out anarchism, which he considers "pervaded radical 
thinking on social and cultural change. " He also points out that the Chinese 
anarchists "participated directly in the initial efforts toward the founding of the 
Party. 1945 The above phenomena have recently been noticed by more and more 
scholars both in China and abroad. 46 The issue is how to explain them. 
Hardly any historians have considered that there was direct co-operation 
between Chinese anarchists and the Bolshevik agents. But allying with 
44 Wilber and How, CNSAC, p 43. 
45 Dirlik, The Oriqins of Chinese Communism, p 3, p 10. 
46 Lu Zhe, Zhonqquo wuzhenqfuzhuvi shigao (Draft History of Anarchism in China), 
Fuzhou: Fujian Peple's Press, 1990; Scalapino & Yu, The Chinese Anarchist 
Movement. 
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organisations of anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists abroad to promote world 
revolution was one tactic of the Bolsheviks, because they believed that these 
organisations were more revolutionary than the social democratic parties belonging 
to the 2 nd International. Without exception, the Bolshevik agents sought Chinese 
anarchists' help in China and persuaded those who believed in anarcho- 
Communism to undertake revolutionary and communist propaganda. For example, 
the newly published Russian and Comintern documents collection reveals that a 
pamphlet for distribution among Chinese soldiers, formerly considered as pure 
anarchist agitation, was actually written by a Chinese anarchist who worked for the 
47 East Asian Secretariat. Failure to see this is perhaps the main reason why several 
scholars have mistaken Bolshevik propaganda for simple anarchist agitation. 48 
With the aim at uniting more radical youths with anarchist inclinations, Li 
Dazhao and Chen Duxiu, who had already committed themselves to organisation work 
for the Communist cause, supported and sponsored the Work and Study Mutual Aid 
Movement. This started at the end of 1919 and spread to many cities in China and 
abroad. Numerous radicals who later joined the CCP, such as Mao Zedong, Yu 
Xiusong, Zhao, Shiyan, Shi Cuntong and Chen Gongpei, actively took part in the 
movement and became members of the Work and Studies Mutual Aid Corps. Chen 
Duxiu once said to Chen Gongpei and others: "It is for Communism and the CCP that 
we organised the Work and Studies Mutual Aid Corps. "49 This not only reflected what 
communism was in their eyes - working, studying and living together and sharing 
47 GLZDC, Vol 1, p 31. 
48 Fang Oingqiu, 'Some Issues on Mutinies under the Rule of the Beiyang Warlords', 
Lishi danq'an (Historical Archival Materials), (Beijing 1982), No 1. 
49 Ma Lianru, Zhonq 
-chandang chuan quo 
Gong 
-qshilU 
(The Founding of the CCP), 
Beijing: The Chinese Social Press, 1991, p 131. 
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common property; but also revealed their plan - to organise a Communist Party by 
drawing radical youths into quasi-communist organisations. Later, Bolshevik agents 
also suggested to anarchists that they forrn a Socialist League with Chinese 
Communists. The anarchists of this League and of some other anarchist groups were 
encouraged to embrace Bolshevism and to participate in the CCP. 
With regard to the process of forming the CCP, most historians in the PRC 
consider that it was Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu who took the initiative to form the 
CCP and their organisational. activities only gained some help from Voitinsky's 
group in 1920.50 It is clear from the analysis of early articles by Li Dazhao and 
Chen Duxiu that their thinking was in a confused state during 1918-20. In Chapter 
6,1 noted the evidence that they started their organisational activities (which led to 
the formation of the CCP) after they had received instructions from Bolshevik 
emissaries. This indicates that the CCP was by no means voluntarily initiated by 
the Chinese on their own accord. 
It may have puzzled many people as to why there were manifold Communist 
and socialist organisations in China during 1919-21.1 have highlighted evidence 
which shows that Voitinsky was not the sole Bolshevik emissary entrusted with the 
task of setting up a Communist party in China. Other Soviet and Comintern agents, 
including Korean Communists, also attempted to help different Chinese radical 
groups to establish Communist or socialist organisations and parties in China and to 
provided them with financial support. The Socialist League, the Oriental 
50 Hu Sheng, Zhonqquo Gonqchandan-q do gishinian, p 19. The most textbooks 
on the history of the CCP published in PRC hold the similar view. 
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Communist Party ( evolved from the Datong Party), the Zhina Communist Party 
(based on anarcho-communist organisations including the Truth Society) and the so- 
called Social Communist Party all belonged to this category. As a result, more than 
one Communist party appeared in China. In spite of the fact that some of these 
organisations were just formed to serve as a stopgap, some really helped to lay the 
foundations for establishing the CCP. 
Unable to distinguish such efforts behind the scenes, most historians could not 
deal with such diverse courses and processes of party-forming action. Facing these 
complicated cases, some students just do not admit that there was any possibility of 
there being Communist organisations and parties other than the CCP in China; 51 
some, who acknowledge the existence of these organisations and parties, insist that 
they were formed spontaneously by the Chinese themselves without relations with 
the Comintern and the RCP(b) ; 52 others assert that these organisations could not 
have existed simultaneouSly. 53 Scholars with the above views may have not 
recognised what tactics the Bolsheviks used in organisational work in China during 
51 Cao Zhongbin: "Discussion and Analysis of 'the Communist Party' in Chongqing", 
Dangshi vanjiu ziliao, 1992, No 2. 
" See Yang Kuisong, 'Some facts about the early Communist organisations in 
China', Dan-qshi vanuiu ziliao, 1992, No 4.1 have to point out that this article contains 
many mistakes. For example, he writes that the Datong Party was started by Yao 
Zuobin in Beijing in September 1921. 
53 For example, Ren Wuxiong denies the existence of the Marxist Study Society in 
Shanghai in early 1920, because he found some new material showing that there was a 
Socialist Study Society around that time; and he also believes that the Socialists' 
League was once the name of the Communist Party and , the Party changed its name to the Social Communist Party only after the League's disbandment. See 'The Socialist 
Study Society Established by Chen Duxiu in 1920' and 'Inquiry into the Socialists' 
League', Dangshi yaniiu ziliao, 1993, No 4 and 6. 
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this time. The Bolsheviks tried to establish more parties and organisations in 
Eastern countries, even fake ones, to make a show of strength, to support Soviet 
Russia and to carry out revolution under the leadership of the Comintern. Some 
front or peripheral organisations were used not only for allying and uniting more 
revolutionaries with varying beliefs, but also for concealing the core organisations - 
Communist parties and their activities- from being discovered. Therefore, the 
process of party-formation cannot be seen as a straight line. It had offshoots, in 
which organisations might overlap each other or, one might contain another. In any 
case, Comintern agents played a determining role in establishing these Communist 
organisations. There are therefore no grounds for saying that the CCP emerged out 
of a number of autonomous Communist organisations or that its foundation was not 
dependent on the efforts of Comintern agents, contrary to what Yang Kuisong and 
Hans van de Ven still insist. 54 
Furthermore, since the establishment of the CCP was closely linked to the 
formation of Communist organisations and parties in Korea and Japan, my research 
demonstrates the co-ordinated efforts to form parties in the Far East under the unified 
leadership of the Comintern. This may help us understand why there existed socialist 
leagues involving alliance between anarchists and the Bolsheviks both in China and 
Japan and why several Koreans and Japanese reportedly attended some meetings to 
discuss the formation of the CCP and CSY. This confirms that the foundation of the 
CCP was merely an integral part of the Bolsheviks' global efforts. A memorandum 
from the Siberian Bureau of the RCP(b) to the Party's Central Committee (dated 4 
54 See Yang Kuisong's Zhonqcionq vu Mo-si-ke de quanxi. 1920-1960 (The CCP's 
Relations with Moscow, 1920-1960), (Taibei, Dongda Books, 1997)and other works; 
van de Ven mainly expresses this view in his From Friend to Comrade. 
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December 1920) reveals that the Comintern Far Eastern Secretariat was painstakingly 
forming Communist groups in China and Korea by sending agents to do clandestine 
study-group work, and disseminating Communist propaganda among the general 
publiC. 55 
By giving so many details about several so-called Communist parties and 
organisations, clarifying their relationship to the early CCP, and relating the 
establishment of the Communist parties in China to the establishment of other 
Communist parties in the Far East, this thesis provides a more comprehensive picture 
of the background and process of the establishment of the CCP. 
As a result of the Bolsheviks' direct guidance and financial support in the 
establishment of the Party, the CCP decided to follow the Bolsheviks' principles. 
From examining the Party's manifesto and program, and its early activities, I 
conclude that the CCP was built along Leninist lines in respect of political doctrines 
and organisational principles. As Liu Shaoqi pointed out, since the CCP was 
established after the October Revolution when the Bolsheviks had succeeded, "there 
was already a living model; therefore, the CCP was built under the guidance of the 
Comintern according to Lenin's principles from the very beginning. ... [It] was not 
influenced by the Second International of European Social Democratic parties, 
either ideologically or organisationally. ... Since its foundation, our Party carried 
out criticism and self-criticism, maintained well-organised Party organisations and 
strict disciplines, did not allow the existence of the inner-Party factions, and 
strongly denounced liberalism within the Party, the tendency of independence of 
*5'5 Far Eastern Affairs, 1997, No 5. 
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trade unions and economism, etc., ... [Those factors] enabled us to 
build a Leninist 
party from the outset. iv% The view that the building of the CCP followed the 
Bolshevik Party's example from the start was widely held by relevant historians. 57 
Chen Yongfa, a scholar in Taiwan, points out in particular that a tendency to 
monism and exclusiveness in ideology and organisation emerged in China after the 
birth of the CCP. 58 In essence, the C CP itself was nothing more than a centralised 
organisation of dlite, professional revolutionaries which strove for state power. This 
basic nature of the CCP was decided at its birth and subsequently there were only 
59 differences in the degree of Bolshevisation it experienced. 
As a result of my research it is quite clear that Marxism-Leninism and the 
labour movement were not significant factors in drawing Chinese radicals into the 
Communist movement, whereas a ma or reason why a Communist force emerged and j 
grew in strength was that Bolshevik agents brought to Chinese radicals the 
organisational principles of Bolshevism and were directly involved in the task of 
organising the CCP. 
There are a number of reasons why several scholars have held different 
positions from mine: some of them did not fully utilise the ample primary materials 
which exist. These include Russian, Chinese, English and other countries' archives, to 
which they might have been unable to gain access or which have simply been ignored 
'56 Liu Shaoqi, 'On the Struggles within the Party, Liu Shaogi xuaii (Selected Works of 
Liu Shaoqi), (Beijing: Peoples Press, 1981), Vol 1, pp 185-6. 
57 Cf. Zhang Jingru's Zhonqquo Gonachandang de chengli (The Founding of the 
CCP)and Luk's The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism. 
5'3 Chen Yongfa, Zhonqquo Gonachan geming gishinian (70 Years of the Communist 
Revolution in China), Vol 1, p 67. 
59 As for the so-called "Bolshevisation" movements in the late 1920s, I believe that it 
was because the Comintem and the new CCP leaders felt that the earlier CCP was not 
"Bolshevised" enough or they attempted to depreciate the achievements under the 
leadership of Chen Duxiu, who was not so tractable as the Comintern expected. 
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so far. Some historians hold certain political stances or are/were in particular 
situations, which could not allow them to entertain explanations other than 
ideologically coloured views. In other cases, although scholars have mastered most of 
the historical materials used by me in the preceding chapters, they still explain events 
wrongly, because they know that something was so, but not why it was so. With the 
exception of causes resulting from lack of materials or from political positions, a 
reason for those who deny the important role played by Soviet Russia and the 
Comintem in the establishment of the CCP is, in my opinion, that they are unable to 
see the wood for the trees, to grasp the essence behind the appearance. It is to say that 
they failed to relate the establishment of the CCP to the general strategy of Soviet 
Russia and the Comintern, and failed to distinguish the tactics employed by the 
Bolsheviks. 
Section 3. Other Reasons Why Bolshevism Took Root in China 
While the major circumstances and main reasons for the establishment of the 
CCP have been made clear, various questions have still been left unanswered. For 
example, in addition to direct Comintern intervention, were there any other factors 
which prompted Chinese radicals to be receptive to the Bolshevik model? Why was 
Bolshevism, as a foreign ideology, able take root in the soil of China? To put it 
abstractly, what internal causes facilitated the external intervention? 
We know that whether an organ transplant succeeds or not mainly depends on 
the affinity that exists between the donor and the recipient. If there is such an affinity, 
a transplant will take; if conditions are otherwise, the transplant will be rejected. On 
the basis of this analogy, we can suggest-that it was the similarities between Russia and 
China that made the transplant possible. Lenin pointed out: "In very many and very 
essential respects, Russia is undoubtedly an Asian country and, what is more, one of 
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the most benighted, mediaeval and shameMly backward of Asian countries. "60 As a 
huge Asian country, China's basic national conditions were similar to Russia's: in both 
countries peasants constituted the great majority of the population (about 83% in 
Russia and over 90% in China); economic development was backward (China was 
even more backward than Russia); and after a long period of despotic rule a legacy of 
autocracy remained. Since there was no democratic tradition or effective democratic 
system in either country, social contradictions and conflicts of interest could not easily 
be settled by compromise and adjustment, and were prone to burst into sharp clashes 
and acute struggles. People who could not find a way to carry out social reforms were 
thus compelled or inclined to resort to illegal, extreme methods. Under such economic 
and social conditions, exacerbated by despotism and tyranny, the consciousness of 
personal autonomy could not develop and human rights were ignored; the broad mass 
of the people was inclined to inertia and passivity and their love of a strong leader or a 
"great saviour made coercive and manipulative methods possible. Bolshevism, which 
itself was a product of despotism in Russia, was easily able to take root in the similar 
soil of China. 
Several Chinese radicals argued that since Russia had many similarities with 
China, Bolshevism could be adapted for dealing with the problems of the Chinese 
revolution. Li Da opined: "Russia is a peasant country and China is also a peasant 
country, it is possible that the Chinese revolutionary movement will adopt the direct 
action of Sovietism. "61 Mao Zedong's friend Peng Huang said that "the national 
conditions, industrial state and the national character of China are quite similar to 
Russia's, therefore, Russian Bolshevism can be practised in China. A2 
Hardly anyone fails to see that such similarities were an important factor in the 
successful transplant of Bolshevism into China. Other internal factors also have to be 
60 Lenin, 'Democracy and Narodism in China', Coflected Works, Vol 18, pp 163-4. 61 U Da: 'Discussing Socialism and Questioning Liang Rengong', Xin ainanian, (8 April 
1921), Vol 9, No 1. 
62 Xinmin xuehui huiwu baoqa , No 2. 
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taken into account. Recently, more and more scholars, while recognising the 
significance of Comintern intervention, have paid serious attention to the indigenous 
roots of Chinese CommuniSM. 63 However, their views are quite different from the 
official explanations that the combination of Marxism-Leninism and the labour 
movement was the major reason for the birth of the CCP. Some of the reasons they 
have enumerated are valid, but others are, in my opinion, mistaken, for they 
sometimes take results for reasons. 
It is commonly, and I believe correctly, argued that the bitter antipathy felt by 
the Chinese for the status quo facilitated their receptivity to the Bolshevik message. In 
the period in question, China fell into dire straits, doubly afflicted by domestic malaise 
and foreign invasions. The Revolution of 1911 did not lead to the building of a 
genuine republic in China. The Parliament existed in name only. State power fell into 
the hands of former officials. Worse still, China was immersed in chronic, tangled 
warfare between rival warlords, who were backed by different imperialist powers. 
Everything went in the opposite direction from the wishes of the Chinese people: the 
political and social situation showed no improvement, and people's living conditions 
were even worse than before. Faced with a deep crisis, the whole country was in a 
state of ferment, which Sokolsky described in terms of China being a "tinder box". 64 
Intellectuals were particularly sensitive to the situation. In 1919, Chen Duxiu 
expressed the radical intellectuals' rancour over the situation: "Darkness will hem us in 
from all sides in these days of international powers, political horrors, the crime of 
private wealth, the darkness of war, the inequality of classes . ... ... 
65 Li Dazhao pointed 
out: "Contemporary life is a life in prison. Our world, our nation, our society and our 
family are different levels of prison which confine us, locks that deprive us of 
63 Cf. B. Schwartz's Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, M. 
Meisner's U Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism, Yang Kuisong's 
Haishishenfou yu damolQzhou and Hung-yok fp's 'The Origins of Chinese Communism 
-A New Interpretation', Modern China, 1994, Nol. 64 Sokolsky, The Tinder Box of Asia, p 4. 
65 Chen Duxiu, 'What Should We doT, Xin gingnian, Vol 6, No 4,15 April 1919. 
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freedom". 66 11 Hanjun believed that the whole of Chinese society had been tied tightly 
by the old system, old laws and old morals and had become a "dead prison"; and 
therefore, it must be completely destroyed and then entirely rebuilt. 67 The young Mao 
Zedong also wrote: "At present, the condition of our nation is terrible, the bitterness of 
human existence is intolerable, and society is in its darkest state. "68 The domestic 
crises in politics and economics and the foreign menace to Chinese territorial 
sovereignty encouraged the development of radical sentiments to challenge the status 
quo. 
Moreover, the Chinese intellectuals' antipathy towards the status quo was also 
fuelled by their discontent with their own fate. After the abolition of the imperial 
examination system in 1905, Chinese intellectuals were deprived of the traditional 
social status of "Shi" (the scholar-gentry), which had made them an integral part of the 
ruling apparatus in late imperial China. Under the new education system, the students' 
place in the political or even social arena was no longer assured. Yu Yingshi describes 
this as the marginalisation of the intelligentsia in Chinese society and believes it was 
an important reason for the radicalisation of China . 
69 Among ordinary intellectuals, 
those whose families declined in wealth and position were more prone to 
radicalisation. Zhou Enlai, 2hang Tailei, Qu Qiubai and many other radical 
intellectuals who later became Communists can be included in this category. For 
example, Qu Qiubai admitted that he belonged to "the status of the bankrupt Shi", and 
when he reached Beijing to study, his family was reduced to poverty. He thus 
"became free from responsibility, [and]... rushed around like a blind fly seeking a way 
66 Ll Dazhao wenii, Vol 2, p 10. 
67 T-Renfie (U Hanjun), We Must Reform Thoroughly and Completely', Jianshe 
(Construction Monthly), (Shanghai, January 1920), Vol 1, No 6. 
r"' Mao Zedong, 'The Great Union of the Masses', Mao Zedong ii (Collected Works of 
Mao Zedong), (Hong Kong, 1975), Vol 1, p 57. 
69 Ying-shih Yu, 'The Radicalization of China in the Twentieth Century, Journal of the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol 122, No 2, Spring 1993. 
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out for his living.,, 70 Furthermore, the Chinese intellectuals' traditional consciousness 
of their social responsibilities, which was similar to Russian populism and the 
Bolshevik concept of revolutionary elitism in certain respects, inclined a part of the 
intelligentsia to become the first radical critics of a corrupt society. Having seen that 
China was on the brink of disorder and collapse in many respects, the radical 
intelligentsia believed that social reconstruction was urgently needed. 
Desperate diseases require desperate remedies. Chinese intellectuals believed 
that the most pressing task was to find a way to rescue China from hell and remould it. 
There seemed to be no disagreement on the necessity of transforming China. The 
problem was how to do it and which way to go. Most radical intellectuals believed 
that the problems of the day could not be solved by traditional thinking and China 
must not follow the old road any longer. During the May 4th period, various ideas 
introduced from the West were discussed and several programmes for social 
transformation were put forward and even practised. Yet, the point at issue is still 
which idea or programme was the most important factor in making the Chinese 
receptive to Communist ideology and the Bolshevik way. 
It is well-known that the famous slogan in that era was to advocate "Mr De 
(democracy) and Mr Sai (science)". Hung-yok Ip believes that 'The May 4ffi passion 
for democratic values - liberty and equality - contributed to the popularity of socialist 
ideas, the first stage in the intellectual process that eventually led some radicals to 
Communism. "71 Gu Xin argues that the so-called "Mr De" was not "democracy" but 
"the doctrine of the common people" -a concept of populism, which was quite 
different from Western democratic values. He attaches more importance to the role of 
populism in the Chinese radicals' conversion to Marxism and the Bolshevik idea of 
"the dictatorship of the workers and peasants". 72 Gu's viewpoint obviously derives 
70 Ou Oiubai wenii. wenxue bian (The Uterary Writings of Qu Qiubai), Vol 1, p 24. 71 - 'The Origins of Chiniese Communism -A New Interpretation', Modern China, 
1994, No 1. 
72 'From "the Doctrine of the Common People" to "The Dictatorship of the Workers 
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from the works of Meisner, who writes that 11 Dazhao's populist views were "ready- 
made for the adoption of Leninist phraseology". For instance, Meisner points out that 
U always used the expression "vanguard of the mass movement" to express the 
significance of the intelligentsia, which "clearly reflected the influence of Bolshevik 
doctrines. " But he thinks that "there is little reason to believe that Li's general 
emphasis on the role of consciousness and the importance of the intelligentsia was 
,, 73 derived from Lenin. If one takes into account Us early connections with Soviet 
agents, it is not surprising that he might have held some views conceived by Russians. 
However, Dirlik notes that there was no distinct line between populism and anarchism 
during the May 4h period, and stresses that the majority of those who turned to 
Bolshevism after 1920 went through an anarchist phase. He therefore argues that 
anarchism "served as a 'midwife' to Marxism". 74 Since I have already discussed at 
length how the Bolsheviks made use of the Chinese anarchists and anarchism in their 
organisational and propaganda works, his inference, albeit impressive-sounding, is 
drawn from insufficient observation and analysis, and is therefore a lopsided view. 
Regardless of all the different views discussed above, all scholars believe that there 
was a "potential predisposition" in favour of socialism which led radical Chinese to 
adopt Bolshevism. 
Socialism seemed not unfamiliar to Chinese people, who could find simflar 
thoughts in the teachings of the great Chinese thinkers of both ancient and modem 
times. For example, Confucius said: "Don't worry about poverty, worry about 
inequality. ... Distribute wealth equally, and there will be no poverty' 975; in the Han 
Dynasty, an article appeared entitled "Datong Pian" (On Great Harmony), in 
Confucius' name. In this article the author depicts a society of harmony and concord, 
in which everyone devotes themselves to public service; people form fraternal 
and Peasants": Populism in May 0 period and the Origins of Marxism in China', 
Donava Jikan, (East Asia Quarterly), Talbel, 1999, No 1. 
"' Meisner, U Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism, p 202. 
74 Dirlik, The Ohqins of Chinese Communism, p 3. 
7's Lun vu (The Teachings of Confucius), Chapter 16. 
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relations; all people, whether old, young, sick, disabled or childless, enjoy welfare; 
there is only public property and no personal property, 76 a Taoist text Taiping iin 
(Scripture of Great Peace) attacked the social and economic inequalities of its time and 
advocates radical reforms; in modem times, Kang Youwei wrote the Datong shu 
(Book of Universal Concord), in which he conceived of a great harmonious society. 
According to him, in such a society, there is no difference between the rich and the 
poor, all people are equal and enjoy freedom; there are also no barriers between races 
and countries. Hence, the whole of humanity will be united in a single civilisation and 
will live in universal peace and harmony. 77 The idea of social equality was also a 
common demand of the peasantry. "Kill the rich and succour the poor" and 
"Equalisation of lands" were the slogans of many Chinese peasant uprisings under 
successive imperial dynasties. The programme of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in 
the Qing Dynasty was "Being equal and even everywhere, there is food and clothing 
for a] I". 
Numerous Chinese intellectuals who were under the influence of traditional 
egalitarian thinking and yearned for universal harmony were therefore readily 
receptive to socialist ideas. Since China had not gone through the stage of large-scale 
industrial production and a fully social division of labour, what they could embrace 
was the idea of economic equality, which was an idea that the backward small-scale 
peasant economy easily encouraged. Sun Yat-sen explained his Principle of People's 
Livelihood as "to make the wealth of society equal among the poor and the rich, and 
not to permit the rich to oppress the poor. , 78 The Chinese anarchists believed that 
private ownership was the origin of all social evils, so if "all goods produced are 
placed in public places and owned by all people, the behaviour of encroaching on 
others' properties will disappear. , 79 Even the understanding of socialism by some 
76 U yun', jai. 
77 Kang Youwei's Datona shu is wriften in 1901-02. 
713 Sun Zhongshan quanji, Vol 3, p 37. 
79 Tianvi bao (Tokyo), No I and No 6. 
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people who later became Communists did not go beyond these bounds. Chen Duxiu at 
one stage believed that socialism was the same thing as Confucius' idea of 
"distributing wealth equally and impoverishing no-one". 80 Li Da also wrote: 
"Socialism, in sum, has two striking slogans: one is to redress economic inequality; the 
other is to reinstate human beings' status of real equality.,, 81 C. J. Friedrich and 7- K 
Brzezinski also acknowledge the relationship between traditional Chinese culture and 
cornmunist ideology. 92 Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng go so far as to assert that it was 
the interaction of Western ideas and the traditional doctrines of Confucianism, 
Buddhism and Taoism that led to the Chinese Communists' acceptance of Utopian 
83 ideas. 
Undoubtedly, the predisposition towards and the yearning to realise socialism 
brought the Chinese to look favourablY on Russia's socialist revolution, since that flew 
the banner of eliminating exploitation and of realising social equality. The October 
Revolution also had a strong appeal for the Chinese people because it seemed to 
confirm the idea that capitalism could be rejected and social revolution more easily be 
carried out in backward countries. As some radical Chinese believed: "rbe October 
Revolution indicates that even when material civilisation is not advanced, it still cannot 
hinder the realisation of socialiSM. "84 
However, what Chinese intellectuals at first took interest in and discussed were 
various schools of socialism, including anarchism, syndicalism, guild socialism, 
democratic socialism, Marxism and Bolshevism. Although many of them sympathised 
with the cause of the Bolsheviks, few of them were willing to follow the Russian 
"0 Chen Duxiu, 'On Suicide', Xin gin-anian, 1 January 1920; 'Malthus' Population 
Theory and China's Population Problem' 1 March 1920, Duxiu wencun, Vol 1, p 285. 8' U Da, 'The Aim of Socialism'. Minquo ribao's Supplement, Juewu (Awakening), 19 
June 1919. 
u C. J. Friedrich and Z K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship & Autocracy, New 
York: Praeger publishers, 1965, p 106. "3 * Idealism and Utopia', Ershivi shiii (The 21 st Century), Hong Kong, 1995, No 2. 84 Xinmin xuehui huiwu baociao (Report on the Affairs of the New Citizens' Study 
Society), (Changsha, 1921), No 2. 
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example of going through a violent social revolution. Before the summer of 1920, the 
idea of a peaceful social transformation prevailed among the intellectuals who later 
became Communists. For example, at the end of 1919, Chen Duxiu stated that he did 
not want to see class struggle take place and in the following spring he showed interest 
in the fraternity of Christianity; in Xin chao in 1919 Tan Pingshan expressed his fear 
that if Bolshevism spread in China it would bring disaster since the Chinese people 
were uneducated and he therefore proposed promoting social democracy in order to 
prevent a Russian-type revolution; in Xiangiiang pinglun Mao Zedong called for a 
"revolution without bloodshecr' and argued against using authoritarian power to 
overthrow authoritarian power. He himself actively took part in the movement for 
provincial autonomy and was a member of the Work and Studies Mutual Aid Corps 
till 1920. Like Mao, most radicals who laterjoined the CCP, such as Yun Daiying, Qu 
Qiubai, Deng Zhongxia, Huang Rikui, Zhou Enlai and Chen Yannian, had had 
anarchist leanings at earlier stages. They tried to practise Kropotkin's mutual aid, 
Tolstoy's Pan-labourism and the New Village movement started by Mushakoji 
Saneatsu, in order to improve the people's spirit and way of life as viable alternative 
ways of avoiding the terror of a social revolution. Yun Daiying once wrote: "I believe 
that if I apply myself to doctrines of freedom, equality, fraternity, labour and mutual 
aid, then naturally, other people would be moved and society would be changed. ', 85 In 
the meantime, some other moderate proposals were put forward as means to 
reconstruct China's society. These included spiritual transformation, revision of the 
constitution, the development of industry, universalisation of education, and the 
abolition of the inheritance system. 
However, only a few months later, the Russian way seemed to some radical 
intellectuals to have become the only viable method for national regeneration and to be 
something to be imitated. For example, in September 1920 Chen Duxiu came to 
'3's Yun Daiving wenii (Writings of Yun Daiying), (Beijing: People's Press, 1984), Vol 1, 
p 109. 
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believe that class struggle was the only way to solve various social problems and to 
achieve socia]iSM; 86 in January 1921, Mao Zedong spoke at the New Citizens' Study 
Society: "Russian-style revolution is a new way that can reach where no other road has 
reached before and this is a more feasible means [to achieve results] than other reform 
methodS. ', 87 
Having noticed this sudden change, Luk raises the question: "If China's 
intellectuals were overwhelmingly opposed to class struggle and a Bolshevik type of 
revolution in 1919 and early 1920, then why and how did such a sizeable Communist 
movement come into being in the second half of 1920 and in 1921 ?,, 88 
The prevalent explanations for this are that disillusionment with the failure of 
peaceful transformation (especially the failure of the Work and Study Mutual Aid 
Movement), the political emergence of labour and the result of the polenlics on 
Marxism with anarchism and social reformism which were took place in 1920-21 
inclined radical Chinese to believe in Marxism and Lenin's doctrines. In consequence 
of this, the CCP was established with the help of the Comintern. I do not dispute that 
these experiences might have played some part, but as I have made clear above, the 
Work and Studies Mutual Aid movement and several labour organisations which 
emerged after the May 4th Movement were in fact deliberately promoted and utilised 
by the Chinese Communists and Comintern agents. 
As to the theoretical polemics, 89 the debates between Chinese Communists and 
anarchists, social democrats and guild socialists started after the CCP had already been 
founded and had obtained the Comintern's ideological guidance" and financial 
86 Xin qinqnian, Vol 8, No 1. 
87 min xuehui huiwu baoqao, No 2. 
86 Luk, Oriqins of Chinese Bolshevism, p 35. 
*' Cai Guoyu discusses the polemics in detail in 1920 Niandai chugi Zhoncl-qu 
shehui zhuvi lunzhan (Polemics on Socialism in China during the Early 1920s), Taibei: 
Commercial Press, 1988. 
90 For example, around the summer of 1920, the Comintern's East Asian Secretariat 
appealed to radical Chinese youth arguing that the only way to save China was to 
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support. Ile CCP's provisional centre mobilised all of its resources to engage in the 
debates; and even the argument between Li Dazhao and Hu Shi over "Isms v. 
Problems" was unfolded in 1919, Li had already been in contact with Soviet agent and 
had participated in Communist movement as an individual. In light of those, 2hang 
Tailei, in his speech on behalf of the CCP at the Yd Congress of the Comintern, 
declared that the Chinese Communists were trying to lead young people who had been 
affected by anarchism and reformism in the direction of Communism. 91 
Although not many Chinese were convinced by Communism, and Bolshevism 
did not hold a dominant position in Chinese's thought in the early 1920s, the CCP's 
powerful and energetic ideological propaganda made non-Russian-type socialisms and 
other competing ideologies seem pallid by comparison. The official historians of 
mainland China therefore assert that the polemics secured the "victory of the truth of 
,, 92 Marxism over various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideological trends. However, 
Dirlik attributes the dominance of Marxism over non-Marxist socialisms; to the 
"prerogatives of Bolshevik organisation". 93 
On the above grounds, I can say that main causes which brought about the 
change to Bolshevik ideology were Bolshevik propaganda and organisational 
activities, which were strengthened after the spring of 1920. Partly from the binding 
organisational force and partly out of their own political convictions, the CCP's 
members opted for Bolshevism. 
launch a social revolution, and that following the capitalist way could not achieve the 
aim of developing China's productive forces and improving Chinese people's living 
conditions. (GLZDC, Vol 1, p 34). At the end of 1920, Voitinsky in his speech at a 
meeting of the Guangzhou branch of the Socialist League talked about the theories and 
methods of Marx and Lenin and persuaded the branch's members to give up their 
anarchist ideas and to submit themselves to the Russian Communists. (Haiyu Guke, 
jiefang bielu, Zivouren, Nos. 73-86). 
'01 GLZDQ, Vol 2. p 183. 92 Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiu shi: Zhonqquo Gonqchandanq lishi, Vol 1, p 
47. 
93 Dirlik, The Ori-qins of Chinese Communism, p 6. 
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In the discussion about why the Chinese "chose" socialism, some scholars 
suggest that the radical Chinese concern with quickening China's pace to catch up with 
advanced countries was a factor. 94 Many radicals indeed showed their strong desire to 
keep China from losing its status in the world and to bypass the capitalist stage. Li 
Dazhao wrote that China's economy should not be out of the scope of the world's 
economic influence. The world had gone through its capitalist stage and would enter a 
socialist stage. China was just at the starting point. If it wanted to keep up with global 
development, it must advance at double speed and run industry using socialist 
methods. 95 Holding a similar view, Chen Duxiu said: "The capitalist system in many 
countries is going to collapse, how can China alone keep it on the excuse of special 
national characteristics and conditions?,, 96 Li Da also claimed: "At present, capitalism 
in China is in the embryonic phase, so the suffering of the people caused by the 
industrial revolution is still not serious. If we can carry out our socialist revolution 
promptly, [China] can be brought entirely out of danger. 07 Their ideas were not new. 
Over ten years before, Sun Yat-sen had expressed the idea that China could move from 
the mode of production of the Middle Ages to the socialist stage, for there would be 
fewer obstacles to reforming the social system in China than in capitalist countries. 
However, this idea was criticised by Lenin in 1912 as a petty-bourgeois "socialist" 
reactionary theory. 98 
At first glance, these Chinese Communists' denial of the indispensable 
material conditions for socialism and their hopes of taking a non-capitalist road 
seemed quite similar to Sun Yat-sen's idea. But, considering that they had joined the 
CCP, we can conjecture that their ideas possibly came from Lenin's self-contradictory 
" Yang Huiqing, 'Brief Discussion on the Ideas to Choose 
Socialism during the May 4h Period', Henan daxue xuebao (Jounal of Henan 
University), Zhengzhou, 1991, No 1. 
U Dazhao. 'Socialism in China and Capitalism in the World', Li Dazhao xuan i, pp L 
356-7. 
96 Chen Duxiu, 'Crificism on Socialism', Xin gingnian, Vol 9, No 3, July 1921. 97 Xb_qtga! n Vol 9, No 1,8 April 1921. 98 Lenin, 'Democracy and Narodism in China', Collected Works, Vol 18, p 166. 
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claim that backward countries might develop Communism without passing through the 
capitalist stage through using the soviet system and with the aid of the proletariat in 
advanced countries. Chen Duxiu made it clear: "In Soviet Russia the Republic 
overthrew the feudal system only to be replaced by socialism half a year later. This is 
clear proof that there need not be any long interval between feudalism and 
socialism. "99 It implied that China had to follow the Russian way to socialism. In 
fact, the aforementioned statements by the founders of the CCP should not be seen as 
evidence of why the Chinese chose socialism, but rather as publicity for the Chinese 
Communist movement. 
According to some people, nationalism, more than anything else, accounted in 
this presentation for the Chinese attraction to Communism from its very origins. 100 
During the May 4th period, nationalist sentiments rose to an unprecedented height and 
to some extent, nationalistic concerns reinforced the Chinese attraction to socialism. 
The advanced Chinese, as Mao Zedong described them, "had searched for truth from 
the Wesf' for nearly a hundred years. The democratic political system, sciences and 
technology were things the Chinese desired to learn from Western countries. But they 
soon found that the "teachers" always committed aggression against the country of 
their "students". As early as the beginning of the 20th century, some intellectuals, such 
as Liang Qichao, found there was a big gap between the rich and the poor in the 
capitalist countries. World War I further confirmed the belief of many Chinese in the 
Western powers' cruelty, although the end of the War brought vague hopes to the 
Chinese, who believed that this was the victory of democracy, justice and humanity. 
But the Versailles treaty made the Chinese realise that the Allied Powers had no 
intention of applying the principle of national self-determination, which Woodrow 
Wilson had proposed, to China, and this shattered the faith many had had in the West. 
Consequently, the fundamental validity of the Western democratic political system 
99'The Value of Commemorating National Independence', Xin qinqnian, Vol 8, No 3. 
100 For example, such view can be seen in Chang Kuo-t'ao's The Rise of the Chinese 
Communist Pa 
. 
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also came under suspicion. 
Under these circumstances, Soviet Russia's policies, such as "peace without 
annexation of territory and without indemnity" and "national self-determination"101 
attracted more and more Chinese. During the May 4th period, with its high anti- 
imperialist spirit and patriotic zeal, China's enthusiasm for socialism increased. Qu 
Qiubai described the course of development: "The prolonged agonies suffered as a 
result of oppression by the imperialist powers wakened vague dreams of democracy. ... 
so the student movement suddenly began to incline towards socialism. "' 02 Many 
scholars also acknowledge that nationalism was essential for radical Chinese to 
respond to the Marxist-Leninist message. Meisner remarks that "nationalism was 
centrally involved in Li Ta-chao's response to the Bolshevik revolution and his 
interpretation of Marxism. ... nationalistic impulses were also very much present 
in 
the motivations of the other founders of the Communist movement in China. " 103 
Schram considers that Li Dazhao "represented the combination of the most radical 
Western ideas with Chinese nationalism. " 104 
Nevertheless, as many early Communists' recollections show, it was the 
Karakhan Manifesto that contributed to the shift in the sentiments of radical Chinese 
from distrusting the Western democratic model to embracing Russian-style revolution 
and the socialist model. In fact, the Karakhan Manifesto itself and the Comintern 
agents' activities in persuading various Chinese circles and organisations to issue 
declarations supporting the Manifesto were also effective Soviet propaganda 
operations. As Odoric Wou points out: "Thanks to the influence of Marxism- 
101 For the Bolsheviks, the right to national self-determination had to be subordinated 
to the interests of Soviet Russia. In 1923, at the 12 th Party Congress, Stalin stressed: 
'The right to self-determination cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the 
exercise by the working class of its right to dictatorship. The former must give way to 
the latter. ' Stalin, Works, Vol 5, p 266. 
102 Wusi yundong wenxuan (Selected Articles on the May 4th Movement), p 429. 103 Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism, p177. 
104 S. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger Publishers, 1969) pp 20-1. 
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Leninism, Chinese nationalism gained an overtone of anti-colonialism and anti- 
imperialism. " 105 After that, the Bolshevik interpretation of imperialism and their call 
for anti-imperialism replaced simple patriotic nationalism and strongly attracted 
radical Chinese. In the light of this, it is possible to make clear that without certain 
Soviet propaganda, pure nationalist aspiration could not have become a dynamic 
which led radical Chinese to espouse Bolshevism. 
Among other causes, a crisis of faith during that time was also a factor which 
should be taken into account. Traditional Chinese thoughts, culture and customs were 
attacked by radical intellectuals from the New Culture Movement. Confucianism, 
which had dominated Chinese thinking as a political and ethical standard for over two 
thousand years, was the first to bear the brunt of this attack. The prevalence of 
iconoclasm among young intellectuals in effect signalled the fading-away of the 
charisma of the old elite and the disintegration of the old value system in the minds of 
the young. As I have discussed above, Chinese intellectuals' faith in the democratic 
ideas of the West was also shaken by their experience of what they regarded as 
imperialist aggression and plunder. This vacuum in faith made China hardly withstand 
the influx of foreign thought and ideologies and inclined Chinese radicals to absorb 
new political ideas and to establish new beliefs. This created conditions where 
Marxism-Leninism could be easily embraced by Chinese radicals, rather as if it were a 
religious faith itself. Knowing that Marxism had been attacked on the grounds that it 
was a kind of religion and that the actions of Lenin and his followers bore the imprint 
of religion, Chen Duxiu and Zhang Shenfu both agreed that nothing could be done 
without some religious spirit and superstitious belief. 106 
Utilitarianism, that is to say, the eagerness for quick success and instant 
benefit, seems a cause which inclined the Chinese radicals to head toward a Russian- 
105 See F. G. Chan and T. H. Etzold (eds. ), China in the 1920s - Nationalism and Revolution, Yew York: New Viewpoints, 1976, p 111. 
"' 2hang Songnian to Chen Duxiu', 12 June 1921; 'Chen Duxiu to Zhang Shenf u', 1 
July 1921; Duxiu wencun, Vol 3, p 826. 
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type revolution. For example, Chen Duxiu once told his friends that he intended "to 
use the Bolsheviks' bold and resolute methods to carry out a revolution, in order to 
change the poverty, ignorance and weakness of China and to overturn its status of a 
semi-colony. " He asserted: "Only by that will we then have the qualifications to 
expect further progress. "107 For him, Bolshevism was a "doctrine of succour" and the 
"need of the time". 108 Many other early Communists who regarded Bolshevism as a 
weapon of action which had proved effective, also adopted Bolshevism as a panacea 
for China's main social problems and the key to national salvation. Cai Hesen, who 
believed that the successful experience of the Bolsheviks offered a shortcut, avoiding 
exploratory detours, argued impatiently: 
We have already had the Russian plan all worked out for us. It's all ready-made. 
Why should we go looking around for some other types? Their whole scheme is 
all ready. It has been written out on paper for us to read, and they themselves are 
carrying it out in practice. Why should we waste our time on further 
experimentation? 109 
Such instrumental views of the Russian experience and this attitude of blindly 
following Bolshevism were quite common among the early Chinese Communists. 
This impatience prepared them to adopt the Bolsheviks' drastic methods for total and 
thorough social transformation. 
So, we can see that China was fertile soil for Bolshevism to take root in: it was 
not only because of the affinities between Chinese and Russian conditions, but also 
because of many special internal causes, including the imperative necessity of social 
revolution"O and national liberation, indigenous ideological traditions, radical 
107 Haiyu Guke, Jiefanq bielu. 
10'3 Duxiu, 'Doctrines and Ornaments', Xin gingnian, (October 1920), Vol 8, No 2. 
109 Xiao Zizhang, 'Mao Zedong's Life in His Youth', Gon-qchan zhuyi xiaozu, p 577. 
110 John Dunn believes that modern revolutions normally unite two components: a 
passage of decisive social and political destruction and a passage of social, economic, 
and political re-creation. T. Saich and H. van de Ven (eds. ), New Persnectives on the 
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inclinations and some individuals' pre-occupations. Hence, the Chinese' acceptance of 
the Russian model was not simply a process of mechanical and passive imitation. 
The various arguments above explaining why the Chinese were receptive to the 
Russian model and why Bolshevism could take root in China all seem plausible, but 
some of them are untenable. It is evident that many Chinese intellectuals who had the 
same or similar preoccupations with democracy, populism, anarchism, nationalism, 
cosmopolitanism, utilitarianism, and with or without religious beliefs, or whatever 
other tendencies to socialism, did not accept the Russian model, and even resolutely 
opposed Bolshevism. Such cases were too numerous to mention individually. And it 
also cannot explain why in some colonies or partially colonised countries which were 
beset with the same sort of social and national problems as China, and whose people 
with same thinking as the Chinese idea of social equality, did not take the Communist 
road. Therefore, none of those factors could become the major and motivating drive 
for the establishment of the CCP. 
In spite of the fact thk China might have favourable conditions which made 
the transplantation of Bolshevism possible, the evidence analysed in this thesis invites 
the conclusion that, had there been no initiative or efforts from Soviet Russia and the 
Comintern, it could not have been successful in the early 1920s. It was mainly the 
Bolsheviks' efforts in propaganda and organisation that brought about radical Chinese 
intellectuals' conversion to Bolshevism and the establishment of the CCP. The birth 
of the CCP was not an inevitable outcome of China's historical development. 
Summary 
From my preceding research and conclusions, people may not hard to find that 
the origins of the CCP and its relations with Soviet Russia is a subject worthy of 
Chinese Communist Revolution, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995) These were just what 
China possessed at the time in question. 
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further study. 
Fully employing historical materials unearthed from archives and newly- 
published documents and examining some historical events from various angles and 
with different perceptions, my thesis has made several findings concerning the 
establishment of the CCP which have never been dealt with before or have been 
neglected by many historians up to the present. Accordingly, I have offered some new 
explanations which may challenge several established viewpoints. Hence, this thesis 
sheds new light upon the origins of the CCP. 
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